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ABSTRACT
The railway industry is largely neglected by current sociology, yet promising topics
for sociological investigation abound: the organisational structure of the railway
industry; risk management and the reaction to railway accidents in a "risk society";
the development and introduction of new railway technologies; the problem of
railway project management, and so on. Despite this there is almost no "railway
sociology" in Britain, a striking omission both in itself and in comparison with the
wealth of work produced by the railway historian.
"Railway maintenance", with an emphasis on the management of a technical problem
called rolling contact fatigue (RCF), was chosen to be analysed in a sociological sense
using sociological methods. RCF is the term given to cracking and flaking of metal of
the rail surface which, it is generally thought, are faults that are generated from the
stresses at the wheel and rail contact patch. It was also decided that the role of tacit
knowledge in rail maintenance procedures would be examined. Tacit knowledge is
acquired from experience and cannot be explicitly formulated. This means it cannot
be effectively transmitted by impersonal means as it often requires person-to-person
interaction. Nevertheless, tacit knowledge is a critical part of railway maintenance.
The project was conceived in the aftermath of the fatal accident at Welham Curve
near Hatfield, England in October, 2000. Though caused by RCF, non-technical
issues connected to the organisational culture of the industry were of direct
consequence: How leaders of an organisation perceive its objectives, and how
employee tasks and specialisms are structured have a huge impact on how workers
conduct their work. These matters intertwine as workplace cultures develop, become
embedded, and affect a group's worldview and language codes, which in turn, impact
on inter-organisational communication and interaction. At all levels in an organisation
therefore, decision-making is effectively a product of the environment within which it
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Figure 1 Terms of the Permanent Way (source: author's photograph).
THE PERMANENT WAY
64 stone grinding unit:
Rail-based vehicle with 64 rotating grinding stones attached to its underside to
grind the rail surface to a uniform shape. Removes shallow cracking. Often
referred to as "The Speno" after the name of the company that manufactured it.
91/440/EC:
The European Community Directive that required of community members to
separate in accounting terms traffic operation from infrastructure ownership,
maintenance and renewal costs.
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Ballast:
Part of the infrastructure and component of the permanent way. Refers to the
stones within which the sleepers are embedded (see fig. 1).
British Rail:
The nationally owned operator of the British railway network between 1947 and
1994.
Cant of railway track (and cant deficiency):
The relative position of rails on a curve: the outer rail is set higher than the inner
rail to ease the passage of traffic and to minimise contact between wheel flange
and rail. Cant deficiency and cant excess refers respectively to a situation where
a train traverses the curve at a speed greater than the so-called "balancing
speed."
Cess side:
That area of the permanent way that separates the "near-side rail" from
boundary fences, embankments, etc. Is often like a small ditch that track
workers walk in when going to a site. Re: walking in the cess (see field side) -
(see fig. 1).
Chair:
Part of the infrastructure and component of the permanent way. What the rail
sits in, and which is connected to the sleeper.
Clips:
Part of the infrastructure and component of the permanent way. Components
that secures the rail to the chair.
Contact Patch:
The area where the wheel and rail touch and which transmits the load as well as
traction and braking forces.
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COSS:
Controller of Site Safety. Individual charged with ensuring safety rules are
adhered to during work at a possession.
Cracking:
Fault or defect whereby a series of cracks have appeared on a rail.
CWR:
Continuously welded rail. Where lengths of rail have been welded together (via
a thermite weld) to give the effect of one long continuous rail. Where rails are
not connected by means of fishplates.
Defect:
Used interchangeably with "Fault". Refers to internal or surface problems such
as cracks, tache ovales, squats, fatigue, RCF, wear.
De-lipper:
Grinding machine use to remove lipping from the rail's field side corner or
gauge corner.
Fault:
Used interchangeably with "defect". See defect.
False flange damage:
The process where the running tread of the wheel of a locomotive, wagon or
carriage, has worn to a level where it exhibits the effect of a "false" flange. The
false flange causes damage to the rail surface, most notably at switches and
crossings as traffic moves from one line to another.
Field flow:
Similar to lipping. Where the rail's surface metal has been pushed by the




See Cess-side (see fig. 1).
Fishplate:
The pair of metal plates that connects two lengths of rail and which are bolted to




Raised part of the wheel that guides vehicles along the rail.
Foot:
Part of the rail that that sits in the chair which is connected to the sleeper.
Four foot:
Section of the permanent way between the two running rails (see fig. 1).
Friction:
Refers to the process that exists where two surfaces are in repetitive contact,
e.g., wheel and rail.
Gauge corner:
Top corner of the rail head that faces into the four foot. Opposite to the field
corner (see fig. 1).
Gauge corner cracking:
Subset of Rolling Contact Fatigue phenomenon. Describes a series of cracks that
occur on the gauge corner.
Green zone working:
When traffic is not operating on a section of railway and work on the permanent
way can be undertaken without the aid of a look-out.
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Grinder:
Typically refers to the machinery used by individuals to grind the rail to remove
shallow cracking from the rail surface.
Head checking:
Subset of Rolling Contact Fatigue. Describes a series of cracks that occur on the
rail head between the gauge corner and field corner.
Infrastructure:
Refers to the whole assemblage of the railway environment: the permanent way,
over head electrical constructs, signalling, stations, bridges, etc.
Infrastructure Maintenance Company (IMCs):
Private companies that won contracts for the maintenance of different parts of
the British railway network. Since Network Rail took over Railtrack the IMCs
have been taken in-house and their workers now work for Network Rail.
Line:
The term given to a track when referring to destinations on the track, i.e.,
Edinburgh - Glasgow line.
Lipping:
See field flow. Where metal movement has create a jagged lip on either gauge
corner or field corner.
Lookout:
Individual whose purpose is to look-out out for traffic and to warn others whilst
work is done on the permanent way: Required for red-zone working.
NDT:
Non-Destructive Testing. Where the component to be tested is not destroyed
during examination. Ultrasonic inspection is a form of non-destructive testing.
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Network Rail:
The not-for-profit organisation that took over Railtrack and became
infrastructure controller of the British railway network in October 2002.
Pads:
Part of the infrastructure and component of the permanent way. A pad sits
between the rail foot and chair, or in some cases, the sleeper.
Permanent way:
The term given to the whole railway track: i.e., pads, rails, clips, chairs, sleepers
and ballast (see fig. 1).
PICOP:
Person In Charge Of Possession. Individual in charge of organisation of work
during a possession. Tells workers when work can start and when it finishes.
Plain rail:
Length of rail that is not part of switches and crossings.
Possession:
Term given to the period of time when work can take place on the permanent
way, from the expression "the engineer takes possession of the line"
Privatisation:
Refers to the process of implementing the EU directive 91/440 in Britain's
railway industry once British Rail was sold to the private sector in 1994.
PTS:
Personal Track Safety. The safety certificate that every person who needs access
to the permanent way must have before entering.
PWSI4:
Permanent Way Special Instruction 4. The instruction specifically produced for
the management of Rolling Contact Fatigue.
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Rail:
Component of the infrastructure and part of the permanent way: The long
piece of metal upon which the train's wheels travels (see fig. 1).
Rail grinding:
The process of removing a layer of metal from the rail's surface to remove
shallow cracking or to adjust the rail head profile.
Rail head:
Where the wheel is in contact with the rail. Where RCF and other faults occur,
such as lipping.
Railtrack:
The private company which operated and owned the British railway network
after privatisation. Was acquired out of railway administration by Network Rail
in 2002.
Railway:
Refers to the permanent way (see fig. 1).
RCF:
Rolling Contact Fatigue. Term which covers the subsets of cracking and flaking
of metal known as gauge corner cracking, field flow, squats, and head checking.
Generally thought to be a fault that is generated by the stresses existing at the
wheel / rail interface.
Red zone:
Where work is conducted on the permanent way whilst traffic is allowed to pass.
Requires a look-out.




That area of the railhead surface where the wheel travels. Typically identified by
a long narrow strip of shiny and worn rail.
SBB:
Schweizerische Bundesbahnen or Swiss Federal Railways. The owner and
operator of most of Switzerland's standard gauge railway network.
Shelling:
See RCF. Term given to the flaking of metal from the rail's surface.
Six foot:
That area of the railway track between separate, parallel lines (see fig. 1).
Sleeper:
Part of the infrastructure and component of the permanent way. Is embedded in
ballast and supports rails (see fig. 1).
Squats:
Form of rolling contact fatigue. Often looks like a bruise just below the surface
of the rail where head checking occurs. Often cracks and flakes.
Stock rail:
Part of the infrastructure and component of the permanent way. Is part of a
switch and crossing (S&C). The rail that is continuous throughout an S&C -
does not "switch" - see switch blade.
Switch and crossing (S&C):
Part of the infrastructure and component of the permanent way. Is that area
where traffic can pass from one line to another. See Line.
Switch blade:
Part of the infrastructure and component of the permanent way. It is the rail that
moves, allowing traffic to move from one line to another.
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Tache ovale:
Internal rail defect that is thought to be caused by non-metallic and hydrogen
inclusions.
The Cess:
See Cess side (see fig. 1).
The Speno:
See 64 stone grinding unit
The Sperry:
Ultrasonic testing technique where equipment is fixed to a basic carriage that is
pushed along the rail by hand. Named after the company that manufactured the
device. Also known as the Roller Search Unit.
Train Operating Company (TOC):
Refers to companies that lease rolling stock and have a franchise to operate
passenger train services.
Ultrasonic Inspection:
A non-destructive testing technique (see NDT) often used by technicians to
assess the internal quality of the rail.
UTU:
Ultrasonic Testing Unit. Rail based vehicle with ultrasonic testing equipment
fixed to its underside.
UTU2:
Advanced version of the UTU.
Visual Inspection:




Term given to the ultrasonic testing equipment. Also known as the Sperry and
the RSU.
Wear:
Refers to the deformation of the rail due to repeated contact with the wheel.
Web:
Thin middle section of the rail between the foot and the head.
Wheel / rail interface:
Refers to the meeting point of the wheel and the rail. See contact patch.
Wheel burns:
Refers to the process and resulting deformation of the rail, due to the wheels of
vehicles spinning and slipping on the rail whilst the vehicle remains stationary.
WRISA:
Wheel / Rail Interface Systems Authority. The railway industry body that was
made up of different organisations within the industry who have an interest in
developing knowledge about the wheel / rail interface. WRISA had to be
disbanded for insurance reasons.
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A NOTE ON THE FIGURES
All figures are author's own photography, sketch or diagram except for the following:
Figure 2-1 Fatality trends from 1975 - 2004 Iinternet source: Health and Safety Executive
website: 13'"'June. 2005).
Figure 4-1 The flange and rail head relationship (source: Jack. 2001: 36).
Figure 4-2 Trevithick's Catch-me-wi-io-can (internet source:
www.spartacus.schoolnet.com).
Figure 4-3 Residual Stress Development (source: Railtrack, 2001 a: 12).
Figure 4-4 Residual stress development. Current thoughts on metal movement of rail
(source: Railtrack. 2001a: 12).
Figure 4-5 Long-term trend of broken and defective rail removed from BRI TISH network
(source: TTCI, 2000: A-9).
Figure 4-6 System diagram for wheel / rail interface variables (source: Brentnall, 1998).
Figure 5-3 Denoting where RCF subtypes occur on the rail head (source: Railtrack. 2001 e).
Figure 6-1 Visual inspection frequencies (source: Railtrack. 2001c).
Figure 6-2 Crack measurement procedure (source: Railtrack. 2002).
Figure 6-3 Crack severity categorisation (source: Railtrack. 2002).
Figure 6-4 Response to crack categorisation (source: Railtrack. 2002).
Figure 6-8 Two visual inspectors at a switch and crossing (internet' source:
www.alveyandtowers.com).
Figure 7-3; photograph, internet source: www.alveyandtowers.com.
Figure 7-13 Star cracking source: (RT/CE/S/055, Railtrack. 1 998b).
Figure 7-18 An example of some UT formulae from the PCN courses books (source: Serco,
2002b: 'Ultrasonic Testing ofRail Level 1 Part2a Sector Specific Theory').
Figure 7-19 Another example of UT formulae (source: 'Serco. 2002b. Ui.trasonic Testing of
Rail Level 1 Part 2a Sector Specific Theory').
Figure 9-6 SBB Maintenance management process (source: Pfarrer, 2002: Conference paper).
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"You remember how you and I dug the old railroad men we saw all over the country last
winter? - We saw them with their lunch pails in the night in Baltimore and Carolina and
Texas and Bakersfield. We dug them as workmen, we understood something about them."
Jack Kerouac (in a letter to his friend, Neal Cassady1)
1 In Charters, 1995.
1 INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 The topic of the thesis
This thesis documents an ethnographic investigation of the role of tacit knowledge in
systems associated with rail maintenance, with an emphasis on the decision-making
process involved with the management of rolling contact fatigue (RCF): the collective
term for the subtypes of cracking that appear on the surface of the steel rail. The
majority of the research was based in Britain, but for comparative purposes I also
conducted a more limited ethnographic investigation of rail maintenance in
Switzerland.
The thesis addresses several questions connected to the management and organisation
of knowledge required for rail maintenance systems: what is organisational culture?
How does it develop historically? How does it shape current work strategies? How do
organisational leaders communicate risk management strategies to geographically
dispersed workers? What role is there for procedural mles and what are the
limitations: how do workers interpret them? The research found that much work is
done in groups: decision-making is often a group activity which has an impact on the
individual's learning processes. The thesis examines how groups develop, organise
and utilise knowledge and skills, noting the vital role of mutual understandings, non¬
verbal communication, and tacit knowledge.
A major finding shows how the disruption of embedded cultural norms through
organisational change (privatisation) had a major and lasting effect on rail
maintenance activities. Perhaps more important though, are findings on tacit
knowledge. Tacit knowledge cannot be captured in written instructions, yet it is
indispensable if current best practice techniques are to be used. My findings explain
how tacit knowledge is: collectively and socially developed; individually deployed;
collaboratively utilised by the groups; and transmitted to individuals.
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1.1.2 The timing of the research activities
The core findings come from interviews and observations which were conducted
between October 2000 and June 2004. My research came at a particularly significant
and turbulent time for the British railway industry as a whole. Unfortunately the series
of serious rail disasters prior to the research period did not relent during it. The place
names of Southall 1997, Ladbroke Grove 1999, and Hatfield 2000 were joined by
Selby 2001, and Potters Bar 2002. 2004 was also a difficult year for the industry: four
railway maintenance workers were killed in the North West of England, and at the
end of the year three incidents occurred in as many weeks at level crossings - the
worst of which took seven lives. Of these serious rail incidents however, it is the
catastrophes at Hatfield and Potters Bar that have been the catalyst for several major
changes that altered the organisational structure of the industry during the time of
research.
Contract renewal negotiations between Railtrack (The British railway network owner
and operator) and the private company (Balfour Beatty) that had the right to work on
the line at Hatfield were on-going at the time of the crash; shortly after the disaster it
was decided not to renew the contract (this information came from interviewee: 35).
Some Balfour Beatty employees (and some Railtrack employees) have been charged
with manslaughter in connection with the derailment - the case is being heard now, at
the time of writing (spring 2005). Several media reports and government figures also
pointed out the spiralling costs of railway maintenance in Britain in recent years.
After Railtrack was given £1.5 billion in April 2001 from the government, and then
asked for a further £4.2 billion just four months later (which was likely to push its
overall debt to £17 billion2) the company was placed in administration in October that
year. Then, several months later, in May 2002, the industry was rocked by yet another
2
The Financial Times (30/01/03).
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catastrophe. Two coaches of a passenger service left the rails after travelling over a
switch and crossing'1 at Potters Bar railway station, England. Several lives were lost as
carriages charged into the station's platforms.
This series of events had a huge impact on Railtrack: numerous questions were raised
about the company's ability to operate and maintain the network. In the end, and just
four months after the Potters Bar disaster, it was announced that Network Rail, a not-
for-profit and public-interest company4, would take over Railtrack (Network Rail
officially started operating in October 2002). The company soon announced its
intention of bringing railway maintenance back "in-house" and under the stewardship
of the company. This objective was achieved within 12 months:
Network Rail today announces that it is to bring rail maintenance activity back in-house. The
contracts currently held by the seven Infrastructure Maintenance Contractors [IMC] will be
transferred to the 'not for dividend' company, unifying the operation and maintenance of rail
infrastructure (Internet source: Network Rail website, 24th October, 2003)5.
I draw attention to these events and the impact they had upon the organisation of the
industry as these changes occurred during the time I conducted my research. Much of
the research occurred when the Hatfield derailment was still fresh in the memory -
making the subject of railway maintenance a particularly sensitive issue6. This was
the context within which I made my observations and it was during this time that I
spoke to all my interviewees.




As one outcome of a more "hands-on" approach to railway maintenance (compared to Railtrack - see chapter
three page 100), Network Rail has created a new apprenticeship training scheme which is based in Portsmouth.
6 In the methodology chapter (chapter two) I point out that some interviewees preferred not to be recorded - the
climate I describe is perhaps why this was so. Additionally in chapter three 1 describe some of the hurdles I had to
cross to gain access to the industry - being an outsider, as 1 was, gaining access was at first difficult. 1, for
instance, could have been looking to add to the "controversy" that has been surrounding the industry recently.
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Though (as noted above) Network Rail started operating in October 2002, there was a
lengthy transitional period where workers moved from private infrastructure
maintenance companies (IMCs) to Network Rail. Due to this drawn out process
workers often referred to Network Rail or Railtrack or EMCs indiscriminately.
1.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
To give the reader a sense of the structure of the thesis, it is better to review the
chapters thematically rather than in the order in which they appear.
1.2.1 Chapter two and ten: A note on the research methodology and the
conclusion
Prior to interviewing (office-based) senior engineers of rail maintenance companies,
(laboratory-based) rail technicians and metallurgists, and prior to observing the
physical work of "frontline" track workers, I had to learn about the industry. I
familiarised myself with the different organisations involved with railway
maintenance. I found out what the core activities of rail maintenance were and I
developed a basic understanding of some of the associated technical terms and
technical problems, such as RCF. This level of understanding gave me the ability to
converse with workers and, as I conducted more interviews my knowledge developed.
As research opportunities opened up I was given the chance to observe railway
workers at work. It may also be worthwhile to point out that virtually all respondents
(bar one), and all workers I observed at work, were male. Indeed, I found that the
industry was male-dominated: during my research in Switzerland I spoke to just one
female worker compared to none in Britain, whilst in Britain, out of the many
conference presentations I heard, just two were presented by females.
The focus of the study has been on a particular aspect of railway maintenance, namely
the task required to keep the surface and interior of the rail steel section in a state that
is safe and fit for purpose. Routine rail maintenance requires three core competencies:
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visual inspection, ultrasonic inspection, and rail grinding. Tacit knowledge underpins
efficient visual inspection for surface rail cracks; ultrasonic inspection for internal rail
flaws; and manual rail-grinding and profiling for the removal of surface cracks and
managing rail deformity respectively. The data illustrates how workplace culture and
bureaucratic proceduralism impact on and accommodate the tacit knowledge required
for rail maintenance.
1.2.2 Chapters six, seven, and eight
Visual inspection, ultrasonic inspection, and rail-grinding usually occur in that order:
a fault is found (visually), it is tested (ultrasonically) and, if indications suggest it, it is
then removed or treated (ground). The importance of each activity and an account of
the tacit knowledge required, demand a chapter in each case. These three activities,
and the role of tacit knowledge, are detailed in chapters six, seven, and eight
respectively.
1.2.3 Chapter five
In chapter five, we see how these maintenance activities are structurally organised and
coordinated. I outline how a particular infrastructure maintenance company is
structured and how it interacts with other companies, such as Railtrack and train
operating companies. This chapter describes how rail maintenance knowledge is
communicated between companies, how it is moved around and managed, and how it
is developed. How risks with rail faults (namely RCF) are perceived, researched, and
judged by technicians and senior engineers is also discussed, giving an insight into the
thought-processes that suggest how rail maintenance should actually be physically
executed. We also see quite clearly how these thoughts are transmitted to the frontline
workers we meet in chapters six through eight.
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1.2.4 Chapter three
Privatisation of Britain's railways in 1994, it is suggested by my findings, had a
significant impact on the skills levels of the railway maintenance workforce. Many
experienced workers, I was told, left the industry immediately post-privatisation,
creating skill gaps in many aspects of rail maintenance in numerous areas around the
British network.
The resulting inconsistencies gave me an insight into the role of history. Many of the
workers I spoke to suggested that in those areas of the network where former British
Rail (BR) workers remained, the quality of maintenance work was of a higher
standard than those areas where "new" agency workers and contractors were
common. After assessing their words it became obvious to me that a brief socio-
historical account of rail maintenance should be completed. In chapter three,
therefore, an illustration of BR's original rail maintenance organisation and methods
is given. This is useful on a number of counts. It, for instance, points out the important
role of culture and experience for learning processes and (tacit) knowledge
development. More importantly however, we see how organisational change impacted
on current rail maintenance procedures: by looking back in time we get a real sense as
to why rail maintenance was carried out in the particular manner I observed.
1.2.5 Chapter nine
The majority of the thesis is centred on British rail maintenance processes. In chapter
nine, however, we are given the chance to see how it is managed and physically
executed in Switzerland. I analyse the maintenance activities of the Swiss railway
operator: Schweizerische Bundesbahnen (SBB). I analyse the methods in the same
way I analysed British methods: I describe the rail maintenance procedures that I saw
on-site, and I describe the philosophies that underpin SBB's organisational structure.




The reasons for differences in rail maintenance methods between Britain and SBB are
symptomatic of a scientific / technological gap in knowledge concerning wheel / rail
interface issues. Rail problems are due to interaction processes between the wheel and
the rail which are exceedingly difficult to interpret and understand. Precise knowledge
of how wheel and rail interact in all areas of a network does not exist. Nevertheless,
the problems have to be managed. In his chapter I take a look at some current
research. In doing so, we find out what the dominant thoughts are and how they shape
current rail maintenance procedures.
Problems with the steel rail's fitness-for-purpose appeared as soon as a powered,
rotating, travelling steel wheel was placed upon it. In this chapter, I also take a
concise look at how rail problems emerged by looking back to a time two hundred
years ago when the modern railway industry began to emerge.
1.2.7 Chapter one: the remainder of this chapter
This thesis is about the social, collective development of rail maintenance knowledge.
It documents how this knowledge is organised and managed. Of interest therefore, is
what others have said on the organisation and management of knowledge from a
sociological perspective. What are the dominant thoughts regarding technological
knowledge? - Where does it differ from science? How should complex technology be
organised when there is a substantial risk of creating catastrophic outcomes? What is
tacit knowledge and what does it mean for the technological organisation's training
strategies, and what does it mean to the individual technical worker? What impact can
organisational culture have on the management of technology? What is the
relationship between risk management, decision-making, and context?
Social scientists have applied these questions, in part, to other environments such as
nuclear power plants (Perrow, 1984) and space agencies (Vaughan, 1996). By
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reviewing their findings, we will be in a position where we can intellectually
scrutinise and understand to a greater extent the organisation of railway maintenance
and rail maintenance in particular, and the implications that organisational forms,
discussed later, can have. The remainder of this chapter provides an analytical
framework for the rest of the thesis.
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW
1.3.1 Introduction
Technology is a notoriously difficult term to define: how it interacts with, and differs
from science could be the sole topic for an entire thesis. In this chapter, however, I
slot this topic into one section (1.6, page 41). It is here we note one key similarity
between the distinguishable subcultures of technology and science: both are shot
through with uncertainty. Given technology's fickleness, we ask: How should
organisations manage complex technology? This point is discussed through an
account of the strengths and weaknesses of opposing organisational theories.
In section 1.7 (page 44) I argue that scientific and technological knowledge cannot be
separated from society intellectually: the two are social constructs. The relationship
between society and technology is analysed. We see how technology's historical
development and construction is intrinsically related to the perspectives of relevant
communities, and because technologies carry inherent risks, we ask questions about
risk perception and its relationship with culture.
In an effort to tie the sections together and to add substance to what has been said, two
case studies are examined. In doing so we find that technological management often
requires tacit knowledge which typically cannot be worded in rules, regulations or
procedures. This has profound implications for the organisation and for its individual
workers and groups. I devote time to "group interaction"; in doing so we gain a
glimpse of the tacit understandings shared among group members. In this section I
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analyse the role of tacit knowledge from the perspective of the individual and the
group: we see how it is generated and transmitted.
1.4 THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANISATIONS
1.4.1 Mechanistic bureaucracy / organic systems
Modern organisations are typically "bureaucratic". Bureaucracy, Max Weber argued,
was "the only way of coping with the administrative requirements of large-scale
social systems" (Giddens, 1993: 287). Bureaucratic organisations aim to operate
through clear rational systems which comprise of: (i) a high degree of specialisation
and a clearly defined hierarchical division of labour, with tasks distributed as official
duties with clearly circumscribed areas of command and responsibility; (ii) the
establishment of a formal body of rules to govern the operation of the organisation;
(iii) administration based on written documents; and (iv) impersonal relationships
between organisational members and clients (Craib, 1997: 139 - 40).
This model has been described as "mechanistic" (Burns, 1969) and "Fordist" (Clegg,
1990: 179). In mechanistic and Fordist organisations "differentiation was the
hallmark of the system. There was a maximal specialization of jobs and functions and
an extensive differentiation of segmental roles" (Clegg, 1990: 179). These workplace
groups or individuals deal with their specific tasks and problems. These groups are
specialised and work only on their own affairs: they know what their responsibility is
and what it is not. Boundaries of responsibilities and power are thus created, allowing
the hierarchical management of the system to be displayed clearly on organisational
flowcharts. This makes it feasible to plot the downward flow of instructions from
chiefs to frontline workers, with production information returning in the opposite
direction (Burns, 1969: 242 - 3). A mechanistic organisational form is not suited to
organisations subject to internal stresses and strains (Merton, 1957: 196). It is
untenable to apply mechanistic principles in an organisation subject to constant
change:
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Ideal bureaucracy falls short of realisation when rapid changes in some of the organisational
tasks are required. ... When changes come along, organisations must alter their programmes;
when such changes are frequent and rapid, the form of bureaucracy becomes so temporary that
the efficiencies of bureaucracy cannot be realised (Perrow, 1972: 5).
To deal with this problem, Burns (1969) and Burns and Stalker (1961) posit organic
systems. Organisations that adopt an organic system often have to adapt to unstable
conditions, making it infeasible for individuals and groups to be hemmed into precise
positions to deal with precise problems (Burns, 1969: 242 - 3). Organisations that
operate through organic systems have been linked with ideas on flexible
specialization theory (Tomaneny, 1994: 161), postmodern organisations (Clegg, 1990:
180), and post-Fordism (Grint, 1998: 285). In these organisational systems there tends
to be less surveillance and supervision of workers, meaning there is more
decentralised forms of workplace activity and control. Clegg (1990) introduces us to
this topic: "Postmodernism points to a more organic, less differentiated enclave of
organization than those dominated by the bureaucratic designs of modernity" (Clegg,
1990: 181). This organisational design is seen to be more efficient because the nature
of problems that tend to arise in manufacturing and technological industries are
technically complex and can rarely be broken down into precise steps, as was
characteristic of the Fordist assembly line (Grint, 1998: 285) or distributed among
specialist roles of a clearly defined hierarchical workforce: "New technology also
required a more flexible and probably, therefore, a more skilled workforce. ...
Flexible technology with an inflexible workforce does not lead to flexible production"
(Grint, 1998: 284).
In other words, operatives in such organisations must now complete their work with a
firm understanding of what is occurring throughout the organisation. They must know
how their affairs affect others. (Burns & Stalker, 1961: 6). Clegg (1990) explains the
difference this way:
Where modernist organization and jobs were highly differentiated, demarcated and de-
skilled, postmodernist organization and jobs are highly de-differentiated, de-demarcated,
30
and multi-skilled. Employment relations... increasingly give way to more complex and
fragmentary relational forms, such as subcontracting and networking (Clegg, 1990: 181).
Jobs, therefore, tend to lose formal definitions and precise responsibilities and work
methods tend to be redefined only after interaction with others, and, once an
understanding of the task as whole is known (Burns & Stalker, 1961: 6). Indeed:
The sanctions which apply to the individual's conduct in his working role derive more from
presumed community of interest with the rest of the working organization in the survival and
growth of the firm, and less from a contractural relationship between himself and a non-personal
corporation (Burns & Stalker, 1961: 121).
This work system requires interaction and communication to be lateral, not vertical.
Instead of instructing workers, communication resembles "consultation rather than
command... [and] consists of information and advice rather than instructions and
decisions" (Burns & Stalker, 1961: 121 )7.
Burns's idea of mechanistic and organic systems developed during research on British
electronics firms. The firms were "equipped at the outset with working organizations
designed in accordance with mechanistic principles" (1969: 243). Yet, in the face of
change, where commitments grew larger and a new situation confronted the industry,
some firms stuck to mechanistic principles: in response to novel conditions, the firms
reinforced the formal structure (1969: 243).
7 A similar idea is the "Task Culture" Handy (1981). This culture is "extremely adaptable. ... [It] seeks to bring
together the appropriate resources, the right people at the right level of the organisation, and to let them get on with
it. ... Each group ideally contains within it all the decision-making power required" (1981: 182).
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1.4.2 Pathological reactions
Why did the firms not change their organisation as technical and commercial
circumstances changed? (Burns, 1969: 246). Burns proposes that the orthodox
bureaucratic system had become so ingrained that it appeared to be the only possible
mode of organisation. What is more, change or the enlargement of commitments of
the organisation's affairs were seen as unlikely, or just not contemplated (Burns,
1969: 243 - 4). Next, he proposes that it was incredibly difficult to change the system
because it was made up of people who had specific interests, and a disruption of the
ingrained way of things might be at odds with these very concerns.
He is a member of a group or a section with sectional interests in conflict with those of other
groups or sections, and he is also one individual among many to whom the position they occupy,
relative to others, and their future security or betterment, are matters of deep concern (Burns,
1969: 246).
Burns's work is an extension of work he completed with Stalker (1961). The
colleagues consolidated March and Simon's (1958) idea of the "sub-group". Sub¬
groups develop "sub-goals" which, when viewed in isolation, can be at odds with the
goals of other groups in the same firm:
When the individual is involved in the bigger, more active, communication network required for
faster technical and commercial change, he is more fully implicated as a person, more
committed, more involved. ... As a result he is drawn more frequently and more closely into
personal relationships with other members of the organisation (Burns & Stalker, 1961: 234).
This could inadvertently invoke departmental loyalty and interest in one's own career:
If one adopts the view that an increased rate of technical progress is healthy, or necessary, or
desirable, then resistance is indeed pathological. But equally, to resist adapting an organisation
and work-roles to the demands of rapid change is a measure of self-defence as a natural reaction
(Burns & Stalker, 1961: 237).
Individuals can shape the working organisation according to their own conceptions of
needs, and groups can create a system of conflicts by limiting the other's involvement
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in each working occasion. In trying to attain their own goal, one group may directly or
indirectly impede another group in reaching theirs. Organisations can create an
"inevitable conflict ofmultiple goals" (Perrow, 1970: 59). It is no surprise therefore
that, despite maintaining an ideal image of bureaucracy, there are informal codes of
8
conduct where a hidden, or true, organisational reality exists (Jacobs, cited in
Lofland &Lofland, 1995: 89).
1.4.3 Organisational culture
When organisations change, the change agents must take into account the current
form of culture. Culture, in sociological terms, refers to the learned, shared way of life
of individuals within a society (Giddens, 1993: 31); it refers to those ties such as
language, custom, convention and norms (Abercrombie et al, 1984: 98) that bind
individuals together. Group members come to realise that their activities and
conventions are fastened firmly to a set of structured ideas (Cohen & Taylor, 1992:
38). Choice and action are intrinsically related to the context within which they are
performed (Cohen, 1994: 69). From our viewpoint, culture refers to the rules through
which a job is organised, the values and attitudes that match such organisation and the
behaviours and justifications which follow from this (Mars, 1994: vi). By referring to
the electronic firms studied by Burns we can guess there was an over reliance on such
culturally based historical procedures. The ingrained working methodology had
falsely presented to the captains of that industry not what their organisation's culture
is, but what it should be (Grint, 1998: 126), and thus: "many of the ills of
organizations stem from imposing an inappropriate structure on a particular culture, or
from expecting a particular culture to thrive in an inappropriate climate" (Handy,
s Testament to this are the numerous social studies of workplaces typically categorised as work-place deviance.
The studies that have been completed by Ditton (1977); Mars (1994) are particularly brilliant. Other studies
include Henry (1987); Burawoy (1979); Gabriel (1988); Punch (1996); and Carson (1977). All illustrate working
organisations whose employees do not lend themselves to the ideal notion of workplace bureaucracy.
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1981: 177). The upshot is clear: "if organisations are to remain effective, they must
change, and change must be by design and not by default" (Newman, 1973: xii).
1.4.4 Bounded rationality
Nevertheless, "even when technical experts have time to discuss and plan around
signals of potential danger their interpretations could be subject to numerous issues
from a wider system that include competition, scarcity, bureaucratic procedures,
power, rules and norms, hierarchy, culture and history" (Vaughan, 1996: 415). Such
issues can shape "managerial behaviour that is not always, or even usually, rational"
(Wright, 1994: 80). This is why: the issues listed by Vaughan, "form institutional
arrangements [which] constrain individual behaviour by rendering some choices
unviable, precluding particular courses of action" (DiMaggio & Powell cited in
Vaughan, 1996: 37). Burns (1969) deepens our understanding of this point when he
says: "On taking a job, the organisation's [worker] steps into a cognitive framework
and accepts a set of constraints on purposive action which are consonant with those of
the organisation" (Burns, 1969: 238 - 9). Decision-making is thus constrained, making
optimisation infeasible. Instead of being an example of perfect rationality, decision¬
making is typically completed within a sphere of "bounded rationality" (Simon, cited
in Vaughan, 1996: 36; Wright, 1994: 92); the decision-making performance is
therefore more to do with "satisficing" (Simon, cited in Vaughan, 1996: 36), rather
than optimising. Therefore, to "understand decision-making in any organisation, we
must look at individual action within its layered context" (Vaughan, 1996: 37).
1.4.5 The layered context
James Reason says that organisations, today, after an industrial calamity, are unlikely:
"to end their search for the cause ... with the mere identification of 'sharp-end'
human failures: Such unsafe acts are now seen more as a consequence than as a
principal cause" (Reason, 1997: 10). Reason's point ties in with Hutter's (2001). Her
railway industry-based research suggested that although accidents stemmed from
organisational bases, workers intriguingly "regarded [accidents] as unique [and]
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explained [them] in terms of individual carelessness or luck rather than systemic or
structural reasons" (2001: 298).
Though humans are naturally fallible and prone to error and procedure violation,
Reason (1997) points out that accidents in complex organisations often find their
source(s) beyond the scope of individual psychology. Reason calls these sources
"latent conditions" (1997: 10). These inevitable conditions exist because:
Resources are rarely distributed equally between an organisation's various departments. The
original decision on how to allocate them may have been based on sound commercial
arguments, but all such inequities create quality, reliability or safety problems for someone
somewhere in the system at a later point. No single group of senior managers can foresee all the
future ramifications of their current decisions (Reason, 1997: 11- 12).
It seems therefore, that regardless of how the worker approaches his or her work (as a
deviant, or pathologically, or well intended), modern business and technological
organisational systems are inherently imperfect (Albrow, 1970: 90).
1.5 ORGANISATIONAL THEORIES
1.5.1 High Reliability Theory
Numerous organisations today operate increasingly complex technologies which
contain a high potential for catastrophe. Therefore, how workers interact to form a
work-place system to control technology is critical. In 1984 the Berkeley School of
high reliability theorists started a project which, among others, examined the
organisational set-up of a nuclear power plant and an air traffic control organisation.
They were chosen because they had "excellent records of safety" (Roberts, 1993: 2 &
17) despite operating risky technologies.
The organizations were designed to account for expected and unexpected
contingencies. Their design rendered them adaptive and sensitive to changes within
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and out-with the organisation (Roberts, 1993: 19). Indeed, common characteristics
were typically found: An ab initio assumption that errors are omnipresent and
insidious and that eternal vigilance is the price of success; a parallel assumption that
the sources of error are dynamic, not static. Therefore, monitoring mechanisms must
be constantly re-invigorated; maintenance of redundant modes of problem solving at
the operational level, and resistance to pressure to resolve or 'rationalise' the process
by adopting a single 'best' way approach; the creation, maintenance and exercise of
multiple simultaneous informal organisational structures adapted to contingencies
(structural variation according to the nature of the problem); a particular kind of
obeisance to formal regulations and codes (going by the book) extended with accepted
standard operating procedures based on tradition (Roberts, 1993: 23). The
organisations took the initiative in meeting and steering change (Newman, 1973: xv).
The findings suggest that serious accidents with hazardous technologies are not
inevitable, but can be prevented through intelligent design and management (Sagan,
1993: 15). There is a belief that rationally organised complex organizations can
compensate for well-known human frailties (Sagan, 1993: 16).
1.5.2 Creating a culture of reliability: the tacit mechanisms of socialisation and
internalisation
Reliability does not occur by simply putting in place the structures. A reliability
culture needs to be created, but:
How can an organization ensure that lower level personnel will identify situations properly,
behave responsibly and take appropriate actions? (Sagan, 1993: 23).
Successful socialisation into the reliability culture assigns the recruit with the
authority, experience and the technical know-how to respond to the problem at hand
sufficiently. Reliable decentralisation requires a centrally-controlled socialisation
process (Sagan, 1993: 22), which presents to the recruit the methods and philosophies
of the organisation which he or she should internalise. Internalisation refers to the
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process whereby the individuals learn and accept social norms and approved conducts
of their society. They are said to have internalized social norms when they act on
them freely9 and obediently (see Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 183 - 19310).
Internalisation is, therefore, "the form of commitment most desired by organisations"
(Handy, 1981: 132), for it creates a homogeneous set of assumptions and decision
premises which, when they are invoked on a local and decentralized basis, preserve
co-ordination and centralization (Sagan, 1993: 22 - 23): it is a commitment that is
self-maintaining and independent of the original source of influence (Handy, 1981:
132). Kunda (1992) explains what internalisation means for a senior manager of a
successful engineering company. The company's organisational culture was held
responsible for the success; it was described as "strong" (1992: 5), but "a way of life
taken-for-granted" (1992: 3). Accordingly, Kunda asks: how did this form of working
life come about?
The guys up there are independent and ambitious. ... That they are committed there is no doubt.
But they are unmanageable. ... That formal structure tells you nothing. How then, he wonders,
can he make them see the light? Work in the company's interests? Cooperate? Stop, or at least
channel the pissing contests? And not make him look bad? Dave [the manager] knows that
whether he controls it or not, he owns it. ... His strategy is clear: Power plays don't work. You
can't make 'em do anything. They have to want to. So you have to work through the culture. The
idea is to educate people without them knowing it. Have the religion and not know how they
ever got it! (Kunda, 1992: 4-5) (See figure 1-1).
9 When I say "freely" I am referring to how Kunda (1992) might refer to it in an example given soon and how
Handy (1981) may use the term. He says: "Internalization also means that the individual recipient of influence
adopts the idea, the change in attitude or the new behaviour, as his own. Fine. He will act on it without pressure.
The change will be self-maintaining to a high degree. But he will also tend to believe that the change was his own
idea and no one else's. He will in a sense, deny that the influence took place" (1981: 132). See also Crane's work
as mentioned in Collins (1982: 47)
111 The key point however is this: "Socialization always takes place in the context of a specific social structure. ...
Since every individual is confronted with essentially the same institutional programme for his life in society the
total force of the institutional order is brought to bear with more or less equal weight on each individual, producing
a massivity for the objectivity to be internalised. ... By successful socialisation we mean the establishment of a
high degree of symmetry between objective and subjective reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 183 - 4).
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From a more general perspective, Berger and Luckmann (1966) examine a similar
issue as Kunda: they, for instance, ask, how does "a taken-for-granted "reality"
congeal for the man in the street?" (1966: 15). To go about answering this question,
the authors accept the "social relativity of knowledge and reality" (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966: 15):
A sociology of knowledge will have to deal not only with the empirical variety of
"knowledge" in human societies, but also with the processes by which any body of
knowledge comes to be socially established as "reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 15).
They qualify this by then asking, how is this 'reality' "developed, transmitted, and
maintained?" (1966: 15). Much of their work (1966) subsequently refers to a form of
"learning", through social activities and processes, which may be described as "tacit":
The individual, however, is not born a member of society. He is born with a predisposition
towards sociality, and he becomes a member of society. In the life of every individual,
therefore, there is a temporal sequence, in the course of which he is inducted into
participation in the social dialect. The beginning point of this process is internalization: the
immediate apprehension or interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning, that
is, as a manifestation of another's subjective processes which thereby becomes subjectively
meaningful to myself (1966: 149).
We can link this somewhat cumbersome quote to another part of Berger and
Luckmann's thesis (1966) which, though dealing with the process of internalisation in
a pragmatic sense, still points to an important role for tacit mechanisms and a form of
mutual understanding which cannot be explicitly said or codified (i.e., is tacit):
In the complex form of internalization, I not only "understand" the other's momentary
subjective processes, I "understand" the world in which he lives, and that world becomes
my own. This presupposes that he and I share time in a more than ephemeral way and a
comprehensive perspective, which links sequences together inter-subjectively. We now not
only understand each other's definitions of shared situations, we define them reciprocally.
A nexus of motivations is established between us and extends into the future. Most
importantly, there is now an ongoing mutual identification between us (1966: 150).
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Berger and Luckmann (1966) suggest that this state of affairs becomes "taken-for-
granted ... As long as they are not challenged" (1966: 168). In other words, the taken-
for-granted reality must be "maintained... The reality of everyday life is on-goingly
reaffirmed in the individual's interaction with others. Just as reality is originally
maintained by social processes, so it is maintained in consciousness by social
processes" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 168 - 9). This essentially means the
development, transmission and maintenance of the taken-for-granted knowledge that
underpins reality refers to those tacit mechanism outlined above: the successful
socialisation of society members, in the sense that they will thus act freely and
obediently, in the way Handy (1981: 131-2) suggests, requires an internalisation
process which involves tacit and implicit social mechanisms.
Later (in section 1.9.2 page 56 and section 10.1, page 59) we analyse, to a
significantly deeper level, the relationship between internalisation and how
individuals acquire subject/role-specific tacit-knowledge whilst discussing language
construction, secondary socialisation and distributed cognition.
For now however, (from the premise of a discussion on organisational theory)
continual education is critical if the workplace member is to successfully internalise
the workplace reality and the philosophies that underpin it. Continual education
reinforces the organisational structure; sensitises the workers to implicit work-place
necessities such as technical know-how; reinforces "codified" knowledge; and drives
away the negative aspects of stability and routinisation. It constantly reinvigorates the
nature of work for workers: it may produce a "self-regulating work unit where
operators are empowered to directly address risks and uncertainties" (Sagan, 1993: 24
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Figure 1-1 Creating a Culture of Reliability (author's own sketch).
1.5.3 Normal Accidents
The organisations in the Berkeley school project held records of safety which were a
"puzzling paradox for the researchers; it seemed to be a negation of Charles Perrow's
findings" (Sanne, 1999: 23). Perrow claims that: "The characteristics of high-risk
technologies suggest that no matter how effective conventional safety devices are,
there is a form of accident that is inevitable" (1984: 3):
The argument is simple. We start with a plant, ship, biology laboratory, or other setting with a
lot of components (parts, procedures, operators). Then we need two or more failures among
components that interact in some unexpected way. No one dreamed that when x failed y would
also be out of order and the two failures would interact so as to both start a fire and silence the
fire alarm. Furthermore, no one can figure out the interaction at the time and thus know what to
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do. The problem is just something that never occurred to the designers. Next time they will put
in an extra alarm system and a fire suppresser, but who knows, that might just allow three more
unexpected interactions among inevitable failures. This interacting tendency is a characteristic of
a system, not of a part of an operator (Perrow, 1984: 4).
Highly complex technology is made up of many individual components, and as is
often the case, their interaction is tightly coupled, meaning: "there is no slack or
buffer or give between two items. What happens in one directly affects what happens
in the other" (Perrow, 1984: 90). Subsequently, tightly coupled-interacting technology
is capable of quickly generating unfamiliar, unexpected sequences that are not
immediately comprehensible to the operators. Additionally, because the system is
tightly coupled, there is little opportunity or slack for the operator to override any
problems (Perrow, 1984: 333). Implementing apparatus to override potential
problems will only aggravate the system further: "technological fixes only increase
the interactive complexity and tighten the coupling" (Perrow, 1984: 333).
The significance of Perrow's work is that it highlights a contradictory dilemma for
organisations operating highly complex technologies with tightly coupled
components. Mechanistic (Burns & Stalker, 1961) or centralised control is required to
ensure operation of all tightly coupled components is systematic, precise, and
punctual. Yet the nature of the highly complex technology requires operators to be
able to take "independent, creative action" (Perrow, 1984: 10) when localised failures
occur - an "organic" (Burns & Stalker, 1961) or decentralised mode of organisation is
thus required. "But systems cannot be both decentralized and centralized at the same
time; they are organizational Pushmepullyous, straight out of the Dr Doolittle stories,
trying to go in opposite directions at once" (Perrow, 1984: 10). Organisational
contradictions mean accidents are inevitable, thus normal.
The differences between Normal Accidents Theory and High Reliability Theory are
clear. The former says that accidents are inevitable when there is a combination of
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tight coupling and high complexity, and that structural arrangements to account for
technical failure merely add to the chance of catastrophe. Others, however, believe
accidents are a consequence of breakdowns in social processes and comprehension
(Roberts and Weick, cited in Sanne, 1999: 24). Through explicit training that
incorporates experience, judgement, intensive communication, and a capacity for
flexible reorganisation in demanding situations, workers can detect and correct errors
(Sanne, 1999: 24 - 5). Despite the differences, the theorists are fully aware of the need
to socially engineer the structure of the organisation due to the capricious nature of
technology. The argument is about how to deal with unruly technology.
1.6 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
1.6.1 The traditional hierarchical model
The idea that technology is unruly will be construed as surprising by some,
particularly so if they accept the following definitions:
Engineering: n applying scientific principles to the design and construction of engines,
cars, buildings, or machines.
Science: n systematic study and knowledge of natural or physical phenomena.
Technology: n application of practical or mechanical sciences to industry or commerce
(Collins Dictionary, 1998).
Apparently engineers only utilise scientific findings for technological operation. This
perspective has been described as the "traditional hierarchical model" (Barnes &
Edge, 1982: 148). This model depicts technology as a "routine activity of working out
and realizing the implications of scientific theories. [Technology] is a humdrum,
uncreative activity crucially dependent upon basic science" (Barnes & Edge, 1982:
148). However, "engineers know from experience that this view is untrue" (Vincenti,
1990: 3). Correspondingly, socio-historic case studies of technological innovation
have shown "that... technologists possess their own distinct cultural resources, which
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provide the principle basis for their innovative activity" (Barnes & Edge, 1982: 148).
The traditional model, it seems:
Ignores the many non-scientific decisions, both large and small, made by technologists as they
design the world we inhabit. Many objects of daily use have clearly been influenced by science,
but their form, dimensions, and appearance were determined by technologists - artisans,
engineers, and inventors - using non-scientific modes of thought. Carving knives, bridges,
clocks, and aircraft are as they are because over the years their designers and makers have
established their shapes, styles, and textures (Ferguson, 1993: xi).
Accepting this argument means we possess "the basic elements of the modern
understanding of the science / technology relation. This characterizes science and
technology as distinguishable subcultures, each with their own bodies of lore and
competence," (Barnes & Edge, 1982: 150) which at times, interact (Vincenti, 1990:
4).
1.6.2 The symmetrical model
Barnes and Edge (1982) point out that: "technologists do, at times, make use of
findings and theories of basic science... [and] it is equally the case that scientists
make occasional use of the ideas and artefacts of technology (1982: 149); indeed,
"think of the great dependence of science on the computer, without which some
modern scientific specialities could scarcely come into existence" (MacKenzie &
Wajcman, 1985: 9). This means the two clusters of disciplines can stand alone,
equally or symmetrically (Barnes & Edge, 1982: 150).
Science and technology are presented in the symmetrical model as clearly demarcated
subcultures that may interact. Yet in reality, boundaries between the two are unclear
(MacKenzie &Wajcman, 1985: 3). When philosophers try to separate the two, they
"tend to posit over-idealized distinctions" (Pinch &Bijker, 1984: 402). Nevertheless:
"An interactive model remains relevant over a wide range of characterizations of
science and technology: it is possible to disagree about what science and technology
consist in and yet agree upon the form of their relationship" (Barnes & Edge, 1982:
152). To be sure, a clear-cut account of the interaction between the two is still to be
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found: "When science seems less than sure, technology is cited in its defence, and
when technology seems less than sure, science is summoned to the rescue; the
responsibility is passed backward and forward like the proverbial hot potato" (Collins
& Pinch, 1997: 4). What is more, technological and scientific innovation is often less
than sure: it is often shot through with uncertainty (Schon, cited in Barnes & Edge,
1982: 150), and unruliness (Wynne, 1988).
1.6.3 Unruly technology
Wynne (1988) takes exception to the idea that "data generated by following scientific
rules of method lead mechanically to regulatory and policy conclusions. [Rather], in
reaching conclusions there is a great deal of interpretative negotiation behind the more
formal language of precise and standard rule following" (Wynne, 1988: 148). Thus, a
formal public image of technology as mechanical, rule following behaviour belies a
far less clearly rule bound and determined world of real technological practices,
(Wynne, 1988: 148). Barnes and Edge (1982) give a reason for this: "There may be
disagreement or obscurity as to what precisely its 'implications' are. And those
'implications' may be disconfirmed by practice, so that the theory has to be
reconsidered and new and different 'implications' 'deduced' from it (1982: 150). A
technological hypothesis therefore, is never fully exposed:
Existing knowledge is always liable to prove insufficient: additional unexpected features
invariably appear in every new artefact or material process, throwing new difficulties in the path
of further advance.... Projects may set off on in one direction and end 'successfully' at an
entirely unlooked for destination as a result of this kind of uncertainty (Barnes & Edge, 1982:
150).
In technological development it is unfeasible to predict universality with experiments.
For applying a scientific hypothesis within technology, means the hypothesis would
have to claim:
Regardless of social aspects the safe operation of design ' y' is exactly reproducible on future
occasions, regardless of time and place, and:
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That design V is capable of intervention to pre-empt or limit knock-on effects of localised
features (Wynne, 1988: 158).
Technological systems evolve "uncertainly according to innumerable ad hoc
judgements and assumptions" (Wynne, 1988: 151): Technology does not fall in line
with historical operating paradigms; instead it requires the existing paradigm to be
manipulated or extended". This means that during technological evolution, relevant
practices are recapitulated into an updated statement of formal rules, for example
when new codes of practice are issued by a regulatory body (Wynne, 1988: 153).
Invariably, the definition of failure and success is fluid and subject to incremental
change, and of course, entirely dependent upon the community that decides "what
similarities matter and what differences do not in technological testing" (MacKenzie,
1996b: 255).
1.7 SOCIETY AND TECHNOLOGY
1.7.1 The social construction of technology
Since all human activity takes place within society, all technology has society at its centre
(Collins & Pinch, 1997: 5).
These words ring true after reading case studies of technological development. For
instance, Pinch and Bijker's (1984) well-known historical study of the bicycle showed
how certain cycles prevailed over others due to the impact of perceptions and
interpretations of "relevant social groups". Quite similarly, Robert Pool's (1997) text
11 A full explanation regarding paradigm manipulation and exploitation is given when discussing Thomas Kuhn's
work later, but just now we can say that a scientific paradigm is a method of work that scientists adhere to. The
paradigm dictates what scientific work should be carried out and how; it suggests what hypotheses are deemed
acceptable and worthwhile for instance.
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on why nuclear power is the way it is, illustrates society's role in technological
development:
As I dug into the story of nuclear power, seeking the forces that had shaped it, I discovered that
the key lay not so much with scientists and engineers as with a host of non-technical influences.
... I learned, one must look past the technology to the broader "socio-technical system" - the
social, political, economic, and institutional environments in which the technology develops and
operates... Every time I investigated what I thought was a technical question -Why was light-
water the dominant reactor choice? What break through led to the broad commercialisation of
nuclear power in the 1960s? Is there a feasible solution to the problem of storing nuclear wastes?
- I found the answers taking me beyond the realm of engineering. The line between the technical
and the non-technical that at first seemed so clear slowly dissolved, and I came to see the
development of nuclear power as collaboration between engineers and the larger society. And in
that partnership, society's role proved to be surprisingly deep and complex (1997: 5 - 6).
As MacKenzie sums up: "technological knowledge is social through and through"
(1990: 10).
1.7.2 The socio-technical system
The term socio-technical system, as used by Pool, was coined by the Tavistock
theorists during their famous studies in the 1960s. They demonstrated that the kind of
technology used has a major effect on workplace culture and structure (in Handy,
1981: 189); postulating that technical requirements of the organisation can be
designed simultaneously with social organisation and needs of the workers, without
loosing technical efficiency (in Schmid et al, 1994: 81). This view seemingly counters
the deficiencies of the social construction of technology theory. Hecht (1996) writes:
"analysing the meanings given to technologies and risks after they are constructed
offers one possible [research] direction. Examining the ways in which technological
activity continues to be social, cultural, or political, even after technologies reach
"closure" can enable us to draw critical connections between the artefacts, structures
and practices of technological activity and broader social, cultural or political issues"
(1996: 518 - 9). Thus, the "bicycle study" and others were criticized for their rather
cavalier attitude towards users, in that they did not show how users could actively
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modify stable technologies12 (MacKay & Gillespie cited in Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003:
3): "users and technology are too often viewed as separate objects" (Oudshoorn &
Pinch, 2003: 2). The theory does not show the radical indeterminacy role of the user13
(Callon, 1999: 181).
Callon (1999), Latour (1984), and Law (1991) strongly reject the idea that the user,
(or agent, or actor) is a passive consumer of technology. They develop the idea of the
Tavistock theorists and speak of co-constructionism (Murdoch, 2001: 117) and the
actor-network theory - which was "developed to analyse situations in which it is
difficult to separate humans and non-humans, and in which actors have variable forms
and competencies" (Callon, 1999: 183). In terms of scientific and technical
knowledge, they argue that development is far removed from traditional ideas of
objective science. Their assumption is that society and knowledge are not detached:
"though science and technology develop in some measure apart from the rest of the
world, they are neither detached nor fundamentally different in nature from other
activities... The development of scientific knowledge and technical systems cannot be
understood unless the simultaneous reconstruction of the social contexts of which
they form a part is also studied" (Law, 1991: 20)I4. Law (1991: 8) then tells us that:
sociologists must talk about "the-social-and-the-technical all in one breath."
12 Oudshoorn and Pinch (2003: 1) give some examples where "stable" technologies have been used in other ways
not necessarily thought of by the artefact's designers and constructors. They point out, for instance, how chiming
clocks were used as an introduction to a Pink Floyd record, and how aircraft on 9/11 were used as giant missiles.
And later, we see that Johan Sanne (1999) noted how air traffic controllers manipulated artefacts, such as
navigational charts, and extended their use beyond their intended scope.
13
But, as Callon also notes, the co-constructionist or actor-network theory perspective has been criticised for
failing to give a "satisfactory theory of the actor which is allegedly endowed with either limitless power or
deprived of any room for manoeuvre at all" (Callon, 1999: 181).
14 For an excellent example of such a research project which drew out "critical connections between artefacts,
structures and practices of technological activity and broader social, cultural or political issues" see: Hecht (1996).
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The socio-technical system theory illustrates a workplace situation characterised like a
rich tapestry: everything interlocks to create the whole. Thus for the workplace to
operate effectively during periods of alteration, relevant changes must be made
accordingly throughout the system: optimisation of the social and technical systems
must be done in tandem (Schmid et al, 1994: 79).
1.7.3 Technological determinism
Abundant social studies of technology urge the rejection of the traditional view of
science-based technology as being independent of context. Instead it is suggested that
technological knowledge is either context dependent (the social construction of
technology) or is co-constructed (the socio-technical system's theory). Either way, the
point remains: technological knowledge is "associated with matters of traditions,
culture and experiences of the social groups involved" (MacKenzie, 1990: 9). For that
reason, many argue for the rejection of the idea that technological development has
internal, autonomous, deterministic characteristics (Mackenzie, 1990: 385).
They argue that the continual, predictable and inexorable tide of progress
(MacKenzie, 1990: 385) only looks this way because it gained momentum (Hughes,
1980: 15). By misreading progress, the general - but flawed - idea of technological
development and change as being naturally cumulative is given. However it is better
to view development as a "perpetual accretion of little details... probably having
neither beginning, completion nor definable limits" (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985:
10) and crucially, such "perpetual accretion" can be mistaken for technological
determinism.
1.7.4 Technological lock-in
Technological determinism fails to account for many "non-technical issues" that
shape development whilst Technological lock-in (Arthur, 1999) tries to account for
society's role. This theory considers the idea that technologies which are initially in
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competition with each other and which have positive returns to adoption, either
become adopted (with a chance of cornering the market) or are frozen out due to
seemingly insignificant chance events. Now the technology that is adopted becomes
the focus of improvement: experience is gained with this technology and so it
progresses - increasing its positive returns to adoption. As it becomes more attractive,
the likelihood of others adopting it increases still further; creating a network of users.
The cycle continues: the more it is adopted, the more it will remain the focus of
improvement, the more it will show increasing returns to adoption.
Because of these social processes, the adopted technology has a better chance of
becoming dominant over any likely competitors. As Arthur (1999) puts it: "an
industry can become locked-in to a technological path that is difficult to get away
from [and this occurs because] more and more people choose [or adopt] one
technology [which may well be technically inferior to others] from a group of
competing others" (1999: 107). Other technologies, simply not thought of or rejected,
become frozen out and dormant (Arthur, 1999; Nelson & Winter, 1977; Dosi, 1982).
This theory perhaps explains the prevalence of the gasoline car over the steam car
(Arthur, 1999); the QWERTY keyboard over the Dvorak keyboard (Pool, 1997);
Betamax's submission to VHS video cassettes; Microsoft Windows' sustained
leadership over other computer operating systems; Stephenson's 4ft 8V2 inch railway
gauge over Brunei's 7ft broad gauge. Arthur's theory (1999) suggests that widespread
adoption of these artefacts has elevated them to "a dominant position over others, thus
it becomes increasingly difficult to reform or reverse development towards more
efficient systems.
Though this theory helps to explain the appearance of technological determinism, we
should look closer at the "constant turmoil of concepts, plans and projects"
(MacKenzie, 1996a: 6) at the heart of technological development. As Arthur (1999:
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107) points out, "the reasons why a particular technology came to be adopted are
difficult to pinpoint".
MacKenzie (1996a) suggests that we should perceive the direction of the flow of
technical accretion as being guided by what is seen as possible, realistic, and most
likely to bear success, in the relevant context by the relevant community of decision¬
makers: "Beliefs about a technology create the conditions to which they refer"
(1996a: 7). Technological development is underpinned by an "institutional pattern of
predominantly incremental change involving, centrally, a self-fulfilling prophecy"
(MacKenzie, 1990: 385).
1.7.5 Robert Merton's "The self-fulfilling prophecy"
W. I. Thomas once wrote: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their
consequences" (cited in Merton, 1957: 421). The theorem is explained in Robert
Merton's well known parable concerning The Last National Bank. The bank was a
successful, flourishing business, yet events on what was to become Black Wednesday
saw to the bank's collapse. A rumour suggested that the bank was on the brink of
insolvency and, believing the rumour to be true, depositors entered the bank
frantically seeking to salvage their own. The actions of depositors brought down the
bank: the prophecy of the collapse led to its own fulfilment (Merton, 1957: 422 - 3).
The parable teaches us a valuable lesson: "definitions of a situation become an
integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments. ... [And it is]
instructively applicable to many, if indeed not most, social processes" (Merton, 1957:
423; 421). This is what MacKenzie (1990) found in his research on missile accuracy:
"Improvement mainly came about by identification of the barriers to accuracy in
existing systems (rather than discarding them) so as to remove these barriers.
Extrapolating that process of incremental change into the future, the proponents of
inertial guidance have prophesised what they will be able to achieve if given the
resources to do so" (1990: 385 - 6). In sum: "If it comes to be believed that there is
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only one way to advance a technology, then that one way at least has a chance of
becoming reality" (1990: 391).
Merton's and MacKenzie's work reminds us that a self-fulfilling prophecy need not
be "invested with internal logic, or through intrinsic superiority... Its continuance
becomes embedded in actors' frameworks of calculation and routine behaviour, and it
continues because it is thus embedded" (MacKenzie, 1996a: 58).
1.7.6 Thomas Kuhn's "scientific paradigm"
We are drawn irresistibly to Thomas Kuhn's work on scientific paradigms (1962 &
1970). On the most common interpretation of it, his work "depicts most science as
taking place inside a paradigm - a set of beliefs and expectations that guide research,
defining which questions are important and designating the proper ways to go about
answering them" (Pool, 1997: 13). Kuhn describes how this way of working comes
about:
A scientific community consists, on this view, of the practitioners of a scientific speciality.
To an extent unparalleled in most other fields, they have undergone similar educations and
professional initiations; in the process they have absorbed the same technical literature and
drawn many of the same lessons from it. Usually the boundaries of that standard literature
mark the limits of a scientific subject matter, and each community ordinarily has a subject
of its own. ... As a result, the members of a scientific community see themselves and are
seen by others as the men uniquely responsible for the pursuit of a set of shared goals,
including the training of their successors (Kuhn, 1970: 177).
These social mechanisms often become embedded in an organisation and become the
basis for future work (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985: 11). As Kuhn points out, this
definition of "paradigm" "stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values,
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given [in this case technological]
community" (Kuhn, 1970: 175).
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The notion of "paradigm" can however be used in many senses. In particular, beneath
the "entire constellation" notion of "paradigm" lies another sense of the word, one in
which it "denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-
solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis
for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science" (Kuhn, 1970: 175).
Technologists operating with a paradigm thus take previous technical achievements
and model future work on those achievement (MacKenzie &Wajcman, 1985: 11).
This process is not challenged by group members, but the paradigm, is instead,
extended and exploited in a variety of ways (Crombie, 1961: 358). But, as Kuhn asks:
How has the group member learnt legitimately to manipulate the paradigm logically
and mathematically (Kuhn, 1970: 189)? Kuhn proposes that, once the new group
member is sensitised and immersed in the aforementioned constellation of beliefs,
etc., he will confront his work "in the same gestalt as other members of his specialist
group. ... He has meanwhile assimilated a time-tested and group licensed way of
seeing" (Kuhn, 1970: 189).
In this way, a paradigm does not explain why a technology is the way it is. It "is not a
rule that can be followed mechanically, but a resource that can be used: it can be
manipulated to serve several different needs" (MacKenzie &Wajcman, 1985: 11).
1.8 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF
RISK AND THE CHALLENGER DISASTER
If technological paradigms can be "subjected to logical manipulation" (Kuhn, 1970:
187) by users as a "puzzle-solving enterprise" (Kuhn, 1970: 183), associated
perceptions of risk must be linked to communities. Anthropologists such as Douglas
and Wildavsky (1982: 2) tell us: "there is a diversity of risk perspectives", which are
products of the community's institutional, cultural or political worldview (Cutter,
1993; Nelkin, 1985: 20). Each social arrangement elevates some risks to a high peak
and depresses others below sight (Douglas &Wildavsky, 1982: 8):
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Whether two things are similar or different, always involves a human judgement. We make such
judgements routinely in our everyday lives. Things appear similar or different depending on the
context of use (Collins & Pinch, 1997: 38).
Risk assessments of technology rest upon the relevant community (MacKenzie,
1996b: 259), which must assess and prioritise problems, consequently non-technical
and cultural influences can impact on risk assessment. Vaughan's (1996) Challenger
disaster study underscores this point.
Rubber-like O-rings within the joints of the solid rocket boosters (SRBs), (designed to
seal a tiny gap created by pressure on ignition) deviated from their expected
performance when temperatures were colder than normal. The launch date was
January 28th; it was a particularly cold day (Punch, 1996: 28). Why was Challenger
permitted to take off?
NASA's work captured the American public's imagination. Triumphant space
missions occurred regularly, cultivating self-confidence. The majority of the
American people admired the valour of 'their' silver suited astronauts. They
marvelled at the painstakingly scientific and technological work of 'their' rocket
engineers. The flamboyant scene of yet another space shuttle entering orbit and being
a leading force in cutting edge technology manufactured a 'can do' attitude within
NASA's workforce (Vaughan, 1996: 209). The 'can do' attitude was not an
uninhibited 'gung-ho' attitude, but an attitude that attempted to symbolise NASA's
pure technical culture. It symbolised, "a commitment to research, testing and
verification; to in-house technical capability; to hands-on activity; to the acceptance
of risk and failure; to open communications; to a belief that NASA was staffed with
exceptional people; to attention to detail; and to a frontiers offlight mentality"
(Vaughan, 1996: 209): NASA engineers, on a daily basis, dealt with the construction,
interpretation and definition of risk, failure and success.
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The problem with the SRBs' performance when exposed to cold temperatures was
noticed in 1982 and a decision had to be made about it: how risky is it in terms of the
whole project? "Engineers ran tests to determine the safety margin. Determining that
the maximum amount of erosion possible would still not fail the joint they concluded
that the joint was an acceptable risk. An unpredicted but localised anomaly had
occurred. They believed they understood what caused it. They fixed it, and altered
ongoing research to incorporate new tests in order to improve joint performance"
(Vaughan, 1996: 244). This process conformed to the basic universal, work ethic of
the engineering craft. Develop work around developing technology on an ad hoc
basis: this process of decision-making became the normative framework for the future
and a risk culture was created (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 71 - 2).
This culturally embedded decision-making process was transferred to a new
administrative set-up brought in by President Reagan. Reagan's administration
increased the interface between government and business. Contracting-out became
institutionalised, making business enterprise a permanent aspect of NASA structure.
NASA was under increasing pressure to do business with business. Control at the top,
superior-subordinate relationships, orders, close supervision, rules and regulations,
and hierarchical reporting relations began to dominate NASA's technical culture. The
ensuing Challenger project was conducted with bureaucratic proceduralism and
hierarchical relations and with the 'can do' attitude (Vaughan, 1996: 209).
Incorporating contractors resulted in additional administrative structures and
procedures to co-ordinate and control NASA-contractor relations. To conform, NASA
increased its non-technical staff, expanding its administrative structure still further.
Subsequently, professional accountability stmggled to survive as the agency adopted
the trappings of bureaucratic accountability (Vaughan, 1996: 211).
The effect was a deluge of paperwork that structured and defined the decision-making
process for future problems: the original, institutionalised paradigm was formally
developed into paperwork as guidelines for engineers to follow meticulously. They
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could go by the book, but competing factors in the new bureaucratic set-up fuelled
problems:
The incursion of bureau-pathology and production goals into the NASA culture did not
eliminate the priority of safety concerns that typified the original technical culture, but eroded it
by making practices associated with it more difficult to carry out... Costs and schedule concerns
had to be balanced with safety not just because safety was one of the prescriptions of the
engineering craft but because failure, and responsibility for it, was something no-one wanted
(Vaughan, 1996: 227).
The result: the original can-do technical culture was applied in an increasingly
restrictive environment, where engineers had to "go by the book" and "align actions
with procedural rigour" (Vaughan, 1996: 234). The engineering workforce adhered to
the historic 'can-do' spirit and decision-making paradigm within an environment that
was distinctively different to the one in which both had originated in. In contracting-
out times it was vice-versa - the process was not ad-hoc. Work methods struggled and
came into conflict with the new, static administrative environment. NASA engineer's
work resembled more and more the work of an administrator - red-tape adherence.
Concomitantly, a sense of engineering autonomy or creativity was stunted leaving no
room for engineering judgment or "hunches" in the decision-making process. Their
work was bracketed by programme decisions made outside and above the lab
(Vaughan, 1996: 204).
Harry Braverman's (1974) "deskilling theory" pointed to a separation of the working
hand from the thinking brain1?, similarly - NASA technicians' "control over their craft
15
Despite it being highly regarded by many, particularly those with Marxist leanings, Harry Braverman's theory
has been robustly criticised. As MacKenzie (1996a) rightfully reminds us, the deskilling theory's arguments
concerning homogenization "are precisely a tendency - no more. The imperative of valorization does bring about
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was altered when planning responsibilities were taken from the individual craft
worker and shifted to managers [engineers were thus] mere carriers of an
organisational belief system ... of which there is a preoccupation with cost and
efficiency, conformity to rules and hierarchical authority" (Vaughan, 1996: 205).
1.9 A POST-INDUSTRIAL TREND: THE EFFICACY OF THE
WRITTEN RULE
1.9.1 Engineering as a bureaucratic profession
Leaders of technological organisations now increasingly aspire to control their
workers and technological development through formalised knowledge. Knowledge is
formulated into rules and disseminated throughout the workforce, delineating exactly
how to work (Hale et al, 1998: 165). Readers of Michel Foucault's Discipline and
Punish (1970) will be reminded of his thoughts on the growth of organised
knowledge. Schema, like timetables, taxonomies, typologies, and registers, he said
facilitated the control of large numbers within a regimented space. Administrative
mechanisms are typically concerned with surveillance and control subordinating
bodies to rules of practice (cited in Featherstone et al, 1996: 158).
Formalised knowledge is thus increasingly displacing empirical knowledge because
of its presumed cost and time advantages16. Rules and regulations are common
changes in the labour process that do away with capital's dependence on many human competences that once were
necessary, these changes do undermine the position of groups of workers who owe their relatively high wages or
ability to resist capital to their possessions of these competences, and technology is crucial to this process. But
these changes in the labor process also create the need for new competences, create new groups of skilled workers,
and create types of work that are far from exemplifying the subordination of labor to capital" (1996a: 39).
16 Theoretical knowledge carries benefits in time and cost management: engineers do not perform trial and error
experiments on every component: indeed Pool (1997) says "It would be impossible to develop a plane with six
million parts by trial and error. There aren't enough people in the world to perform all the trials, nor enough time
before the sun dies" (Pool, 1997: 121). However he reassures us when he writes: "At the same time, no-one would
ever attempt to design a plane with six million parts unless there was some a priori reason to think it would fly...
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features within workplace settings: what has become decisive for the organisation of
decisions and the direction of change is the centrality of theoretical knowledge - the
primacy of theory over empiricism and the codification of knowledge into abstract
systems of symbols [i.e., rules for procedures] (Bell, 1974: 19).
1.9.2 Labelling a problem (or constructing a language)
Codification of knowledge requires leaders to "define" and "label" technological
anomalies and problem areas. A common language tends to develop that is
comprehensible only to those who belong to the technological community. A
secondary socialisation process is marked by the: "acquisition of role-specific special
knowledge [which] requires the acquisition of role-specific vocabularies (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966: 158). Karl Mannheim (1982), similarly states: "Within [a]
community, a distinctive terminology takes shape [that] acquires a distinctive
conjunctively determined meaning for the narrower community, and this meaning is
understood only by those who have taken part in the pattern of experience in which
the word in question suddenly springs forth as designation" (1982: 197). By
borrowing concepts from Scheff s Being Mentally III, (1966) we can take a closer
17
look at how "terms" per se can spring forth. .
Scheff was intrigued with the interplay between social control [rules and regulations], social
organisation [technological industries], deviance [technical anomalies and defects] and identity
[labelling of technical defects].... There are abundant labels and definitions which describe the
character and behaviour of the mad [technical anomalies and defects]. These labels are available
to those [technicians, engineers, workers] who witness strange conduct [technical deviation]....
Labels [technical terms] may not be applied immediately. They may not be accepted without
qualification when they are applied: there is often some scope for negotiation [throughout a
modern technology arises because scientific and engineering theory guides the design effort, indicating what
should be possible and how to achieve it" (Pool, 1997:121).
17 In the following I paraphrase extensively Downes and Rock's (1982) illustration of Scheff s work. However, the
words within [these brackets] have been inserted by me. I have done this to show clearly how Scheff s work can be
manipulated for a sociological study of technology.
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workforce there may be different interpretations of what constitutes a technical problem, and
there will be differences in interpretations as to what a problem is, and how it should be
addressed]. But labels do embody general and seemingly objective ideas [the label - a technical
term - within an instruction is seemingly so-called after vigorous, bias-free scientific processes].
Labels make sense of [technical] problems, suggesting ways in which one can, and should go
mad [how a technical artefact can and is expected to deviate, (remember Wynne's and
Vaughan's work)]. In particular, they inform psychiatric [maintenance] practice, providing a
basis for diagnosis and treatment [planning and timetabling of maintenance and safety
procedures] (paraphrased from Downes & Rock, 1982: 151).
Nelkin (1985) sums up: "Once a problem is defined, possible solutions are
considered. ... As action flows from the definition, the way a problem is framed has
an important bearing on what is or is not done about it" (1985: 25). For the case in
point, this means that workers "frame a problem precisely, by introducing and
standardising vocabulary, [a] frame provides a vision of a world in doubt... it grounds
our interests" (Rein, cited in Nelkin, 1985: 20).
Workers, therefore, can refer to documents for best practice procedures, which
however, may remove freedom (Henry, 1987). Or on other occasions, interpretation
of wording may be gratefully seized upon by those required to conform to the rule
(Hale et at, 1998: 167). Such shortcomings are the focus point for the next section.
1.9.3 Responding to Three Mile Island: Thousands of work steps.
After Three Mile Island, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission encouraged utility
managers to develop a comprehensive set of work procedures. Compliance with these
procedures, the commission reasoned, could prevent accidents. At Ocean Reactor18
18
Ocean Reactor is a fictitious name used by Hirschhorn (1993).
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managers developed over a thousand operating and maintenance procedures
(Hirschhorn, 1993: 139).
Plentiful procedures, Merton (1957: 198) argues, exert a "constant pressure upon the
official to be methodical, prudent and disciplined." At Ocean the constant pressure did
not yield and employees found themselves under increasing pressure to go by the
book: an activity termed as verbatim compliance. This was increasingly difficult to do
in most occasions and simply impossible to do in others. Compliance with the
verbatim left no space for procedural deviation, yet deviation was needed as some
procedures, which ran into thousands of work-steps were "incomplete, contradictory
and inaccurate" (Hirschhorn, 1993: 139). This was common after design
modifications and the issue of new broad policy statements. New statements, written
by senior managers, had a huge impact on supervisors as it meant they had to re-write
two hundred other test procedures unexpectedly" (Hirschhorn, 1993: 139).
Exacerbating this problem was the inability of the verbatim compliance philosophy to
account for the critical role of tacit know-how. Therefore, many of the printed
regulations were incomplete. One supervisor sums it up: "No procedures, however
well written, can substitute for technical knowledge" (Hirschhorn, 1993: 139).
Verbatim compliance left the employee in a precarious situation. Precise written
procedures made operatives feel that he or she had to adhere unequivocally, but when
the operative "knows" something is wrong with the written order, dilemmas are
created. "If a procedure is wrong, incomplete, or contradicts another, what should the
mechanic or operator do?" (Hirschhorn, 1993: 140). The worker felt "accountable for
mistakes and would be personally fined or punished. If he violates a procedure, even
if he's right, he's wrong: if he doesn't violate a procedure and it's wrong, he's wrong"
(Hirschhorn, 1993: 140). The outcome of such organisation could be a self-inflicted
catastrophe, as one manager put it: "The next major accident in the nuclear industry
will be caused by operators following procedures" (Hirschhorn, 1993: 140). In efforts
to protect themselves, (and the power plant) engineers and middle managers
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"subverted formal management processes to meet management's expectations". This
meant that engineers and technicians "feeling unprotected, would hang back and
either follow bad procedures unthinkingly or correct them carelessly" (Hirschhorn,
1993: 139).
The organisational system at Ocean Reactor emphasised the role of rules and
procedures or as Hirschhorn (1993) says, there was an authority based on "rules rather
than roles". There was a displacement ofgoals from "end-centred" to "means-
centred":
This very emphasis (of rules) leads to a transference of the sentiments from aims of the
organisation onto the particular details of behaviour required by the rules. Adherence to the
rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an ends-in-itself; there occurs
the familiar process of displacement of goals... Discipline, readily interpreted as conformance
with regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure designed for specific purposes
but becomes an immediate value in the life-organisation of the bureaucrat. This emphasis,
resulting from the displacement of the original goals, develops into rigidities and an inability to
adjust readily (Merton, 1957: 199).
Ocean Reactor leaders did not assume leadership roles fully; they did not manage the
risk of the enterprise fully; they could not delegate authority and they tried to use
technically developed procedures and rules as a substitute for roles. The structure
promoted:
Functional or instrumental rather than substantive rationality. Since, in this ideal-type state the
rules are complete and consistent, authority is vested in the rules and people need only to follow
these orders (Merton cited in Hirschhorn, 1993: 146).
1.10 TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND NON-VERBAL THINKING
1.10.1 Distributed cognition
At Ocean the written rule was unable to cover all eventualities because some
management techniques required either tacit knowledge or non-verbal thinking. In
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this sub-section we look at the latter and how it matters for organisational
communication. Firstly, we should absorb this thought:
In no society does a member face demands for response in isolation. Always, when she has a
choice to meet demands, there is a backdrop of social relations via which the necessary
resources are channelled to her (Barnes, 2000: 96).
Barnes then suggests that when a society is close-knit (i.e., small work-groups), strong
reciprocal pressures can be generated, thus members are called on to help and assist
[workmates] (2000: 96). Thus: "It is through participating in the community that
individuals... learn the logic of the system and their own role" (Hutchins cited in
Sanne, 1999: 33). Moreover, mutual dependence and shared tacit understandings can
be generated within the group (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 158) which each member
is expected to maintain (Goffman, 1959: 88):
Accomplices in the maintenance of a particular appearance of things ... are forced to define one
another as persons 'in the know'... [Members] tend to be bound by rights of what might be
called familiarity. Among team-mates, the privilege of familiarity - which may constitute a kind
of intimacy without warmth - need not be something of an organic kind, slowly developing with
the passage of time spent together, but rather a formal relationship that is automatically extended
and received as soon as the individual takes a place on the team (Goffman, 1959: 88).
Goffman's work can be linked to Heath and Luff's (1992) idea of distributed
cognition which is: "A process in which various individuals develop an interrelated
orientation towards a collection of tasks and activities" (cited in Sanne, 1999: 31).
This idea and strands of Goffman's work are developed in Johan Sanne's (1999)
study of air traffic controllers. Sanne points out how controllers developed a common
orientation which is maintained by two components: a social component which
"involves a commitment to the task and to the team" (1999: 312) in the way Goffman
and Barnes mention; and a cognitive component which "includes a shared
understanding of the situation and what one should do now, given what colleagues
do" (1999: 312). The cognitive component interests us, for it relies on visual thinking
and image construction.
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Sanne (1999) noted how controllers often use radio communication, strips of stiff
paper with information about a specific flight, radar screens, and closed-circuit TV to
build up a picture of the traffic as a means of understanding the situation. These
objects are used as an "aide memoire" to plan how traffic is to be controlled; to
simulate in the control room the movement of traffic; and to visualize and coordinate
the traffic for themselves and others (1999: 70). The controllers do not necessarily
resort to a mental picture inside their heads in the way Eugene Ferguson might mean
when he refers to the mind's eye (1993).
Each picture of all the controllers in toto adds to an appreciation of the overall
situation; an individual picture is used to fit in to the complete work situation. This
means the picture is used to achieve a working division of labor within the team, in
which everyone knows what to do now and how (Harper & Hutchins cited in Sanne,
1999: 236). Individual controllers come to see themselves as part of the system,
knowing what to do and when. Ultimately, humans and non-humans, i.e., strips of
paper etc (Callon, 1999: 183) are forged together to form a culture ofsafety (Sanne,
1999: 240 & 312).
1.10.2 Knowing what and knowing how: Wittgenstein's paradox
If events are novel though, how can people know the best way to deal with them?
Linguistic philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein deliberated over such contradictions. He
noted how human activity appears to be based on knowing what (Dreyfus & Dreyfus,
1986: 4). I know that 5 + 5=10, and I know this because I know what the symbols +
and = mean. Yet, as a sceptic might ask: How do I know this rule will be applicable in
the future? (Kripke, 1982: 8). My certainty and confidence is driven by something in
my mind, and this something will instruct me on how to conform to the meaning of +
and = (Kripke, 1982: 22).
But, when I concentrate on what is in my mind, what instructions are to be found there? How
can I be said to be acting on the basis of these instructions when I act in the future? ... To say
that there is a general rule in my mind that tells me how to add in the future is only to throw the
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problem back on to other rules that also seem to be given only in terms of finitely many cases.
What can there be in my mind that I make use of when I act in the future? It seems that the entire
meaning vanishes into thin air (Kripke, 1982: 22).
Languages, it seems, are "gradually established by human conventions, without any
promise" (Hume, 1978: 490). Experience and perception, it seems, cannot be
explained by "the application of rules to basic features. [Instead], human
understanding is a skill akin to finding one's way about in the world" (Dreyfus &
Dreyfus, 1986: 4). In other words, "one must do the correct thing with them [rules]
but, they themselves do not determine what this doing will be" (Canfield, 1981: 20),
so basic understanding is knowing how rather than a knowing what (Dreyfus &
Dreyfus, 1986: 4).
Vincenti (1990) continues this important point. Visual aids (like those utilised by air
traffic controllers), and others such as sketches, drawings, images on computer
screens, etc, are only effective tools if the operator knows how to interpret them
competently. He has to possess the relevant tacit understanding, as Burns once put it:
"Knowledge consists of the ability to do something. ... Knowledge is the property of
people rather than documents" (cited in Collins, 1982: 45).
An important difference between members of different groups lies in the contents of their tacit
understandings of the things that they may legitimately do with a symbol or a word or a piece of
apparatus. ... The process of learning, or building up tacit understandings, is not like learning
items of information, but is more like learning a language or a skill (Collins, 1982: 46).
1.10.3 The apprentice and the skilled practitioner
Tacit knowledge therefore, "has not been (and perhaps cannot be) formulated
completely explicitly and therefore cannot be effectively stored or transferred entirely
by impersonal means" (MacKenzie, 1996a: 215). Tacit knowledge, instead, is "built
up by experience or is acquired by example. ... it can only be transferred by personal
interaction" (Faulkner et al, 1997: 19). Collins' seminal work (1982) regarding TEA
laser construction, is particularly relevant.
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In the 1960s some laboratories were intent on increasing the output of gas lasers by
increasing operating pressures. No-one had successfully done this until one Canadian
organisation unveiled the Transversely Excited Atmospheric (TEA) Pressure CO2 laser
(Collins, 1982: 50). Published articles soon appeared in scientific journals and patents
were sold; others were able to copy the Canadian way. However, whilst some
companies had some success, others failed entirely (1982: 51 - 2). One British group
reported that despite creating an apparently exact copy of a successful operating TEA
laser, they were at a loss to explain its failure. Part of the reason is because TEA laser
development and construction did not consist of the logical accumulation of packages
of knowledge (1982: 52), but required constructors to operate skills which cannot be
transmitted through the medium of the written word. Indeed, during his research,
Collins heard of no-one who had succeeded in building a TEA laser using written
sources as the sole source of information (1982: 54). Laboratories only learned how to
build a laser by calling on a specific source who had been involved in construction of
a successful laser elsewhere. An outsider, who did not work in the lab where the laser
was being built, had to be relied on. The source had to make personal visits, and the
frequency of visits depended upon the degree of expertise already available in the lab:
For instance, a spokesman at Origin [Canadian firm] reports that it was only previous experience
that enabled him to see the success of a laser built by another laboratory depended on the
inductance of their transformer, at that time thought to be a quite insignificant element (Collins,
1982:55).
The laser builders required the tacit knowledge of one who had successfully built one
before. They needed at least one member of the team to know where to look for
problems and who was likely to say without formulating explicitly but more often in
the manner of: "have you looked at component x?" In doing so they passed on
judgement skills. Judgement is "the feel experienced designers have for what will
work, and what won't, for which aspects ... can be trusted and which can't [and this
skill] is passed on face-to-face, person-to-person" (MacKenzie & Spinardi, 1996: 231).
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"Tacit knowledge is empirically generated, it is derived through experience,
experimental testing ... and generally through the use of the particular technology"
(Pinkus, 1997: 33-34). This is because it is too difficult to acquire this knowledge any
other way; thus "deliberate organisational learning strategies [must incorporate] on
the hoof or person embodiment mechanisms of transfer" (Faulkner, 1997: 184). This
means there is a need for the apprentice to learn from the journeyman (MacKenzie &
Spinardi, 1996: 216).
Take the apprentice scientist for instance. She is formally trained in the laboratory -
she learns her trade by working through lots of examples under supervision and
through laboratory experience - she is immersed into the culture as she learns to make
inductions in the same way as her peers (Collins, 1997: 129). This organisational
learning strategy gives the trainee scientist the opportunity to pick up tacit skills
which enable them to assess the merits of different experimental paths: which
research directions are likely to bear fruit and which are likely to be of no
consequence? To answer this, scientists must refer to tacit, judgemental skills. Polanyi
(1983) eloquently explains the process:
A most striking concrete example of an experience that cannot possibly be represented by any
exact theory... is an experience within science itself: the experience of seeing a problem, as a
scientist sees it in his pursuit of discovery. It is a commonplace that all research must start from
a problem. Research can be successful only if the problem is good; it can be original only if the
problem is original. But how can one see a problem, any problem, let alone a good and original
problem? For to see a problem is to see something that is hidden. It is to have an intimation of
the coherence of hitherto not comprehended particulars. The problem is good if this intimation is
true; it is original if no one else can see the possibilities of the comprehension that we are
anticipating (Polanyi, 1983: 22).
1.11 CONCLUSION
The management of technology has been at the heart of this chapter, and this is how it
will be throughout the thesis. I analyse how technical decision-making involved with
rail maintenance in the industry is structurally organised; I look at how history,
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culture and organisational change shape risk management and technical decision¬
making. I also refer to the impact of these issues on the worker in terms of (tacit)
knowledge and skill development. I note the limitations of rules whilst discussing
how individuals accrue tacit knowledge and how groups operate it. The theories and
findings put forward by the scholars in the foregoing provide a framework from
which analysis begins. However prior to presenting and analysing findings, the
following chapter explains how I went about my research and gained the findings I
did. I explain what methodologies I used and why.
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2 METHODOLOGY
But a first hand immersion in a sphere of life and action - a social world - different from one's
own yields important dividends. The fieldworker who has observed closely in this social world,
has had, in a profound sense, to live there. He has been sufficiently immersed in this world to
know it, and at the same time has retained enough detachment to think theoretically about what
he has seen and lived through (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 226).
2.1 RESEARCH PRELIMINARIES
2.1.1 Introduction
I now detail in chronological order how I went about my research: from deciding what
to research, to reading related literature, to finding out about the industry, to
introducing myself to the industry, to organising interviews, and to gaining access to
the railway environment for fieldwork. Throughout the following discussion, I also
argue why I did things the way I did. For instance I point out why I chose an
ethnographic study. Firstly I explain why I researched something to do with the
railway industry at all.
2.1.2 Choosing a research project
"What is the point in sociology?"
This question was fired at me during a particularly heated argument with a friend,
who (A): had a misguided notion of what sociology entailed, and (B), was
deliberately being churlish only to get a rise out me. I took the bait. Although I cannot
remember my exact retort, I do remember it being poorly constructed (on account of
the alcohol that had been consumed). I said something like: "look around you... why
are things the way they are? Why do we behave the way we do? Cultures, norms...
it's 'cause of things like that, but where do these things come from - that's what I
want to know?"
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"Why, what would it explain?" My friend continued the inquest. I then remember
turning to the TV and saying that plenty of news stories would be better explained and
understood after some sort of sociological investigation.
This ostensibly haphazard argument would eventually define the following five years
of my working life, for the argument took place on the 18th of October, 2000: the day
after the Hatfield railway crash.
When I turned to the TV, I said something like, "that rail crash... apparently they
knew that rail was dodgy... why did they not stop traffic?" At this point, and having
recently completed a "sociology of work and industry" course for my undergraduate
degree, I went on about industrial organisations; decision-making by workers; formal
and informal work procedures; workplace cultures and so on. All these things, I told
my friend, must have been implicated in that crash. It was at this moment that the
metaphorical light bulb appeared above my head - what a good idea for a research
project, and what timing! I had just recently started my MSc and was searching for a
research topic. This train crash could serve the purpose.
From such implausible beginnings I embarked on my research, and I shall now detail
the directional process of my studies.
2.1.3 Related literature
During the first year of my studies I searched for literature that might suggest how I
should go about my research. It was then that I was introduced to Charles Perrow,
Diane Vaughan, Tom Burns and G. Stalker, and the high reliability theorists. Their
work gave me a deeper understanding of "the industrial organisation". Through their
work I appreciated more the impact that an organisation's social characteristics can
have on the management of knowledge required for effective organisational
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functioning. Organisational culture and decision-making, these authors told me, go
hand in hand and to understand the latter, you have to understand the former.
I realised that I had to complete an organisational analysis of the railway industry if I
was to understand why a train was operated over a rail that was known to be in poor
condition.
2.1.4 The role of documents: foundations to learning
For much of the first year of my research I had contented myself with secondary
sources of information. Documentary evidence needs to be interpreted and
understood. Others (Cicourel, 1964; Bonnell, 1980; Piatt, 1981) pinpoint the critical
aspects of analysing documentary evidence: a document needs to be evaluated in
terms of who produced the document and what their intention was; the researcher
should ask whether there is any underlying bias and whether the creators of a
document have a hidden motive; is the document genuine and authentic? A
streamlining process has to be engineered to determine what articles can be put aside,
which articles should be analysed, and which leads should be pursued. The sheer
volume of documents produced in response to the Hatfield railway crash ensured this
was a lengthy process.
The documents found had advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages were
obvious. If it was a newspaper, depending on its political slant, there was a skewed
opinion that the crash was because of privatisation, or it was because of shortcomings
in the current government's railway transport plans. If it was written by an engineer, it
was incomprehensible to me for reference was made to RCF: the technical problem
that I had never heard of before that was the root cause of the crash. If there were
quotes from a track worker, they often referred to an environment that was foreign to
me and one I could not fully comprehend. These documents, however, gave me an
idea of who is involved in railway maintenance work. I learnt about the role of
Railtrack and Infrastructure Maintenance Companies (IMCs), for instance. I learnt
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about their professional and contractural relationships with each other and how each
slotted into the organisation of rail maintenance.
2.1.5 An unsafe industry?
Documentary evidence also allowed me to dispel the oft-quoted opinion that the
industry's safety levels are at a shockingly dangerous level.
I initially set out to show how safety levels had fallen and that fatalities had increased
and that the organisation of the industry was the underlying reason. This hypothesis
was driven by the media: according to reports, travelling by train was simply not safe.
Figure 2-1 Fatality trends from 1975 - 2004 (Internet source: Health and Safety
Executive website: 13th June, 2005).
Early research suggested differently, as I found that fatality rates had been dropping
and continued to do so. Despite high profile rail crashes in recent years, fatality levels
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are reducing in the long term - in figure 2.1 for instance it is shown how in the 11
years since privatisation (in 1993/1994) there has been 119 fatalities on the British
network compared to 174 fatalities in the 11 years prior to privatisation. Furthermore,
since privatisation, the number of services that operate on the British network has
increased significantly (TTCI, 2000). If research were conducted that correlated
traffic volume to fatality rates it could show the British railway industry is actually
experiencing its safest era ever! At this stage, my research aim began to change.
2.1.6 A shift in research aims
According to accounts (International Railway Journal, January, 2001; and Railtrack,
2001a: 3) the technical cause of the Hatfield disaster was put down to a problem
called rolling contact fatigue (RCF: a term for a series of cracks upon the rail's
surface which, in this case, descended into the internal body of the rail causing it to
fracture), which, it seemed to me, was slowly transpiring as an enigmatic problem: its
exact cause was unknown, a precise solution was absent, the term seemed new to
some whilst to others it was not. Given these inconsistencies, methods to manage
RCF, I hypothesised, could well depend on varying thoughts of individual personnel
and groups. This hypothesis was strengthened after finding out further information
about the rail maintenance activities called ultrasonic inspection, rail-grinding, and
visual inspection19.
Ultrasonic inspection by a train-based system, I heard, was questionable, whilst
manual ultrasonic inspection (at this point in time during my research) struggled to
19 Each of these maintenance activities are described fully in chapters six through eight. For now
however, visual inspection is simply that activity whereby personnel walk along the railway track
looking for problems on the rail and in the railway track environment. Ultrasonic inspection is a non¬
destructive technique which involves an ultrasonic sound wave travelling into a rail to search for
internal defects, and rail grinding is that process whereby the rail's surface is shaved to remove shallow
cracking or to re-shape the rail's profile.
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pick up RCF. Restarting a regular rail-grinding programme was called for by some
after its near total abandonment in the 1980s; I also heard about the difficulties and
limitations with a practice called "visual inspection" of rail. It seemed at the time that
there were many thoughts being put forward regarding how RCF management should
be conducted. Here we have technical problems that must be organisationally and
collectively managed - but apparently depends on the diverging perceptions of those
closest to the technology. On reflection it seemed that I had a topic that could be a
novel addition to the discipline of sociology of technology.
I was now in a clear-cut position: I had to get beyond documentary-based evidence. I
had to talk to railway workers; I had to hear their opinions about rail maintenance. I
had to see them test a rail ultrasonically; I had to find out how this is done, and what
they thought about it. I needed to walk the track with a visual inspector to find out
what those difficulties were; I had to spend time with rail-grinders to see exactly what
it is they do, and what there opinion is of it. I needed to see and hear about all these
things if I was to complete a sociological thesis on the decision-making process
involved in the management of RCF of rail and rail maintenance.
2.2 PREPARING FOR A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH PROJECT
2.2.1 Sociologists should be puzzled from the outset
I wanted to complete a qualitative study that involved interviews and an ethnography.
A quantitative account that involved questionnaires and documentary analysis, I
reckoned would be unsuitable for the study I now envisioned. I wanted to complete a
rich contextual account of rail maintenance. Something in the style of Jason Ditton's
classic ethnography of a bakery in "Part-time work" (1977), or something similar to
Gerald Mars' features in "Cheats at Work" (1994) I thought would unravel and
illustrate in clear detail the complexities of rail maintenance and the life that goes with
it.
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I am not a technical person. I have no qualifications in the likes of mechanical or civil
engineering. I am certainly no expert in ultrasonic testing, and I have to admit to a
distinct lack of knowledge about metals. Additionally, I have simply never had an
interest in railways; I knew there were debates concerning privatisation and re-
nationalisation, but it did not interest me - until now. Considering the topic I was
about to research, some might say that this background of mine could be a major
disadvantage. Indeed, I admit that the thought of interacting with professional
engineers, scientists, metallurgists, ultrasonic testing (UT) operators, and trackmen
filled me with apprehension. I was an "outsider" and I was going to have to talk to
them in their terms if I was going to present my self as a bona fide intelligent
researcher. But how was I going to talk to a UT operator, for instance, if I didn't even
know what UT entailed?
Prior to undertaking social research "the sociologist should regain a sense of
puzzlement about the world. Many sociologists have lost the simple impulse of
curiosity, the desire to solve riddles of experience, the concern with problems. At the
beginning of every sociological investigation there has to be a fact which is puzzling
to the investigator" (Dahrendorf cited in Bulmer, 1977: 16-17).
The technicalities of the maintenance activities I was about to study ensured I was
puzzled from the outset, but this turned out to be quite advantageous. My research
resembled the methods advocated in Glaser and Strauss (1967). Grounded theory is
about the discovery of theory rather than the verification of theory handed down to us
by our sociology forefathers, Marx, Weber, Durkheim20 (1967: 1 - 2). This means
"theory" is "discovered" during inductive sociological examination (1967: 3).
20 In any case, Glaser and Strauss also suggest that sociology's forefathers simply didn't "provide enough theories
to cover all areas of social life that sociologists have only just begun to explore" (1967: 11).
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Inductive rather than a logico-deductive research premise (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:
31) applies pressure upon the researcher to desist from relying on preconceived ideas
to guide research.
To be sure, one goes out and studies an area with a particular sociological perspective, and with
a focus, a general question, or a problem in mind. But he can (and we believe should) also study
an area without any preconceived theory that dictates, prior to the research, "relevancies" in
concepts and hypotheses. Indeed, it is presumptuous to assume that one begins to know the
relevant categories and hypotheses until the first days in the field, at least are over (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967: 33 -4).
My total lack of knowledge of everything I was about to research let me fulfil quite
fully the Glaser and Strauss technique - I certainly did not know what "relevancies"
21would be the mainstay of my research .
Research thus depends upon the "insights" of the researcher. The researcher, the
authors point out, is a: "highly sensitized and systematic agent ... the root sources of
all significant theorizing is the sensitive insights of the observer himself' (1967: 251).
In other words the researcher should "mull over" their research: instead of defining
observations as "opinions", we should "look at them as spring boards to systematic
theorizing" (1967: 252). The researcher can also "borrow insights" (say from
literature) from others as long as they are not "cultivated at the expense of insights
generated by the qualitative research" (1967: 251 - 2). In practice, however, this
means that the sociologist has a precarious task. They must:
Balance between the two sources by avoiding the reading of much that relates to the relevant
area until after they return from the field ... on the other hand some read extensively before
21 For instance 1 did not know that "tacit knowledge" was going to be a major topic in the thesis -1 only realised
this after completing some fieldwork.
74
hand, others periodically return to one or the other for stimulation. There is no ready formula, or
course: one can only experiment to find which style gives best results (1967: 252).
2.2.2 Learning a language and finding out what my research is about
Prior to conducting any interviews and fieldwork, numerous trips were made to the
science and technology library. Texts about railway construction, management, and
maintenance were read. I came across technical terms that I had never heard of before,
but would become an essential part of my "research vocabulary". Instead of talking
about railway tracks, it was the "permanent way", and the "stones" beneath the track
turned out to be "ballast". And that section where a train travels from one line to
another, that's not points, it's a "switch and crossing", and parts of these can be made
of a form of steel called "manganese" that is "ultrasonically un-testable".
I also found out that my research was all about what happens where the train's wheels
meet the rail, or in industry-speak, the "wheel / rail interface". What happens at this
interface, it transpires, is hugely consequential for the rail, especially at curves where
something called "cant deficiency22" matters, and likewise, what occurs on the rail's
surface also matters: "wheel burns" (when the wheels of the locomotive'slip as the
vehicle starts to move causing rail damage), "wear", "cracking" "shelling", "fatigue",
and "squats" (all defined later, or see glossary), can occur and what is more, each of
these either occur on the rail's "head", "gauge corner", or "field side" which is
sometimes known as "the cess-side" (all defined later, or see glossary), and depending
on the character of the fault it may be classified to a sub-type such as "gauge corner
cracking", "head-checking", "field-flow", "lipping", or "false flange damage" (all
defined later, or see glossary).
22 Cant deficiency is where one rail is higher than the other at curves. This helps to ease the locomotive
round a curve, however because there are many different types of traffic travelling at different speeds
round the curve, the cant is not suitable for every type of vehicle - hence the deficiency.
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I did not, of course, pick up immediately what all these terms meant by merely
reading books. Attending two rail engineering conferences early on in my research
helped significantly. At these meetings I heard people talk in these terms "naturally",
and I was able to "see" what they meant on diagrams on overheads and handouts. I
saw how the terms were applied to real life situations. I now knew about their
existence and I had a rough idea of what some of them meant, and at the same
conferences I was able to start to talk with some railway workers, tentatively using
their terms for the first time.
2.2.3 The reason for a comparative study
At these conferences I found out that other railway organisations around the globe had
similar or identical problems too, yet diverging rail maintenance options were
presented to the audience. I gathered that different national industries had different
maintenance perspectives and utilised different methods for managing the wheel / rail
interface.
Donald MacKenzie tells us that: "Sociologists of scientific knowledge have seen their
task as being to explain how different groups of people come to put forward different
knowledge claims, rather than to adjudicate between these claims, or to put forward
an analysis premised upon the superiority of one set of claims. Faced with
technological controversy, the task of the sociologist of technical knowledge is surely
the same" (1996b: 248 - 9). The reason for some sort of comparative study was
becoming clear: it could grant access to otherwise unobtainable and unforeseen
matters that could strengthen the project as a whole. Findings from two different
national rail communities could illustrate quite explicitly how rail maintenance
depends upon socio-historical issues such as norms, cultures, conventions, etc. From a
practical viewpoint as well of course, my findings might well suggest how each
industry can learn from each other's experiences.
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2.3 GAINING ACCESS
2.3.1 Contacting British and Swiss rail maintainers
Gaining access to two different national industries was not the problem I thought it
would be. My co-supervisor, Dr Schmid, is a British-based professional engineer at
The University of Sheffield; he has numerous contacts in the British industry. He is
also a Swiss native with contacts in the Swiss railway industry.
For my British-based research, Dr Schmid put me in touch with one engineer and
after a brief phone call where I introduced myself and spoke a little about my research
aim, a time was set for my first meeting. For the series of interviews that ensued, I
contacted individuals who were suggested to me by the last interviewee, a process
known as "snowballing" (Black, 1993: 50). Some interviewees did not mind me using
a Dictaphone to record the session, on most occasions, however, they did. Rail
maintenance and railway industry issues in general, as I have already pointed out, is a
sensitive issue in Britain and, because of this some workers were unwilling to be
recorded. When they did object they were, however, happy for me to take notes
which, I ensured them, would remain anonymous. Throughout this thesis, all
respondents remain anonymous; all names mentioned in ethnographies are thus false.
In any case, using a Dictaphone, I found, was often more hassle than it was worth. I
found out that "ringing" mobile phones interacted with my Dictaphone to such an
extent that interference drowned out my respondent. In a busy office where I spoke
with many workers, mobile phones routinely rang - thus a lot of interviews were
spoiled at numerous parts. Taking hand written notes was a must.
For my Swiss-based research, Dr Schmid was involved extensively. He made several
phone calls to members of SBB (the main Swiss rail operator), and he gave me
contact numbers and email addresses. I drafted letters detailing my research and asked
if there was a possibility that I could visit the organisation to talk with workers and to
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view rail maintenance techniques. They kindly offered to set-up some interviews over
one week and, depending on how it went, a further two weeks could be organised for
observations.
2.4 INTERVIEWING
2.4.1 Learning curves and interviewing techniques
I now discuss how I prepared for interviews and how my ability to guide
conversations developed over time. What I say is applicable to my experiences in both
countries. Where there were marked differences in my approach, I mention these there
and then.
The more I talked with industry workers, the more I learnt and, as I progressed, my
ability to converse with the respondents greatly improved23. Nevertheless, the point
remains, not only was I researching issues connected to the wheel / rail interface, I
was continuing to learn about the industry all the time. This had obvious, on-going
impacts on my interviewing technique.
My first set of interviews was more un-structured than semi-structured. I prepared for
interviews by having a list of headings which were often labelled by those "new
terms" I noted above. I let the respondents talk about these things, and they often
explained them quite deeply, often by sketching. Ensuring that the respondents talked
about the point at hand was not a real problem, after all, they knew much more about
the wheel / rail interface than I did. They spoke at length "in their own terms" (May,
23 Towards the end of my research I got back in touch with some of the men I had spoken to quite early on in my
research. One of those I spoke to again was (Int: 01). He complimented me on how my understanding had
progressed.
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1997: 112) on both critical matters and matters that I simply would not have known
about, given my non-technical background. Thus, trying to utilise a structured
technique would have been impossible.
A key difference for interviewing in Switzerland and Britain is obviously language.
Over 18 months before visiting Switzerland, I started to learn the French language. I
managed to progress to a basic conversational level and, helpfully, many of the
workers I eventually met up with spoke good English or broken English. Whilst
learning French the conventional way - with CDs, French newspapers, BBC learning
zone, and one-to-one tuition, I also had to learn technical terms. For instance, the
permanent way is the voie ferree (way of iron). Having some understanding of the
French language helped enormously as much of my research was completed in the
French speaking parts of Switzerland.
The more I interviewed workers (in Britain and Switzerland) the more my
understanding of technical matters developed; through time I was able to pose
"relevant" questions. In the latter stages interviews were often semi-structured, as I
was able to guide conversation towards certain topics (Bell, 1993: 94) whilst using
technical terms intelligently.
2.4.2 Research design and development
My research did not follow a pre-planned timetable. Instead, what I found out during
one interview often suggested the next research step. The most notable instance of this
was the "Personal Track Safety (PTS) certificate" example.
Time after time, interviewees ask me if I had a "PTS". A PTS is a safety related
certificate that all railway workers must have if they are to get on the permanent way.
And time after time, the same respondents suggested that issues would be better
explained if I saw them for myself - this was the reason many respondents resorted to
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sketches to explain issues. This was my first inkling that the spoken word had its
limitations in rail maintenance.
The industry does not just hand out these safety certificates to anyone who may be
interested in obtaining one. There is a strict process that private companies must
adhere to. This meant that I had to become a member of the industry, and this
involved me becoming an unpaid member of contracted staff of a rail maintenance
company. An interviewee offered me this chance: I signed a contract of work; my
national insurance number was required, and the amount of hours I was willing to
work was accepted as nil. I signed the contract after successfully completing the
three-day course and certification process required for the PTS, which also depended
on passing a medical, alcohol, and drugs test.
The actual course itself involved health and safety videos, preliminary questionnaires
relating to the videos and role playing24.1 was issued the safety rule book which I had
to revise prior to the final examination.
With my PTS I was able to go on site at a (different) railway maintenance company's
discretion. Over a period of roughly three months during the summer of 2003,1
accompanied visual inspectors (at night and during the day), ultrasonic operators
(typically at night) and manual rail-grinders (always at night). Work on the permanent
way is done during a "possession," meaning, where engineers take possession of the
line (see chapter eight, page 236 for possession planning and problems). Possessions
24 I had to pretend, for instance, that I was at the scene of an accident or hazardous situation, such as seeing a
broken rail. Depending on what equipment 1 had, I would have to do slightly different things. But typically I would
have to contact the signalman or electrical control office telling them my location whilst using the phonetic
alphabet and other appropriate railway terminology. I would then describe the problem and what 1 require - block
the line [to traffic], for example.
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during the night are typically planned to start after the last service has passed. This
meant that I often travelled to different sites for work, with workers at around about
midnight. Possessions often finish in the region of 5am - give or take an hour or two.
On my first day ofmy second visit to Switzerland, I was given a detailed timetable of
all the places I was going to visit and the people I would meet during rail
maintenance. Most of the work I describe from my research experience in Switzerland
(in chapter nine) was completed during daytime.
2.5 FIELDWORK
2.5.1 Secret societies, trust, being accepted, and learning how to interact
Erving Goffman once said about social research: "any group of persons - prisoners,
primitives, pilots or patients - develop a life of their own that becomes meaningful,
reasonable and normal once you get close to it, and a good way to leam about any of
these worlds is to submit oneself in the company of the members to the daily round of
petty contingencies to which they are subject" (cited in Gilbert, 1996: 156).
I got close to those petty contingencies and, as a result, I found that the whole
experience of being at a possession added flesh to the bones of material I gathered
from interviews. On the whole, attending possessions was a completely different
matter to the interview set-up.
During my first stints of fieldwork, it tended to be just the supervisor of the UT group
or grinding group who knew that I was coming along to see things, thus when I turned
up and met the small groups of workers I was going to watch, I was often an
unexpected addition to the small squad. Such a situation has profound implications
from both the researcher's and the workers' point of view. To the group, why I was
there watching them was hugely important. The opportunity for me to join a working
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group was initially organised by senior management based in offices. Thus, it was
conceivable to the group that I might be there to "spy" and to report back to senior
managers (May, 1997: 142). This suspicion was eased over time however, and quite
often at the end of a night's work I would organise with the team members when I
could next come along to a possession with them. This required the swapping of
personal mobile phone numbers; something that the men I was with did not mind after
getting to know me. Indeed, on some occasions, a member of the group, or the group
itself would drive to my home and pick me up if there was work to be done in the
area. This, I believe, is a strong indication that I was accepted by the group, and that
they had a significant level of trust in me.
At the beginning, however, I was an outsider and I would have to be accepted (Bell,
1993: 10) if my research was going to work at all. In his paper "Good People and
DirtyWork" Hughes (1964), wrote: "We are dealing with a phenomenon common in
all societies. Almost every group which has a specialised function to perform is in
some measure a secret society, with a body of rules developed and enforced by the
members...". For my work to be successful, I had to be accepted by the secret
societies I was going to watch.
The teams of manual rail-grinders and UT operators - who often also act as visual
inspection teams - were normally made up of three to four men and a supervisor.
Depending on the possession start time, the supervisor would ask the team to meet up
at location "x" - this was typically a yard where equipment is stored. The UT
operators, for instance, would test (calibrate) their machinery here. Once this was
done, we would all climb aboard a van and travel to the site. The time in the yard, the
time in the van, and the time waiting in railway sidings for the possession to start, was
absolutely invaluable to me. It gave me a chance to talk with the men I was going to
watch. I could tell them all about my research; I was able to ask questions, we had
numerous chances to converse about their work and mine. This was incredibly
important, for it slowly allowed them to see who I was and what my agenda was. I
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firmly believe that those moments prior to any work getting done, and when we had
the chance to talk informally, helped me to become accepted.
Simply writing notes had to be accepted by the workers. The men's trust in me was
critical, and therefore, I made it clear on all instances of research (when I met new
workers) who I was and what I was doing. I ensured the men that they would be
anonymous in any likely papers; this was important given the current climate and
sensitivity of safety of rail maintenance in Britain. This, I believe, let them speak to
me (and behave) openly, honestly, and most importantly, normally.
After meeting up with the same groups after a few nights, I felt I was accepted to a
25
significant degree" judging by the nature of the conversations I had with the men. For
example, we shared jokes, but I was also able to empathise with them about working
during the night. We often spoke about our sleeping patterns during the day, and we
had the same moans if the day was particularly bright and sunny and disrupted our
sleep. To a certain level, my daily routine became the same as that of the railway
workers I was watching. This again, helped me to become accepted by the group as I
had the same gripes about the rail maintainer's lifestyle.
2.5.2 Interpreting proceedings and the role of the researcher
Those occasions when we were waiting and when we chatted, had added importance
to me as a researcher. It gave me time to test my knowledge of rail maintenance. This
is related to another important methodological issue - interpretation and validity
(Burgess, 1984: 143; Dey, 1999: 24). How do I know that my interpretation of things
251 don't know if I could ever consider myself as being "fully" accepted. I was, to start with, an outsider, and
though I got to know the men, and was able to chat quite comfortably with them in the end, I, in a sense, will
always be an outsider. I am social researcher watching them, 1 am not a UT operator or hand grinder in "their
group".
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is a valid reflection of what occurred? In my case, the actual research environment
gave me numerous chances to clear up any queries. There is a lot of "waiting"
involved with railway work, so during these moments I was able to run my ideas and
understandings by the workers I was with - they corrected me and made issues
clearer. My understanding was refined continuously. Furthermore, I contacted some
interviewees after our meetings to clarify points, and I wrote two papers during my
research period which were read by some industry members. Feedback was positive
and they indicated that I had developed a clear understanding of the issues discussed
in the thesis.
As a researcher, and as an outsider to the workgroups I watched, I must acknowledge
that my mere presence will have had an effect on the situation. By what I have
described regarding my relationship with the group members, I would suggest that the
consequence of my presence was minimal in terms of the actual work that the men
did. I hope that this is borne out through my accounts of their work in later chapters.
2.6 ORGANISING AND ANALYSING DATA
2.6.1 Filing systems
For my ethnographic study I completed a comprehensive diary and transcribed dozens
of interviews which required circumspect analysis. Glaser and Strauss (1967: 43) say
"collection, coding and analysis of data [should be] done together as much as
possible. They should blur and intertwine continually from the beginning of an
investigation to the end".
For my analysis I created an ongoing filing system. Themes were indexed and
categorised - which enabled effective compilation and division of numerous sub¬
topics. This process was assisted by a coding system that enabled cross-referencing of
interview and observational data: trends in terminology, skills, history, risk
interpretation, respondents' thoughts, and further themes were drawn out (Sanne,
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1999: 54; Lofland, & Lofland, 1995: 131 - 135). This process was completed in a
traditional way. My analytical and filing system consisted of numerous folders with
headings, ideas and topics. Laid out on my office floor, I shuffled the topics around
which let me "see" trends and suggested ideas which would be inserted into a "thesis
map" illustrated on a large white marker board.
2.6.2 Taking notes and my tacit knowledge development
In writing an ethnographic-based thesis, there is pressure on the author to show that
he or she "was there", and that what is written is a true account of what he saw. He or
she has to "make it real". As Dalton (1959: 61) points out: "The social investigator
must sort out his values and obligations and weigh them repeatedly throughout the
research process... he is committed to give as clear a picture of what exists as his
limitations allow". Correspondingly, my aim was to capture and record accurately
what I saw. However, the railway environment made it impossible for me to write up
full notes there and then.
I had to conduct my observations largely at night. So I often observed detailed
technical work (such as the detection and treatment of tiny, scarcely-visible flaws in
the rail) at 2.00 a.m. or 3.00 a.m., in darkness and sometimes in cold weather and
pouring rain! At other times, I was observing groups of workers in daylight hours,
but with the constant danger of an express train suddenly appearing around a bend in
the track. Because of this I tended to write down key words, terms, and drew
diagrams. When the men were not working and when it was safe, I was able to "fill in
the blanks" by asking supplementary questions. Once the possession was over and I
was home I was able to complete a diary. Several notes from this diary are replicated
in the following chapters.
These diary entries are full of detail that does not necessarily revolve around specific
technical work procedures. For instance, I do not merely describe how, say, UT, is
completed as a technical exercise. Instead, I show how the actual process of
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ultrasonically testing a rail is part of a social system made up of individuals and
groups who interact with: each other; the machines they use; and the environment.
This means that I give lengthy accounts of activities which at first glance may appear
to be quite unrelated to the overall issue, but which show, ultimately, what is required
for successful UT. In much the same way as Burgess (1984: 169), "my notes were
predominantly descriptive and aimed to provide a detailed portrait of the various
situations in which I became involved. The field notes included physical descriptions
of situations and informants, details of conversations, and accounts of events ... I
focused upon the words and phrases that were used so as to provide an almost literal
account of what had been said".
Like Burgess, I was able to "build up a portrait of the relationships in particular
settings and of the structure of particular groups" (1984: 169). Focusing on, and
extensively detailing, the seemingly "mundane" or "unrelated" has further worth.
What may be perceived as mundane I found, is typically the normal order of routine
work practices which, on analysis, turn out to be quite complex and not necessarily
straight forward (Lofland & Lofland, 1995: 133) By focusing on the typical work
practices involved with UT and manual rail-grinding, for instance, we see how the
label "routine work" is actually a misnomer. Instead, the processes that underpin
seemingly "routine work" are tightly coordinated, complicated and rely on tacit
understandings.
On occasion I did not merely observe; on some nights the workers let me participate
in activities. In chapters seven and eight respectively, I describe my efforts at UT and
magnetic particle inspection, but it is in chapter six - the visual inspection chapter -
that I am able to give "my account" of the tacit knowledge that I developed as I
became socialised into railway maintenance work. Searching for minute cracking, I
point out, is extremely difficult - being aware of numerous variables such as light,
shadows, and dampness all affect how one sees the rail. Thus it was not until a few
days had passed that I was able to gain an understanding of these matters and how it is
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one comes to "see" light cracking. I describe, in chapter six: 6.5 pagel69, how one
isolated crack swims into view only after the "trained" eye "knows" what to look for.
In these instances I demonstrate how I became a small part of the rail maintenance
workforce. I was not just watching and describing: I was able to give my experience -
indeed in chapter six: 6.5.7 page 178,1 describe one event which shows some
consequences of becoming a socialised "visual inspector" of the permanent way. In
the words of Marshall and Rossman (1995: 16), I would suggest that from "real world
observations, dilemmas and questions have emerged from the interplay of the
researcher's direct experience, tacit theories, and growing scholarly interest".
2.6.3 A note on the text
In the following chapters I refer to quotes from interviews, these are off a smaller font
and are closed with (Int: xx). Excerpts from my fieldwork diary are written in
Tahoma, and are closed with (Fw: xx). Though the fieldwork notes detail my
observations, there are on occasion direct quotes from workers, they are written in
" Tahoma italics."
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3 BRITISH RAIL, ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE,
AND PRIVATISATION
Because interchange of structure and function goes on over time, a natural history of an
organisation is needed: We cannot understand current crises or competencies without
seeing how they were shaped (Perrow, 1972: 175).
3.1 HALCYON DAYS?
3.1.1 Introduction
In this chapter I deal with the culture of British Rail (BR) and how it affected the
privatisation process. By referencing words and memories of some of those who
worked for BR and who are now retired, semi-retired or still working in the privatised
industry, we garner an insight into how work was organised. We see how knowledge
about the permanent way was stored and preserved, developed and utilised. We will
see how a certain sense of community enabled the perpetuation of this knowledge: it
will be shown how permanent way assets were managed. The idea of an asset register
will be explained through a discussion on the privatisation process, and how the
industry lost critical maintenance knowledge. Initially, I look at the organisation of
BR and how it affected maintenance activities after privatisation.
3.1.2 The Organisational Culture of British Rail
Birmingham's National Exhibition Centre is the location for a massive railway
industry exhibition that is held biennially. At one exhibition a retired railwayman told
me:
Before privatisation management was not so specific, I was a maintenance engineer. I was
responsible for a certain length of track. I had a sense of ownership; others like me had the same
philosophy (Int: 18).
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Once, as I am being driven to a site on the West Coast Main Line, the driver, who has
been in the industry for the 30 years tells me:
BR had its faults, but it had a lot of good. We were lucky at this IMC [Infrastructure
Maintenance Company], we call ourselves railwaymen - I am a railwayman. When you meet
other railwaymen or just telling people in a pub or on holiday that you're a railwayman there's
immediate rapport. There used to be 152,000 of us.... There's a kind of selfishness - we want
our place to be ship-shape, we're all railwaymen and you don't want a derailment in your area,
we feel sorry for the other guy when it's happened in his. But now it is split into little money
making machines... And now when you're working, it's... you know what I mean... they're not
railway men, they're contractors. You don't mean any harm by it, but that's just the way it is
(Int: 08).
Elsewhere I am in a van parked by the side of a railway. It is nearly 1AM and we are
waiting to hear from the Person in Charge of Possession (PICOP26) to give us
clearance to get on site. It would be an eerie place to be if it were not for the vans by
the railway side and the dozen or so men in orange fluorescent jackets who are dotted
around the area. They are either unloading machinery, talking to each other, using
mobile phones, or perusing papers. I ask a railway worker for his thoughts on BR and
the organisation today:
Privatisation ruined the railway. At [location x] you walk past people in jackets with a different
company name on the back and no one speaks to you. But we did when it was one company.
You don't know them now; and you don't know how they work if they're not going out of their
way to speak to you (Fw: 02).
Back in Birmingham's Exhibition Centre another retired railwayman gives me his
account:
26 Pronounced - "PIE-COP"
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For track inspection I would walk from Pontefract to Wakefield on the Monday; then back again
on the Wednesday. The walk was done in the morning; then back in the afternoon to repair what
was found. .. .The gang would do the job there and then; they wouldn't know what the job was
until they got there. But you were asked, or you would ask - do you think you could do that -
people spoke to each other. Then at the weekend it was lengths of the Pontefract to Nottingham
line. You had to travel, always travelling to different areas, used to see a lot. You enjoyed it.
You knew what was going on (Int: 14).
The differences between communicating knowledge about the permanent way during
BR and privatised times were again referred to by another retired permanent way
engineer;
During the BR days it was very good, if you didn't know the answer to a maintenance problem,
you would ask a colleague. If there was a problem you didn't know or understand there was
always someone who did know. It was a closed community in that sense, now there's a loss of
networking (Int: 18).
A lack of networking, a lack of communication, a loss of community, and a lack of
knowing what is "going on" in the private industry was illustrated to me quite
perceptibly during one episode of fieldwork.
The scene: I am being driven to a site; there are two other railway workers with me
who together, have over 60 years ofrailway experience. We are talking in general
about BR, Raiitrack, communication, andRCF:
A: There's a need to address what causes it [RCF], sometimes you need a quick fix,
but you need to look at the long term. ...BR had a good research base at Derby, and
we found out what was happening with a BR newspaper, but it [the research base]
was sold off... Do you know what research Raiitrack are domq?"[Question to me]
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I answer by telling them about the involvement of WRISA (Wheel/ Rail Interface
Systems Authority). I have to tell them both what the acronym stands for and what
the group intends to dcf7. Neither of them has heard of WRISA. B, then points out
how things can be found out haphazardly:
B: You find things out by chance now; sometimes someone in the office will have a
rail magazine, [he mimics the scene] look what they saying about RCF! - [he then
shrugs his shoulders].
A: It's not that bad, finally Railtrack are getting better, but there is a problem. You're
not sure what is going on anymore. In the past all the records were kept at
[location]. But now IMCs have their own records."
Then, as ifsymbolising the lack ofcommunication in the industry, when we arrive at
the site we see this: the large metalgate for access to the railway is ajar. Typically,
these gates are shut and secured with a padlock. Beyond the gate there is a van with
a different emblem on it from ours. It is a different company and three of its workers
are by the railway side.
A: Oh, there's someone here... what are they doing... I wonder if they've got a
possession?
A approaches the other workers to enquire about their business. Whilst he is doing
this I ask B who he thinks they are.
B: It could be [name of contractor]... but I doubt they'll have a possession...
27 WRISA will mainly collate information on RCF from different areas of academic and private industry research
whilst being funded by industry members, it also intends to coordinated and enhance communication between all
bodies with a keen interest on good wheel / rail interface).
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A comes back to the van and says, "No, they haven't got a possession, they're
planning work though, they're nearly finished" (Fw: 20).
This small incidental scene illustrates ideas of loss of networking, loss of community
and shared knowledge, and so on. As a further instance, compare it to the following
notes:
A railway track dissects a desolate expanse ofcountryside; the route joins two main
towns. Iam walking along this line in the 4-foot (the section of track that is between
the two rails of the same line). This route and others make up a large region, the
maintenance ofwhich was once under the control of the railwayman I am now
talking to.
I used to be in charge of this area, I had 447 men. There were the ultrasonics, the
welders, the plate layers... I knew them all by their first name.... It's different now in
the industry, you don't know who you could be working with. These guys are alright
[he is referring to the three men with us; the Controller of Site Safety28 (COSS), and
the two look outs], they're agency, but last week I was working with a lad who was
on his mobile phone every minute to his girlfriend, that's no use. I won't work with
him again (Fw: 08).
Then with reference to the Hatfield rail crash and the role of "pride" in the past,
another railway man with nearly three decades experience and still working today
said:
Hatfield would never have happened here, that was poor. They knew about that rail
and it should never have been left... that wouldn't happen here. When you're on track
28 As the title suggests, the COSS ensures that safety procedures are followed. This involves discussion
with the look-outs (for trains) as to where they should be positioned on the track and how they will
communicate with us, and discussion with me to ensure I know where my point of safety is in the event
a train comes. The COSS also takes my Personal Track Safety (PTS) certificate number at the start of
the shift.
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you note everything, a hole in a fence, you try and fix it there and then, even if it's just
temporary, but then you go back and fix it properly, you make sure it will be sorted....
It's about pride, I don't know if it still exists in the same way since the companies came
in (Fw: 16).
The maintainers responsible for the site at Welham Curve, Hatfield did indeed know
about its poor condition. A leaked report of the official investigation into the crash
(Financial Times 08/05/01) details this by listing the chain of events before the crash.
• 1998: Cracking in the rail on Welham Curve on the East Coast mainline first noticed
by the area maintenance engineer: Rail recommended for grinding programme
1999/2000, but cancelled; re-scheduled for following year.
• Mid-1999: Area engineer decided the rail needed replacing quickly: gave Welham
Curve top priority out of 10 sites.
• Early January 2000: Railtrack renewals project manager on East Coast line receives
the proposals, by which time Welham Curve was on a list that was "impossible to
deliver" within the existing work schedule. List sent back for prioritising: came back
with six items marked "PI" (to be done within a month). Renewals manager had not
seen the code PI before and never knew what it meant.
• January 26th 2000: Jarvis, the renewals contractor sent to survey the site, but
surveyed wrong site, completed second survey three weeks later.
• March 2nd 2000: Jarvis warn that one month is too tight to get so much rail renewed
and to get enough welders.
• Spring 2000: Five of the six sites prioritised re-railed out-with one month time limit,
Welham Curve site not re-railed. Welham Curve to be re-railed with nearby Hatfield
Curve over nine weekends between March and May.
• April 28th 2000: Work gets started. But, two rail delivery trains were late and could
only drop off part of their load, another could not work below the over head
electricity lines. Due to delays there is only time to complete Hatfield Curve.
Welham Curve not started.
• Summer period 2000: The busier summer timetable allowed fewer slots for
maintenance and renewal, Jarvis understaffed with welders.
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• September 2000: Railtrack arrange for grinding to start at site, but experts fear
grinding might be detrimental and could make cracking worse at this late stage.
• November 2000: Welham Curve renewal scheduled to start at the end of November:
six weeks after the crash (Financial Times: 08 / 05 / 01).
This timeframe suggests that a loss of networking, lack of pride, and inadequate
knowledge about "what was going on" all impacted upon the crash. Problems were
exacerbated because key workers had insufficient knowledge of the area and
insufficient access. This underscores some differences that were intimated to me by
those I spoke to. Differences in pride between "then" and "now" are apparent: pride
of BR workers is strongly noticeable, when listening to them it is instantly audible,
almost palpable. A sense of workers belonging to a region that housed its own
community promoted a sense of "ownership" of an area of track; and this was helped
by maintainers having uncomplicated access to "their" track:
In the past when the engineers needed their line they got it, it's not as easy as that
now (Fw: 07).
Workers developed a sense of affinity with their region and knew its weak points.
Knowledge was accumulated by the railway men; informal asset registers developed
in the minds of regional workers:
I mean one of the fundamental problems is, prior to privatisation, there were a lot of track
engineers out there, they all had their length of track that they inspected and knew very well
And they knew the problem areas. And the problem with privatisation was, there was a big loss
of expertise, and with privatisation you had all these contractors coming in, and, they never had
the experience. So there is a big lack of experience (Int: 27a).
Developing experience and getting to know an area required incessant learning:
I was in the industry for 40 years, and training started on day one and finished on my last day.
There was no specific training, no formal training for track inspection, it was on the job. The
track patroller would walk the track one, two, maybe three times a week, if you saw something
you would report it to your engineer. Knowledge was passed on like that (Int: 18).
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In a similar vein, others said:
Basically there was no training, it was passed on; it was all stuff you picked up and you
progressed that way. It was knowledge you would pick up every day; rail alignment; twist faults;
fencing, and other off track things and so on. It was all hands on. .. .But progress, that's the best
way to go because you need experience, you need to build on experience. You need to build on
experience because you can't give a fortnight course worth of training then say go out there and
know everything (Int: 13).
Training, other than p-way designers was down on the track, all hands on, nothing was done in a
classroom (Fw: 09).
We can summarise what these men are talking about by referring to Railtrack's Chief
Engineer:
In the past you worked in a gang of experienced people and learned what to do through a
combination of instruction and emulation. And it worked (Modern Railway, September: 2002).
This method of work and learning meant that:
There was no cross fertilisation, no leadership and people on the track had their own thoughts of
how to address issues on their track (Int: 03).
This was often due to geography:
Take a simple thing like flooding. We know we are going to spend a lot on flood prevention. But
take a place like Cambridgeshire, there is no place to put the water. Whereas our problem is
water coming down the embankments, and there is a lot you can do about that. So there are
going to be different solutions in different parts of the country. A risk assessment of how you
control it and put it into the current budget changes in different parts of the country (Int: 03).
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Yet the point remains:
Everyone knew each other. In the areas everyone had the same knowledge, there
was no need to share... this could mean there were areas of good maintenance and
bad maintenance (Fw: 19).
BR maintenance was characterised by "regional baronies" (Wolmar, 2001: 55) where
gangs of maintenance workers in different regions developed and trained their own
members, and harnessed their own methods under the stewardship of a regional chief.
This in turn generated a sense of pride and ownership as "work planning ... was based
on a work bank with significant local discretion" (Edmonds, 2000:75). But have these
memories of BR been manipulated by the passage of time and idealised? The
following piece of text forces us to refocus if we think that BR was an untroubled
organisation.
3.2 BRITISH RAIL: HALCYON DAYS?
3.2.1 The 12th of December, 1988
In recent years the privatised railway industry has suffered a series of catastrophic set¬
backs leading to calls for re-nationalisation from members of the press, the public,
and politicians: their argument being that privatisation is failing and safety levels have
dropped. In adopting this view, whilst accepting the words of the BR men, we might
idealise BR, but we should not. The organisational structure illustrated in the last
section is re-examined in the context of another BR department.
During the 1970s BR had to acknowledge the deficiencies of its regional baronies. To
fulfil obligations under the 1974 Railways Act, BR "recognised that the existing
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organisation needed to be reshaped... and the desire [for organisational] change was
encouraged by the failure [of an earlier project29] to transform regional management,
and the consequent pressure to impose a firmer grip from the centre" (Gourvish, 2002:
24). Despite the changes that were made in 1974, BR had to concede that in places,
loose, decentralised regional command, in some areas, still existed some 14 years
later; and this undermined the organisation's commitment to safety.
On Sunday 27th November 1988 one Mr Hemingway, a senior technician, was
working in the relay room at Clapham Junction. The relay room controlled the
signalling for the tracks leading to the Junction.
Mr Hemingway was considered by his superiors to be a very good worker. He would make his
own assessment of the task in hand. He would consider it carefully. He would make the plan in
his head, and then put it into effect. There were no complaints about the standard of his work. In
the eyes of his colleagues and superiors he was a thoroughly competent and efficient senior
technician (Hidden, 1989: 65).
Two weeks later on the 12th of December, three trains collided at the same junction.
35 were killed and hundreds were injured. The crash was caused by signal WF138
giving an incorrect aspect to the driver of the first train; a problem that was caused by
or\
the working methods ofMr Hemingway" . The subsequent report (Hidden, 1989) into
29 The project was called Field Organisation: "a proposal to remove one of the middle-management tiers and
replacing the existing regions with eight territories. By 1974 it was clear that this attempt to restructure middle
management was met with fierce resistance... and was abandoned in January 1975" (Gourvish, 2002: 11).
30 "At 8:10 a.m. on the morning of Monday, 12th December 1988, a crowded commuter train ran head-on into the
rear of another which was stationary in a cutting just south of Clapham Junction station. After the impact the first
train veered to its right and struck a third oncoming train. As a result of the accident 35 people died and nearly 500
were injured, 69 of them seriously... They were all travelling in the first two coaches of the first train.
"It has already been established that the electrical "culprit" for the false feed of current to signal WF138
was an old wire in the relay room at Clapham Junction. One end unintentionally re-established contact with a
terminal on relay TRRDM and the other was actually connected to a fuse. The current permitted to flow out to the
signal. This situation was the result of electrical work done in the relay room on the two Sundays in the fortnight
before the accident" (Hidden, 1989: 1 & 57).
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the accident illustrated several features of organisational practices which, in the end,
remind us of the rhetoric of the permanent way men who spoke to me.
The "reality" of the competencies ofMr Hemingway, when compared to how his
superiors and colleagues perceived him, "was very different... many of the errors [he]
made in the relay room [were] errors he had made all his working life". They were not
isolated momentary lapses; they had become his standard working practice" (1989:
65). The report did not point the finger of blame at Mr Hemingway alone; the entire
organisation of BR was blamed.
That he could have continued year after year to follow these practices, without discovery,
without correction and without training, illustrates a deplorable level of monitoring and
supervision within British Rail which amounted to a total lack of such vital management actions
... Those charged with responsibility for monitoring and supervision fell down completely on
their tasks, so did management and so did those responsible for the issuing of instructions, both
oral and written, and for the provision of training, both "on-the-job" and in the classroom. ... Mr
Hemingway... had a bare minimum of training on courses and no training for any technical
qualification whatever. It is in light of that experience and that lack of training and of
qualification that one can begin to understand his working practices (Hidden, 1989: 65 - 67).
In conclusion, a QC, stated:
I make it quite plain to you that in relation to all these matters we recognise that these are not
satisfactory and indeed bad practices, but that the blame for that does not lie with you, it lies
with British Rail (Hidden, 1989: 68).
Hidden concurred:
These errors of practice were not Mr Hemingway's alone, but were part of a widespread way of
working, almost a school of thought at technician, senior technician and even supervisor level
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within the Signalling and Telecommunications department of Southern Region British Rail
(Hidden, 1989: 65)31.
Groups of workers in BR tended to develop idiosyncratic ways of working. It was a
practice that underpinned BR's functioning: when it failed it was catastrophic, as
shown by the Clapham disaster, yet it was a valuable mechanism in terms of
managing the permanent way: permanent way engineers developed in-depth asset
knowledge. In the end, however, this organisational structure was to be completely
overhauled.
3.3 PRIVATISING BRITISH RAIL
3.3.1 91/440/EC, the Tory party, and Privatisation
The impetus for the restructuring and eventual privatisation of BR was connected to
the railway transport ideology of the Conservative government of the 1980s and early
1990s, and their interpretation of the European Commission directive 91/440.
Gourvish (2002: 259 - 262), Wolmar (2001: 58 - 85), and Hutter (2001: 263) confirm
that the Tory government started discussions on rail privatisation during the 1980s.
After their re-election of 1992, the Tory government led by John Major, embarked on
a privatisation process that saw the enactment of the 1993 Railway Act, which paved
the way for the sale of the component parts of the old BR. The Tory plan was to some
31 In depicting the findings of the Hidden report I have endeavoured to show how work was organised and
supervised only. Though the report is concerned with the organisational structure of the S&T department, I think,
by reference to the railwaymen above and to Gourvish's work, this structure appears to have been replicated
throughout British Rail, including its maintenance organisation. In no way am I suggesting that the poor quality of
the actual work of the S&T department is emblematic of British Rail as a whole. What I am suggesting is that the
way work was structured and organised in this department appears to have been symbolic of British Rail's
organisation (re: lack of training for instance which is mentioned in the Hidden report and referred to by railway
workers earlier). Indeed as we will see later, a restructuring process was initiated with the aim of flushing out the
inefficiencies connected to this organisational structure.
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extent prompted by the EC directive which had come into being in July 1991. This
directive included the following proclamation:
In order to render railway transport efficient and competitive as compared with other modes of
transport, Member States must guarantee that railway undertakings are afforded a status of
independent operators behaving in a commercial manner and adapting to market needs
(Brussels, 1991. 440/EC).
The Tory ideas concerning the re-organisation of railway business and the rules
imposed by Brussels connected, so when it came to utilising the EC's proposals the
Party fully embraced Section 3, Article 6 of the directive: "Separation between
infrastructure management and transport operations". In the eyes of the European
Commission, this separation was only a must in accounting terms in that the costs of
maintaining the infrastructure had to be kept apart from the costs of operating
transport. The wording goes:
Accounts for business relating to the provision of transport services and those for business
relating to the management of railway infrastructure are kept separate. .. .This separation shall
require the organisation of distinct divisions within a single undertaking or that the infrastructure
shall be managed by a separate entity (Brussels, 1991. 440/EC).
Major's administration fully embraced the second option, and Railtrack was one of
the first organisations created.
3.3.2 Railtrack
Railtrack32 was ultimately responsible for controlling the entire railway network; it
had several activities, such as selling train paths to train operators, controlling train
movements, and maintaining and leasing stations and depots. Most importantly,
12 When I refer to Railtrack - I am referring to Railtrack Pic - the operating arm of Railtrack Group.
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Railtrack was also charged with "maintaining and renewing the railway
infrastructure" (Glover, 1999: 6).
Though Railtrack was created to fulfil these obligations, the company itself did not do
the practical hands-on work of driving trains and maintaining fixtures and fittings,
instead Railtrack was the controller of who did these tasks. In matters of the
permanent way, Railtrack decided which company had access to the track for
maintenance and renewal of assets. In practice this meant that Railtrack was charged
with controlling those who maintained approximately 20,000 miles of track. The idea
that Railtrack should be a controlling organisation and not an "engineering
organisation" was deliberate: the intention was to create an "engineering-free
corporation" (Gourvish, 2002: 249).
[Railtrack] was to own the track and signalling, but not engineering activities. It was to function
as an access, capacity management, and sales organisation; and it would buy in all its
engineering requirements, not only physical renewals and new construction, but also with
detailed inspection and monitoring functions.... Although Railtrack was to own the
infrastructure, a critical feature of the new [privatised] structure was the contracting in of
maintenance and renewal work in civil, signal, and telecommunications engineering, electrical
equipment and fixed plant (Gourvish, 2002: 402 - 3).
The organisational restructuring processes that led to Railtrack outsourcing work are
complicated, yet reference to these processes is essential if we are to understand why
work was organised and described as it is in later chapters.
3.3.3 Privatising Railtrack
Railtrack was initially envisaged as a publicly-owned organisation that would
supervise the role of private contracted companies (Wolmar, 2001: 86-7; Gourvish,
2002: 401). This meant Railtrack was government owned when the maintenance and
renewal division of BR was being re-organised with a view to being split-up for sale
to different companies. The re-organisation was coordinated under the rubric
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Organising for Quality (Gourvish, 2002: 394) that was designed to flush out the BR
inefficiencies which caused the Clapham Junction disaster and typified the working
structure of the regional baronies. The result was the creation of BRIS - British Rail
Infrastructure Services. BRIS's headquarters oversaw the establishment of 14 regional
infrastructural units (Gourvish, 2002: 403) which would be sold to the likes of Balfour
Beatty and Jarvis:
Infrastructure maintenance and renewals companies were formed out of parts of the former
British Railways Board (BRB) organisation to carry out physical works on behalf of Railtrack.
They were sold into the private sector, largely to construction companies (Schmid, 2001:
Conference paper).
The sale of maintenance and renewal work occurred when Railtrack was not yet a
private company, so during this time, it is alleged by Wolmar (2001), Railtrack had no
"say " in the sale of these units. "When Railtrack was created the track maintenance
and renewal companies were not part of its structure. Instead they were also in the
process of being separated out from British Rail and put up for sale" (Wolmar, 2001:
89). The exchange and allocation of infrastructural responsibilities took place between
BR and the maintenance companies alone: "The maintenance contracts were let in
1995" (Wolmar, 2001: 91), whereas Railtrack, it was eventually decided, was sold "to
the private sector in April 1996" (Gourvish, 2002: 403). The effect for Railtrack was
significant. One Railtrack manager explains how it was impossible for the company to
get information out of BR about the nature of the contracts:
British Rail were saying that the contracts were commercially confidential. They did not want us
to know what was in them. ... The contracts were 'closed book' which meant that Railtrack had
no idea what the real costs were, nor how much profit the contractors were making (Wolmar,
2001: 89 & 91).
Effectively, this meant that "British Rail, under instructions from the government, was
setting out the terms of contracts between two third parties, Railtrack and the BRIS
units" (Wolmar, 2001: 90). It meant Railtrack was in charge of, and owned assets,
which were being used and maintained by companies whose contracts were not
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originally determined by Railtrack. This arrangement resulted in an almost total lack
of asset knowledge within Railtrack.
3.4 THE DIASPORA OF SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE
3.4.1 Shedding workers and historical under-investment
The creation of BRIS intended to flush out BR's inefficiencies. Down-sizing staffing
levels was seen as essential: "necessary restructuring would require the unbundling of
a very large number of individual posts" (Gourvish, 2002: 403). Figures released by
the National Union for Rail, Maritime, and Transport (RMT) outline the outcome for
track workers alone: in 1994, the year after Railtrack took over from BR, 21,500
workers were employed on track maintenance. By 1998 that number had fallen by
26% to 15,500'33. Jack (2001: 59) similarly points out that "between 1992 and 1997,
the number of people employed on Britain's railways fell from 159,000 to 92,000.
These figures are backed up with some details in a 2002 RMT report34:
There are [since privatisation] far fewer permanently employed rail maintenance employees, and
far more casual and agency staff who are used by contractors and sub-contractors on the
network: The number of permanent staff employed on rail maintenance has collapsed since
1994, when BR began to make preparations for privatisation by making massive voluntary
redundancies. Under the privatised companies, the permanent workforce has continued to fall:
Directly employed Rail Infrastructure Employees Since Privatisation
1994: 30,280
1995: 25,204
33 The Times (20/10/00).
34 "RMT submission to the Potters Bar Inquiry outlining the case for bringing all infrastructure work directly




Intriguingly enough the same report then points out that:
Latest figures from Sentinel in May 2002 show that the number of PTS cardholders has now
risen to approximately 120,00036. [However many of the card holders are temporary staff which
accord with the]: peaks and troughs nature of maintenance work, and the implied dangers this
creates - particularly with regard to sub-contractors:
Much of the work is undertaken at night and particularly at weekends. Such activity leads to the
creation of peaks in demand for support services such as specialist plant and labour. For this
reason the IMCs and track renewal companies are under-resourced from within their own
organisations and they turn to their suppliers for labour to reinforce their own pool of track
workers.
The report also found that many (namely, permanently employed railway
infrastructure maintenance company staff - i.e. non-agency staff) in the industry had a
deep mistrust of sub-contractors:
The lack of desire for ownership of health and safety issues by the [labour] agencies, not always
helped by main contractors, is a major factor. Current labour suppliers are "unreliable", and have
no "strong allegiance" to or expertise in the railway industry. ... The risk of vagrant workers
travelling from site to site with inadequate local knowledge or rest between shifts are not
sufficiently controlled.
351 gained this information from the RMT internet source: 14th April 2005, which in turn, detailed their sources
as: 1994 and 1995 data from BRB (British Railways Board) accounts 1994/95; 1996 data from HOC Written
Answer Dunwoody / Hill, 16th January 2001 (Column 187W), 2002 data from Rail Forum fact-sheets / RMT
Membership data.
36 This is same PTS card that I obtained for my research, as I detailed in chapter two.
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The impact this work system has had on skills levels is noted in a Railway industry
Training Council (RITC) report (2001) entitled: "Analysis of Priority Skills in the
Railway industry". It states: "The issue of recruiting people to undertake skilled and
operative work on the rail infrastructure is a concern ... The need for qualified
engineers, technical staff, skilled employees and operatives represents a challenge for
the industry" (RITC, 2001: 5 - 6).
Streamlining the workforce was designed to remove deadwood and to make the units
of BR attractive for selling, but inadvertently many key workers left the industry:
While restructuring was rightly driven by a desire to remedy weaknesses, in so doing, it failed to
appreciate that real strengths were also being thrown away unnoticed. These included strong
industry leadership, a highly effective organisational structure and the sheer professionalism of
the delivery machine (Modern Railways, March: 2001).
The legacy can be traced till recent times. In 2001, Rod Muttram of Railway Safety,
said: "If our industry is going to build the bigger better railway the politicians are
willing to fund, we have to recognise that we don't have the human resources to do it.
We have to remember when talking about 'resources' we are really dealing with a
multitude of skills" (Modern Railways, July, 2001). Thus the shortage of experienced
railway engineers has been described as "worrying" (Modern Railways, September,
2002).
Compounding the situation was the level of financial input. The Railway Industry
Training Council (RITC) point out: "low levels of investment during the last decades
of BR left the newly privatised industry with a series of equipment and infrastructure
headaches which will take many years to resolve" (RITC, 2001: 14). Similarly
transport specialists - Transport Technology Centre Inc. (TTCI) - in a report for the
Office of the Rail Regulator noted how this affected rail renewal trends:
There has been a falling trend in rail purchase since the 1960s... Levels of rail purchase were
historically low through the mid-90s. Since the railway network has not decreased in size
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significantly over this period the implication is that average rail age has been increasing. Since
the number of cycles of applied fatigue stress increase with age, increasing rail age implies
increasing fatigue and hence increasing numbers of defects and breaks37 (TTCI, 2000: A-21).
The decrease in permanently employed track workers and the decrease in financial
investment impacted on the permanent way's fitness-for-purpose. This was outlined
38
in yet another report' which, after interviewing many industry workers, stated:
It was broadly felt that a legacy of years of under-investment in maintenance and renewal,
coupled with poor asset management, resulted in the deterioration of network assets and an
inability to expand and to cater for growth. Interviewees pointed out that the average age of
track had increased dramatically since 1984 as a result of the reduction in renewals. Insufficient
investment was exacerbated by the loss of asset knowledge at privatisation. They felt that
Railtrack chose not to build an asset condition register (DTLR, 2002: section five).
3.4.2 Shedding workers: Dispensing with an asset knowledge base
On May 24, 2001 Railtrack's Technical Directorate was set up to rectify Railtrack's
lack of knowledge of its own assets:
Assets are now being measured, monitored, and having their condition verified on a consistent
basis across the network. .. .This recognises the role that Railtrack hasn't had in the past. [This is
because] Railtrack was not set up with control over its assets. Through BRIS, BR had an asset
stewardship role, but this was not passed to Railtrack (Modern Railways, March, 2002).
A key reason as to why an asset register was not passed to Railtrack was due to the
way BR historically managed this very knowledge during its incumbency. BR's
regional permanent way maintenance communities developed and shared local
37 The report's authors account for advances being made in rail production techniques such as the de-oxidisation
process which is discussed in the next section.
18 This time commissioned by the Department of Transport, Local and Regional Governments, 2002: "The GB
Railway industry: In Its Own Words: Problems and Solutions".
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knowledge of local problem spots. The methodology of developing, storing and
utilising this information was not centrally controlled and stored: asset information
was in the heads of the railway men. So, when the men walked away from the
industry during the downsizing process, a valuable asset register left also.
The Rail Regulator, Tom Winsor, likewise suggested that problems post-privatisation
were exacerbated by a lack of knowledge about the network's assets which stemmed
from BR's organisation. "British Rail had a great deal of information about its assets
OQ
but it was not organised in a systematic and accessible way" :
Things have got steadily worse, and now we find that the once great power house of the railway
industry is in danger of stalling. How could this have come about?
I believe the answer is found in the mistakes of the rushed privatisation with too many corners
cut, weak regulation and a company which squandered its skills base whilst neglecting the
condition of its physical assets. ... Engineers were discarded and before long an essential skills
base had been significantly diminished. ... Railtrack has no reliable and accessible register of its
assets, with too much essential knowledge missing, misunderstood or locked up in the heads of
people who had left the industry. For a company whose very existence is wholly dependent on
the condition, capacity and capability of its assets this was a recipe for serious trouble. And
that's exactly what has happened (Winsor, 2001: Conference paper).
My own research illustrates the consequences of losing knowledge about assets. At a
rail manufacturing plant, a senior metallurgist told me:
The main causes of rail failure are: boltholes, star-cracks at boltholes; thermite welds [see
gloassary - Continuous Welded Rail); and in 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s rail it was taches ovales.
Prior to Hatfield we carried out a major study because rail breaks were increasing and Railtrack
were telling us that it was because of taches ovales. But, because of our production process the
internal quality of the rail is now hugely different. .. .The whole integrity of it is better because
39 (The Observer: 27/07/03). The regulator expanded on this theme elsewhere, for instance an extract of a speech
delivered to the Institute of Electrical Engineers is now given (June, 2001).
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of the de-oxidisation process, so we shouldn't be getting taches ovales. So we asked them to
send some samples back with taches ovales. We looked at them and told them they were RCF
defects. The problem was coming from the wheel / rail contact area and going down into the rail.
Taches ovales are defects that are manufactured into the rail and grow outwards from within,
and now, you will not find taches ovales manufactured into rails because of the de-oxidisation
process40. Railtrack were wrongly classifying defects. They lost a lot of expertise (Int: 22).
The recipe for disaster that Winsor referred to reached a climax. Spiralling
maintenance and renewal costs; delays in project completion41; increased reliance on
public revenue, and; the confidence of the public and its reaction in the aftermath of a
series of disasters signalled the end. Railtrack Pic, during the period of this research
project was shunted out of business.
40 On the same matter, a researcher who studies the causes and manifestation ofRCF, Dr Stuart Grassie, points
out: "Tache ovales are associated with bad welds, though they do occur elsewhere. They are commonly considered
to be defects which develop 10 - 15mm below the railhead from longitudinal cavities caused by the presence of
hydrogen" (International Railway Journal, February, 1997)
41 The up-grading the West-Coast Main Line, for example.
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4 CURRENT THINKINGABOUT AN OLD PROBLEM
At that moment the train was passing... And past it went, past it went, mechanical,
triumphant, hurtling towards the future with mathematical rigour, determinedly oblivious to
the rest of human life (Zola, 1996: 44)
4.1 A 200 YEAR OLD PROBLEM
4.1.1 Introduction
In chapter three the reorganisation of the industry was discussed in terms of the effect
it had on skills levels. The impact had obvious far-reaching consequences for the
private companies that came into the newly privatised industry - their personnel had
to address the knowledge gap created by those BR workers who had left the industry.
In chapter five we look at the make-up of one private maintenance company - we
look at how it socially manages rail problems: we look at the methodologies that are
used. However, in this chapter we take a moment to look at the technical side of
things. We find out a little more about the fatigue of rail and what research activities
are currently on-going. In doing so we find out what opinions and thoughts accentuate
current thinking regarding wheel / rail interface management issues and what ideas
guide the organisation of maintenance methods discussed in chapter five.
4.1.2 An old problem
During my research I interviewed a scientist concerned with the development of
knowledge of the wheel / rail interface. To explain its complexity he said:
The railway's interface and the contact conditions are very important... simulations using a
very simplified twin disc test, two discs rotating against each other and the contact
conditions there are assumed to be similar to rail, for if you take for example a wheel and
localise contact, this is also curved so it's like having two discs there. However, the
complexity in real life is much more than what it is in the laboratory, it is not a one to one
correlation; cracks will develop after the passage of so many wheels. It will not necessarily
match with what happens here (Int: 23).
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Figure 4-1 The flange and rail head relationship (source: Jack, 2001: 36).
These words were spoken by an industry scientist in 2003 and appear to concur with
what others have said about the wheel / rail interface:
As carriages are kept on the rail by flanges on the wheels [see fig. 4-1], it is obvious that
where curves are quick, the friction on the side of rails, and the consequent retardation must
be very great. This is a point which, till lately, has not been sufficiently attended to...
[Thus] the setting out of curves on the ground is a work requiring considerable skill and
exactness (Booth, 1830: 61).
These words were uttered by a Director (Henry Booth) of the Liverpool and
Manchester Railway - the first proper railway line to connect two major cities. It
opened in 1830, and clearly wheel / rail interaction was a problem that its chief
engineer - George Stephenson - had to contend with. Indeed a colleague of his wrote,
after conducting numerous experiments on frictional resistance:
There is no subject, perhaps on which there is a greater diversity of opinion, than in the
laws which govern friction (Wood, 1838: 388)
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Wheel / rail interface problems in other words have always created dilemmas for
engineers ever since the idea of placing a metal wheel on a metal rail was put into
practise by one Richard Trevithick in 1804 (Garfield, 2002: 66).
George Stephenson is often referred to as thefather ofthe locomotive, but in that simple
form the statement is untrue.... It was Richard Trevithick who first practically showed...
that a steam engine with smooth wheels could be made to travel and haul a load along a
smooth track; that it could be driven with wheels on more than one axle coupled together
(Robbins 1980: 9).
Trevithick's experiments and inventions included the construction of the engine
Catch-me-who-can. Trevithick showed off his engine to an intrigued public, however:
After several weeks of running in a circle, at 12 miles an hour, for the amusement of
passengers who cared to pay a shilling for the ride, a rail broke and derailed the engine.
Unfortunately, for Trevithick, the number of shillings collected prior to the break in the rail,
and subsequent derailment, were insufficient to pay for putting the wreckage back together
again (Paul, 1975: 323).
Figure 4-2 Trevithick's Catch-me-who-can (Internet source: Spartacus.schoolnet
website, 5th August, 2002).
This outcome led Trevithick to confront:
The most fundamental questions of friction and slippage, finding that the weight of the
engines alone was enough to ensure good traction in fine weather. But this presented
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another dilemma, one that torments engineers to the present day: how to prevent the rails
cracking under the colossal new load of moving machines (Garfield, 2002: 66-67).
4.2 RESEARCHING A 200 HUNDRED YEAR OLD PROBLEM
TODAY
4.2.1 Elements that are difficult to interpret
The wheel / rail interface still torments engineers today. The increasing frequency of
RCF problems and the willingness of many railway undertakings to fund research
into its origins and the development of an understanding of its impact are indicators
of the interface's complexity.
During their service life, wheels and rails are subjected to a large number of repeated
contacts. For instance, a wheel on a passenger coach can travel 200,000-miles per year,
equivalent to about 100 million revolutions. Although these contacts are scattered across the
width of the wheel tread, a small area on the wheel is still likely to see more than 10-million
contacts per year; this cyclically stresses the material through rolling contact (Clark &
Dembosky, 2002: Conference paper).
It has been shown that as result of such intensive contact:
The natural processes of wear and deterioration of steel can proceed at a pace that results in
long service life, or they can result in rapid condemnation of a rail (IHHA, 2001: 5-54).
Where the wheel / rail interface encourages the shortening of rail life it is also known
that the:
Rail surface suffers from failure in the form of wear (detachment of material) and RCF
(cracking) (Kapoor, 2002: Conference paper)
The process of deterioration that gives rise to RCF and wear involves the
deformation of the rail. The rail:
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Accumulates deformation until the ductility of the material fails (Kapoor, 2002: Conference
paper).
The Railtrack document RT/PWG/001 (Railtrack, 2001a) described the same
process:
In track, the running surface of a rail gets rolled out by the passage of wheels which results in
the creation of a zone of residual compressive stress at, and just below the surface (Railtrack,
200 la: 12).
Traffic tries to roll out the top surface of the railhead
Because the top surface is attached to the metal beneath, it cannot expand freely (as shown on the
right). The effect of rolling out is therefore to put the top layer in compresison;the layer below this
is also put into tension to balance this.
Compres s ion
4*
Figure 4-3 Residual Stress Development (source: Railtrack, 2001a: 12).
It is also widely accepted that, when under repeated / cyclic stress, as rails necessarily
are, two behavioural characteristics can be expected.
Repeated loading of rail steel will lead to either elastic or elastic-plastic behaviour (Kapoor,
2002: Conference paper:).
The former (elastic behaviour) sees the rail returning to the initial state that existed
prior to the passage of contact. The latter (elastic-plastic) sees the rail surface stressed
beyond the limit where which it could return - this will result in "plastic
deformation" (Hiensch et al, 2001: Conference paper). In figures 4-3 and 4-4 the
stresses that create the potential for metal movement and plastic deformation are
illustrated.
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When exposed to a cycle of applied pressure as illustrated above, the metal will
fatigue and its fitness-for-purpose will reduce. However, as long as the pressure is
applied constantly and equally over a specific time-based period the resulting crack
will exhibit a developmental pattern at a constant rate relative to the applied pressure
Developmental patterns of cracking can result from normal steady-state conditions;
as such, the developmental patterns become interpreted as normal:
Fatigue crack growth prediction is ofprime importance for engineering design. Each cycle
during crack growth under certain constant amplitude loading sequence contributes a
characteristic and equal crack growth increment to the extension of the crack (Lang, 2000:
588).
When the conditions are steady-state, predictions of crack growth and fatigue over
time are feasible.
Rolled out surface.
Figure 4-4 Residual stress development. Current thoughts on metal movement
of rail (source: Railtrack, 2001a: 12).
4.2.2 A shift in thinking
It was considered that steady-state conditions were inherent at the wheel / rail
interface, but recent rail-failure trends (see fig. 4-5) have suggested that there should
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be a re-think. During 2000, and before the Hatfield derailment in October of that
year, the Office of the Rail Regulator invited the American company TTCI to assess
and compile a report of Railtrack's methods for managing broken and defective rails
in light of growing rates of rail defects.
Findings told how a specific rail failure type, RCF, is now a major form of rail defect
not just for the British network, but for many other railway networks around the
world. They wrote:
Three of the major passenger railways report RCF damage (shells and squats - subsets of
RCF) as the number one cause of defective rails. This illustrates the rise in RCF damage on









Figure 4-5 Long-term trend of broken and defective rail removed from British
network (source: TTCI, 2000: A-9).
As a recommendation for Railtrack, the report's authors said:
Given the growth in numbers ofRCF defects (such as squats and gauge corner cracks - both
are subsets of RCF) which pose a special safety risk, Railtrack should actively pursue
research to gain a better understanding of the way in which the defects form in order to





A consequent development in Britain was the formation of the Wheel / Rail Interface
Systems Authority (WRISA). An aim of the authority was the drawing together of all
those in the industry (i.e. maintenance companies, vehicle operating companies,
infrastructure owner) who have a commercial interest in the quality of the wheel / rail
contact spot, as it is widely believed that RCF is a manifestation of the interaction
between wheel and rail. A speaker for the authority at a conference said:
RCF is a consequence of operating steel wheels on steel rails - [RCF] will always be present
in one form or another (Clementson, 2002a: Conference paper).
He then conceded that there had been a shift in perception that departed from the
"steady-state42" school of thought. He claimed that there was an:
Initial belief that RCF was due to steady-state operations and that the conditions were, in
effect, designed into the railway. ... But it has become clear that many of the mechanisms
leading to RCF are not steady-state (Clementson, 2002a: Conference paper).
Lang did not suggest that steady-state conditions characterised the wheel / rail
interface of the railway industry, it seems, however, that this was a common line of
thinking: Lang only described the process ofmetal fatigue from cyclic pressures
which are constant and "normal". The idea that stresses at the wheel / rail interface
are "transient" and not "normal" or "constant" marks the shift in perceptions hinted
at by Clementson (2002a: Conference paper). It is now thought:
Wheel / rail contact stresses and traction coefficients are both steady-state and transient.
Steady-state causes are a consequence of the constraints placed on the engineering design of
the railway system such as tight curvature in geographically restricted location. Transient
causes are the result of normal vehicle / track degradation or imperfections in the
42 As a reminder of what was described on pages 112-3, steady-sate conditions refer to conditions that
are constant; meaning any cracking and wear will exhibit developmental patterns relative to the
pressure applied, enabling prediction of fatigue and crack growth. Transient refers to conditions that
are not steady-state, thus predictions of fatigue and crack growth are infeasible.
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maintenance of the infrastructure and/or the vehicles (Clark & Dembosky, 2002: Conference
paper).
Determining contact stresses and the traction coefficients, for predicting rail lifespan
has become the focus of much research. The research problem is characterised by
gaining an understanding of the steady-state and transient nature of the stresses (see
fig. 4-6), as an example of the likely sources of these stresses) involved at the
interface. As Eickhoff (1999) suggests:
The rolling contact of the steel wheel on the steel rail is a phenomenon that is peculiar to
railways and is fundamental to an understanding of the behaviour of the railway system.
[But] the way in which the forces (that are required to stop and start, support and guide the
railway vehicle) are generated and transmitted are highly complex and highly non-linear
(Eickhoff, 1999).
Figure 4-6 System diagram for wheel / rail interface variables (source:
Brentnall, 1998).
About figure 4-6, the author tells us: "All the above elements contained within the
"wheel / rail dynamics system can have a direct impact on RCF and crack
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propagation rates" (Brentnall, 1998: 15). Quite similarly, Eickhoff (2002: Conference
paper) suggests that managing the problem of RCF, and ultimately understanding it,
is a mammoth task. This is because of the large number of identified influencing
variables that are connected to the wheel / rail interface and which pose a problem in
the search for an optimal performance of wheel and rail. Eickhoff (2002: Conference
paper) lists some of these variables below; the list is not intended to be exhaustive




Wheel profiles - new and worn
Wheel diameter
Track Factors
Curve radius, cant, gradient
Track structure, support stiffness -
fastenings, etc
Track geometry - design /maintenance Rail
profile - new and worn
Consequently, rail specialists across the globe are concerned with understanding the
interaction of these variables. One group of technicians offer the hypothesis:
Once linear and angular wheel-set coordinates, velocities, and forces are known from the
vehicle / track interaction, then the magnitude and distribution of normal and tangential
stresses, relative slippage (creepage) and friction on the contact patch can be found, provided
that the rail and wheel profiles and third body properties are known. The latter is a rail / wheel
contact mechanics problem (IHHA, 2001:3-4).
Wheel material









The authors then demonstrate the problem for rail engineers by analysing the wheel /
rail interface from two angles. They labelled one: the normal problem, and the other:
the tangential problem. To start, they refer to the work of Hertz who:
Presented the first reliable mathematical solution to the normal problem. [The solution Hertz
proffered] determine[d] the size and shape of the contact region and the normal contact stress
distribution. [Hertz's solution assumed that] two bodies (wheel tread and rail rolling surface)
touch at a point. [Thus] the un-deformed distance can be defined if the radius of the curvatures
in the region of wheel and rail are the same. [Also] if the bodies are loaded by a normal force,
then an elliptic contact area comes into being with a longer semi-axis along the rails
longitudinal axes, [and by way of an equation] the maximum contact pressure can be
calculated (IHHA, 2001:3).
But, for Hertz's theory to give a valid reading of normal contact stress on rail and
wheel tread surface it has to follow some assumptions such as:
The contacting bodies are homogeneous and isotropic
The contacting surfaces are frictionless
The contacting surfaces are smooth (IHHA, 2001: 3-7/8).
The "normal" problem may be rephrased as the "ideal" problem: where all aspects of
the properties of wheel / rail interface are perfectly understood. Yet, there resides the
problem and goal for the railway industry.
During vehicle movement the position of the wheel-set in relation to the rails changes
considerably resulting in various combinations of wheel / rail contact zones. ... Even for a
constant axle load, the normal contact stress distribution varies considerably because of the
difference in radii of the curvatures in these regions of the contact.... [Thus] the Hertzian
assumption is not valid and a non-Hertzian solution is necessary for predicting the contact
patch geometry (IHHA, 2001: 3-7/8).
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4.2.3 Examples of current research
Of the railway industry's attempts to gain a non-Hertzian understanding of the
problem of wheel / rail mechanics, a respondent told me:
There're a lot of different research activities ongoing at the moment concerning the track. The
research is an accumulation of, and mixture of, history, current working practices, new
research, new technology and best practice experience (Int: 19).
Given now are just two examples of current research activities.
Example one In a paper presented to an audience at The Institute of Mechanical
Engineers, a member of Railtrack discussed the "Wheelchex" programme:
In 1999 the number of broken rails being reported periodically was increasing. In this
climate Railtrack committed to a programme of reduction and included within that was the
introduction of "Wheelchex" on the network to monitor and address excesses of vertical
force as impacts from wheels on rails. ... [U]sers had to be recognised, operators had to be
included to complete the system development, procedures for communicating and using the
data had to be written, reliability had to be designed in, the costs for maintenance and on
going development had to be addressed (Wasserman, 2002: Conference paper).
Clearly, communication, cooperation and, most importantly, feedback between the
infrastructure owner (Railtrack) and the personnel from different parties they
collaborated with to create the programme, were critically important if it was to be
successful. The parties included passenger and freight service operators, maintainers,
and consultants.
The response from operators and Railtrack zones has varied from initial suspicion to
enthusiastic embracing of the information. Most operators have recognised that the output has
supplied them both with real information to manage maintenance as well as a means to be
compliant with Railway Group Standards (Wasserman, 2002: Conference paper).
During the presentation the danger of non-cooperation between parties was
highlighted by illustrating a hazard that hit a similar programme elsewhere:
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It is useful to compare this against the experience in Spain where an installation [of
Wheelchex] has not progressed any further as the cooperation between operator and
infrastructure and supplier did not appear to take place (Wasserman, 2002: Conference paper).
The thrust of the speaker's argument is simple: the introduction of new technology
requires explicit cooperation because of the organisational structure of the industry
and the nature of the wheel / rail interface. Management of one side of the interface
cannot be independent of the other side. A change on one side has to take into account
the impact it will have on the other. To be precise: Network Wide Collaboration Is
Essential:
There has to be an industry-wide response to implementation of condition monitoring because
the systems tend to interrelate - the wheel and the rail interface. Real improvements are being
made in reducing the number of broken rails, and train operators are also more aware of the
consequential damage being caused to their subsystems by poor wheels. These achievements
had been made by drawing together of the interested users by Railtrack and AEA,
(Wasserman, 2002: Conference paper).
This example emphasised the need for cooperation and exchange of knowledge
between the parties at the heart of the industry, i.e., the train operating companies
(TOCs) and Railtrack, in the area of rail-condition monitoring.
4.2.4 The need for balance
Continuing this line of enquiry, it was also argued that the industry had to be "joined-
up" regarding matters about the wheel and the rail. A member ofWRISA told an
audience at a regional meeting of the Institute of Mechanical Engineers, that the
system had to "be in balance with itself'. To describe what he meant he spoke of
historical changes within the industry whilst offering an array of significant examples.
He mentioned how "traffic rates are now higher", and that "traffic is getting heavier".
Underpinning his argument, he gave a simple example as to how traffic is getting
heavier in one way, and the effect this has for the track components:
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A TOC wishes to have air-conditioning: it's fitted. This puts the weight up, especially as
carriages are also longer now. Braking performance is changing: Braking capacities need to be
higher as traffic is faster. There have been changes in the track. The track is now stiffer than
what it was; due to a change from wooden sleepers to concrete sleepers. The suspension of
vehicles is stiffer now than it ever was. Yaw dampers are fixed on all modern vehicles; this
affects the vehicle / track interface on curves. Wheels are smaller in diameter now but we are
unsure as to the effect that this has (Clementson, 2002b: Conference paper).
The important point is that all these changes have an impact on what happens in the
wheel / rail contact patch. The players involved with the development of the
components mentioned, must move together. This point was agreed upon by an
industry metallurgist;
The problem is the rail is one component in a system, if you're designing a pin for a car, you
don't know how it will be used by the operator. Our standards and others' standards are
scientifically based, but rolling stock has to be maintained, dampers have to be maintained,
springs have to be maintained. Everything has to be maintained exactly then there may be no
RCF. The whole thing has to hang together; the problem was that it was split up; there were
changes all over the system. After privatisation sales dropped, we then produced 30,000 -
40,000 tonnes of rail, that is enough to cover just .6% of the network, that is estimating a 150
year life span for each rail (Int: 22).
The industry clearly has to move together, and if they do not, one industry worker
suggested:
There has been a significant change in the weight of the vehicles, in the speed of the vehicles,
that has to have an effect, to give you an example, [name of TOC services] they have
motors... they have driven axles... virtually every other axle is driven so the amount of power
that you are putting into the rail is quite high and that has an effect. Equally, over the years the
amount of investment into the track maintenance has been limited, and things deteriorate. The
railways of this country are 150 odd years old so, everything has to come together. Now small
changes are the straw that broke the camel's back because you're so at knife's edge (Int: 23).
Elsewhere, others mentioned specific instances of "industry-parts" moving out of
sync:
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The problem of RCF was highlighted post-Hatfield, but RCF has been documented for the last
20-30 years - it was not a significant problem, but an imbalance was created: rails have
remained unchanged over the last 150 years or so, I think the first steel rails, as we know
them, were laid here in Derby in... 1857 or so. The chemical composition is pretty much
unchanged, but the manufacturing process has changed, tolerances have become tighter, but it
is a dated system and the imbalance is using vehicles with higher tractive and braking forces
on it. There's been an optimisation of vehicles, but not with rails... I mean rail profiles have
been played with, but the same problems remain (Int: 25).
Echoing this, another said:
You can pick on a lot of different areas; they'll all have a contributory effect. Newer vehicles
will steer better around corners, and the suspension is better. Whereas before you had vehicles
going all over the rail but now there is more focused contact on one area of the rail that is
being worn and hardened. Whereas before there is more balance across. Also you've got
increased forces, there is a gradual deterioration of the track, which is increasing because of
financial cut-backs on the track maintenance. And they're introducing trains with higher
traction forces, so it all seems to be contributing to general rail deterioration and RCF (Int:
27a).
Then, through a graphic account of differences that existed between industry
members, an industry scientist explained why the different organisations involved in
railways and their management must cooperate:
Again, you have to excuse for this because you will always get a personal bias here. My
perception of the industry was that it was extremely difficult to get to understand the practical
situation of the railway / wheel interface because effectively the guys running the railways
said you guys go and do what the hell you like in the laboratories leave us to run the railways,
don't come and interfere. So access to the track was very, very limited. What Hatfield did
was, if there can be a silver lining to such a catastrophe, make them aware of the potential
disaster that can happen. So access to track became a lot easier. So now we are monitoring
about 30 different lengths of track regularly (Int: 23).
123
Functionally effective interaction within the industry is a must, but what of the impact
of organisations outside the industry, such as research institutes and companies with
railway engineering sectors?
Example two This example is drawn from observations made by two organisations:
the Rail Technology Unit of Manchester Metropolitan University; and the firm AEA
Technology which has a subsiduary called AEA Technology Rail. Whilst the
Manchester Rail Technology Unit gave a solo presentation at one conference I
attended, the two organisations gave a joint a presentation at a later meeting. I will
touch on the work presented at both conferences.
Both organisations dedicate work to furthering knowledge of the wheel / rail interface
and problems that arise from changes in its constitution. This is how they perceive
their research:
The formation of RCF in rails is due to the combination of contact stress, tangential creep
forces and creepage in the wheel / rail contact patch. Most of these parameters cannot be
measured directly with current technology. However, the science of railway vehicle dynamics
allows us to predict with confidence what the values of these parameters are for a wide range
of different conditions. This gives us a valuable insight into the influence of many different
factors that affect the incidence of RCF (Evans & Iwnicki, 2002: Conference paper).
These organisations are involved in modelling railway vehicle dynamics as a means
of developing knowledge of RCF through computer software. Take for example the
approach these organisations took in co-constructing the programme they are involved
with:
The first stage in setting up a computer model is to prepare a set of mathematical equations
that represent the vehicle dynamics. These are called the equations of motion, and can be
prepared automatically by the computer package through a user interface requiring the vehicle
parameters to be described (Evans & Iwnicki, 2002: Conference paper).
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The two organisations highlight the role of computer packages in the development of
RCF understanding: they also acknowledge that they are not alone in constructing
programmes as a means of measuring rail condition and predicting rail failure or
fatigue:
A number of vehicle dynamics analysis packages have been developed by research institutes
and railway administrations around the world. Examples are ADAMS/Rail, Vampire, Gensys,
Nucars and Simpack. These packages have often grown out of in-house software tools that
were developed to solve specific problems and are thus different in their operation and
capability (Evans & Iwnicki, 2002: Conference paper).
The involvement of research institutes and external technological firms shows how a
wide arena exists within which RCF knowledge is developed. Knowledge of rail
fitness-for-purpose matters is acquired from numerous resources. There is a wide,
complex social network of rail condition research, and of this network, it was said:
[Name of technological research company! objective is to provide solutions to railway issues,
by bringing together the necessary expertises whether they are within [this wing of the
company] or in [the company] as a whole or within universities and other research
organisations. So we don't claim to have all the knowledge and we are happy to hold hands
and go together with other organisations and universities to ensure that we achieve the
solution (Int: 23).
Despite the numerous sources of relevant knowledge, know-how and skills, problems
related to the wheel / rail interface remain. In 1984 de Fontgalland said:
The wheel on rail relationship is about steel on steel adhesion and this requires significant
attention. Adhesion is to the railway what lift is to aviation. This is a complex notion, which
has been the object of numerous research experiments ... but it still include elements that are
difficult to interpret (de Fontgalland, 1984: 8).
And some twenty years later Railtrack stated:
The RCF of rails whether manifested as head checking, tongue lipping or squats, is a major
problem worldwide. Despite considerable research, the problem is still not fully understood
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and to complicate matters there is often a mismatch between laboratory test results and service
performance (Railtrack, 2001a: 3).
This point was consolidated elsewhere by rail specialists of the Union of European
Railways:
Faced with insufficient knowledge of the growth rates of various defects and large
variations in the capability to detect and size smaller flaws, the industry is poorly equipped
to apply scientific rich assessments to rail removal practices (Zuber et al, 2002).
Nevertheless:
The eventual aim of research into the understanding of RCF must be to find ways to eliminate,
or at least manage the problem in the most cost-effective way (Evans & Iwnicki, 2002:
Conference paper).
Cost is of course another important issue in RCF management. Premature rail failure
is a major cause of expense for many rail industries: "The total annual cost of the RCF
problem in Europe has been estimated to be about $US 375 million" (International
Railway Journal, February, 1997). Evidently, current interpretations of "best-practice"
are thus a major area of work for railway industries around the globe:
RCF is an insidious affliction which must be identified, minimised and managed. ... Things
can be done to manage the problem and minimise the risk of rail breakage (Railtrack, 2001a:
3).
In view of this statement we now examine those "things" that are "done to manage
the problem and minimise the risk of rail breakage", by analysing how one
maintenance company operates.
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5 MAINTENANCE AFTER PRIVATISATION - A
SINGLE COMPANY PERSPECTIVE
That is what reforms can do on soil that is unprepared... nothing but harm! (Dostoyevsky,
(2003: 822).
5.1 HOW ONE MAINTENANCE COMPANY OPERATES
5.1.1 Introduction: the organisation of finding and fixing:
Despite the research that underpins knowledge development of rail problems (as
outlined throughout chapter four) a simple idea buttresses RCF management and other
maintenance concerns which can be put as thus: rail problems have to be found and
then repaired. Track patrollers and ultrasonic operators are the principal finders,
whilst manual rail-grinders are the principal fixers. We look at how these occupations
slot into the wider organisational spectrum of the maintenance company: we see how
these task forces interact with each other in rail fitness-for-purpose management.
The organisational plan of the maintenance company I worked with is given in figure
5-1. Though the illustration refers to how the company is structured for the "Central
and South West", the structure is replicated for other regions: the West, and the North
and East. The dashed line highlights clearly how the organisational structure separates
the finders and the fixers.
A respondent speaks succinctly about the difference between the two roles:
The overall maintenance in [location] is still run by the finders and the doers. The inspection
regime is separated from the doer's organisation. [Name] is running the inspection side, his guys
find the faults and the Permanent Way Maintenance Engineer's (PWME) organisation repairs
and brings the track back to standard (Int: 02).
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Figure 5-1 Adapted from sketch by respondent Int: 01.
I saw clearly how the two tasks are separated physically and organisationally during a
visit to one complex:
Everyone in this building is concerned with inspection and finding... managers and supervisors
and technical assistance. The other building [at this point the respondent points out through a
nearby window to a building that is identical to the one we are currently in] is where the
Permanent Way Section Manager (PWSM) is who decides on speed restrictions, so we're all
quite close. Good communication. They double-check our stuff and we double-check their stuff,
it's a good failsafe system (Int: 07).
The respondent then gave me an insight into exactly how the two departments
cooperate:
We don't get involved in the speed restrictions; that's for the Permanent Way Maintenance
Engineer (PWME). But we have to know because of the testing frequencies. We notify them if
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it's [an RCF site] gone to severe and we check the gauge corner cracking monitoring and the
PWSM is notified. Inspectors don't have the power to impose, but they do advise (Int: 07).
Despite working together closely, the two roles are split quite clearly apart. As such, I
now look at each role individually.
5.2 THE FINDERS
5.2.1 Looking for problems
One respondent tells us about the roles of the finders:
Track patrollers are the guys that go out and physically look at the track. They get the data, hand
it in or fax it to the database in-putter. ... Track patrollers go along and do the inspection
visually, then it's the ultrasonics who do a different type of inspection in more detail (Int: 03).
Another respondent gives a little more detail on this type of work:
We have teams of ultrasonic inspectors and teams of track patrollers whose duty it is to inspect
the rail for RCF if possible. I say "if possible" because it is so difficult to identify, especially at
night, at the present time most of it is being done and identified at night.. .we're dictated by
Railtrack - we can only get access [to the track] at night. We've come to the conclusion that
there is a problem there, because the only way you can be clearly confident is by doing it in
daylight. ... We're going through a transition period at the moment from night till day. ... At
present, 75% of the route we patrol is by the road / rail Land Rover. But S&Cs [switches and
crossings] are done on foot. In the Land Rover at night in artificial lighting you have very little
chance of finding RCF. ... The lighting can be like at a football ground but in that environment
it's still very difficult to identify the stuff, and all it is, is an operator that drives the vehicle and a
patroller for each rail (Int: 02).
It is explained throughout chapter six how searching for RCF is not a simple task as
many variables must be taken into account during the procedure, which requires a
significant degree of know-how. Because of this the maintenance company decided to
cut the variables by limiting the set of people who can confirm RCF sites.
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The only people who can clearly classify and mark RCF now are the ultrasonic operators (Int:
02).
This is because:
We can all go out [onto the permanent way] and think we see something, so we have to
ultrasonically test... so in all cases of RCF the ultrasonics have to go to it anyway so it was an
automatic decision to make them the people who measure it and categorise it. And this way
hopefully we don't have so many variables from different individuals... cause anyone out on the
railways can find RCF, or think they find RCF so that's why we decided that it was the
ultrasonic operators... because they would be there on every occasion. There're so many
variables, they would be there in all occasions, moonlight, wet, dry, so it was thought: get these
people to understand what all these variables are, and to look at it from different directions and
all the rest of it. We were trying be more standardised (Int: 03).
Another said of this standardising process:
I've been at five conferences since Hatfield where the issues have been debated but at the end of
the day, what do you do? We have to respond to Hatfield. ... Anyone can do it visually... at
[this maintenance company] we decided that it would be the ultrasonic operators but other
maintenance companies you'll find there are a variety of people looking for RCF. But we went
down the route of trying to produce a group of individuals [for the task of identifying RCF] ...
we just decided to do it this way (Int: 06).
5.2.2 Ultrasonic teams
The structure of the ultrasonic teams within the maintenance company however, has
been refined still further. The maintenance company's network zone43 is broken into
regions, and regional teams are made up of three or four men, including a supervisor.
Of the three teams two are concerned specifically with "annual planning" (Fw: 10).
43 Zones - At the time of research the British network was split into seven zones. This maintenance
company was the major IMC of one zone.
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The other team is only concerned with testing and retesting new and known RCF
sites. What this means in terms of ultrasonic inspection of a rail with RCF was
sketched out by a respondent. I have re-done the sketch below in figure 5-2:
As a category one line the length of 54 miles is inspected every 6 months, now on top of that 6 month frequency the severe sites are
tested (ultrasonically) every 4 weeks,the heavy sites every 8 weeks, moderate sites every three months, and lights sites every 6 months
So the whole route has a laid down inspection frequency and where sites have been identified you have additional frequencies.
Figure 5-2 Adapted from sketch by respondent in Int: 02.
Despite this anybody on the track that spots RCF must report it:
Anybody who walks and inspects the track has a duty to identify RCF if they see any sites (Int:
02)
And whatever is found has to be examined by an ultrasonic team:
[RCF problems] can be found by track patrollers and track inspectors, but it's been decided that
the ultrasonics are the guys who are trained to verify the length of the crack (Int: 07).
A specially developed rail-based ultrasonic testing vehicle is also used on the
network. The UTU (ultrasonic testing unit), ofwhich there was only one until
recently, was marshalled by Railtrack. About it, one UT worker said:
Railtrack operates the UTU, a train that runs up and down the network that finds defects. Now
when it finds a defect it is meant to spray paint on it [on the rail where the fault is], for us to
know where it is when we go to look at it. We get paper work that tells where [the fault] is. 1
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have to take guys off planned work for this... it's not a great disruption.... But there's not
always paint, we can't confirm the defect, and out of say, 15 defects three to four are actionable
[that's where the UT indicated there was a fault]. And the other 12? It's a waste of time... (Int:
04).
Likewise, a UT operator said:
You can't beat the guys on the ground, we're walking it, surely we'll find the faults. The UTU is
fast... but you wonder about it's accuracy, and we have to check all the faults it finds - Railtrack
and now Network Rail continue to use it... what can we do? (Fw: 02).
These words echo those of another:
Rail inspection is being developed; since RCF mushroomed you have a number of different
companies trying to develop different methods. ... There used to be a lot of walking the track,
manual inspection. Manual non-destructive tests [NDT] ... NDTs were always done, but now,
because of access problems it has to be done quicker... But doing it quicker, are you always
going to pick up all the faults? Even now they have a train that picks up faults but they're still
checking them manually, because there are questions about reliability of the UTU because of the
speed, and that's because of limited track availability (Int: 27b).
Consolidating this view are these published words:
During the 1990s, ultrasonic testing of the track focused on hand-held equipment, in part due to
the unreliable results from the UTU (Modern Railways, March: 2002).
5.3 THE FIXERS
5.3.1 Grinding the rail
The grinding of rails is a basic means of maintaining rails in switches and crossings ... Recent
experience has shown that rail grinding is one of the primary means of removing and managing
RCF cracks (Railtrack, 2001b:3).
Once found, a problem has to be treated. In terms of RCF, when there are occurrences
of it at switches and crossings (S&Cs), manually grinding the rail is the commonly
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used practice on the British network as it is thought to be more economic than
replacing a whole S&C (Int: 28). For lengths of plain rail44 grinding stones attached to
the bottom of a specially designed train are used to remove shallow cracking.
However, the design of switches and crossings means it is impossible for a grinding
train to operate over them; therefore, rail-grinding must be done manually by
specially trained teams.
Grinders are typically split into teams of three and a grinding supervisory manager.
Each team usually works in a region of the zone whilst the train-based grinding
vehicle operates over the entire network:
We have teams of hand-grinders that do it manually at switches and crossings. ... Railtrack have
got from the States two 64 stone grinding trains which are running up and down the network
skimming and re-profiling the gauge corner., we had one just a couple of weeks ago. ... There
are two grinding trains for the entire British network, there's another... one... or two... on its
way... don't know the timescale [of them arriving in Britain].. But this [organisation of train-
based grinding] is done by Railtrack themselves. ... The database that Railtrack have dictates
where the grinding train goes, we don't have any say (Int: 02).
5.3.2 The RCF manager, databases, and paper-chains
For the management of RCF, the finders and the fixers require an intermediary, and
considering the growth of RCF as a problem (see chapter four, page 114) the
maintenance company created the position of RCF manager:
The Inspection Manager [once] encompassed all track inspection not just for RCF; RCF was
managed in that role. But the problem was that RCF was becoming such a big beast and we were
struggling to keep on top of it, so it was decided to bring in an RCF manager. ... The RCF
manager's role is still in its infancy at the moment, we don't have all the resources in place for
the renewal side of things and the organisational side of it (Int: 02).
44 That is a normal length of rail where there are no S&Cs.
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Whilst another said:
The role of the RCF manager is combining the finders and the fixers but only on RCF matters.
[The RCF manager] oversees the finders and the doers, so [the RCF manager is] bringing the
roles together under one banner (Int: 02).
The process of finding and fixing problems can be understood through an account of
the paperwork and computer software that the RCF manager works with. During the
research period, the maintenance company I worked with had three databases: A, B,
and C45. "A" recorded all problems associated with all track and rail defects, and "B"
dealt with RCF alone.
Individual maintenance companies developed their own software and databases, the
consequences of which meant:
There is a lot of duplication... I mean, you have one maintenance company who has developed
one rail defect database for their little bit of the network, and then further up the track there is
another maintenance company with their own database... you know. It might be a different
software package and they don't talk to each other. So these are problems we're faced with and
Network Rail has to get control of that. Get all these organisations together and have a two-way
flow. You can't have like... the left hand doing something and the right hand doing something
different (Int: 27a).
The maintenance company I worked with developed their system in partnership with
Railtrack:
45Databases A and B are due to be amalgamated and brought into one system: system C. I cannot give the actual
names of the databases as this could identify the IMC. Indeed as RT/CE/S/103 (Railtrack, 2001c) Track Inspection
Requirements states: "Reporting of broken and defective rails in running lines shall be undertaken using Railtrack
approved systems".
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It's [the software system] a Railtrack and [name of maintenance company] driven system.
Railtrack can check what we're putting into the system... which is the way it should be, it's their
infrastructure (Int: 07).
The computer software and paperwork form quite a complex system within which
RCF and other rail maintenance issues are managed. To describe the system it is best
to outline it step-by-step through a selection of quotes.
5.3.3 The long and winding paper trail
The track patrollers go out [on to sites with an At form and] with a list of defects say between
[mileage], and then if they find a new [RCF] defect they report it is as a new site [on an A2
form] (Int: 08).
A2 is only for RCF (Int: 08).
The track patrollers put their findings into a database [A]. As well as finding faults in the first
place they also check faults after they have been repaired to make sure they have been repaired
meaningfully. Wet-beds are a good example. Perhaps a wet-bed has been dried out, so it looks
like it has been repaired, but then the following day it rains and it floods again at the same point,
that means it has not been repaired in its entirety (Int: 01).
So it's all fed into this one database, given a unique number and it is fed into [database C],
which has got a planning part, a management part and the work is prioritised by the section
manager and permanent way maintenance engineer and it is given a date (Int: 06).
Every three months the Section Manager walks his route armed with the data fed into [Database
C] to see that the work has been processed. On top of that the Maintenance Engineer walks the
same route every six months to see that the regime is working properly (Int: 01).
The permanent way section manager actions Form B [form B is for all defects, including RCF]
and actions it within 13 weeks, seven days... [depending on the severity]... This is handed to the
database [A] operator and it goes into [database C]. The permanent way section manager plans
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the renewal and attaches CI [which is only for RCF faults. He attaches it only, he doesn't
complete the form C1 ] (Int: 08).
So with a Form B, once it's been repaired the Section Manager has to fill in [a small section of
the] CI to say the defect has been removed so you have two [forms] telling you that the fault has
been removed. CI is what the Section Manager puts in with an RCF faults. What happens is,
whoever repairs the fault [the respondent names three maintenance and renewal companies],
they fill in the C1 form and give it to Railtrack. Railtrack gives it to us and we go out and check
that the faults been removed with the A2 form. So the CI form is for the contractor who
removed the fault. But we don't take it out of our system until we've checked it. But Railtrack
don't rely on that alone, they wait on the A2 back from us as well (Int: 07).
Sources of material are brought into this, the work is carried out. If the work is completed
successfully and on time then it is fed back through the circle to [database A] (Int: 06).
Ultrasonic operators report their [RCF] findings by putting them into [Database B]. ...The rail is
given a reference number, by doing this, whoever has access to the database can see when the
fault was found, where it is, the category of the track, its inspection history, when it is scheduled
to be worked on and what checks have been made afterwards. There is a paper trail of all the
work and the inspection that has been done on any defect, it records who done what (Int: 01).
After it's [RCF] found, prior to any input into the system (B), the Inspection manager checks it
and asterisks anything he wants to question (Int: 08).
The A2 form is given to [name, and they] update the [database B] system and [then the A2 form]
is given to the inspection supervisor, who records and programmes it [on paper]. If the
inspection supervisor makes a mistake the system highlights it in red and [name] brings it to the
attention of [the inspection supervisor] (Int: 08).
We double check all the time; keep all things on paper in case the computers crash. And we do
gauge corner cracking monitoring every week. We just monitor anything that changes category
so that we know and that the permanent way section manager and permanent way maintenance
engineer know (Int: 07).
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If a defect is removed it is classed as historical, but not RCF. RCF never comes historical46, even
after it is renewed. There is an inspection frequency for it (Int: 02)
5.4 WHY THIS MAINTENANCE COMPANY WORKS THE
WAY IT DOES
5.4.1 Paperwork Standards, regulations, specifications
A key reason for such a complex system is because of the "Permanent Way Special
Instruction 4 (PWSI4) - Management of RCF". Railtrack stated in it:
Where sites have been identified with RCF or have been re-railed or ground, as part of the
treatment of RCF, records shall be maintained for all visual and ultrasonic examinations
(Railtrack, 2002, PWSI4-2, 6.6).
Therefore the finding and fixing system is:
A laid down process which is worked around standards. Anything out-with the standard is done
by Railtrack and signed off by Railtrack engineers. It's a complex system but quite a strict
system (Int: 02).
The paper-chain illustrated in the last section depicts a trend which has increased
significantly in recent times:
It's a paper industry now (Fw: 12)...
said one railwayman, whilst another stated:
46
Quite simply, a rail that has had, at any time in its lifespan, RCF, will always be classed as an RCF
site. RCF, it is commonly thought "comes back", even after treatment such as grinding - there is more
on this topic later.
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In the past you would look at the track and give it a points system, this was
counterchecked by senior managers. ...Now? The whole concept of engineers has
changed... engineers are now administrators... oh, there's a lot of paper work... now
everyone has a data bank, emails getting sent everywhere with new and more
instructions (Fw: 09).
By issuing this instruction (PWSI4) Railtrack added to an instruction-based portfolio.
5.4.2 The impact of history
Railtrack and maintenance companies have to work to Railway Group Standards
(RGS), which were produced by the Safety and Standards Directorate47. This
directorate was erected during the Organising for Quality programme (see chapter
three: 3.3.1 page 98) and, to flush out inefficiencies and to gain control from a central
base, the body developed some 20,000 standards and procedures; 4,000 of which were
considered mandatory operational and engineering requirements (Gourvish, 2002:
428), which are:
Technical standards with which railway assets (or equipment used on or as part of railway
assets) must conform, and operating and management procedures with which all operators of
railway assets, including the infrastructure controller, must comply (Railway Safety and
Standards Board, 2004) (This quote is identical to a passage that was printed and published by
Railtrack, 1998a: GA/RT6001: 4).
To comply with RGS, Railtrack and maintenance companies had to become a member
of the "railway group", and to do so both had to submit a safety case48. Once accepted
47 This directorate was originally intended to be an independent body, but later became the safety wing of
Railtrack. Through time it became Railway Safety and Standards Board (RSSB).
48 Infrastructure operators and train operators must "submit suitable and sufficient safety cases to the health and
safety executive for acceptance, prior to the conduct of railway operations. ... [The argument for the safety case is
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by Her Majesty's Rail Inspectorate, Railtrack could start to function. To fulfil its
obligations in terms ofmanaging the permanent way, Railtrack released specifications
such as these:
RT/CE/S/103 Track Inspection Requirements (Railtrack, 2001c)
RT/CE/S/057 Rail Failure Handbook (Railtrack, 200Id)
RT/CE/S/104 Track Maintenance Requirements (Railtrack, 2000)
RT/CE/S/055 Rail Testing: Ultrasonic Procedures (Railtrack, 1998b).
As the foreword to one of the specifications points out:
This is one of a group of four high level Railtrack specifications which are intended to respond
to Railway Group Standard GC/RM5600 (Railtrack, 2001c: 4)49.
strengthened if it] "demonstrates control of risk the reflects of goes beyond relevant good practice; includes
significant improvements to the RSC or control methods from previous submissions or; where new control
measures, etc, clearly reduce risks" (Safety Case Assessment Manual, pages 1 & 37, internet source: HSE website
2nd April 2002)
Railtrack's safety case was assessed by Her Majesty's Railway Inspectorate (HMRI). The HMRI is part of the
Health and Safety Executive, and by accepting the RSC of Railtrack HMRI was satisfied that the HSE would
thusly be satisfied (Safety Case Assessment Manual pages 1 & 4: internet source: HSE website 2nd April 2002).
Once accepted by HMRI Railtrack was admitted to the Railway Group. Now, there is a slight difference in how
maintenance companies become a member of the Railway Group. Their safety case through time would be
assessed by Railtrack, which was fulfilling its role as network controller (Gourvish, 2002: 428).
49 Other group standards Railtrack had to comply with include these two for instance:
GC/RT5022 (Railtrack, 2002b) Rails and Rail Joints, the synopsis of which points out: "This document ensures the
safe performance of the, track system by specifying requirements for rails and rail joints and for their inspection. It
also lays down requirements for minimum actions to restore safety when broken, cracked or defective rails and rail
joints are found."
GC/RT5023 (Railtrack, 1999) Categorisation of Track: "This standard sets out the procedure for categorising track
in running lines by usage and speed, so that requirements relating to design, maintenance and renewal and
inspection of the track may be specified and applied."
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In complying with RGS, Railtrack issued many specifications which the maintenance
companies had to adhere to, as set down in contractural agreements:
The line specification or group standard is issued to us through a variation of instructions
through the contract that we are duty bound to follow. You can't just bring in a group standard,
or a specification, there is always a ramping up period. It's got to be briefed out, the guys have
got to understand it, it's very difficult (Int: 06).
Another similarly pointed out:
It's not just a matter of that's what you work with; there's a lot of debate, it can take a document
over a year to get passed down. There's a lot of debate, to-ing and fro-ing... It's because, to
increase your inspection you have to increase your staff levels and increase your access levels,
the staff levels have got an immediate impact on the core budget because you've only got a set
amount of people, and you need to bring in technically qualified people, competent people. You
can't just bring someone of the street and say tomorrow you're looking after RCF; it just doesn't
work that way. There're a lot of contractural things that can prevent best practice coming
through (Int: 07).
5.4.3 PWSI4 Issue 1, PWSI4 Issue 2, PWSI4 Issue 3...
This is the contract climate within which the document PWSI4 Issue 1 (Railtrack,
200 le) was released, and of its release I was told
After Hatfield Railtrack issued Special Instructions which we had to act on, they included
instructions on inspection. The initial inspection was the total walk of the route by senior
managers. But at that point because it was a relatively new defect a lot of people walking it
didn't know what they were looking for... That exercise was done over the 6 weeks immediately
after Hatfield... As a result of this Railtrack issued amendments to the Line Standards, and
called it PWSI which means permanent way special instruction. And from this they defined what
they identified as RCF, and what the inspection frequencies should be for both ultrasonic testing
and visual inspection... And what the minimum actions should be from the inspections.... We
are currently working to PWSI 4 issue one (Int: 02).
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It will be noted that the PWSI4 was referred to as Issue 1, this is because at the time
of that interview Issue two had been released by Railtrack; and in April 2003 Issue
three was released by Network Rail. The rapid release of these issues is because of
increased RCF-knowledge, for instance:
This instruction contains changes to previous requirements. These result from increased
knowledge on the types of RCF, advice from world experts and analysis of data (Railtrack,
2002: 2.2).
Despite gains in knowledge, the rapid release of these documents created some
problems:
The difficulty was that [issue one] contained a lot of technical errors; it came out in haste
following Hatfield but because it contained technical errors and confusion in some parts issue 2
came up very quickly. Certainly issue one did allow for engineer's judgement but because it was
abused... more extreme than expected, issue 2 came out very quickly... which was all about
"shall do in accordance..." and issue 3 as far as I am aware is not any different (Int: 03).
Nevertheless, problems remain:
Anyone on the track doing visual checking can report something: the section manager can report
something; Railtrack people can be on the track and find something and report it; the UTU
[Ultrasonic Testing Unit] finds things; and your track patrollers... and these can report things
and the problem is, is it's not all standardised. There's a problem of people not working to the
same standard... and people's terminology can be different. Even location [of RCF defect] can
be unclear! (Int: 05).
5.4.4 Spray paint marks the spot
In this section we have a brief look at the problems of location of an RCF problem. To
start, let us take the following excerpt from a monologue that took place during some
fieldwork where the railway man I was with had to inspect two separate sites. Now
what needs to be known is that a defect's location on the rail itself is labelled by paint
on the sleeper and web of the rail. Also, according to PWSI4, sites must be 18 metres
apart (defects within that distance are classified as the same site).
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I notice that the two sites that Alan (false name) has checked are side by side. One
though is long and covers several yards, whereas the other is only three yards long.
But why are they not all classed as one site as they are definitely not 18metres
apart?
Alan explains: what happened here was that someone came out and spotted the first
site, it was so many yards long; recorded it, and itgot its own [code for a database].
Then someone else came out later, spotted this site [the one we are at now], 'but
it's part of a switch and crossing and the other site is continuously welded rail. You
can't put it down as all the same, because it could come up as a renewal site. The
[renewal] guys come out expecting it to be continuously welded rail, but it's a switch
and crossing also and they don't have a set, it has to be ordered, so it has to be
different. It can be confusing though because you can see all the paint on the
sleepers and the rails. The guys will come out and think... what's going on here?"
And the problem gets worse when guys come out andgo by their own mileage,
because then you getmore paint andmore locations that should be one and the
same. "As soon as it is fed into [the database] everyone should work from that
mileage but people don't. They stride it out themselves and come to different
conclusions". So this problem with sites so many yards apart is a problem that
PWSMs don't address; 'It can be confusing. I had a disagreement the other day
about where a site was because of the wording in the PWSI, you can take some
instructions two ways" (Fw: 11).
Offering an explanation for this confusion I was told:
An RCF site is the length of rail from the first occurrence of RCF to the last. Sites must be 18
metres (or 50ft apart). But there are no markers to give you the exact distance, some should be
there but have gone; vandals have taken them and they have not been replaced. So one's 50ft
could be different from another's. You can mark it out by pacing, but then the short man's 50ft
is different from the tall man's. And then in the site you have to mark the longest crack by
painting a mark on the rail web. Railtrack now wants all crack lengths marked individually,
that's a lot of paint on the web, and with the grease it gets dirty... and grease from the
lubricators can hide crack and propagate cracks... And then one track patroller can see a crack
longer than the last track patroller and he puts on a new mark, and so on, it can all get confusing
(Int: 01).
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Despite these problems, confusion was intended to be cleared up by the PWSI4s in
one area, namely terminology when referring to RCF.
5.5 NAMING THE BEAST
5.5.1 Defining a problem
The PWSI4s (issues one to three) are more than a mere instruction on how to manage
a problem. Railtrack - also "defined what they identified as RCF" (Int: 02). This is
because the term RCF has a curious history.
In a 1974 project commissioned by the British Railways Board Research and
Development Division, RCF was described as a "phenomenon ... which has received
very little attention in the past"50. Then curiously enough, ten years later in 1984,
British Railways Board issued the document "Rail Failures: description,
classification, and reporting", in this document the term RCF (and its subtypes i.e.
gauge corner cracking) do not exist. Twenty years later in the Railtrack documents:
Rail Failure Handbook (200Id) and of course in the Railtrack PWSI4s the RCF
acronym reappears. In the PWSI4 (all issues) the: "Classification of Types of RCF" is
shown; areas of the rail head are divided into regions, denoting where each type of
RCF occurs (fig. 5-3).
Given RCF's historical - documentary - "absence" steps were taken to ensure all
relevant persons now share the same language and terms when talking about the
50
The project was commissioned by British Railways Board (1974): Research and Development Division, Track
Group (Internal Memorandum IM FM 57). The project was titled "A Preliminary Investigation of RCF", and was
completed by Mr R. J. Allen,.
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problem, but members of the industry past and present have a range of views
concerning RCF's historical "existence". "It's been around for years" (Int: 21) and
"it's a new phenomenon51" (Fw: 07), are two quotes that categorise the dominant
views. This is why Railtrack had to provide a clear definition of the problem:
Gauge corner cracking and RCF? It's new by name. Before the Speno, [see glossary -train fitted
with grinding stones] took it away before it got out of hand. There's more shock associated with
it now because it was only associated with curves, but now it's everywhere (Int: 08).
Furthermore, an ultrasonic operator gives his thoughts on the role of terminology
since industry leaders pursued the "RCF" problem:
It used to be just head checking and then gauge corner cracking because it was on the gauge
corner. But over the last couple of years it's all called RCF; this includes false flange damage
[see glossary] (Int: 07).
gauge corner cracking
Figure 5-3 Denoting where RCF subtypes occur on the rail head (source:
Railtrack, 2001e).
51
RCF was indeed described as a "recent phenomenon" at an industry conference also. The speaker also said
that the railway industry should seek to "contain the phenomenon... and to develop an understanding
of the phenomenon and its causes" (Higton, 2002: Conference paper).
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Similarly other railway workers told me:
[RCF] has been around for years, well gauge corner cracking has been around for years, then it
was head checking. Now it's all called RCF (Int: 21).
Before Hatfield it was not RCF, it was gauge corner cracking, but it became a bad name, it was
in the news all the time, the media was looking to use it, so it was decided to call it RCF, it's just
the same (Fw: 02).
RCF wasn't highlighted until Hatfield. It was known about, but it wasn't seen as a problem. I
was with the Track Renewal Division when Hatfield happened, and three days later, there were
speed restrictions all over the [West Cost Main Line] WCML. RCF was all over the line, it had
always been there, but now there were 20mph speed restrictions everywhere (Fw: 18).
Then, in response to the question, whether RCF is more common today than it was 10
to 20 years ago, an industry metallurgist told me:
It is difficult to say yes or no to that. RCF has been there for a long, long time, but the
consequences of RCF are far more serious today as it can develop into a defect like that [he
pointed to his computer screen where he had downloaded an image of what looks to me a very
bad case of RCF which has caused a rail fracture] which can break. Whereas previously it
appeared as cracks on the surface; some of which had developed over a longer period of time
because the traffic was less and axle loads were less and so on. But it did not manifest itself into
a huge safety risk (Int: 22).
Another worker told me how perceptions of RCF used to be different to what they are
now:
Years ago, about '91-'92, when I was working down in London, I came across it, the guys I was
with were asking "what's that?" "What's that?" And the guys from that area said, "Oh, that's
nothing"... Then rails starting breaking, and it came to a head with Hatfield. ...But with that,
everyone started worrying about the surface, but what's underneath? That's what I'm worried
about (Fw: 16).
Likewise another said, in response to my question, whethe RCF is new:
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It was basically head checking [see glossary] and no-one really paid attention to it, no-one
thought about its repercussions, no-one thought that Hatfield would ever happen. It's just that...
it's really jumped forward since then... maybe if you look at the rail make-up as well, maybe it's
poor quality rail, I don't know, maybe the metals too soft. Maybe the train operating companies
should have a look at the quality of their wheels, I don't know, it's like a disease (Int: 07).
The men I spoke to suggest there has been a shift in the "status" of the problem; it has
indeed become "a big beast". In October 2000, just days before the Hatfield disaster, a
report into Railtrack's methods for managing broken and defective rails was released.
It was completed by transport specialists (TTCI), and commissioned by the Office of
the Rail Regulator in light of an increase in broken rails across the network.
The report said Railtrack and two other "major passenger railways [that took part in
the study] report RCF damage as the number one cause of defective rails". Whilst
elsewhere, it stated: "RCF damage (squats [see glossary], gauge corner cracks, head
checks) on the rail has increased on Railtrack over the last few years" (TTCI, 2000:
A-17&51).
The shift in terminology appears to accommodate the burgeoning problem. Take these
words of an industry welder, for instance:
I've been in the industry for 25years and it's always been there, it's not new. It's because of
work hardening. .. .RCF was found at crossings but we didn't pay much attention to it,
because it was just "cracks" it wasn't called RCF. There was the Speno train that used to
operate over the network grinding it out. Grinding was done before Hatfield; we regularly
removed lipping [see glossary] by grinding and if there was a crack you dug it out and
repaired it, it was good practice and it was an ongoing programme. But it was Hatfield, then
the shit it the fan. .. .The cause of that crash was not RCF, the cause of the crash was because
it was not removed, it was the maintenance standards that caused the crash. .. .But Hatfield
happened and people were panicking... it was pure panic, we walked hundreds of miles of
track being told to look for RCF, and we're asking: What's RCF? What's gauge corner
cracking? So people just didn't know what they were looking for and noted everything. Then
the first time I saw it, I was out walking with a guy from Railtrack and he pointed it out to me
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and told me: "That's RCF". I thought that's "shelling" [see glossary]! I've repaired that
thousands of times! (Int: 28).
Elsewhere, a professional engineer addresses an audience at a railway industry
conference. Whilst discussing RCF's increased frequency he refers to the
development of RCF terminology:
Railway engineers have been aware of transverse cracks across the rail head, what would now
be classified as gauge corner cracking, for some time, though it is generally considered that
the occurrence of this type of defect has increased in recent years (Wright, 2002: Conference
paper).
The stand-out line is this: "Transverse cracks across the rail head, what would now be
classified as gauge corner cracking". RCF has always been a "problem": recall
Trevithick's problems in chapter four (4.1.2 pagel 10), yet now it is commonly seen as
a serious problem, and for this reason it is no longer "funny flaking" (Int: 18), or
"shelling" (Int: 28). It has been verbally recast. PWSI4 constructed a definition of a
problem into a common vernacular for all who mattered - the role of precise terms
and labels was now critical.
The rise in RCF as a major problem also led to a change in the technical specifications
of rail. Industry leaders decided to halt the use of a particular rail-type after the
Hatfield derailment. A senior metallurgist at a manufacturing plant where rail is
produced for the British railway network, told me:
After Hatfield Railtrack stopped ordering heat treated rail immediately, but we were still
selling it to SNCF, Swiss Rail, to the Dutch, to America, Belgium.... the industry at large
adopted heat treated rail. The heat treatment plant [at this site] has not been used since
Hatfield. Just before Hatfield, [this plant] almost halved its work force and reduced its output
from 10 to 5 shifts working with the intention of concentrating on the home market with about
10/15% export. Before, [this plant] exported up to 75% of its produce. In the 75% export there
was some heat treated (HT) rails. Since Hatfield [this plant] has not produced HT for Railtrack
but there was about 1000 tonnes of HT on stock for the home market which is being used up.
... After the Hatfield derailment Railtrack decided they didn't want this "new grade", it wasn't
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new they'd been using it for 20 years. Before Hatfield we knew about RCF, 10 years ago we
gave seminars in Latvia and elsewhere advising: "don't move to hard rail as standard" as they
didn't have the management structure in place (Int: 22).
5.6 COMMUNICATION ISSUES: A TWO-WAY PROCESS?
5.6.1 The Wheel / Rail Interface: the organisational meeting point
We now look at the communication process between Railtrack and the IMC by using
two subject areas as heuristic devices to asses the quality of this process. Firstly, RCF
is commonly accepted as a wheel / rail interface problem. Given this, what forms of
communication are there between the maintenance companies, the train operating
companies, and Railtrack? Secondly, in the privatised climate there are numerous
private companies that all require access to the track: how is this organised?
So to the first point regarding the wheel / rail interface. One engineer gave me a brief
historical glimpse when I asked: what interaction is there between the IMC and train
operating companies then, because wheel profiles presumably have an impact?
Well, in the past there were the British Rail rolling stock engineers and British Rail approved
wheel profiles. Now... Railtrack still approve the wheel profiles of the train operating
companies... We knew the wheel profiles in BR days... Now?... [Name of TOC]... wheel
profiles come from an Italian company... I think (Int: 05).
Another confirmed the hesitant words of the last speaker after I asked the same
question:
None, no interaction... Railtrack seem more focused on rail profiles than wheel profiles (Int:
02).
And when I asked another about Railtrack's intermediary role between the IMCs and
train operating companies, the respondent at first said nothing but then made a zero
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with his thumb and forefinger and shook his head negatively. But when pressed, he
did eventually say:
There is a forum of the area delivery group which is attended by contract directors of the
maintenance division. Railtrack chairs this and [representatives of train operating companies]
attend... as far as train companies are concerned... I would suggest that they think of it as a
rail maintenance problem. But there are various thoughts that changing wheel profiles doesn't
help matters over the years. These are my thoughts! (Int: 06).
So what about the gaining access to the track?
5.6.2 Possessions
When work has to be done on the track the maintenance company has to gain
possession of the relevant section of track. Possessions are slots of time when no
traffic will operate over the track that is to be maintained or renewed. Planning is
therefore a key process, and of this, one worker said:
Applying for possessions is a logistical nightmare (Int: 05).
This is why:
Well, train operators want to run trains: that's what the track is there for, to move people. The
less time you have trains running on it, the less income you have. There is a need for a
balance, to get enough possessions so that you can be sure the track is in safe condition but not
restricting access so people can't move around. So all the developments in the industry are to
try and get things done quicker, and done in a smaller possession time, and doing it when
people don't want to travel, which is in the middle of the night (Int: 27).
Once, when I accompanied a worker who completed a single ultrasonic test during the
day, it became clear to me why most work is done at night:
It's difficult, it's not done during the day, there's just too much traffic... how long was that
between [name of TOC] and [name of different TOC]... five minutes?... So you only get time
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at night, and then you've got problems of light, it is easier to see [RCF] during the day... (Int:
05).
I had a discussion with another industry worker on the same issue:
R: ... the biggest thing in inspection at the moment is access and getting possession, everyone
has to be safe. And RCF at the moment is done in a red zone52 where we need lookouts, so
that's a problem when looking for new sites. ... They're changing it; all the detection of RCF
at the moment is done in red zones. Now they want all RCF done during green zone so that's
moving to nightshift.
I: Flow much input do you have in these changes?
R: Not as much as we would like to have... the central planning area deals with all our
possession requests, but when it comes to technical things like why we need daylight, we're
not getting it, the train companies would not allow it. Cause it disrupts the travelling for the
public. Work on the railways has always been done during the hours of darkness (Int: 07).
Moving work to night-time does not solve all problems: instead it can create problems
as it makes that time of day extremely busy with railway workers almost jostling for
access to the track:
You could have a possession from 20 past midnight to five, and the bigger the possession you
want, the more people want in. The contractors are wanting in, and rightly so. But inspections,
... inspections are not at the lowest end of the pecking order... but its not at the top ... and
you're forced to go green [work in a green zone means traffic is not operating], but if they
wont allow us in when we want in [respondent shrugs shoulders]... so we have to write a
52Red zone working rarely occurs now - but it means that traffic is operating on the line that is getting worked. It is
a possession between traffic. The comment from INT: 05 regarding the amount of time between traffic whilst
completing an ultrasonic test was done in a red zone possession - organisation of this is critical. Phone calls
between worker and signaller are imperative. The signaller can warn traffic of the workers; stop traffic; and tell the
line worker exactly when a service is next due. A green zone possession is when there is no traffic operating
anywhere on the line that is being worked on.
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compliance report to show the amount of inspections we've done, which is seen by our bosses
and Railtrack and they'll find out that if we're not getting proper access, inspections could fall
down. So they might be forced themselves to give us access. ... We can put in an application
to central planning, 13 weeks ahead; a year ahead. We now have generic inspections kicking
in... at the same time, but the problem with generic possession is there are maybe too many
folk wanting in at the same time... so there might be a problem of having a possession but not
being able to do your work. So we don't get in, or Joe Bloggs is not getting in... so it causes
problems. There's going to be a fall back somewhere along the line (Int: 07).
In describing delays that can occur during possessions at night, another worker
highlighted still more problems:
A good possession will be from 12:30 midnight to 5:30 in the morning. In some areas
possessions are three hours on a week night, that's a night shift green zone working. During
the day, that's red zone working on the [name of line between two places], possessions are as
little as 15 minutes. On the [route name] we can get an hour between trains sometimes during
the day... depends on the rate of traffic at that time. ... At night, although you have a
possession from 12:30 to five, the last train might be delayed, can't get on the track till 1 o'
clock. Once all the passenger trains have moved through there's the [name of company] train,
then there are the [name of business] trains and they can run in the middle of a possession, and
that means that someone has to go to each end [of the site possession - which can be some
miles apart], take the boards down, then put them back up, and that can take 30 minutes each.
So there's quite a disruption. Planning possessions is quite an onerous task (Int: 03).
To conclude, we should recall how Railtrack was set-up as a non-engineering
organisation (see chapter three: 3.3.3 page 100). This view has been backed up in a
revealing report53 which may explain why there are problems regarding
communication between train companies and IMCs, and why there are problems
during possessions:
53The 2002 report was commissioned by the then Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions. It
was entitled "The GB Railway industry. In Its Own Words: Problems and Solutions".
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Interviewees felt that Railtrack failed to focus sufficiently on its core business of maintaining its
assets. Many believe the company did not see itself as an infrastructure manager. Indeed, some
participants suggested that Railtrack would have performed better if "one tenth of the effort that
was spent on commercial concerns was spent on engineering". This view was broadly accepted
by Railtrack (DTLR, 2002: section two).
And from the same report:
Railtrack was felt to have followed and suffered from a "hands-off' approach to infrastructure
management. Interviewees felt that Railtrack was left with - and did not address - a lack of
sufficient information or experience to make informed decisions on the upkeep of the network
... [additionally] Railtrack displayed an arrogance that made collaboration difficult (DTLR,
2002: section two).
These comments and my findings appear to mesh together cohesively. Nevertheless,
in the later stages ofmy research, when the organisation of the industry changed, I
was told:
The relationship with the TOCs is moving towards a better relationship... but it is still really us
and them... it's all very political, they've got share holders... but it is getting there, it's moving
to a formal process (Int: 29).
5.7 THE NEXT THREE CHAPTERS
In this chapter I investigated the structure of a maintenance company to see who is
involved with rail and railway maintenance. In doing so we saw how teams are
organised and how they interact. We were also given a glimpse into what problems
exist for the individual maintenance teams - such as getting into possessions and
working with procedures. In the following three chapters we take a much closer look
at these problems whilst we examine respectively, the skills of the visual inspector;
the ultrasonic operators; and manual rail-grinding teams, by illustrating their work
comprehensively.
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6 TOUCHINGAND LOOKING: SKILLS OF VISUAL
INSPECTION
My fingers were an intake valve through which my mental reservoir was being filled; of
course, my eyes and my ears were helping in the process, but what I learned with my
fingers and my eyes together seemed never to forget -Walter P. Chrysler (cited in
Ferguson, 1993: 50).
6.1 THE PURPOSE AND PLANNING OF VISUAL INSPECTION
6.1.1 When to inspect and what to inspect
Because of the rail's inbuilt limitations'54 (see chapter four: 4.2 page 111) continual,
timetabled monitoring of the rail's fitness-for-purpose is required. A key method in
Britain is the frequent visual inspection of the track and rail by competent personnel.
The working environment on the railway, however, is generally far from ideal and
visual inspectors often have to make judgements on the fitness-for-purpose of a piece
of rail based on their experience rather than clear evidence. In this chapter I analyse
the skills of the experienced visual inspector.
Instructions on the visual inspection of the rail are contained within the Railtrack
company specification "Track Inspection Requirement" (Railtrack, 2001c). This
document spells out how components of the permanent way (sleepers, rail, ballast,
54 As described in chapter four the rail as a metallic component has very little surplus strength and redundancy:
excessive fatigue and excessive wear can lead quickly to rail fracture which poses an obvious risk of catastrophic
derailment. Many rails tend to be subject to almost continual use also. As noted in chapter five: 5.6.2 page 149
some of the busy routes in Britain have traffic only minutes apart.
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etc) and its environment (fencing, embankments, bridges, platforms, gates, etc) should
be visually inspected and when and by whom:
The persons undertaking these inspections are not necessarily designated track engineers, but
shall be able to demonstrate competence through relevant knowledge and experience... [and
when conducting]... routine visual track inspections [they] shall identify defects which if
uncorrected, could affect the safety or reliable operation of the railway before the next
inspection. Particular attention must be paid to new defects and to the development of existing
defects (Railtrack, 2001c: 8).
The document lists what should be inspected, such as:
Visible rail defects, including head checking and other cracks, breaks, rail head damage and
significant corrosion;
Excessive side wear
Check rails for security, wear and flange way obstructions;
Broken, cracked or defective fishplates... and so on,55 (Railtrack, 2001c: 9).
Before adding:
...Other items shall be included according to local conditions (Railtrack, 2001c: 8).
Inspection is:
Carried out on foot, supplemented by cab-riding, by the track engineer responsible for the
maintenance of the track inspected (Railtrack, 2001c: 8).
The inspection of the rail is also timetabled in accordance with the annual tonnage and
the maximum speed permitted on the track:
55 The rest of the items to be checked are: , altogether from the different categories of items to be inspected,
the worker must look for, in all, approximately 60 [sixty] different possibilities of defect or fault.
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VISUAL INSPECTION FREQUENCY BY LINE CATEGORY
Line Category— — Inspection Frequency — Maximum interval
between days
la 70 million gross 125 m.p.h. Twice perweek 4
1 70 100-110 m.p.h. Weekly 8
2 38 90 -95 m.p.h. Once per two weeks 17
3 &4 15 85 m.p.h. Once per four weeks 31
5 &6 6 63 m.p.h. /22 m.p.h. Once per four weeks 31
Adapted fromRT/CE/S/103,2001:26
Figure 6-1 Visual inspection frequencies (Railtrack, 2001c).
The Specification: "Track Inspection Requirements" (Railtrack, 2001c) was released
by Railtrack in April. This was the fourth edition and its release came approximately
six months after the Hatfield derailment in 2000. The Specification does not include
the term RCF, however, head-checking can be found but it is followed by these
words: "also known as gauge corner cracking" (Railtrack, 2001c: 34 & 35). We are
reminded of the problems that concerned the definition of RCF (see chapter five: 5.5
page 142). Interchanging the terms gauge corner cracking and head checking without
any reference to RCF, we can surmise, added to the confusion referred to earlier. In
response to these problems, the industry released the first PWSI4 also in April 2001
(the 27th to be precise), meaning the first PWSI4 appeared just three weeks after
"Track Inspection Requirements" (Railtrack, 2001c), rendering the specification out
of date:
This document [PWSI4 Issue 1] takes precedence over RT/CE/S/103, ["Track Inspection
Requirements"] (Railtrack, 200 le: 1).
This is an insight into how quickly the industry tried to clean up the confusion over
what RCF is and where it occurs, indeed they immediately separated the terms gauge
corner cracking and head checking (recall figure 5-3, page 144) and, of course,
introduced the term RCF. But, the release of these documents came some six months
after the derailment, a period of time within which track walkers were instructed to
look for instances of RCF.
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The outcome of hundreds of workers walking hundreds of track miles saw the amount
of RCF sites increase dramatically in many regions of the network:
Prior to Hatfield there were 15 odd sites in this area, now we are sitting at 550 sites (Int: 02).
The Hatfield disaster had produced a climate of fear where people in the industry
worried that an identical derailment could occur again and soon. But,
At that point, because it was a relatively new defect a lot of people walking the track didn't
know what they were looking for... (Int: 02).
Emergency and temporary speed restrictions soon littered the network, but because
many did not know what they were looking for, many false RCF sites were recorded.
Post Hatfield faults were wrongly classified, they were classifying taches as RCF, which they're
not.... The ultrasonics knew then... but not everyone. Now the track patrollers are up to date -
they know what gauge corner cracking is. But there was a problem with identification: at
[location] there were lots of leaves, and when leaves fall on the line they can leave little lines
that looks like cracking, that's what they were reporting! (Fw: 01).
This was why industry leaders issued the first PWSI4. However, in addition to
defining RCF, it also gave additional instructions on when to inspect RCF sites. These
instructions are based on the estimated risk of instances of RCF cracking which
involves a categorisation process based on the measurement of surface cracking:
Site categorisation is based on type of RCF, surface length of the crack, length of rail affected
and whether the rail is full section or planed (S&C and expansion switches).
The longest crack should be used in categorising the RCF even if this is only one crack in
otherwise much shorter cracks.
Cracks shall be measured so that the tip-to-tip length of a single crack including any branching
or change in direction is added together to give the total length. Care should be taken to make
sure that individual cracks, which are in close proximity to each other, are not added together to
give a false result.
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Cracks may extend around the gauge corner and down the gauge face; any such extension,
including any branching, is to be included in the tip-to-tip measurement. If a crack has
developed a chevron or branched pattern, the length to be considered is the total length of visible
crack as shown below in Figure 6-2.
Figure 6-2 Crack measurement procedure (source: Railtrack, 2002).
Measured Surface Length of Longest Crack or Other Criteria Category
Less than 10mm Light
10mm to 19mm Moderate
20mm to 29mm Heavy
30mm and greater Severe
Ultrasonically untestable with U3 Severe
Spalling with RCF if untestable with U3 Severe
Tongue lipping on gauge face Severe
Figure 6-3 Crack severity categorisation (source: Railtrack, 2002).
Classifying the riskiness of instances ofRCF in this way is the starting point from
which all further RCF management work is guided (see figure 6-4). The activity of
measuring the surface length of a crack tip-to-tip sounds simple. Surely it depends on
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nothing more than to open your eyes, look, and to possess rudimentary skills with a
common tape measure. What could be less complicated?
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Figure 6-4 Response to crack categorisation (source: Railtrack, 2002).
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6.2 IT'S 25MM! HOW DID THE BASTARD NOT FIND THAT!
6.2.1 How long is a crack?
Searching for and recording surface RCF cracks that vary in length is difficult. The
following collated quotes refer to problems with the procedure.
Crack measurement?... Can't get the same measurement twice. Well I found from experience
that you could send me different guys to me with their measurement of the same crack and they
would all be different (Int: 04).
So measurement can depend on the individual?
You can't see the full length of a crack, there are too many variables, lipping is a problem,
lipping can hide defects. There was an instance where RCF experts from America and Canada
came over, they found a crack and they all looked at it with the naked eye and estimated the
length. The differences from each ranged from 11mm to 64mm... It was actually 13mm after
checking it with a magnifying glass (Int: 01).
This means:
At the moment it is a bit of lottery trying to get an accurate crack length... it's unpredictable
because at the minute its down to an individual's judgement call: I can measure a crack at
22mm, you could measure it at 25mm, and David [fictitious name] over there [colleague sitting
at desk opposite] could measure it at 30mm. ... It is actually quite difficult to accurately measure
the full extent of the individual crack. Now bearing in mind the guys are inspecting, say 1000s
of yards of track, now for them to clearly mark the longest crack in 1500 yards of rail like this
[I'm shown a picture of a rail with severe RCF] is a very, very, very difficult job (Int: 02).
Whilst another echoed:
It's all down to visual, so it's down to how we see it and interpret it differently, certainly other
people's eyesight can make a difference, even if it is just 1mm (Int: 07).
Why are there differences?
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The problems arise with the identification process and the inspection process for RCF... I mean,
the problem lies in the daily changing of railway out there (Int: 02).
Another concurred:
When RCF first appears.... there are so many different variances, lighting conditions? Is it dry?
Is it wet? My eyesight, your eyesight? Whether I was on my hands and knees and whether you
were standing up... Now that is part of the problem... there are variances (Int: 03).
There are, it seems, many variables:
Visual inspection is a hit or a miss; it can depend on the type of train that passes between one
inspection and the next. I might see some gauge corner cracking, a train passes, takes the skim
[of the rail head surface], the next person inspecting doesn't see it. Over a period of six to nine
months you can have the same rail with different findings. In that way it's unpredictable, you
could walk the track, then find it, a little later, not find it (Int: 21).
And:
Weather has an effect as well, if you could imagine a crack... it can open up with the weather,
and what they're finding is that in wet weather it is very hard to pick up [to see]... With heavy
and severe cracking it can be easy, but with sunlight effect you can lose it (Int: 07).
Spotting cracks at night could be difficult then?
It certainly is, using visual techniques (Int: 27).
So why is it measured this way?
They decided on visuals... Visuals: everyone can do it fairly quickly, but it's not that accurate,
and it causes a lot of problems that we've had... You categorise a crack length at 20mm, then a
Railtrack engineer or manager walks along the track: that looks longer than 20mm... he
measures it... it's 25mm! How did the bastard not find that! ... Anyone can go on their hands
and knees and see that it's that bit longer, but these guys have to walk and measure the longest
crack in between trains, and at night (Int: 03).
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Visual inspection is a core part of RCF management, so there must be knock on
effects after measurement?
Ultimately, if the crack is sized an instruction is imposed, the trains have to slow down, they're
not reaching their destinations...etc. So, if the crack is categorised wrongly it tends to be
expensive, (Int: 27).
Because of these problems with visual inspection, what are the general thoughts on
the categorising process and technique?
You need to have something laid down, it's as good as anything else (Int: 06).
And:
I suppose there has to be a cut off point somewhere... and my eyes, your eyes... they're not the
same (Int: 08).
But still, we are told:
As a technique it's the worst thing we've ever done, categorising RCF visually... there's too
many variables... ultimately what we are asking the guys to do is walk the length of an RCF site
with trains passing every seven minutes and measure the longest crack! Now to do that job
properly he has to be on his hands and knees measuring every crack (Int: 03).
Others, however, offered a way out from problems and false classifications:
Categorising RCF by visual examination is too stringent, one millimetre more and the crack is
severe instead of heavy, or heavy and not moderate. Maybe if there was a 5mm berth between
categories... (Int: 04).
Or:
Oh it's got to go [the visual process]. Personally I think it's got to go, got to be done
mechanically, got to be more exacting... you'll never get rid of human error. Need a better
system, something digital. It's getting closer to this with the UTUs [train-based ultrasonic testing
units] and the Sperry walking sticks [see next chapter, page 191]. It's not the case where you'll
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get someone saying it is 5mm and someone saying its 35mm, but there needs to be a better
testing system. If it's a machine picking it up, it'd be better... better for the infrastructure (Int:
07).
Given these views and opinions regarding variables, how are visual inspectors
trained?
There's no training in identifying RCF, track patrollers are shown pictures of it... they cover
themselves now by reporting "possible RCF"... but the majority are just briefed (Fw: 02).
Whilst a laboratory based technician said, interestingly:
If I was to go out on site, even though I've seen it in the lab, I probably wouldn't be able to put
the two together the way that someone might who has been looking at it for the past five years.
So it is experience, I think the guys out there, once they're shown what they're looking for,
they'll see it (Int: 27b).
The last line of this quote - once they're shown what they're looking for, they'll see
it,- is troublesome as it suggests that RCF is relatively easy to spot and recognise on-
site if shown an example of RCF prior to inspection. In light of what others have said,
this seems a simplification.
6.3 WHEN PICTURES ARE NOT GOOD ENOUGH
6.3.1 The necessity of experience
When I interviewed industry members some referred to the importance of experience
when undertaking a visual inspection.
You need someone to know what they're looking for. It's like... you have a new guy looking
"Jings! Look at the size of that!" Whereas the experienced guy will say, "I've seen worse". And
that's what happens when looking at a wheel burn; a new guy will see it and think the worst, but
an experienced guy will have "seen worse", you need experience and being sensible (Int: 08).
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Similarly, another said:
You identify RCF by experience, only by experience. There's no training course for the
identification of RCF (Int: 21).
To overcome problems with visual inspection of RCF, experience is critical.
"Knowing" precisely what to look for is vital, thus "not knowing" can have severe
consequences:
Respondent:. ...So there is an analytical process that goes on [when the rail inspector is] looking
at the system [the permanent way].
Interviewer: And experience is a fundamental part of that?
R: Oh that's right, that's right, yes, very much so. And how do you cope with that, because
nobody shadows anybody anymore. So how do you gain that experience?
I: Is this a problem: not passing the experience onwards?
R: RCF was not perceived as much of a safety risk as it is today... Following the Hatfield
derailment there is a fear in the industry that could cause another Hatfield, and who would be
responsible for that? Psychologically, that has an important bearing. ... Immediately after
Hatfield there was an awful lot of inspection of the track in Britain and a lot of rails were taken
out as a result of that inspection and a fair length of track that was taken out need not have been
taken out. But, people were being... safe... guarding their own backs. And that is still going to
happen today: why should I take the responsibility if it breaks? (Int: 23).
It was noted in chapter three (section 3.4 page 102) that when valuable experience left
the industry it was increasingly difficult to transmit (pass on) key skills onwards,
because in BR days a fundamental method of learning for the new-comer was
essentially to watch how the experienced workers worked: new-comers shadowed the
experienced. Today however, nobody shadows anyone anymore. What this means for
visual inspection of RCF now, is significant:
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Although Railtrack had known about gauge corner cracking before Hatfield, the company lacked
the engineering knowledge to understand how fast cracks could propagate through a rail and
even the extent of the phenomenon on the network. In the hasty privatisation process key
railway skills [i.e. competent visual inspection of, and assessment of, instances of gauge corner
cracking] were lost as a result of the fragmentation of British Rail into nearly a hundred
companies (Wolmar, 2001: 3).
Visual inspection for RCF is not a simple activity; this argument is reinforced in the
following as I show the imperative role of experience and further skills.
6.4 VISUAL INSPECTION OF RCF SITES
6.4.1 Finding out who's doing what and where: some informal arrangements
In the remaining sections of this chapter I order fieldwork notes from different times
and mesh them together to give a full picture of the skills required for visual
inspection.
Willie, Gordon and I meet in the car park before Mark appears, driving a van. We all
get in the van and drive into a dark yard by some railway sidings of a main line. There
are some pieces of rail lying around. There is some activity in a nearby Portakabin, but
generally there are not as many people here as there was last night... (Fw: 02).
Last night there were lots of vans and:
Lots of people in reflective jackets moving about, there's no movement of tools, just
people getting together; talking; moving on; and talking to someone else... Mark is
talking to another man and looking at a book that details the routes in the area and the
location of different signals. Mark is telling the man with this pad of paper which signals
he is working between tonight, he seems to be double-checking everything is ok. Later
I ask Mark about the point of going to the dark yard. "When we're [working] in [this
region] it's a meeting a place, and it's a place where you make sure that there's no
problems with possessions, and you find out who else is working in the area, you see
what's happening "(Fw: 01).
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Back to tonight:
Mark parks the van and Gordon gets out a flask and pulls down a folding table from
behind Mark's seat. We have a cup of tea whilst I, Gordon and Willie chat. Mark has
been using his mobile phone for most of the time since we met. He has been telling
someone where he is working tonight; what time he hopes to be finished; and what he
has been doing during the day. He refers to his sleeping pattern: "three hours this
morning, three hours in the evening; that was all I could get". Enquiring about each
other's sleeping patterns is a common topic of conversation.
Mark is still on the phone. He asks the person on the other end where he and his (UT)
team are working. He asks if they are going to be in that area all week. Mark offers his
services for maybe Wednesday night; he has to see how things go (Fw: 02).
Already it seems to me that workers (UT operators, at least) communicate often; Mark
is rarely off his phone to the other teams as conversation moves from general chat to
matters about work, which is often about who is working where, or if others can help,
or if there are delays that others need to know about. It seems that even though work
is planned in advance, there is an informal set-up between workers that helps work to
get done systematically. I asked Mark about this:
" Yeah, Isuppose it is like that... well... grinders finding cracks can panic, they're
grinding a crack that's got a surface length of20mm, theygrind further and itgoes to
40mm, they call us and we go down and check it with the UTs. I won'tput it down [log
it on paper] that I've been there... it's teamwork".
We spend about 20 minutes in the dark yard. A couple of people come to the van to
speak, but only about copying computer games and humorous emails. There is a real
comical moment though when someone approaches the van with a massive, dusty
heavy torch which is encased in black metal and has a lens that's about 12" in
diameter. (Due to the hours the men work, having torches is nothing out the ordinary,
but this old weighty example looks like a throwback to the early railway days for it is
certainly nothing like the smaller, lighter torches now used). The cumbersome torch is
attached to thick leather straps which are roped around his shoulder allowing it to hang
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by his hip. Mark asks where he got it: "I found it in a shed!", he says incredulously.
Mark mentions how it must be quite powerful, to which the man with the torch throws
a handle and a shaft of light fires into the night. He aims it at one of the terraced
houses away in the distance at the top of one of the hills that borders the yard. It
illuminates a bedroom window and the surrounding wall. The five of us all laugh as the
guy with the torch says, "That'll wake them up". And it sure does! Seconds after
switching the torch off, we notice the bedroom light comes on as a startled looking
figure appears at the window. The man with the torch laughs and turns and leaves us.
Whilst laughing, Mark decides we should focus on work.
The front of the van is in the same state as last night; papers everywhere. Mark
shuffles some and looks at them. "What is it tonight?"! ask. "Only visuals", there are
five sites, two are on the same stretch of rail close together and the other three are
also close together and again on the same stretch of rail (Fw: 02).
6.4.2 The foul four foot
It's the first time I have walked on the permanent way (the actual railway track). I am
constantly watching my feet in my heavy steel toe capped leather boots. Each step
seems unsteady as I make my way through the four foot (between the rails of the
same line - see glossary). The ballast is loose and my footing is always thrust to an
awkward, uncomfortable angle. My torch is focused on the ground in front off me. In
the interests of my own personal safety, I don't look up for long; I am too intent on
knowing what is beneath my feet and what obstacles are coming my way. However, I
am aware that we are walking through a long valley where the thick undergrowth
stretches above our heads which adds to the darkness.
I have to steady myself often. Apart from the ballast, there are broken glass bottles;
crushed beer tins; I saw a golf ball; a dead cat; loose bits of metal; lumps of wood;
brick; and general rubbish like polythene bags. I try to adjust my stride so I only stand
on the concrete sleepers, but they're too close together for any comfort, I have to go
back to walking on the uneven ballast. Every so many yards I see a dark mess with
what looks like paper, I can have a guess at what I think it is, but I ask anyway.
"Shite", says Gordon, "I couldn't believe it when I first started on the railways"(wh\ch I
find out was about 20 months ago). Gordon was genuinely shocked when he first found
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out that when the toilet on a train is flushed it goes straight on to the track. He goes
on to talk about the hazards. "See thatgolfball? I wouldn't touch it, what's on it, or
underneath it? Rat shit, fox piss, shite from trains?"We. also told me how workers can
panic in a red zone (when trains are liable to pass) when they see a train approaching
with spray emitting from one side. This means someone aboard has flushed the toilet,
and the guys, despite already being over six feet away from the line try to scramble to
a safer distance.
We walk on over this unforgiving terrain. I notice, when I do look up, that the three
guys with me walk in steady confident strides with their heads held high, indeed Mark
must as he's looking for mileage posts hidden in the overgrown hedges and bushes. He
continually shines a torch from his clipboard to hedge, looking for a sign. All the
tripping, stumbling and adjustment of step is done by me. We eventually find our
mileage post from which Mark strides out counting his steps; he's finding the yardage.
He counts about 70 strides / yards, we follow behind him. He stops and looks; he can't
find what he was hoping to see: a reference number on a sleeper and mark on the rail.
(The fault we are looking for is gauge corner cracking and it's due for its 12 monthly
visual inspection, the line is category four and line speed is 85mph). He discusses the
absence of any paint mark with Gordon and Willie, where-upon Gordon remarks that
may be it was last marked out by a guy with a longer stride. Mark is a small guy and of
course this will have a bearing on where the location is, if it is measured by strides. We
walk on a little further staring at the web of the continuous rail until we see some
faded paint; Mark has a close look and claims this is it (Fw: 01).
6.4.3 Still feeling the effects of Hatfield
We crouch down low and have a look at the rail. The fault is apparently on a thermite
weld56. With four powerful torches shining on the rail at this point, and with my eye
just several inches away from it, I could see nothing that resembled gauge corner
56 This is the type of weld where lengths of rail have been welded together, giving the effect that the rail is long
and continuous. These types of weld have replaced the older way of connecting rail with "fishplates", thus the
name of this rail is now referred to as CWR - continuously welded rail.
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cracking, or what resembled gauge corner cracking in a photo from the booklets issued
by Railtrack that I had looked at in preparation for my fieldwork. Almost immediately I
am convinced that there is no cracking here. Yet Mark continues to look. Surely it is
obvious that there is no cracking here? Some seconds after I convinced myself that
there was no cracking, Mark agrees: "Nothing, no cracking here".
I am aware of the time difference between us. Even though we came to the same
conclusion, the length of time Mark took to make up his mind was longer than me. This
is my first inclination that perhaps looking for a crack is, indeed, not that simple. If
there was a crack there, would I have missed it? The men I spoke to in my interviews
before my fieldwork were perhaps on to something!
So no crack; I presume this is good news, and say so to Mark who replies: "Iknew that
there would be nothing here." I am taking aback by this comment as I feel that the
last hour or so has therefore been a complete waste of time, so I ask him what he
means. He was certain that he would find nothing. He tells me that cracking at
thermite welds is "peculiar to this area, but not on this one stretch of line". (He's been
in this area for 12 years). He explains what he means:
During the aftermath of Hatfield everyone on the track had a duty to keep their eye on
the rail, thus many instances of gauge corner cracking were reported. But there was a
lot of panicking, and false reports were submitted, people didn't know what they were
looking for and were claiming they had seen gauge corner cracking in different areas.
Now as soon as gauge corner cracking is reported it is fed into a database. And (as I
knew already after speaking to managers) Mark told me that"RCFnever becomes
historical, it is always alive". So once gauge corner cracking is reported and regardless
of whether "it is the real thing or not, it remains in the [IMC's] database"(Fw: 01).
I had just experienced an effect of the Hatfield derailment: someone who didn't know
what they were looking for had walked this line, spotted something, thought it was
RCF and reported it. It was a false site. The outcome of panicking, or not knowing
what was to be looked for during those days, was felt tonight, some three years later.
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But what occurs when there is a crack? The following sets of notes delve further into
the activity of looking: we see how tacit skills combine sound individual judgement
and interpretation to underpin RCF management decision-making. Ideas of individual
judgement, interpretation, tacit knowledge and risk-management are all latent in the
following.
6.5 ANALYTICAL PROCESSES (1-3)
6.5.1 Looking for RCF in the middle of the night
After traversing some filthy obstacles on the permanent way we arrive at the site. Mark
has counted out the yards again and we have found the paint on the rail. It's a
thermite weld again.
The three of us peer down at it. On bended knee we focus the torches very closely. I
can't see anything, but conscious of the fact I don't think I really know what I am
looking for I ask Mark what he sees. "Nothing", he says eventually and hesitantly, but
he seems to be unhappy with something as he constantly wipes the rail with his thumb
and peers at it from different angles. Then with authority he says there is, indeed,
nothing there. We walk on to the next thermite weld, this is the second site.
At the second site we go through the same procedure. Three guys bent double eyeing
a piece of metal from close quarters shining torches on the suspect. Mark uses the sole
of his boot to rub the surface then peers down again. He seems a little more attentive
to the matter tonight, unlike last night where he decided in seconds that there was no
cracking. Once more I am keen to try and see something; there are specks on the rail
on the running surface:
"Is that anything to be concerned about?"
"No, that's ok, that's nothing", says Mark.
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Looking closely but not touching with his hands or fingers he rises up from the rail and
says "nothing' is there, but then turns and walks toward the first site that we just had
a close look at. We get to the first site again, and from a standing position Mark shines
his torch on it, and then with the beam of his light he traces the route of the rail in the
direction from which we first entered the railway (Fw: 02).
6.5.2 An analytical process (1)
He walks after the beam on the rail. I follow him. Lifting his line of vision from the rail
to speak to me now and then and to watch where he is going, Mark tells me that,
though he is not scheduled to, and though he doesn't have to, he is going to check the
weld further down the rail, his reason being that there are problems with thermite
welds [at this location] - "it's curious, he says.
We get to the weld and Mark immediately lowers himself to get closer the rail, he only
bends at his waist. He is in the 4-foot (between the rails) and I am in the 6-foot
(between the two sets of lines - see glossary) and we are both looking at the right
hand rail. I am also trying to get a close look at the rail: I am bent at the knees and
closer to the rail than Mark. "There is something herd', Mark mentions after a moment.
I lean further over and can't see anything; I ask him where the problem is. He points at
it, I still can't see anything. He says it's on the gauge corner (i.e., the corner that is
partially out side my line of vision) and that I should stand in the 4-foot. I go to the
better angle, go down on my knees and without being prompted to its precise location
I try to look for the fault on the rail. I still can't see anything; my eyes are flitting over
the surface of the rail too quick I think. " You see, there it id', Mark says, and he points
directly to a small area of the rail.
I focus my eyes, squinting at the rail, I examine the rail closely and eventually I see a
crack emerge.
It is as wide as a single strand of hair, and to me it seems to be working its way from
the corner and partially down the gauge face. It's running at an angle to the ground,
like a jagged, fractured crack in a pane of glass. The crack, from the gauge corner,
slides down from the right to the left and onto the gauge face. I try to see where it
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starts and finishes. Where I think it ends at either point is different from Mark's
perspective. He has a small plastic measuring rule and places it against the rail just
where the crack is. He manoeuvres the rule around the crack, taking into account its
growth pattern in one process, and says: "it is 20mrrf'.
He seemed to finish measuring it at a point where I could see no crack. So I ask him:
" Where does the crack start and end?"
He points to either end, I can barely see any problem, and as if Mark is aware of my
uncertainty he says,
"See the slight shadowing, that's its ends".
Shadowing! There are numerous shadows on the rail because of our unsteady hand
held torches and distant lamp-posts, so I can't really see anything; I can only take his
word for it, perhaps if I had 12 years experience of looking at rails (as Mark has) I
might notice something! Still, I remember hearing railway workers speak about the fish
scales-like feeling of the cracking, so I run my finger along it firstly in the direction of
traffic. I can feel nothing out of the ordinary, just a smooth piece of rail, but then I
drag my finger back along it, against the flow of traffic so to speak. This time I can
certainly feel something; something akin to a serrated edge, any quicker and I might
have nicked a bit of skin. But the thing is, I could feel something beyond my sight, I
could feel it, but couldn't see it. And where I couldn't see it but could feel it was where
Mark had continued to measure - that area in the shadows. I then remember about the
hazards and the filth that gets dropped on the track. I should wash my hands as soon
as possible.
I am genuinely impressed at Mark spotting that crack, and though I have asked him
before, I ask if he can tell me precisely what is involved in looking for something that
small, in this light. He tells me things along a long these lines: " You get to know the
area, you know the problems that can occur, you know what to look for, the shadows,
171
the shading". He also refers to luck, despite experience, luck still has a role. "You can't
walk with your head bowed all the time, you'd break your neck; you look down every
couple ofyards and hope you find something' (Fw: 02).
When speaking to me to explain what was involved, Mark looked uncomfortable with
the terms he was using. He could not tell me precisely how you go about searching
for a crack. It became clear to me that there was no concrete formula to "looking".
There was not a skill to "seeing" that could be "said". Indeed there was something
implicit and tacit; there was something un-stated about the way he knew to go on and
look at the third "unscheduled site" - he just thought he should do it, and the exercise
was fruitful.
Mark, as his set workload instructed for that line, checked two sites, but then he
checked a third unscheduled site: Why? There was an analytical process underpinned
by experience that shaped his decision. What he had done, or rather why he had done
it was built upon a degree of tacit knowledge that suggested he should look elsewhere.
The product was an exercise in analytical risk-management: an exercise which was
best described by an industry scientist:
In the application of the rules, people can treat as black and white... but because the science is
not fully understood you need the human interpretation, the plasticity of the human brain, to be
able to look a various aspects and come to a conclusion: "that is what is needed." The efficiency
of one inspector to another... I think the difference is that: somebody who wants to satisfy the
rules, "it is not my jobs-worth, I will simply measure it black and white and report it full stop
and the responsibility is finished". Whereas the other guy; "I can see a crack here this size but I
can also see that the sleepers are skewed... or the rail pad is missing therefore I can understand
what is happening here and I will come and inspect it in three weeks time. And so on". So there
is an analytical process that goes on looking at the system (Int: 23).
Another reason why railway maintenance workers have to adopt an "analytical
process" is because of the actual nature of the permanent way. The "permanent way"
is a misnomer; some refer to "voiding" to describe the movement of the track as trains
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pass over it. Each part of the track moves in its "own way"- each section of track can
develop a memory, meaning each section of track can develop its own idiosyncratic
problems peculiar to that location. The consequences for inspection have been
mentioned:
There's a good chance that, historically, it [RCF] will come back in whatever timescale.... You
can do any work to a track but it will go back to its existing memory that it had, there are so
many moving parts that it will go back. There's no point in saying - I've identified a
realignment problem there, realigned it and walked away, - you have to re-visit maybe 4-5
times because it will go back to the way it was (Int: 02)57.
Why Mark assessed an unscheduled site was an example of the analytical process
ticking away: he accounted for the idiosyncratic nature of the permanent way. In the
next section we see further examples of the analytical process at work; additionally
the notes come from research that was completed during the day: we can also assess
the idea that RCF inspection would thus be easier.
Figure 6-5 Example of how gauge corner cracking is labelled with paint on web
and sleeper (author's photograph).
57 On the same point, a retired railway man who spoke to Jack (2001: 59), told him that a rail, if it has been
transposed (turned around so that its gauge comer is now on the field side) for instance: would want to assume its
previous form: "to go back, as he said, to where they lived before."
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6.5.3 Looking for RCF during the day: Safety, trust, and... where are we?
We find a dirt track that leads up to a big metal gate with a Railtrack sign on it bearing
a warning to trespassers. One of the team (there are five of us) gets out of the van,
unlocks the gate, and we drive on 20 yards to the track side. We all get out of the van.
My PTS card is checked and I sign my name by it. I am told: where I am; who the first-
aider is; what line we are walking on / inspecting; and that the line is not blocked; that
there is traffic operating on both lines and capable of speeds up to 125mph (red zone
working). The first thing we do is look for a mileage post to get our location, but this is
proving difficult. We look down the line to a bridge which corresponds with an "over
bridge" in the map; we see another bridge that again corresponds with the map, but it
is a mileage post that we definitely need to get the yardage. This tells whether we are
a quarter (440 yards), a half, or three quarters away from the next or last mileage post
- and the precise yardage is what we need prior to inspecting the rail. Each quarter is
marked by a post with one, two, or three dots or strokes on it respectively.
Mileage post: how to get to the fault NOT TO SCALE
53






If we were on the permanent way and were looking to retest a site that was at
location: 53.889, we would look for the mileage post: 53. When we found
"53", we would continue to walk until we pass a post with one dot, as above (or
vertical dash), and on to the next with two dots. The second post with two dots
means we are at "53 and a half miles ", or 53.880. Then, at this point,we would walk
approximately nine full strides and look for a paint mark on the web of the rail or a
spray painte d reference number on the nearest s leeper.
Figure 6-6 Reading mileage posts (author's sketch and example).
We ascertain the yardage from which we should start our inspection. For the inspection
we have to turn on our heels and start walking the way we came (towards the
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oncoming direction of traffic) but this time one of the men has a mile- o-metre, (on the
cess rail - see glossary) marking the distance we travel and this time, instead of
walking in the cess, myself and Alec are in the 4-foot: between the rails and in the
centre of a line where traffic is live and travelling fast towards us.
Despite the fact that one of the men remains quite some distance ahead of us and able
to see the stretch of line coming into the curve we are on, I am a little apprehensive as
I realise that this job requires me to look at the rail more or less 100 percent of the
time. This gives me little chance to look up, thus I need to place my full trust in the
men looking out for my safety. The man - the look out - who is some distance ahead
of us is armed with a horn and a whistle (and a flag) and he alerts us of approaching
traffic. When he does, we have to immediately stop what we are doing and move to a
position of safety - approximately 4 - 6ft away in the cess. The site warden and the
COSS make sure that we do not "wander" onto the other track. They were also
adamant that we should not take notes within the 4-foot. In these conditions we walk
along the uneven ballast peering at the rail to my right hand side (Fw: 07).
6.5.4 How a rail should be
This rail to start with, John points out to me, is the way a rail should be. There were no
grinding marks on it and the running band round the curve was steady and just off
centre towards the gauge corner. And above all else the rail was shiny, indeed it was
gleaming and that was how it looked for nearly 440 yards. The permanent way here is
neat with no debris. John and I walk promptly along this stretch of rail until he stops
abruptly. We stood silently for a moment. John looked intently at the rail, so did I: I
couldn't see a problem until John lowered to the rail and pointed to an area of the
head. Then I saw some cracking. It looked to be quite long cracks over a length of rail
covering a few inches then nothing. I couldn't see it from a standing position, but John
did and labelled it "moderate". From then I could start to see where lengths of affected
rail started and stopped. Small cracks, perhaps only two-to-three millimetres long and
about an 20 - 50mm apart started to appear, gradually they would grow longer as the
distance was covered by walking, then like a symmetrical pattern they faded away in
the way they materialised. Again it was like this for about two hundred yards, ranging
from extremely light (see categorisation table, page 157) areas to patches of moderate
cracking - John never labelled any cracking here as severe (Fw: 07).
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6.5.5 An analytical process (2)
We find a rail with numerous taches ovales and wheel burns. John doesn't like the look
of it. Though no individual crack length is long enough to be classified severe,
according to the PWSI4 categorisation table, John simply doesn't like the way the rail
looks. He stands over it, eyeing it with a furrowed browed; " itjust doesn't look good",
he labels it as "severe". It's the first time I have seen a rail like this and I never needed
any prompting to see the faults, they stood out as dark patches like bruises on or just
under the surface of the rail. (Fw: 07).
6.5.6 An analytical process (3)
We are at an S&C which was ground last week. This is a last minute inspection that
John has been asked to undertake.
Figure 6-7 Definition of stock rail and switch blade (author's sketch).
Apparently, when they were grinding, a 40mm crack was found and could not be
ground out any further and they want John to assess it.
He runs a finger over the fault, then wets his thumb and again feels the surface. He
looks at it from different directions before we move to let a train pass. Instead of going
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straight back to the rail once the train has gone, and even when the COSS says it is
safe to do so, John remains where he is, looking at the S&C as a whole, eyeing it up
and down from a distance, then eventually we go back to it.
Figure 6-8 Two visual inspectors at a switch and crossing (internet source: Alvey
and Towers photography).
The moment of just standing and looking at the S&C was for an overall assessment of
it. John says he is unhappy with the entire S&C. Firstly he tells me that the crack, in his
opinion, is only a surface crack [that is, it doesn't descend into the main internal body
of the rail head], then he highlights the running band which the crack is in. It is on the
stock rail and it is not steady: it wavers from side to side - unlike the opposite rail that
runs on a steady straight line. He has a look at a sleeper and the chair and the pad;
bolts are missing and the wooden sleeper is split. This is not good and "couldbe
causing all sorts ofproblems".
He then pushes a stretcher bar with his foot, it moves - it is not fitted tight and solid,
John shakes his head. We look at the switch blade, John points out that it is fractionally
too high - it is higher than the stock rail that it should be flush with. Altogether, the
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entire S&C is in poor quality and needs a lot of attention. All these factors could have
caused that 40mm surface crack (Fw: 07).
Figure 6-9 Example of head-cheeking on a stock rail of a switch and crossing
(author's photograph).
6.5.7 Looking for clues, knowing the symptoms of problems, and silent trains
When instances of RCF were found, John looked for the rail's information, like where it
was produced (i.e., Workington or Glendarrock); how old it is, (I saw rail that had been
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in place since 1973 and rail as new as 2002). This information is welded onto the web
of the rail. It can be hard to read on occasions if the ballast is too high. Also, when the
rail starts to rust the writing on the web can be defaced. Indeed, finding the web
information hard to read is a symptom of too much ballast, John told me. Nevertheless,
he wanted this information for his papers as he may spot trends (Fw: 08).
We have come across a site of gauge corner cracking. John and I are in the 4-foot
crouched low and peering at the rail. He tells me it is light and runs his thumb along
the surface of the rail; I do the same and can feel smoothness with the flow of traffic
but a series of very slight serrated edges the opposite way. John is about to tell me
something when I hear a piercing whistle; a yell of "train"ar\6 the COSS telling me to
get in the cess. I move quickly, conscious of my footing in my heavy steel toe-capped
boots on the uneven ballast. The second I am in the cess I look at the curve where the
rail runs out of sight just as a train comes charging round the corner on the line I was
standing in the centre of a moment ago. One moment it is at the corner, the next,
numerous carriages blur into one as it rushes and thunders by hammering the ground
below my feet; and then the magnetic-like drag of wind that follows its passing tries to
pull me along at its tail end; and then it's gone; round the curve: out of sight. Before
going back on the track we wait for the look-out to wave a flag signalling safety. "Did
you see the slight voiding?"hoX\x\ asks me. I don't know what he means so I ask him to
explain the term. Voiding is when the sleepers move during the passage of traffic.
During the terrific din of the train and as I tried to catch my breath, John had calmly
analysed the behaviour of the sleepers58 (Fw: 07).
Despite the noise of the train as it passes, traffic on lines can become surprisingly
quiet to workers when they are on the permanent way and working. When I walked
the permanent way during visual inspection, I did so with my head bowed to one side,
5S Most people will have experienced a high-speed train pass them when standing on a station platform. On the
permanent way however, it is a vastly different experience. Remember on a platform, you are able to step directly
into a carriage - on the permanent way you are not: the floor of a carriage is roughly shoulder height to one
standing on the ground. As a train passes then, it is not just the speed that is awesome but the size of the
locomotive is also immense.
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keenly inspecting the rail. Periodically the inspection stopped as a train hurtled by.
After some time I realised I was totally relying on the look-out and COSS for my
safety. I had got engrossed in looking for cracking, and instead of looking up every so
often for traffic, I had begun to look solely at the track59.1 found myself at times
shocked to hear the COSS tell me a train was approaching and only then hear the
service approaching quite audibly. Before my fieldwork I read how some accidents
have been caused by trackmen being so immersed in their work that they simply never
heard oncoming traffic - the idea that you could not hear a train hurtling towards you,
I thought, was ludicrous, until I experienced it60.
After informing me about "voiding", John and I go back into the 4-foot to look at the
gauge corner cracking again. It can be difficult to tell the difference between light
gauge corner cracking and grinding marks left by the 64-stone train-based grinding unit
[see glossary], John says. There are differences between the two when the gauge
corner cracking is more severe, but when it is light it can resemble grinding marks; if
you're unsure you should record it as light gauge corner cracking, between 0 and
10mm. We both run a finger along the surface and, in a peculiar way I am not sure
what I can feel, is there a slight serrated edge there -1 ask myself. I'm unsure, so is
John. The majority of this rail at this curve has been ground. So I run my finger along
what John tells me is definitely grinding marks just short of the cess edge of the rail
and again over the suspected marks on the surface towards the gauge corner. Again,
I'm unsure if there is a difference, the grinding marks feel quite smooth either way, but
so too does this possible gauge corner cracking (Fw: 07).
On two occasions when John was a little unsure he took out a tissue, wetted it and
wiped the rail then tried to feel for cracking to determine if there was any. On another
occasion, he stroked the rail prior to leaving the track for a train. Then he went back
and felt for the cracking, but then said "/ thought I could feel it, but nd' (Fw: 09).
59 I should not have done this, and afterwards I recalled my training for my PTS. It is ultimately me that is
responsible for my safety, and that I should always look up every few seconds to look for traffic.
60
Bridget Hutter's text (2001) on railway industry risk management refers to this type of accident: here she quotes
a Railway Inspectorate Report: "A track patrolman was struck by a train from behind as he was walking alongside
a bi-directional line. The locomotive's warning horn had been sounded as the train approached and the patrolman
had apparently acknowledged the warning ... he appears to have been so preoccupied with his duties that he failed
to assimilate the warning from the train" (Hutter, 2001: 60).
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Figure 6-10 Close-up of heavy head-checking (author's
photograph).
Figure 6-11 It is barely perceptible, but there is light RCF upon the rail's gauge
corner (author's photograph).
6.5.8 The randomness of RCF
Another site is found. John believes that it is severe. I run my finger over it and can
certainly feel serrated edges - compared to the grinding marks it is very rough. The
cracking is not isolated to one area like a cluster within an inch or two as at other sites;
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it is spread out over a few inches. Within this area the cracking is packed close
together.
I notice how John continually refers to it as gauge corner cracking: I ask him about the
term RCF. "It's all the same; it's all faults that need attention". RCF came in "as a term
to cover them all', he says. Fie is also convinced that it is a new problem... he had
never experience it or had heard of it until the last ten years. I ask him if he would
describe it as a recent phenomenon as others have - "Oh yes, that's quite correct", he
says before adding that wheels on the trains have a critical affect. Beforehand, there
were a variety of wheel profiles, each in its own way ground the rail in different areas,
thus gauge corner cracking never had a chance to develop as it would wear first. Fie
goes on to tell me that gauge corner cracking predominantly affects the curves on the
network, it's the high rail that gets affected worse (see "cant", in glossary)... and S&Cs.
You can get it on straight lengths but that's rare, very rare (Fw: 07).
We finish a quarter of a mile and start the next, this time I take a note of the findings
for the entire 440 yards. The severity of gauge corner cracking is judged by John.
148 miles + 00 (the starting point).
+05 yards. Small cluster over 6 inches. Very light.
+ 16yrds. Cluster over 3 inches. V. light.
+26yrds. One individual crack. V. light.
+34yrds. One individual crack. V. light.
+46 - 60yrds. Continuous cracking. V. light.
+148 - 151yrds. Continuous cracking. V. light.
+186 - 201yrds. "
+207 - 230yrds. "
+234 - 243yrds. "
+250 - 261yrds
+296 - 317yrds. Continuous cracking. Light to moderate.
+324yrds. 3 cracks. V. light.
+337yrds. Cluster of cracks over an inch. V. light.
+379yrds. Cluster of cracks over an inch. V. light.
+404 - 421. Continuous cracking. V. light.
+422yrds. Thermite weld, several cracks within 2 inches of weld - moderate to
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heavy.
+423 - 440yrds (quarter mile post). Continuous cracking. V.light (Fw: 09).
Figure 6-12 Example of an isolated single crack and its label on the web
(author's photograph).
6.5.9 Testing times
After some days of visual inspection I thought I might test my ability to spot RCF. I
wanted to see ifmy brief "training" would pay off so soon. So one morning we set
off: the "visual inspector" with a handful of hours experience led the semi-retired
railway man with nearly four decades ofpermanent way experience.
About 200yards in "we" find the first occurrence of gauge corner cracking. Or rather,
John finds it. I had walked right past it, it wasn't until John stopped and asked for the
yardage that I realised I totally missed it. He didn't even run his finger over the surface
to know there was some cracking. He didn't even lower himself to the rail for a better
look. It was nil to light [the crack length was less than 10mm long and classified
according to PWSI4 catergorisation], there were two cracks close together which I
totally overlooked. Even when I turned back to see where I had missed it, I still needed
a moment to find it. After this, however, I found that it was easier to see forthcoming
sites and cracking. It was as if I had to train my eye by focusing on a rail that had RCF:
183
it was like I needed practice by "looking at a site" before moving onwards to look for
new sites (Fw: 09).
Figure 6-13 Example of severe gauge corner cracking (author's photograph)
6.6 SOME THOUGHTS ON VISUAL INSPECTION
Experience, judgement and tacit knowledge (specifically when interpreting
shadowing on the rail's surface and the feel of cracking) are critical. These
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factors shape decision-making, but I was also aware of problems with this type
of work, which I now discuss.
6.6.1 Problems: shadows, measurements, PWSI4 and opinions
I notice that John labelled instances of RCF as light, moderate, heavy or severe (that is
according with PWSI4 terminology] but without a measuring device. I ask him about
this and he dismissed the whole idea of measuring the crack with a tool. Placing a
measuring tape over the crack and trying to shape it to the crack, taking into account
all the turns and twists is not needed: " You can telljust by looking at it what it is". And
indeed that is what he has been doing. He had already told me that, when the cracking
is close together it is likely to be near heavy or severe. When the cracking is further
apart it tends to be not too bad. I also ask him about the PWSI4s and the role this
paper plays in actual working procedures. "Ifwe followed them to the letter we would
have to shut the network down, as simple as that".
John then gave me an example of an actual situation ..."they were going by the letter
in [location] they nearly had to close it down... then at a meeting"\)oX\n at this point
names two senior Railtrack engineers] "got up and told us to treat the document
[PWSI4s] sensibly... but you break the rules, your arse is out the window". So I ask him
about the role of experience then, it must be important... "you know what is bad and
what needs attention, you can tell"(Fw: 07).
185
7 ULTRASONIC TESTING ON THE BRITISH
RAILWAY NETWORK
The tacit knowledge and skills of workers may not have been the determining factors in
Britain's leading role in the Industrial Revolution, but they were essential components of it.
Today, similarly, the knowledge and skills of workers - sensual nonverbal and subtle acts of
judgements - are crucial to successful industrial production. Yet the engineering profession
makes little effort to give credit to skilled and knowledgeable workers or to learn from them
(Ferguson, 1993: 59).
7.1 IN THEORY: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNICALITIES OF
ULTRASONIC TESTING
7.1.1 Hidden problems at Hither Green
It is not sufficient to only inspect the rail visually, the internal make-up of the rail also
needs to be scrutinised using non-destructive testing (NDT) equipment. To do this,
trained railway personnel use ultrasonic testing (UT) equipment. To appreciate fully
and understand this type of testing, a short section has to be dedicated to explaining
what ultrasonic testing is, how it works, and why it is used in the railway industry.
Pulse-echo ultrasonic inspection has now been used on Britain's railway network for
over 30 years. Its implementation came after a serious derailment in November 1967
when a train left the permanent way at Hither Green, South London: 49 people were
killed, 78 injured. The inspection of the internal quality of the rail at the time was by a
system called Audigage, and of this system an industry worker told me:
Prior to Hither Green, rail inspection involved rail tappers. Men would literally walk the
line, tapping the edge of the rail [and would use the tapping staff held against the rail and
ear] to listen for a particular sound [pattern]. Depending on the sound it suggested a fault
(Int: 27).
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"Audigage", however was thought unreliable, not systematic and relied excessively
on individual judgement, the tester at the derailment at Hither Green was found to be
tone deaf! (Brentnall, 1998: 24). Thoughts on Audigage's inefficiencies found their
roots in the investigation of the Hither Green disaster. It was:
Found that defects relating to the rail ends61 were increasing dramatically at the time and
resulting in numerous rail failures. The defects consisted mainly of fishplate bolt hole star
cracks on jointed track, weld failures, and the kidney shaped defect found in the rail head,
now known as the Tache Ovale. The investigation committee recommended that a research
initiative should be undertaken to investigate alternative rail-testing methods and, from this
initiative pulse-echo ultrasonics emerged as the technique to replace Audigage (Brentnall,
1998: 24).
7.1.2 The pulse-echo method
At a railway industry conference, the principles of ultrasonic testing were described as
such:
Ultrasonic testing is a non-destructive inspection technique to assess the integrity of a solid
object that is based on the principle of ultrasound reflection, also known as the pulse-echo
method. A pulsing beam of electro-acoustic energy with a frequency beyond the normal
hearing range travels from a crystal housed in a probe head through the material of the
component under examination. For railways, the probe is placed on the rail and the
ultrasound is transmitted into it via a coupling fluid, usually water. In an intact rail, the
ultrasound beam travels through the rail to its maximum depth and is then reflected back
from the so-called 'free face' to its origin at the probe. Here the mechanical vibrations are
re-converted into electrical signals by the probe and are displayed on a cathode ray
oscilloscope or computer monitor screen. The waveforms shown on the display are then
analysed and assessed by the ultrasonic operative. When the maximum depth of the material
is known, the technician will be looking for an uninterrupted signal (the signal is commonly
referred to as a signature) from the boundary at the rail depth. Any discontinuity in the wave
61 The Hither Green derailment was due to a fault at a rail end, known in the industry as bolt hole star
cracks. A definition of this fault and how testers test for these faults is given later.
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from the specimen's depth will suggest that there is an internal flaw (Wilson et al, 2003:
Conference paper)62.
Applying UT to the railway industry has advantages:
Another very important territory of ultrasonic testing is the finding of dangerous incipient
defects in components in service, e.g., fatigue cracks and effects of corrosion. One cannot
imagine, for example, efficient maintenance of a railway system without routine ultrasonic
checking of axles, rails and other highly stressed components (Sziland, 1982: 45).
7.1.3 Considerations for the operator
Correct operation of the UT equipment and interpretation of its output substantially
relies on the competence of the technician carrying out the test. In the following,
experts refer to problems for ultrasonic operators:
In principle, information [on a cathode ray oscilloscope or computer monitor screen] suffices
to locate potential defects. In practice, the traces are lively and require great attention for
interpretation ... the problem is now one of information technology to assure the recognition
of potential defects among the mass of tested data that will flow through the system. ... [In
response to this] recent developments have sought to assist the operator by recognising
patterns typical of rail ends, bolt holes, etc. The objective is to present to the operator only
those patterns, which cannot be explained by typical features. This prevents the operator
from being flooded with information that he must mentally process. ...
[However] current testing systems continue to be operator sensitive. The ideal operator can
maintain mental vigilance over extended periods of time, using his training and experience
to identify suspicious indications. ... Such operators exist but there are an equal number of
excessively conservative operators who frequently stop and may mark a rail for unnecessary
62 In describing the principles of ultrasonic inspection, the authors relied extensively on the following
documents: 'Serco 2002a: Personnel certification in NDT - ultrasonic testing of rail level 1 part la:
general ultrasonic theory'. And 'IHHA, 2001: Guidelines to Best Practice for Heavy Haul Railway
Operators: wheel and rail interface issues'.
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removal where they do not recognise the pattern of indications. On the other hand, some
operators are product-orientated, or are perhaps too quick to attribute unusual indications to
a rail surface condition. Operator performance should be reviewed regularly (IHHA, 2001:
7.1.4 Technological strides and some limitations
Manual UT of the rail since the Hither Green investigation has been a regular feature
of inspection. For manual inspection, the operator places a small probe on the surface
of the rail, depending on where he or she wants to UT. Depending on the type of test
to be completed the relevant probe has to be chosen. Different probes can emit
ultrasound at different angles into the rail: different angles are used for different
defects. For instance, a zero degree probe emits a sound wave directly down the rail,
see figure 7-1.
Figure 7-1 Zero degree probe and a problem it can find (author's sketch and
photograph).
63 Due to the demands that are placed upon the UT operator other non-destructive techniques have be
sought for, but: "Many technical organisations have been spending substantial amounts ofmoney
searching for an alternative method to ultrasonics for testing rails and rail vehicle axles. Millions of
pounds have been spent but no alternative method has yet emerged" (Brentnall, 2002: 29).
5-30)63.
inclusions (as indicated by the red
line). Such cracking can be
In this example, it is shown how
the zero degree probe would pick
up cracking from non-metallic
189
Other probes, such as 38, 40, and 70 degree probes emit the ultrasound wave into the
rail ahead of the probe's position (see figure 7-2)





Figure 7-2 Ultrasound wave at 40 degree angle (author's sketch).
This next diagram (7-3) is a close up of the probes, and the picture shows a UT
operator testing the rail with a hand held probe:
This angle ^
denotes the degree
to which the beam















Figure 7-3 Sketch of probe and on-site operation (author's sketch; photograph,
internet source: www.alveyandtowers.com).
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In recent years there has also been a significant development in the use of the so-
called Walking Stick. The walking stick is based on the concept of sliding a probe
along the surface of the rail. The first type of walking stick had two probes: one probe
(0 °) injected ultrasound waves into the rail, and another transmitted sound into the rail
at a 70° angle ahead of the walking stick. The next walking stick development utilised
another 70° probe that entered the rail in a direction opposite to that of the first angled
probe. This walking stick was known as a bi-directional stick64 - the 070 RAIL
TESTING SYSTEM65 - known as the U3 because of the three sensors present. These
sticks, however, did not cover the full railhead section. Technicians and operators
would therefore have to rotate the stick to an angle to test the gauge corner and the
field side corner. Indeed two respondents told me:
The single direction walking sticks came out in the... '60s I think... the bi-directional ones
came out in the 80s... you have to wind the probe to either side to check the gauge corner of
the field side (Int: 25).
U3 is only really effective for transverse defects so gauge corner cracking is only really
picked up visually. But what you do is you move the probes to either side to check. ... The
Sperry walking sticks will do this in a oner (Int: 07).
Diagram 7-4 depicts how manual probes and early walking stick probes missed the
gauge corner. It also shows where the operator shifted the probes to get a fuller
coverage:
64 Taken from Int: 25.
65 For a description of the procedures used with this system see Railtrack, 1998b: RT/CE/S/055: Rail
Testing: Ultrasonic Procedures.
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The red dotted probe position is where the
probe is position by the operator in an effort to
Figure 7-4 Missing the gauge corner (author's sketch).
A new walking stick has been introduced recently which addresses this problem: the
Roller Search Unit (RSU), also known as 'The Sperry'66. This uses a testing method
known as the U14 procedure. This walking stick has replaced the earlier sliding probe
with a rotating wheel arrangement, using three forward and reverse looking 70-degree
probes and a 0-degree probe, which allows the total rail profile to be tested in one
sweep. "This is a major advancement in the ultrasonic testing of rails and, in
particular the detection of serious RCF defects at the gauge corner" (Brentnall, 1998:
28). The impact of the Sperry is clear:
Issue two [of the PWSI4] categorises RCF on surface length and, based on surface length
only, a speed restriction is put on or not. In issue three there has to be an ultrasonic
indication to put a speed on, so they've moved on, that's a good step.... But that's on the
assumption of the Sperry walking stick. If we find a long crack length we don't have to put
on a speed restriction immediately but we have to UT it within 36 hours. But no UT
indication, no speed restriction goes on. (Int: 03).
66 So called after the name of the manufacturing company that designed and manufactured the device.
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The Sperry, also known as
the "Walking Stick" or the
Roller Search Unit (RSU),
and the operation ofwhich
is referred to as theU14
procedure.
Figure 7-5 "The Sperry" or the "Walking Stick" (author's photograph).
7.1.5 Confidence
The confidence in UT and its importance has developed significantly over the past
two to three years. Speaking before the introduction of the Sperry, workers suggested
that the discipline required progress:
Traditionally it was just a signal system, there was only one way to test the rail, and that is
unlike other industries which have many ways to test for cracks... In the nuclear industry
and others, one test complements the other... the results are compiled together. It's done that
way. ... In the railway industry, I think the entire [UT] system needs overhauled; you can
run [the bi-directional sticks] up the rail that direction and test ultrasonically, find
something, turn around and test the other way, and then find nothing... in terms of accuracy,
you can't measure a defect, the tests are not repetitive, no sensitivity, then repeatability? You
can test at 2am then four hours later test again and get a different result (Int: 12).
Where another simply said the UT in the railway industry was in "its infancy" (Int:
05). Still, the Sperry was a response to the worries noted by Int: 12 and now
confidence has grown. This confidence is captured in the PWSI4s. In the first PWSI4
there is a section entitled: 'Guidance for Ultrasonic Testing in RCF sites'. The section
is limited to approximately one page of the document and raises 12 individual matters
concerning UT inspection. In the latest PWSI4 (Network Rail, 2003), again a section
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is given the same title but it now fills three pages and highlights 29 specific points that
the UT operator must be aware of.
The technical reliability of ultrasonically testing the rail has evolved. For example, in
PWSI4, issue one (Railtrack, 200 le), an instruction states that an RCF site that has
been categorised as 'heavy' (cracks between 20 and 29mm long) but shows no UT
flaw indication, must be retested using the same method within 4 weeks. Yet, this
time limit - in PWSI4, issue three (Network Rail, 2003) - has been increased: the
same site now has to be inspected within two months. Effectively, it has been possible
to increase the retest time, as reliability of the method has improved.
7.1.6 Developing technology, changing perceptions
The progress of UT in recent times has had an additional effect for those who operate
the equipment. It was suggested that, in the past, the occupation had an unfavourable
reputation because UT operators are employed to look for faults that need to be fixed
by others. The very nature and aim of the ultrasonic operator's work, from the very
start, was designed to find work for others. Ultrasonic technicians are not problem
solvers but problem finders: this is exactly their safety critical role but other workers
it was suggested, looked upon it differently.
The feeling about [UT] operators... they were just not wanted... there was a lot of
aggression between ultrasonic operators and fixers. They're never seen but they were always
felt, but the guys never felt wanted. Ultrasonics was seen as a black art, they tended to be
given a patch of work, defects were reported and some paper work would come in... it was
something that just happened, it threw up the odd defect and problem (Int: 03).
Ultrasonics! [said with a discontented groan]... it was seen as an additional test, that it
wasn't hugely important. It was seen as a pain in the neck, Maintenance Engineers would
have to re-do plans because of ultrasonic tests (Int: 05).
People panicked when they saw them [ultrasonic operators] - "Oh no, what have you found,
you're not putting on a speed restriction" - because that's what no-one wants. Ultrasonics
finds jobs for people, and they're not pleased, but what can we do, we're only doing our job
(Fw: 02).
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Historically, ultrasonic operators worked alone67, they were always seen as the ones who
don't fit in with a group, the PWSM doesn't want the ultrasonic operator to find anything, he
creates work for him (Int: 01).
Still, perceptions of UT are changing (not least because of the Hatfield derailment)
and, as a consequence, there has been a marked difference in the staffing levels of UT
operators:
Since Hatfield, ultrasonics has been highlighted... since privatisation there was no
consideration of the WRI [wheel / rail interface], but there's increases in braking forces and
so on, so your wearing out your asset faster, so you need to inspect more, there's been an
increase from about 200 UT operators to 500 since 2000. Historically, UT was viewed as...
not extremely important... I mean, there was 30 years or so between two major incidents,
Hither Green [1967] and Hatfield [2000] (Int: 25).
In this section we have been given an insight into the role of UT, its technical
progress and we were given a glimpse of the requirements placed on the UT operator.
In the following sections, I analyse the actual activity.
7.2 IN PRACTICE: ULTRASONIC TESTING ON SITE
7.2.1 Preparing to go on site: the meeting point
I have condensed and connected numerous pieces of observations from fieldwork
notes that, in total, span several nights and days when I was involved with ultrasonic
testing (UT). This has been done to give as accurate an account as possible of the
working life of an UT operator and a UT team.
67 He is referring to the Audigage system - which involved the operator wearing a device similar to
headphones to hear the sound from the tapper on the rail. This of course meant the operator had to
work alone.
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Alex has organised it for me to meet up with a worker involved in UT of RCF sites. I
meet him at the permanent way hut at the back of a mainline station at 11 p.m.
I turn up at the appointed time. There are three maintenance company trucks where
I am due to meet Mark. Each vehicle, whilst capable of carrying equipment, also has
seating in a cab capable of taking about 6-7 people. I see four people dressed in
jeans or tracksuit and wearing fluorescent jackets with Railtrack emblazoned on the
back. They are standing in the darkness talking. I approach them and ask for Mark.
"He's ultrasonics isn't he?"says one guy to the other. He has not arrived but, I am
shown the hut where he will go when he does. I wait in the darkness. The only light
is from streetlamps and the vans in the yard. It has got quite busy; over 20 different
people are now shifting "STOP" signs, clamps and drills into the back of trucks, it has
also got quite noisy. I have been here in this yard before, but that was during the
day and it was much quieter. I see someone entering the hut where I was told Mark
would go.
I stand in the small hut with Mark. Though they refer to it as a hut, it is actually a
room of a large building (about 12feet long and six wide: I guess that a full size
billiard table would fit in snugly). Inside there are filing cabinets and numerous metal
shelves. On these are pieces of rail used for calibrating gear. There are also
ultrasonic packs (digital packs: i.e., new ones, and analogue packs). There are rows
of batteries being charged for the digital packs. Beside these rows of batteries is a
dirty kettle. Below these shelves there are UT walking sticks. Two of the four walls
hold shelves, at the third there is a large desk hidden beneath layers of papers.
There are also inspection frequency charts, and names of workers and phone
numbers below an underlined supervisor are listed. There are two calendars both
featuring topless women. Between the door to the room and the desk are five tall
metal lockers; blocking access to the lockers are numerous tall rectangular
cardboards boxes - used to send faulty equipment back to York (Fw: 01).
The numerous empty boxes for faulty equipment remind me of what another said:
The guys achieve about 80% of what they have to do. The reliability of the equipment is a
major issue, two walking sticks a month are sent back to York for repair (Int: 07).
Back to the hut:
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A fluorescent tube lights up the entire room. Given the amount of material in the
room, and the size of the room, there is not much space left to manoeuvre yourself.
Mark rummages through the papers on the desk and, after collecting some together,
and after reading a memo, he tells me about his work and the importance of
calibration (Fw: 01).
7.2.2 Preparation and calibration
During an interview in the same hut, a worker gave me a clear idea of the importance
of calibration:
R: [In the permanent way hut] there're sections of rail with flaws manufactured in them,
when waiting on a possession the guys calibrate the gear on these sections in the shop.
Sometimes the guys can go a couple of months without finding a defect, so we use these to
test.
I: Is this a safety mechanism, to make sure the gear is working?
R: Yes, it's a standard we have to work to (Int: 04).
During another interview a respondent, again in the same hut, tells me more about
calibration:
Before the guys go out onto the site they have to calibrate their gear: by calibrating their gear
in the shop they are making sure that the instruments are working and picking up the right
signals from the sections of rail and calibration blocks that have flaws manufactured in them.
Some of the rail sections have been taken directly from the railway network after the
discovery of faults. ... They calibrate their gear so that each UT procedure picks up the
relevant defect (Int: 05).
What follows is my interpretation of how calibration is done for one procedure: the
detection of taches ovales. Taches ovales and horizontal or vertical defects are
searched for with the U3 procedure: before going out on site the guys calibrate their
gear on a section of rail that they know has a tache ovale in a certain position (see fig.
7-6).
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T o understand how the rail
flaw looks like inside, the
respondent showed me a
thin piece of steel that was
the shape of a rail profile.
Just where the black mark is
on the picture opposite, is
where the respondent
coloured the thin steel
profile.
J
Figure 7-6 Explaining the location of an internal defect (author's sketch).
The sectioned rail above has a defect in it (the dark patch). This defect's position is
known to be "40% full screen height" (FSH), and it is visualised as such onto a
display screen that records what the UT probes pick up as shown in fig. 7-7:
Figure 7-7 Example of a UT reading on a cathode ray tube (author's sketch).
Now because the UT operator knows that the flaw within the rail is "40%" he has to
adjust the sensitivity of the reading on the cathode ray unit by turning a dial to make it
read 40% full screen height (this is the calibration process). Once the flaw is read as
40% he knows that the gear is calibrated. The reason for calibrating is this:
Anything that reads over the calibrated measurement of 40% FSH in this case [when testing
for a taches ovale] would be a defect that would demand a response of some kind: retest
within 36 hours, clamp and impose a speed limit, retest in 7 days, or remove the section of
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rail within 36 hours. ... If anything is found below 40%FSH, an audible alarm is activated to
the draw the operator's attention to it (Int: 05).
There are different procedural responses, depending on the severity of the problem. A
defect that reads 50%FSH, (see "A" below, in fig.7-8) means the rail would be
clamped and retested at a set frequency. If the feedback read 100%FSH (see "B" in
fig. 7-8) the procedure would be to clamp and remove the section of rail within 36
hours.
Figure 7-8 Example of fault severity differences (author's sketch).
The problems in fig. 7-8 would look like this (fig. 7-9) on a cathode ray box
respectively:
O O o
Figure 7-9 How the flaws in fig. 7-8 would be represented on cathode ray tube
(author's sketch).
Whilst in the permanent way hut I was shown an example of the technological strides
that UT has taken in recent years. New digital packs brought in to replace the old
cathode ray tubes are sitting out on a desk.
R: They're expensive, about five grand each... I don't like them, they encourage you to be
lazy. It already has stored in it the different calibrations for each defect type.
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[Observation: The respondent switches one on and my understanding is this: you turn a dial
to switch between different calibration types. The calibration is displayed on a digital screen
and a sensitivity level is also set by default, but the operator can change it to make it 2-3dbs
[decibels] over sensitive...]
R: ... Experienced people tend to work oversensitive...
[.. .and the feedback, once the probes are placed on the rail, is displayed on a table / graph¬
like display. There is continual "noise" on the display at the bottom of the graph, and when a
defect is found an outstanding point rises from the noise].
In the opposite
picture a new digital
display is shown. It is
attached to a walking
stick.
The "peak" on the
reading towards the
right of the screen
shows a clear reading
from the rail bottom.
It is when this is
interrupted and there
are peaks to the left
of the display that
suggests that a fault
might be inherent.
Figure 7-10 A reading on the digital display packs (author's photograph).
R: This [digital pack] can hold information on about 5000 defects. Information like
mileage....
[He turns the unit around and shows me the ports at the back of it]
R: This information can be downloaded... we don't have the software, the software costs
about £80,000
[This is not an error; it is eighty thousand pound for the software. I asked him to repeat the
price to make sure I heard correctly!)]
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R: The leads alone [from digital pack to probe] cost £16. A probe can cost £100.
I: How reliable is this equipment?
R: It is re-certificated every year [he shows me the small labels that are on each of the probes
and on each of the digital packs and other equipment in the room]. This [label] shows when
it was re-certificated, [there is a date on each label] it gets sent to NRS (national rail
supplies) in York where it is re-calibrated. As long as this is done we know we're working to
standard. We don't use anything outside [the] calibration, if something went wrong and
Railtrack came in and checked our equipment and paperwork ... our feet wouldn't touch the
ground This is 18 years old...
[Jim draws my attention to a long -approximately 12" long-, oblong shaped item, yellow in
colour, with a handle on top. At one end there is a visual display screen with several lines
going across the screen horizontally and vertically to give the effect of a grid. There are 2-3
dials next to this display. It is the facing of this that I have sketched in fig. 7-9]
R: This is what was used before them [the digital packs], it's a cathode ray. I'll be using this
tonight... they're robust,... feel the difference in weight between this and that [the digital
packs].
[The digital pack is light; I could easily hold it in one hand. The older testing unit was very,
very heavy].
R: It's [the cathode ray] still up to standard, it doesn't have any pre-calibrations in it, doesn't
store any information. There's a lot more paper work when using this. Each time you test
have to re-calibrate it, it keeps you on your toes. But this is the way we're going [points to
the digital pack] (Int: 04).
Back to Fw:01 and, after telling me about calibration in the permanent way hut, Mark,
armed with papers he had lifted from the desk, walks to the parked van to drive to the
first site;
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There is a seat between Mark and I that is absolutely covered in papers. Indeed the
seat that I am sitting on had been covered in papers until Mark told me just to move
them on to the dashboard or to the side of me. Print-outs from computers are either
folded or unfolded: hand written notes are dotted around; some paper is scrunched
up ubiquitously; and thin booklets and thick booklets create an unstable tower on the
middle seat between us. On the dash board it is more or less the same, indeed, when
Mark moves the van I have to instinctively reach out to grab falling papers. Wedged
in a space on the dashboard above the radio is a small polystyrene cup crammed
with pens. A mobile phone is in a holder that is pinned to dash board. Above the sun-
visors there is a space that holds numerous ring binders. In the pockets of the door
to my side there is more paper and, at my feet, random A4 sheets lie. Quite frankly,
everywhere in the van that a slip of paper, or a book, or a folder, can be inserted,
crammed or slid into, is indeed, taken up with some form of stationery (Fw: 01)68.
The scene before me is replicated on other nights in other vans and it reminds me of
the words of those in interviews regarding paperwork. Moreover, at the end of one
night's work, when one UT worker starts writing up his findings and comments, he
tells me:
The information we put in, it doesn't come back. I try to put in as much information I
can under "additional comments" - "RCF, longest crack length, has come back at
[location name] on switch blade, or stock rail, at [S&C number]. But when it comes
back to us [stating the inspection frequency that the fault requires], it will say
mileage, location and rait, but won't tell you if it's the stock rail or the blade... means
we have to check both, or the length of the longest crack... I know the area and can
remember the majority, but I can't remember each and every fault I test, I test
hundreds every week!... I don't know if it's a problem with the software package...
but we get little feedback. The list of faults I have to check [that he is given at the
start of each week] is not even in order, I have to order itmyself [in terms of
location]. I don't want to be driving around the countrygoing back on myself, or
68 During all my field work (for UT, visual inspection and grinding) I met up with the workers at
arranged meeting points, at these meeting points we climbed into vans and headed for sites, the vans all
had numerous pieces of paperwork. Albeit, the one described here from my first stint of fieldwork had
arguably more paper scattered around it than all the others I eventually rode in.
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finding out at the end of the week that Imissed one.... That's why I spend time
ordering the workmyself"(Fw: 02).
Another UT operator commented:
Paperwork? There's a lot of it - I take it home and fax it into the office- it's a nightmare, it
can still take me a couple of hours or so, so I'm still not finished really (Fw: 12).
The same worker then suggested that he may have actually got his job as he was more
willing to work with paper than others might have been:
I: Did you have any particular experience with RCF / gauge corner cracking identification
[to get this work position]?
R: Not really, I had just as much [experience] as the other guys before Hatfield. I mean...
everyone had seen a bit of it, it was just [name] wanted me to do [this job]. There's a lot of
paperwork with the job, maybe that's why, maybe it would put the other guys off. ... No
disrespect to the guys, they're good at their job, they just don't want the paper work (Fw:
12).
7.2.3 Getting on the permanent way
The first site we are going to is due for a six monthly retest. It's on a curve where
RCF was reported, in response the site was ground, and now, six months later, it is
time for a visual and ultrasonic inspection.
Mark phones the PICOP [person in charge of possession]: "we can get on 00:55".
Mark tells me again how he should be booked into a possession, "that's Alex's job, he
should have me booked into every one, but he doesn't, but I know the PICOPs so it's
no bother. I tell Alex that I must be booked into a possession on Saturday night -
that's the busiest night, and I should be booked in just to make sure" (Fw: 12).
On another occasion I heard how access to a possession is granted:
"I'm on first name terms with all the PICOPS in this area, I can get in.... the PICOPs
tend to be all agency guys from [company name] ... It could be a problem if you're
not booked into a possession, but I know the PICOPS, they're like... 'aye ok, on you
go'. Any new person won't get on, the PICOPs, you know... 'and who are you?!!'. I
don't blame them, I wouldn't let any one on. [Person's name] should plan
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possessions. There used to be T2Xs, [possession between traffic], this doesn't
happen anymore, everything has to be planned" (Fw: 02).
Back to Fw: 12: it is 00:55.
We climb a fence, get in to the 4-foot and walk to the site which is found quickly -
the database reference number for this site is painted on a sleeper and is faded,
Willie re-writes it with a tin of spray paint whilst Gordon switches on the walking
stick. Before Willie walks with the stick Gordon walks on ahead to visually inspect the
rail. After Willie has made sure the water couplant is getting onto the rail and he is
getting the rail bottom signal, he and I walk along the line with the walking stick. He
tells me what he is looking for.
Along the timescale, marked 00 - 200mm, he says "you should always have a rail
bottom signal"- a signal near 80%FSH near the 160mm division. That means you
are getting an " uninterrupted signal right through the rail", no defects or faults are
breaking the signal. If there was something you would expect to "see something
about the 20mm division, something quite shallow here because this site has been
ground recently. But mainly, what you are doing is looking for a loss ofrail bottom.
You have to keep the walking stick centred, ifyou go too far to the edges you get a
signal ofabout 40mm - the first time you see that you might think you've got a
problem, but it's not - it's the underside of the rail you're hitting - so you have to
keep it centred (see fig. 7-11).
The red dotted areas
denote where the probe
is on the rail when the
ultras ound wave hits
the underside of the rail
head. The "blue" box in
the centre denotes
where the probe is
when the ultrasound
wave is able to travel
through the rail head,
web and foot to rail
bottom..
Figure 7-11 Hitting the underside of the rail head (author's sketch),
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I ask Willie about the skills he needs when operating this machine. He tells me "it's
pretty basic". He came from the oil and gas industry and he's worked on submarines
- ultrasonics is his thing- always has been - for 23 years. But "this is just rails - it's
straightforward". You do need "a bit of interpretation, but that comes with
experience - you know when your hitting the underside of the rail head - you know
when to centre up again, you know when the coup/ant is not working - you get to
know these things"(Fw: 12).
In this example we got to the site at 00:55 without any delay, this however, was not
typical. Signalling problems and late traffic often means a lot of hanging around for
workers:
A railway station is in sight to our rear and on the line to the north, there is a vehicle
of some type. The bright lights of the vehicle make it hard to distinguish exactly what
it is. It is also hard to determine whether it is moving or not.
Mark, with clipboard, takes our PTS numbers and tells us exactly where the site is; he
tells us to look out for the "usual" hazards underfoot: loose ballast and debris. He
asks one of the men if he will be the first-aider.
Mark then leaves us to speak to someone. The two other men in the team and I
stand together and speak...
After speaking for some time, perhaps 20 minutes or so, Mark approaches and joins
in the conversation. The conversation continues; it goes on for some more minutes,
nearly a quarter of an hour passes. I am curious as to why we are not going on to
the track, and why no-one has spoken about this time we are spending just standing
here talking and not getting on with the work. The conversation between the three of
us tails off with still no reference as to why we are hanging about. As much as I want
to ask why we are not working, I also want to wait and see if anyone mentions this
period of inactivity. Because no-one talks about what seems like wasting time I guess
that this perhaps occurs frequently. Despite my curiosity, I continue to hold my
tongue. Mark wanders aimlessly around, so do the other two men. I find myself
occupying my time by walking on lengths of unused rail, testing my balance. I also
shine my large, powerful torch on objects far way. Time is passing. It's nearly an
hour since we got here, nothing is happening, other vans arrived some time ago,
some of the occupants are perusing The Sun and drinking from flasks. Thankfully it is
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a nice mild night.
I can't stand it anymore, I ask the obvious question: 11Is there a hold up?"Mark tells
me the PICOP is not letting any one near the track because of the large vehicle that
is stationary to the north of us at the station. I find out that this machine is used for
tamping (realigning the ballast). Mark tells me that the signaller in charge of the
signal that is at red in front of the tamper will not change it until the line further
south is clear. Mark tells me that this sort of things happens often. "What can you
dd' he says with a hint of resignation. The tamper "onlymoves at about 5mpif9,
you're going to see it coming, and hear it. But we all have to be on the side ofsafety
now."
It's about an hour and a quarter since we got here and eventually the tamper moves
off. There is a burst of working activity before us...70 (Fw: 01).
It is to some activities that we now direct attention.
7.3 GETTING TO KNOW THINGS: FIVE EXAMPLES
7.3.1 Example one: experience and decision-making
In Fw: 12 the worker said of UT inspection: "you get to know things". But what did
he mean? - How do you get to know things? It will now be shown that getting to
know things is often a tacit, complex process that relies on informal training, group
discussion, collaborative learning, experience and know-how, interpretation and
imagination.
I ask Jim about the role of experience when doing UT. He points out to me how "you
have to be wary when relying on the audible alarm. There is a three second delay;
69
Tampers can actually move significantly faster than this. They can move at 40 - 60mph between
tamping - meaning there is a safety risk
70 Such delays, like the one just described, occurred on other occasions and could be given as a preface to most
field-notes however, but not wanting to write repeatedly out boring uneventful waiting, I think it is sufficient to
give one example and to simply note that delays in getting on to the track were common during my research.
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you cover the defect, then the alarm sounds but because of the speed you're
walking, ifyou look down then, you willmiss it. You have to retrace your steps and
scan the rail again and look closely. That can be a danger, but you should always be
looking at the display screen in any casd' (Fw: 16).
Understanding the operation of the machine is an obvious pre-requisite, but
understanding the environment of the permanent way and being able to dismiss
spurious factors is also required:
"Patterns on rails can be confusing/'. Jim points out an area of rail that looks
damaged, but isn't. It is simply because of "diesel or something else that has been
picked up by the wheels and has made the rail look like that, you can tell the
difference through time".
We are at two switches and crossings and despite exhibiting light RCF, there was no
UT indication. Whilst here, Jim tells me that UT operators must be "wary of the rail's
shape"w\\er\ testing. For instance, here is a rail that has been transposed, and the
field side (i.e. what was once the gauge corner side) is well worn down and is
affecting the rail depth reading. Instead of being approximately 160 it is at 120. Just
reading the display alone would have suggested a problem. Fie says: " when you're at
the training centre they do point out things like this to you, but still you have to see
on site with guys who already know these things, that's how you learn. These little
things are important"(Fw: 16).
7.3.2 Example two: hand held ultrasonic testing of bolt holes
I am following a UT worker whose task is to test for bolt hole star cracks at fish-
plated joints, see fig. 7-12, that is the cracking that caused the Hither Green
derailment. The calibration for bolt holes is 80% full screen height.
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Fish plate
Figure 7-12 Ultrasonic testing at fish-plated joints (author's sketch).
Star cracking at the bolt holes through the web of the rail can occur and this is called
because of the crack shape. In Railtrack document RT/CE/S/055 (Railtrack, 1998b)
each bolt-hole and star cracking is lettered71, see figure 7-12. It is the detection of
these cracks with hand-held probes that the following example is concerned with:
Figure 7-13 Star cracking (RT/CE/S/055, Railtrack, 1998).
All crack positions except ID and 1C: Place the probe at the start line and pointing towards the bolt hole.
Obtain and maximise the signal from the bolt hole as the control signal and set this signal to an amplitude of 80%
full screen height. Move the probe backwards until the control signal disappears. If a crack is present in the B/D
position the signal from the crack will maximise at a longer range than the control signal. Move the probe forward
to its original start line, ensuring that the control signal returns to 80% full screen height. Continue to move the
probe forwards until the control signal disappears. If a crack is present in the A/C position, the signal from the
crack will maximise at the same range as the control signal (Railtrack, 1998b: RT/CE/055).
In all cases when the control signal disappears, the probe must be swivelled on it's axis to search for the presence
of any defects at the sides of the hole. This instruction also applies to the following scans.
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Neil and I walk to the first fish-plate, where he sprays the surface of the rail with
water before running the probe over the centre of the rail. He starts at the end of the
fish-plate and heads towards the rail end. We see the first bolt-hole - the reading
comes up on the digital display between 100 and 120mm and is between 80 and
100% full screen height. "I've calibrated it so it would be higher than 80%, that way
you can see it easier. Sometimes when it doesn't read as high as 80%, it can be
because ofwear on the surface of the rail head, you've got to look out for things like
that. But then send in more soundjust to make it 80%. Then test it again but slower
to see ifanything is there" (Fw: 11).
Manipulating the machine to suit the conditions of the worn rail was done here for
effective UT. But looking out for a worn rail is not as simple as it may sound. A keen
well-trained eye is required: this is because a rail that has suffered wear can be worn
by only a matter of millimetres.
Now, despite the fact that Neil pointed out that the rail he was testing was worn, I
simply could not have said from my own observation: "That rail is worn". Perhaps if
there happened to be a brand new rail with no wear lying parallel for me to compare
it with I might have noticed the difference, but there was not, my eye was untrained
in the skill of recognising wear. To find out these things Neil spoke about on-site
learning; "Another [in the group] will always be there to te/i you if things are fine or
/7o/""(FW: 11).
When we are walking Neil tells me about the importance of discussions:
"If there is something we have not seen before [on the visual display] - say a
signature duplicating exactly the first, you might at first think that there is a fault.
You're getting a double kick, but you realise, someone will tellyou it's ok; the boit is
too tight and you're getting a double reflection ofthe boithoid' (Fw: 11).
At this moment, Neil then gives an example of the decision-making process that can
occur within the group. Later, he also refers to a collaborative learning process that
calls upon the experiential knowledge of others:
"But if there is something strange, the guys have a confiab - we discuss things and
get the probes out, and if we're still not sure we take the bolts out and take the
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plates off to look at it visually. Then we can see if it has been drilled or bored badly
or if the bolt is too tight and is catching the ultrasonic wave"(F\N: 11).
Do UT operators learn such things during training?
At Derby [location of the training school where all UT operators for Britain's railways
are trained]: "you practice on rails with very dean boithoies, and definite faults. So
you can see the difference. But when you're on the site, things are not always that
dead'. Another in the teams said: " The first time I saw something like that I thought
crikey, got a fault here, but you find out it's otherwise. Sometimes, the way they've
battered the bolt - it can cause a slight chip and you can get a reading of that. Even
though you do the course a Derby and they assess you andyou pass your test you
still team on the track'.
Neil goes on to tell me about the noise that runs up and down the timescale at 00mm
to 40mm (See fig. 7-14). He says that this is when water drips down the rail end or
when the join is too tight. "See here... [he points to a specific area between two
adjoining rails] that is tight. The biscuit [the name of the pad between the rails] is
squashed, sometimes you get a kick off that when the sound waves runs up and
down it, and that's what it looks like on the display [the noise between 00mm and
40mm]. You get that noise, but again that is something you learn from others!' (Fw:
11).
The role of the group and its dynamics, in the sense that team members tacitly learn
from others, is clearly essential, but not just for any new-comers who have to rely on
the experience of others when learning how to make decisions. A solid structured
group with a shared sense of responsibility is a must:
They're learning from experience, they're a good bunch of boys... there's different types...
the impatient one... the thinker that questions everything, and the one who's a bit of both,
the balance. ... They look out for each other, that's good. It's important to have that. They
discuss the problem, and they agree on the final action. ... The lads have to be interested in
their work, if they come to their work with the aim of just getting finished, that's no use...
they have to be interested because it depends on their interpretation of that screen (Int: 05).
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7.3.3 Example three
We now have an inkling ofwhat operators look for, and what skills they rely on when
testing. We now look at these skills in action.
We get to [the site]. It's a complicated looking set up of tracks and switches and
crossings: there are four main lines, two of which are fast -lOOmph, and two are
slow - 40mph. Coming off each line there are subsidiaries that are also slow. So
there is a lot to know when considering where the traffic is coming from and how fast





that there is no
problem.
This feedback at the bottom ofthe display is "noise", if this noise
"climbs "the left hand side ofthe display to approximately position
"A", this suggests to the operator that the signal is reflecting off the rail
edge and pad (known occasionally as the biscuit).
Figure 7-14 Explaining noise on the digital display packs (author's photograph).
What makes it all the more treacherous is that it's been snowing; the sleepers are
extremely slippery underfoot; each step is taken with caution. Each one of us now
and then, slips and slides, but we regain our balance. There are five sites to look at
here, four of which are at S&Cs. The other is in a plain line (CWR).
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It takes a bit of searching to find the first S&C, the number [of the S&C] is written on
top of a large plastic container but beneath a layer of snow. So we have to walk to
each S&C and scrape off the snow until we find the one we want.
We find the first fault. It's a 100mm crack, yes - one hundred - and when measuring
it we see it hasn't grown. As Eric puts a metal rule against it, the men decide not to
UT it simply because it has not grown and it has no UT reading history. But Eric and
Dougie both agree that this crack is not true RCF, the area on the rail around the
crack is full of wheel burns. Eric tells me, "technically, that's not RCF, it's wheel
burns, but someone first reported it as RCF, so we have to check it as that." Eric is
convinced the crack is only along the surface of the rail.
We have to clear the track, a freight service with dozens of wagons full of coal go by.
"That's the boys that cause all the wheel-burns", says Dougie. "When theypull away
all the wheels slip".
We get back on the track and search for the next S&C. Apparently there is a crack on
the rail head that is 10mm. After a bit of time searching I see the 10mm mark on the
foot of a rail in yellow crayon, I point this out to the men; this is indeed the crack
that we should be checking. It's in the field side of the rail, and it is relatively easy to
spot for someone has already scraped the rail, so against a rusty looking background
there is a silvery area that highlights where the crack is.
I mention how this seems a little unusual: one isolated crack on the field side, when
often there are clusters on the rail on the gauge side or on the head. " That's the way
it goes, there's just no pattern to it', says Dougie. Eric measures it with a metal rule;
it's grown from 10mm to 12mm. Again I couldn't see where it started and finished. It
was too difficult to see as it went into the rusty looking part of the rail. John notes
done on a small bit of paper that this crack has grown. Earlier he had noted how the
100mm crack had remained the same.
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Figure 7-15 The 10mm crack I found (author's photograph).
We then cross some tracks and make our way to the area where we think the next
S&C is. A train passes, it is a high speed passenger train, and though we know that it
is not on the track we are on, and is actually quite a bit of distance away, we make
our way to the point of safety and watch it go by. Back on the track we get to the
area and scrape away the snow to see the S&C number. We've found it. The crack
we're looking for is 35mm long. We find it quickly, because, again on the web and
foot of the rail it had been marked in yellow crayon. This crack was not in isolation;
there were other smaller cracks around it. Eric gets the rule out and measures it. I'm
by his side and this time I can see the crack quite clearly and, immediately, I say that
it looks like it has grown. Eric agrees and says it has grown from 35 to 48mm. Eric
and Dougie have a small discussion where they mainly refer to the shape of the crack
and some shadowing that borders it, but the majority of the time they are in silence.
They look from one angle then another and often they touch the rail. After a
thoughtful moment they decide they will check it out again tomorrow for they are
back in this area then and the weather might not be so bad. The underfoot
conditions might not be so slippery and it might not be too difficult to carry the UT
equipment down a slippery flight of wooden stairs and over a few tracks. In the end
they decide to wait till tomorrow.
At the next S&C there's a 10mm crack on the stock rail. We find it simply because it
is marked brightly with yellow on the rail foot and web. The same procedure is done
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with the metal rule. It's grown also - from 10mm to 18mm. This crack is isolated.
Alec says it has grown into an "L" shape. Alec and John have a look at it. Though it
has grown they do not appear to give it the same attention as the last crack that had
grown. They note it, and go on their way to the next site.
Figure 7-16 How an S&C is labelled (author's photograph).
Though the sites have been tested, Eric and Dougie still seem unhappy with the
crack that had gone from 35 to 48mm. Before heading to the van, they pause and
though they haven't spoken about that crack since they measured it, they seem to
have it at the forefront of their thoughts for they have both looked in the direction of
the S&C that was affected. When looking at the S&C from a distance, and as if
knowing what the other is thinking, they decide that instead of waiting till tomorrow
they will get the walking stick down and have a look at it now. Eric goes back to the
van, and drives it closer to the area and comes down the wooden steps safely with
the equipment.
At this moment I talk to Dougie about the hassles involved in searching for faults. He
is not convinced that inspecting rail at night is correct: "many [faults] mustgo
undetected', but adds; "they don't mind how it's detected, as long as it is looked for.
Ifanything happens, but we can prove that we were looking for it, that's ok". Eric
approaches us with the stick.
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Figure 7-17 An example of how a crack is labelled on the rail foot (author's
photograph)
The stick is put on the rail and the probes are connected up to the pack. Dougie runs
the stick over the fault. There is no reading; the signal from the rail bottom is clear
and not disturbed. But one pass over the affected rail is not good enough to satisfy
them and to make sure Dougie goes over it a few times. He manoeuvres the stick in
slight ways as if feeling for something. Eric keeps an eye on the pack, as Dougie
skips his eyes from rail surface to pack. Eventually they say it's clear.
We're walking back to the van over the track when Dougie stops and says, "See, how
would you spot that at night?"Douq\e noticed a series of very small RCF on a stock
rail, it was very faint and each crack was only a matter of millimetres long, "that
wouldgetmissed at night', Dougie concludes (Fw: 17).
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An implicit process occurred during these tests that relied on a degree of know-how
and tacit knowledge. Specialised knowledge and being wary of some cracks and
dismissing others as spurious is a necessary skill. Having an inkling as to where they
will occur is another. This tacit skill is captured now:
7.3.4 Example four
Gordon has found one crack, which I eventually see myself. But again I am wary that
I am looking at the rail from a closer distance than Gordon before I see it slowly
emerge. I run my finger along the subtle serrated edge and then Gordon measures it
with a plastic rule: "20mm, I would say". Willie then ran the walking stick over it and
got no signature. We then continued walking over the length of the site; no UT
findings were found over the remainder of the rail. When we got back to the van
Mark was filling out papers and he asked if we had found anything. We told him
about the 20mm crack but that nothing was found with the stick. Mark found another
sheet of paper and filled it in whilst passing the comment: "Iknew it would come
back". I immediately ask him how he knew this: "It's just a hunch I s'pose, but if
there's been gauge corner cracking there before, it's going to come back after
grinding". Then pausing and looking out the windshield to the permanent way we
had just walked, he says: "It'sjust something about these curves, it'll come back". I
mention how it was only one isolated crack we saw: " it doesn'tmatter ifyou see one
crack or ifyou see hundreds, one is enough. That tells you it's back. Imean, ifyou
were out here during the day and you walked this track you could find lots ofsites,
butjust finding one is enough at the end of the day, cause it tells you: it's here - full
stop'jFw: 12).
7.4 THREE ULTRASONIC TESTING SPECIALISMS
7.4.1 Interpretation, imagination, and touch
When reading the results on the display unit the operator needs to be vigilant and his
interpretation must be finely tuned. Being able to distinguish between typical noise
and double kicks and real faults, and between serious cracks and minor surface
cracks, is a key, practically acquired skill.
Ultrasonics is a very specialised field usually left to the experts... The passage of the
ultrasonic energy is not as clean as one would like. In particular, there is a disturbed zone of
about 10mm at the interface between the probe and the rail [thus] the first several
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millimetres of the entry into the rail cannot be exploited. But, in principle, the information
given is sufficient to locate potential defects. In practice, the traces are lively and require
great attention for interpretation (IHHA, 2002: 5-25).
Another UT specialist likewise suggests:
When ultrasonic flaw detection techniques are applied, a considerable amount of skill is
required on the part of the operator. He must be suitably trained in order to be able to
identify various types of defects from the shapes and sizes of the traces observed on screen.
Care must be taken to ensure that a particular peak corresponds to a defect and is not a
spurious indication (Blitz, 1971: 106).
Another refers to the operational advantages to be gained if the UT operator has
significant experience:
In practice, when testing a larger object in detail, or a number of similar objects, a skilled
operator can eliminate to some extent all unknowns not related to the defect, especially if
there is a back-wall echo to be found, which serves as a reference. By carefully examining a
flaw, and using his experience, the operator can gain a significant amount of information
about it (Sziland, 1982: 45).
7.4.2 Example five
Findings suggest that effective interpretation of signals requires a certain use of
imagination and a delicate touch by the operator when testing. One night a UT team
let me UT a section of rail.
Team member A: "It does require a lot of interpretation... in this industry they... they
like a "yes"or a "no"...
Team member B;... "And the hardest\bo\t\\o\e to test] is the 'D'position..."[recall
figure 7-13)
Team member C: "Sending a sound wave into rail is like shining a torch on a building
in darkness. To know about the building, if it's a house, if it's semi-detached, if it's
two floors or one, you have to move the beam about to find out. That is what you
have to do with a probe on a rail to find out the details ofthe flaw... Sound deflects
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at different velocities offdifferent surfaces... It's like throwing a ball offa wall,
depending how you throw the ball it will bounce ofat different angles and speedd'.
The men then offer me the chance to UT a random section of rail. With a knee on a
sleeper and a foot on the ballast and with the digital pack in one hand, I place the
probe on the wet rail with the other and try to slide it over the running band. I notice
a big difference already between the way I am testing and the way the men have
been testing. When they test the rail the probe glides effortlessly around the rail as if
it is a smooth block of ice, yet when I try it the probe sticks or shudders around the
rail, then one of the men tells me:
C: " The medium matters, pressing the probe on the rail with different force can
change things as well'.
Just now I recall words that I had recently read in a UT text book for training
operators, which said:
Acoustic coupling between probe and test object [in my case a rail] can be provided
through a layer of water. For manual work contact coupling is preferred, because it gives
the operator a better "feel" of what they are doing (Sziland, 1982: 43 - 44).
My technique improves a little, and one of the team says:
A: " You're looking for a pattern [on the display], sometimes it's easier to go faster
over the surface of the rail; it can be easier to see something that way instead of
going slow".
It is at this moment that I guess UT operators need to use their imagination if they
are to understand what is going on inside the rail with the pulsing ultrasonic beam. I
asked about the role of imagination, and transferring what it is the operator imagines
onto\he visual display screen...
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B: " That's it!... It's simple trigonometry really... Training is done at Derby for a
fortnight, for the basics, it wasn't until the second week that I suddenly got it... I
understood what was happening with the probe and where the beam was inside the
rail. Until then it was all over the top ofmy head'.
I continue testing the rail head above a fish-plated section trying to spot patterns on
the display:
A: " When you're at the rail endgive it [the probe] a little twist, it can be harder to
pick up faults here..."
I try to do so, but just when I thought my technique was improving my unskilled,
maladroit manner returns. The probe moves ungainly across the rail and I lose all
signals on the pack, then when I adjust I press too hard and it's just a noisy
nonsense on display. But I ask more about training and how the operators knowXhaX
you might have to "swivel" the probe at the rail end.
A: "It's learned over time... swivelling it there... He, [another group member], has
been doing this for five years, he's experienced, he toldme things." (Fw: 10).
Imagining what is happening inside the rail with the signal is an important aspect
when comprehending the feedback on the visual display screen. Determining what is
happening with the pulsing beam is the operator's touch, which needs to be delicate
and subtle.
7.5 TRAINING THE IMAGINATION
7.5.1 Informal structures
The extent to which UT operators rely on practically acquired know-how skills which
are developed from shared on-site experience has been referred to frequently through
numerous examples, whilst others expressed it succinctly:
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When you come back from Derby, you need to go out with experiencedguys -
there is always someone there who can help you, you always need a hand during
that time - the learning continues during that time. The problem is, some ofthe
guys in the office think that when you come back from Derby you can go out and
do all these checks by yourself- it's not like that{Fw: 10).
R: Experience is important, you can't have guys just passed their test and in two weeks
checking for RCF...
I: So there needs to be a structure after the training?
R: Oh yes, we've got guys who are competent in everything and guys who have just started.
It's quite a good thing to have that... then new guys can always ask questions (Int: 07).
It takes three months to get the certificate, and after Derby they work with experienced guys.
They always work as a group, and they assess between the two of them or within the group
what the problem is, to come to an agreement on action (Int: 05).
Given these comments, what role is there for formal training?
7.5.2 Formal structures and tuning the mind's eye
The training of UT operators is a crucial part of the system of rail fitness-for-purpose
inspection.
The guys go to Derby where they learn the mandatory basics72 [U1: Ultrasonic Testing of
Fish Plated Joints' and U2: 'Examination of Locations not Covered by U373]... then three
72
Through time the operator can go back to Derby to learn further UT skills. The following text points out the
need for further skills: "The complex nature of a rolled steel rail and the potential for failure necessitates a number
of different procedures each related to a particular part of the rail, form of defect or type of rail steel' (Railtrack:
1998b:5).
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months later, after they have been on sites, they're tested on these skills: then they get their
certificates (Int: 05).
One UT operator told me briefly about the training set-up at Derby:
We went to Derby for a fortnight for a course that covers the U1 and U2 procedure. The first
week is taken up with a lot of theory, there is some practical, but that is mostly done in the
second week (Fw: 11).
During a visit to the Derby rail test centre I was given the opportunity to see how
training is organised. The following notes and comments from workers are from this
visit.
"Historically, this was the old BR training centre, everyone for rail testing came here,
we knew all the operators, we issued the certificates, we knew every one that had a
certificate". The training centre is one building of a very large complex. There is a
series of small rooms which act as classrooms. In one room there are many rows of
rail sections with faults. Many of the rail sections have been taken from the actual
railway network. Many of the rails have been split open so the fault inside the rail is
visible to the naked eye. I am told each section of rail has been mastered: the exact
range of the fault inside the rail is known. It is in this room that the candidates spend
most of the first week; it is where they learn the theory and it is where they are
introduce to the course booklets.
This room also houses an interesting looking gadget. A sectioned rail-head made
entirely out of clear Perspex sits diagonally below an instrument that can emit a red
beam. The red beam has been designed to replicate the characteristics of an
ultrasound wave. In the railhead and clearly visible to the naked eye is a clean cut
forming a small hollow expanse that has been designed to imitate a real fault. By
firing the red beam into the railhead the candidate is able to see how an ultrasound
wave "travels", and how it "hits" the clear cut "defect". The instrument simulates
73 U3 refers to the testing of the full rail section by the 070 rail testing system, commonly known as the
walking stick.
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what occurs when the UT operator is on-site and in a real occasion. The system
provides the operator with an image for the mind's eye: it underpins the imagination
that those operators spoke about during an earlier episode of fieldwork. As one
worker here told me: " This is a visualisation process, simulating with the Perspex you
can see the lights, this gives the UToperator an idea of what goes on ... Operators
test on railpieces that have been mastered, so we know what results the guy should
get". (Fw: 25).
Spending the first week of the training fortnight in a classroom learning theory is due
to a recent change:
They're trying to bring in a lot of theory now... intense theory... some of the guys might
struggle. ...They're trying to make ultrasonics a recognised skill. The guys are getting PCNs
[personal certificate of non-destructing testing]. It's more theory based now (Int: 05).
A training centre worker put it this way:
In 2000 PCNs came in, PCN stands for Personal Certificate of Non-destructive testing.
PCNs are recognised in other industries, but a specific sector for rail testing was introduced,
the skills are transferable to a certain degree (Int: 25).
The key difference for UT operators after this change is that candidates now have to
learn general UT theory, rather than just its practical application to rail testing. The
major and potentially beneficial difference is that candidates are now being taught
some of the fundamentals of the process, but:
Historically we tested rail testers on rail alone; there was some theory with it. But with the
PCN there is more general theory about UT, that's the material that can be transferred from
one UT job to another. This theory involves trigonometry, it's been difficult introducing this,
we've had complaints (Int: 25).
The intensity of the theory is notable by referring to the course booklets that
accompany the two week course at Derby. There are two booklets: 'Ultrasonic
Testing ofRail Level 1 Part la General Ultrasonic Theory' and 'Ultrasonic Testing of
Rail Level 1 Part 2a Sector Specific Theory'. The first booklet is 78 pages long while
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the second numbers only 20 pages. The new training content, it is feared, may have a
negative impact:
Now they have brought in a national certification (the PCN), this brings in more theory... is
this a good thing? It is in a way. But the guys who are doing the job just now and who have
been doing it for years, they're good at it, they are very competent UT operators, but they're
suddenly faced with the theory. You can't just bring it on, you've got to bring it on gradually
or the guys could get lost, and some might learn quicker than others (Int: 05).
This worker suggests that UT operators, who have been in the industry for years, and
who were trained on pieces of rail alone, have become very competent and highly
skilled operators despite their lack of theoretical knowledge. Their basic training,
combined with years of experience has produced in them a sound (tacit)
understanding of the UT principles associated with rail testing. However, for them to
remain in the industry, they have to be re-tested to PCN standards every two years,
which involves learning new material (see figs: 7-18 and 7-19). Take the following
comment:
The difficulty is for traditional guys out there who have been testing rail for years and are
excellent at it, but they left school at 15, came off the shovel and are now excellent UT
operators. But now they have to face equations. They have to learn more than they need to
for a bit of rail (Int: 25).
Another warns:
There's a lot of knowledge about ultrasonics in general... but we, in the railway industry...
you can't tell the guys everything about ultrasonics, they'll forget (Int: 05).
The same respondent then talks about qualifications, but suggests:
It's [UT technological development and progress] getting better all the time. It's improving.
I've been in the industry since 1976, at first it was like, leave your brains indoors, and take
the brawn outside, gradually that is changing... there's nothing wrong with qualifications...
but if they had the experience also... cor-blimey! (Int: 05).
223
NEAR FIELD CALCULATION
Low angle compression wave probe ^ ^
with circular crystal: j
Bi i> I n
d2f
High angle shear wave probe
with circular crystal:
The modified near field distance Nm«sfj*> is as the above formula for iow
angle compression probes minus the Perspex Correction distance.










High angle shear wave probe
with square or rectangular crystal:
¥modi/la./









i Note that 1.3 and 0.97 are constant factors)
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Figure 7-18 An example of some UT formulae from the PCN courses books




probe crystal 23.8mm diameter, perspexwedge depth 30mm,
probe frequency 2,5 MHz, perspex velocity 2730 m/s (corop.),













Near Field In steel - N - correction for depth of perspex
f 2730 N'i
= JV — 30 x
I. 5900J
= 60 - 13.8 - 46.2mm
Worked example 2:
probe crystal 8mm width x 9mm length, probe frequency 5 MHz.,
perspex wedge depth 10mm, perspex velocity 2739 m/s (comp.),
steel velocity 3230 m/s (shear.)
1.3LxQ.97ff'xF 1.3x9x0.97x8x5.0
A = - —— = 5>mm
4V 4x3230
Modified Near field in steel = N - perspex correction
= 35-i 10x| ~ 26.6mm
3230 J — —
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Figure 7-19 Another example of UT formulae (source: 'Serco, 2002b. Ultrasonic
Testing ofRail Level 1 Part 2a Sector Specific Theory').
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8 GRINDINGA RAIL
All our knowledge proceeds from what we feel - Leonardo da Vinci (cited in White, 2001:
55)
8.1 INTRODUCING RAIL-GRINDING
8.1.1 Grinding out problems
Depending on UT indications, rails are either replaced if cracking descends deeply
into the rail, or ground if the cracking is shallow. In this chapter I analyse the skills
involved in manual rail-grinding for removal of cracking at S&Cs.
It is commonly accepted in the industry that repetitive contact between the wheel and
the rail deforms the rail, whilst compressive stresses can induce cracking on the rail
head. By grinding the rail, shallow cracking may be removed and the original rail
profile may be restored.
The passage of wheels over the rail head removes rail head material in a process akin to
grinding. Where this process occurs at a rate in excess of the growth of any defects they are
effectively removed before having the chance to establish themselves. Where this is not the case,
grinding of the rail head is used to achieve the same effect (Wright, 2002: Conference paper).
In normal operation the wheel grinds the rail, a process commonly known in the
industry as artificial grinding. A technician referred to artificial grinding:
One of the historical things is that railways used to wear out, so steel was made harder so it
wouldn't wear so easily and it takes longer for the cracks to form. It takes even more passages of
trains, it's a cyclical thing. The more cycles it sees the more likely it is to initiate a crack. It's a
cycle dependent thing. So because it is not wearing out anymore, what used to happen is, it
[cracking] didn't form because the material was wearing away, there was artificial grinding. So
now it's getting the balance: you do not want to grind too often 'cause you're wearing it away,
but you don't want to leave it too long until the crack has initiated (Int: 27b).
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Likewise, an industry metallurgist commented:
Hard rail ... grade 260 ... won't wear that fast, the wear rate of normal rail... grade 220, normal
rail... is four times that of harder rail... The wheel / rail contact patch matters and the axle load.
If there is good contact there is far lower stress and it will crack less. But if it is soft rail and
there is a mismatch between the wheel and the rail it will wear fast (Int: 22).
When grinding out shallow cracking, the profile of the rail and the running band can
also be adjusted, (see fig. 8-1):
In the practice of "profile grinding" the head of the rail is re-profiled to control the location of
contact between wheel and the rail" (IHHA, 2001: 5-58).
With wheel and rail in contact at this spot, a
"running band" will appear on the surface of
the rail. By grinding the rail at the different
points on the head,the profile of the rail can
change thus shifting the point of contact
between wheel and rail, and hence
the running band will also shift.
Figure 8-1 The wheel / rail contact patch and running band (author's sketch).
This means that the running line can be moved:
Away from visible cracks, [this] can stop cracks growing even though they are not fully
removed by grinding (Railtrack, 2001a: 13).
The latest PWSI4 (Network Rail, 2003) also says:
Where RCF exists, grinding of long sites should be undertaken using a grinding train so as to
produce a uniform running band towards the crown of the rail and to relieve load from the
cracked area and slow the development of the existing cracks (Network Rail, 2003. 10.5).
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Grinding acts as a form of control of the processes of rail surface fatigue and metal
movement. Thus grinding is commonly undertaken by railway infrastructure owners
in different countries around the world:
In-track rectification by grinding is a standard maintenance activity with modern railways... it
has become a routine remedy for deformation of the transverse rail profile and, increasingly for
deterioration of the rail surface and sub-surface (Schoch, 2002: Conference paper).
Accordingly, Network Rail wrote:
Rail grinding is widely recognised as the principal treatment to control RCF and other rail head
irregularities. Rail-grinding will be undertaken as a preventative maintenance activity on a
planned cyclic basis (2003: 10.1).
The majority of rail on the British network is ground by a 64-stone grinding train.
This controls and prevents cracking:
(1) The rate of crack growth will be retarded, allowing cracks to be progressively removed with
subsequent grinding passes (Network Rail, 2003: 10.7).
(2) [Train based grinding] will provide an improved profile and remove the fatigue damaged
surface layer and reduce the rate at which the profile deteriorates. The profiles, frequency and
minimum metal removal rates have been developed to slow down or stop the rate at which
cracks initiate and grow (Network Rail, 2003: 10.8).
The train-based grinding system is only used on plain lengths and curves. It cannot be
used at S&Cs because, the majority of S&Cs have rail which is not vertical but at an
angle74 (see fig. 8.2). Therefore any grinding at S&Cs is completed manually by
teams of hand-grinders.
74 Rail at S&C that is inclined is known in the industry as 113 lb / yd (pounds per yard). Rail that is not
inclined but vertical is known as RT60
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AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE GRADIENT OF RAILS AT S/Cs
AND IN PLAIN RAIL (NOT TO SCALE).
/
Note the slight incline of
rails. This is how they are set
in plain lengths and curves \
Sleeper
Note how the rails are not
inclined. This is how they are set
Figure 8-2 Rail incline in plain line and at S&Cs where the rail type is known as
113 lb/yd (author's sketch).
8.2 PRINCIPLES OF A NEW ACTIVITY
8.2.1 The core objectives when grinding a rail
Manually grinding the rail at S&Cs is a relatively new activity on the British network.
Towards the end of 2000, post-Hatfield, it was decided that a rail-grinding programme
should be implemented (Clementson, 2002a: Conference paper). Regular rail-grinding
of S&Cs complements the train-based system, which was also re-introduced post-
Hatfield.
To fully appreciate and understand the work of the men who rail-grind rail, some
basic information about grinding procedures must be given.
When the rail head wears and deforms, metal movement can cause "lipping" (see
glossary): a sliver ofmetal becomes detached and creates a jagged crust on either the
gauge face or field face. Figure 8.3 illustrates (clockwise) the growth pattern of
lipping.
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Figure 8-3 The development of lipping (author's sketch).
Removing the lipping is typically the first thing that is done by a manual rail-grinding
team, prior to checking for cracking using a process called magnetic particle
inspection. Then the rail-profile is assessed by placing a template over the rail. If the
rail-profile is in optimum condition the template will fit over the rail head snugly (see
fig. 8-4). If not snug, the rail head is uneven. The task of the team is to redress the
7S • • • •
profile . If shallow cracking is present, the team must also ensure it is removed as
part of re-profiling whilst making sure not to grind too deeply:
75 As an aside, instruction 14.2 of the latest PWSI4 tells us: Hand grinding of S&C should be undertaken to
achieve the same profiles as those specified for plain line. The high rail "ATH" or "NR HR 1" profile should be
used for the high rail or outer rail of all turnouts and a low rail "ATL" or "NR 113A" profile for either low rail or
inner rail of turnouts and straight track (Network Rail, 2003: 14.2).
230
Standard hand grinding equipment can be used to grind out gauge corner cracks to a depth of up
to 5mm (7mm in exceptional circumstances) (RT/PWG/002, 2001: 6-7).
Figure 8-4 A snug fit between rail-head profile and template (author's sketch).
When removing cracking and re-profiling, teams cannot grind the affected area of rail
in isolation. This would create a dip in the rail making for imperfect ride- conditions
(see fig: 8-5).
BLENDING IN THE RAIL
The grinding teams cannot simply attackthe area of the rail affected with cracking alone. If they did,
the grinding would create a "dip" in the rail's running surface as suggested bythe short arrows
Such conditions create bad travelling conditions due to bad contact between wheel and rail.
This means,when grinding, the teams must "blend" in the rail to the surrounding rail.
For instance, if the rail has been ground to the maximum 5mm at one point, 3 metres of rail on
either side of the 5mm point needs to be ground so as to allow a gradual descent and transition
for the vehicle.
If the maximum depth ground is less than 5mm,the length for the transition grinding is
less. The ratio forthe rate of change is no greaterthan 1 in 600mm (RT/PWG/002:12).
Figure 8-5 Blending in the rail (author's sketch).
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Grinding involves repetitive passes over the rail with frame-mounted machinery. Each
pass removes a fraction of a millimetre of metal from the rail surface until the shallow
cracking has been removed completely (or until the maximum 5mm has been reached)
and the desired profile has been attained.
8.3 THE PERSON AND THE MACHINE
8.3.1 Everyone's learning
The regular grinding programme for S&Cs is new. Its implementation came in light of
the recommendations after the Hatfield derailment in 2000. What now interests us is
how training for this "new" activity is organised:
The training is made up of a four day course, each day is eight hours, it's quite intensive. In the
first day, in the morning they get the theory, then in the afternoon and for the next two days
they're outside working with the machines. ... Then on the last day they're assessed. I ask them
eight questions, verbally. They put the answers on a paper, and if they are bit vague I ask them
additional questions, to try and clear things up, so I know what they're meaning, or trying to say.
It's recorded as well. Then two years later I go out on to the site, assess them again, there's no
point in bringing them all back here (Int: 28).
However, I was told that training was:
Shite... we were shown what we had to achieve... but not how you got there... that's all learned
on site. There're different problems and they all have different methods for grinding the
problem... even now we've been doing this for.... two years. We were one of the first to
start grinding [here]... and still now... we're coming across new problems and trying to figure
out how to get round them... There are so many different methods and variations (Fw: 15).
Because of this we can surmise that there may have been teething problems in trying
to teach the course during the early days:
When it first started there were four grinders and [we] just had to "teach it", but we all had to
learn our trade. ... When I first came into this job they handed me that file [the respondent drops
a thick large folder on his desk] ... "teach this!"... It was death by overhead! There were things
in there about ultrasonics that the guys don't need to know. ... But because there was no real
experience in grinding S&Cs like this, I was learning about it at the same time (Int: 28).
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Though the men were starting afresh, it was clear early on that grinding operatives
had to have experience with grinding machines:
It's a difficult course to teach, it can be difficult to grasp - "moving the running band?" - So we
need guys who have a history in grinding - they need to know how to make shapes. Whether
they've come from within the industry or not - some guys have come from the shipyards...
wherever [they have come from], they need to have had a history of using hand grinding
machines. These guys with us, they were all welders, so they already knew the principles of
grinding, new about the touch you need - that history is important. It would be very, very
difficult, to teach someone who has had no experience, these machines are dangerous, so they've
got to be comfortable with them, and confident (Int: 28).
This point was echoed by others elsewhere:
Grinders are generally welders because people naturally grind after welding. ... They [new
recruits] don't come from pencil-pushing to grinding, they've had an engineering background
(Int: 09).
And:
In [location] they've not got the men to do this work... They lost teams; their quality of work...
was not the best... I don't mean to be derogative ...they weren't cowboys, but you can't take Joe
Bloggs off the street whose got experience in electrics and ask him to grind a rail, he may be
doesn't understand metal... or the process, so he'll never get a good result... There were
problems... they were not getting right down to the rail, they were leaning too heavy on it and
bang!: there's a gouge taken out the rail... There's a problem. There's a totally different quality
[of grinding] across the nation... In Scotland the shipbuilding's in decline, [those] welders [are]
men who've got experience with metal [and came to the railway industry]. They were getting a
lot of praise, but the [rail] surface... it was too good, they were buffing it... a perfect sheen
across it... doesn't need to be that good, you need a general profile and a rough surface is ok
(Int: 29).
Getting to know the machinery, and finding out what it can do is thus, a key part of
learning:
A new starter would take about six months to a year to get to know what they're doing... a new
start wouldn't be able to just come along and push this grinder up and down the rail... it would
keep cutting out on them for starters (Fw: 15).
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Likewise, another passed comment on the skills needed for handling the machines:
When we first start teaching the guys, we tell them the shape we want them to get, and just let
them have an attempt, and they'll make a complete mess of it (Int: 28).
8.3.2 Creating conditions
The men, when they first try to grind a shape practice at a complex specially set-up
for rail-grinding, but:
It is difficult to simulate the conditions of real life here [at the training centre], because what the
guys train on, there's no RCF. But what we do is we give them an HG1 form76, on that it says
what is wrong with the rail, so from that they know the depth to grind to. It's as if there is RCF
on the rail then, so then we assess them that way (Int: 28).
At the same training centre I am shown where the men use the machines for the first
time. It is in a yard outside and there is a large layout of track:
This is a mock-up of an S&C; we give the guys a scenario, and they practice here. It's how they
learn... The rails have been ground in areas, up and down the lengths, and when the rail is done,
we transpose it so they can start on the other side. We don't just change the rails around
ourselves, we use that as a learning process for trackmen, then again, when the rails need to be
totally renewed, we have guys learning to be a trackman doing that. So it's quite good, this
whole set-up gives a lot of opportunities for training, for trackmen and grinders. We've also got
the facilities for a switchblade repair course and how to grind that (Int: 28).
Yet, the learning process is not just for newcomers to manual rail-grinding, those who
teach, are also learning continuously:
We play with it [with the grinding machines] to see what it was that we could do.... Initially
there was a lot of contact, but now with us having our own [technical] heads, we just make
phone-calls to each other... We have a contract in [location].. .and I'll hear that they're trying
something new, or they'll hear we're doing something different... and they'll phone us and ask
us what we're finding and what the limitations are (Int: 28).
76 An HGI form - issued to a grinding supervisory manager (GSM) - gives location and type of problem and once
worked, the GSM completes the rest of the form - saying work is complete or highlights any problems.
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And of the re-certification of hand-grinders (two years after their initial course), it was
interesting to note what one instructor said:
Then two years later I go out on to the site, assess them again. There's no point in bringing them
all back here. I see what they've learnt in that time too though... if they've got new ideas (Int:
28).
Still, once training is complete:
When we put out new guys they always go with someone with experience, it's a must (Int: 28).
Basic training forms the foundations upon which grinding operatives build numerous
skills. In the following section graphic accounts of my observations and experiences
with teams of manual rail-grinders are given, this is done to demonstrate extensively
how these skills are developed and utilised. The notes are taken from several different
nights and are connected to give a systematic account of the working life of a rail-
grinder and his team.
8.4 WAITING TO RAIL-GRIND
8.4.1 Organising rail-grinding: the job bank and opinions
I meet up with a Grinding Supervisory Manager (GSM) at 12:30am: a possession is
planned from 1 a.m. to 4:30 a.m. There are two sets of S8t.Cs in close proximity to each
other that require attention.
I sit with the GSM (Ally) in his van by the track. There are numerous forms, books, and
folders in the van. He takes a large folder, opens it and removes an equally large pad
of paper, unfolds it and tells me: " This is the job bank for this area. AH thejobs are
passed on to ud'. There are lists and lists of S8iC grinding jobs for the area that Ally
and his teams work. Looking at the headings on the job bank I see there are columns
for: location of job; fault-type; fault severity, and I notice every single job is at an S8iC:
S8iCs are the only places they hand grind. They don't hand grind on conventional long
stretches of line. "It's cheaper to renew the rail in those places," he tells me.
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Ally also mentions how there could be sites within sites with different numbers. He tells
me the same story I've heard before, but adds: "something to do with the databases
the faults are reported into". Also when it's reported and the grinders are given the
location, they are only given the S&C's reference, they are not told whether it is the
blade or stock rail. Again, he mentions how this has got something to do with problems
when transferring databases from UT reports to gauge corner cracking reports: I've
"highlighted this problem", Ally tells me, with a hint of resignation in his voice (Fw: 03).
8.4.2 Who's who at a possession and how a new face can fit in
When I was at that possession (Fw: 03), I found determining "who worked for who"
confusing. Ally was the GSM for a maintenance company; the six guys he was
supervising are all agency guys, with whom he had worked for 18 months. The Person
in Charge of Possession (PICOP) did not work for the same company as Ally; he
worked for a smaller contractor who had booked the possession. There was someone
called the Engineering Supervisor (ES) and the Controller of Site Safety (COSS) he is
an agency worker as well. I noticed however, that there seemed to be some semblance
of a hierarchy: work could start only once the PICOP had told the ES, who in turn told
Ally, who then told his team it can start.
I found it interesting that Ally had to tell the PICOP what he and his team were there
for. I had presumed that when a possession was booked, everyone working in the
allotted period of time and space would know who was going to be there and why. I
have found out this is not the case. Workers from many different companies can turn
up and ask the PICOP if they can get into the possession.
I found out why this is the case. Ally showed me a book about one inch thick, like a
diary; a page put by for one date and under which was a list of all the possessions all
over the country that have been booked by different companies. Other companies refer
to this book and send men out to do the work they want done. When these men turn
up at the possession, it is up to them to basically ask the PICOP if they can get on the
line. This book is renewed weekly but the possession times tend to be the same each
week, thus companies and workers tend to know when they can get on a specific part
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of the network. It seems this is why different people can turn up and why there are
often new faces77. During other nights I saw how people can just turn up at a
possession to see if they can work:
The COSS tells me this possession was booked for the grinding that these guys are
about to do, however, two men appear, introduce themselves and ask "can we nip on
over there"{they point to the nearby station) "it'sjust a bit ofgauging by the
platform". "Aye, no bother," the COSS replies, and takes their PTS numbers and they
sign their names beside it, just as I did when I first arrived. " They'll be in and out
tonight, they won't be here long at all, "the COSS tells me (Fw: 04).
Another example:
It is very busy when I turn up at five minutes to one in the morning. Numerous vans
and a few cars are here; there's plenty of activity. I meet up with the GSM and the
three man team. I mention how busy it is and one of the team agrees. I ask them if
they expected this many people: "you can never tell, it's swings and roundabouts". He
tells me how this possession is actually for the grinders I am with, and all these people
saw it booked and came along and "chanced there luck to see if they can get on". If he
(the PICOP) doesn't recognise them " they should notget on, they should have used
their own gumption andgot it booked for themselves", he says with a bit of a laugh.
"Can't complain, we've done itplenty times on otherpeople's possessions "says one of
the team (Fw: 06).
8.4.3 Waiting to work - a problem
A task of the PICOP is to organise work around operational problems like late trains
which can delay the start time. On one night it is not a late train that is the problem:
Ally has been talking to the PICOP. There is a problem that apparently, Ally says,
occurs " time and time again". At the S&.C, where a team will be working, (where a
77 This had a profound effect for me as a researcher. I began to feel just like another "someone" and that I did not
"stick out" as a new face as much as I had expected. Though the scene was intrinsically foreign to me, its structural
make-up did not make me feel out of place at all.
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branch line joins a main line) the switch is set so vehicles passing over it must be
travelling on the main line and may not come from the branch line. The branch line is
closed (see fig. 8-6), but the grinding team have to grind the gauge corner of the main
line's stock rail. This means that shifting the switch blade "opens" the branch line (see
fig. 8-6 left hand side), and the PICOP says the details of this possession does not
allow for that route to be "open". Phone calls have to be made to the signaller and
permission has to be sought for this process. After a short period of time and after
clearance from the PICOP, work proceeds.
The interaction between the men during this episode is interesting as it seemed their
different "occupational needs" generated the potential for conflict. Ally tells me that
"the PICOP was being pedantic", the work could have been done without the phone
calls and the clearance, but the PICOP was "going by the book", and "he has every
right to do so". After all, it is "new faces all the time, he'd never seen that PICOP
beford', and the PICOP was "only doing hisjob'. Ally continued to talk about the
current climate in terms of personnel and the communication between them: "Man
management is everything now, there're otherguys who would have been like - what
do you mean we can't have possession of that line! - Caused a fuss with attitude and
got nowhere." But he hinted as to why people get worked up about these things when
he said: "StHi, you daren't lose time, the possessions are that short' (Fw: 03).
Figure 8-6 Illustration of a closed and open S&C, respectively (author's sketch).
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8.4.4 At the start of a possession
The start of a possession is marked by the moving of bulky equipment from the back
of vans to the relevant S&C which can be as much as 100 yards away. The men lift
machinery onto the nearest track and push it towards the S&C. The others each grab
an end of another grinding machine and balance it on one rail; then one of the men
follows the first. The last of the team grabs spray paint; a spray on dye; and gets the
very heavy generator ready to lift at the edge of the van when one of the men return.
Eventually the men are parallel to the appropriate S&C: the generator is firstly put in
place in order to power the portable floodlights that are set-up. Then the men, in twos,
carry the de-lipper and the rail-grinder over the rails to the S&C where they will work
Getting machinery to the site and assembling it, all has to be done once the possession
time has started. This means the actual grinding work starts some 30 minutes after
preparation. When the men are ready to work, problems can still present themselves:
8.4.5 A hold-up - another problem
It's been a night of start and stops; there were problems at first with the generators,
one was broken and, after getting another to the site, it ran out of petrol immediately.
Then track patrollers appeared in their rail-compatible Land Rover. Letting them
through was not a straightforward procedure. You can't just stand back and let them
pass. A signaller has to be informed who has to ensure there is no traffic where the
patrollers want to go. Then the signaller has to change the switch blades for the track
patrollers after we make sure the rail is clear of machinery. Then the signaller has to
shift the blades back to the original position, but only after knowing that the patrollers
are gone - then before we go back onto the track we have to wait for clearance from
the PICOP. We have been here for nearly 90 minutes, and only the lipping has been
removed (Fw: 15).
8.5 THE DE-LIPPER
8.5.1 Removing the lipping
When the men get down to work the first thing they do is mark the length of the rail to
be ground. Spray-paint acts as a border at each end of a length of rail. Then:
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The rail is measured; you see what the wear is. The guys scope it together, they all need to know
what is going to be done; what needs to be done; and they need to know what they're going to
achieve at the end of the shift. That's when you need experience, the experienced guy will look
at the work, and think, and know: there's no chance ofgetting that length done in six hours, so
they split the work, and plan it over the nights. That's why they scope it...so they know that,
that'll take 3 hours, that, that'll take one night. Then all the lipping is removed if any... (Int:
28).
A team member gave me a little more insight into "scoping":
... depending on the length of the S&C being ground, the time taken to grind it varies, but
ideally an S&C takes four nights, and ideally it is a night for each rail, the stock rail, the switch
blade, the other stock rail and the other switch blade [see fig. 8-6 for layout of stock rails and
switch blades] (Fw: 04).
This plan could be spoiled:
.. .it depends on the length of the S&C and cracking - you can spend all night trying to get the
running band and get nowhere - you have to go back to it the following night (Fw: 04).
8.5.2 Operating the de-lipper
The machine that removes the lipping is operated by one person, it is a large machine
that sits on both rails and is pushed and pulled along the railway track. The de-lipper78
has a large circular grinding stone that sits perpendicular to the gauge face of the rail,
and by levering a large handle the operator is able to place the spinning stone against
the rail. By fluctuating between pushing and pulling on the handle he applies differing
pressures on the rail with the stone. The harder he pushes against the rail, the more the
metal will be removed from it (see fig. 8-8. "Knowing how" to apply pressure,
however, requires tacit knowledge. The following set of field notes attempt to show
how the operator of the de-lipper works:










of the left hand
side rail.
The area of the
de-lipper in the circle
shows the angle at
which the grinding
stone can be placed
against the rail. The
dotted line shows the
direction ofthe handle
that the operator uses
as he exerts more or
less pressure on the
rail with the stone.
Figure 8-7 The de-lipper (author's photograph).
I notice that there is not a precise setting for "pressure". It seems to be free moving
and entirely down to the operator's discretion: the angle of attack and the pressure












it is all down to th
pressure he "feels
he should apply.
Figure 8-8 Operating the de-lipper (author's photograph).
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Periodically, the operator stops to ascertain his progress. On hands and knees, he
checks the rail - he is figuring out how much pressure should be applied next, and
where (Fw: 15).
To mark the progress of
his work, the de-lipper
operator has to pause
his work, switch off the
machine, and examine the




devices of any sort are
used here. He simply
looks at the rail to form
an idea as to how much
pressure should be
applied and where,
when he next operates
the machine.
Figure 8-9 Assessing progress (author's photograph).
Notice how the de-lipper
operator has his eye on
the area of rail where the
grinding stone is. This
allows him to chart his
progress and adjust
pressure as and when
required..
Figure 8-10 Operating the de-lipper and the role of judgement (author's
photograph).
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8.6 MAGNETIC PARTICLE INSPECTION
8.6.1 An account of an awkward test
The lipping should be ground off and the rail examined carefully using magnetic particle
inspection to check for the presence of horizontal cracking on the gauge corner and face, which
may have formed and been hidden by the presence of the lipping (Network Rail, 2003: 14.19).
This is how a magnetic particle inspection is typically done: the rail that has been de-
lipped is sprayed with white paint. Then black dye is sprayed onto the rail, covering
approximately twelve inches at a time. Then they place the MPI device on the rail,
and by pressing a button a slight charge is forced through the rail between the two
probes at either end of the device. Any cracks within the space between the probes
will show up as dark black on the background ofwhite paint.
The men let me MPI a rail. It could be a one man job at a push, but I quickly see how
it is better to swap roles for the tasks. It is an awkward job and considering it has to be
done on two different rails over about 15 metres each, it isn't easy on the tester's back
or knees - moreover, you're not just bent double between, and on, sleepers, but you
have to manoeuvre yourself between the spars of metals and bars that come with the
make-up of the S&C. I use the MPI device for a distance of nearly six metres. The
device is not easy to use (Fw: 06).
The length of rail
marked by white
paint has just been
ground by the
de-lipper.
It is upon the white




Figure 8-11 White paint on the rail head marks out the area for MPI (author's
photograph).
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Operating the MPI device, in the abstract, sounds relatively simple and straight
forward: the person holds the device in one hand; it is rectangular in shape,
approximately ten inches long with two metal probes like pincers at either end. It is
placed on the rail where the dye is, and by pressing the button the charge is released
between the pincers, you can feel the device sticking to the rail and you can feel a
sensation through your hand (if you are wearing a watch that keeps time by kinetic
energy, the second hand will spin at a phenomenal rate79). Even though designed to be
held in one hand it is heavy and the handle is uncomfortable.
The device fits into your hand badly. The piece of plastic that is closest to the palm of
the hand is too wide and too thick: it feels like a plastic brick, and trying to reach under
it with your finger to press a small button to release the charge is extremely
uncomfortable. I sometimes have to use both hands to operate it; this offers no respite
from the awkwardness. It is a very uncomfortable job. To combat the poor ergonomics
of the activity, we work in pairs. I'm in the 4-foot placing the magnet on the rail, one of
the team is in the 6-foot spraying the rail, we go along together; spraying, testing,





three team members are
looking at the rail for small
cracking The man on the
left has the tin of dye, he
sprays it on the rail whilst
the man in the centre is
holding the awkward
testing device, and pressing
a button on the underside of
it to send a chaige through
the rail between the two
pincers and on the rail where
I have marked two lines. The
third man to the right is
s imply anotherpair of
eyes looking for shallow
cracking.
Figure 8-12 Looking for cracking during the MPI (author's photograph).
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MPI-ing is tedious, and on one occasion, whilst we were all staring at the rail for the umpteenth time looking for
a crack, one of the men, somewhat sarcastically, said how time flies during this task. Only then to show me his
watch and say: see, toldyou so!
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Then I stand back and let the guys finish the job. They speak to me and to each other
as they conduct the test.
In this picture the three
members are discussing their
work. Notice, however, how
the rail has been coloured
white. If any cracks are present
the black dye would seep into
them, and highlight them
against the white back -
ground.
When a crack is found the
teammark it clearly. In this —
instance they have circled a
crack
This way,when they start
grinding, they can easily see
where the grinding stone is
attacking it. Also, theywill
also find it easierwhen they
next come to test it with the
MPI
Figure 8-13 Discussing their work (author's photograph).
They tell me what they watch out for; if a crack shows up "it is very dark"(I don't see
a crack during my time here), but twice over the length they stop and have a close look
at the rail towards the gauge corner. "Cracks are like that"one of the team tells me... I
see what looks to be a small series of cracks barely 4-5mm long, and indeed they have
shown up to be dark once the spray has gone over them and the MPI has been used.
But, they're only minor surface abrasions that you get from the MLC, (a type of
grinding stone that is very coarse). I hear one of the men telling the youngest of the
three who has been with them for six months, "to slow down, and to let the spray drip
right in... to leave it for a few seconds... just to make sure"(Fw: 06).
8.7 SHAPING PROFILE AND GRINDING OUT CRACKS
8.7.1 The profile
The men now know if any cracking needs to be removed whilst grinding for the
profile. Then:
.. .the template is chosen, either for straight line, mild or sharp curve and whether it's the high
leg or low leg [see "cant" in glossary]... Then the grinding is done... you can't just go at it, have
to take it easy, it's a gradual process. If you went at the rail you would just flatten it, it's got to
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be done gently or there's blue-ing, the rail head gets hot and will go brittle. When you've ground
one rail, you have to grind the other, grinding one rail is only doing half the job: because you're
shifting the running band it's going to affect how the train travels, so it's going to affect the
other rail and the running band there (Int: 28).
The men place a template over the rail in the middle of the length to be ground and
they shine a light at the contact line between rail and template and look to the other
side for channels of light coming between the two. You search for channels of light by
getting right down to the level of the rail and placing your cheek on the rail and
staring into the join of template and rail.
If there is light coming through, the rail is uneven; it is too high in parts and must be
ground lower. The template is marked into divisions, -4, -2, 0, 2, 4, 6,... to 18 —
(recall fig. 8-4, page 230). Where the level of the rail is too high, a team member with
a marker pen scores on the rail, perpendicular to the template, a shaded area. If there
is more than one area needing to be ground, more than one shaded area is scored onto
the rail. These shaded areas show the grinders the area of the rail that needs to be
worked. However, it is not just a case of grinding the high-spots, gung-ho.
The team assess
the profile of the
rail with the
template. They look
for light from the
torches between
the template and
the rail. Any light
suggests an
imperfect profile
Figure 8-14 Assessing the rail's profile (author's photograph).
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8.7.2 Teamwork
They check the profile with the template and assess among themselves the area that
should be attacked. I ask about this process: "there're different methods forgrinding
each railproblem... sometimes it's not a straightforward case ofgrinding the highest
spot, maybe you have to work the corner first and then work over to the high spot...., it
all depends on the type ofproblem... the initialproblem tells you how to grind....."
(Fw: 15)
Then:
Sparks are flying as the grinding has started (Fw: 03).
The operator of the machine pulls and pushes it along the length of rail, turning a
handle like a steering wheel in a car. This allows the grinding stone to move over the
surface of the rail head - from gauge corner to field corner. Another function applies
the stone to the rail with differing pressure.
Grinding a rail is a long process. It is not a case of fitting the machine to the rail, in¬
putting dimensions and running it over the rail to gain the desired result. Instead it is a
stop and start affair that needs to be monitored continually, and which relies on the







over the surface of
the rail. Also note







Figure 8-15 The manually operated hand-grinder (author's photograph).
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It is a stop / start affair because:
Each skim of the grinder over the rail removes just a fraction of a millimetre of metal,
(the maximum they can remove is 5mm).... you can go harder (with the grinding stone)
but it shifts the high spots (Fw: 05).
After so many runs along the rail the operator stops and places the template over the
rail head to assess progress. This stage is not reached quickly. It takes time.
One of the team told me that there are "high spots and low spots on the rail, ifyou
grind too far then your higher at the other side, it takes a lot offeei ..a lot ofmoving
and adjusting, takes a lot ofjudgement... and we don't have much time, we'll be lucky
ifwe get it done tonight'.
One of the team
assesses the
profile himself
Figure 8-16 Assessing progress (author's photograph).
After a cycle of runs the team members have a close look at the template.... I listen in
to their conversation during one of these moments. During a lot of pointing, looking,
and touching, I hear them say things like: " There.... one skim, check it'.... "It's too
square here, fee/ it here; it's rounded: needs to be like that (be instructs with his
hands), tryjust taking a skim ofif. It seems to take a lot of time and I would say
patience also.... At one point, when the team had been grinding the length of rail for
248
over 45 minutes, one of the team looked at the light flooding through under the
template and said "no even fucking ciosd."
And this is how it went for the three hours we were there; grinding, check the profile,
adjust the stones, grind, check the profile, adjust the stones.... and so on and so on...
(Fw: 04).
8.8 BEYOND WORDS: THE ROLE OF TACIT KNOWLEDGE
8.8.1 Communication and foresight
After spending some time with the rail-grinding teams, I suggest to them that they
appear to need-to-know what the rail will look like after some passes with the grinder:
one pass with the grinding machine is only one small part in an otherwise long
process, and each pass surely impacts on the next whilst the objective is chased:
"Aye, you need some... idea, some foresight... you've got to know how grinding one
area of the rail will affect the rest of the rail," ... It takes discussion? I asked. " That's
important... everyone's got to know where we are [during the grinding] because you
swap over, its not the same person grinding the rail all night, we swap over, so we all
need to know where we grinding... it's because we all take turns?0." (Fw: 15).
Therefore, communication is a critical mechanism in this working-system if grinding
is to be completed successfully. However, it can be quite noisy at times - grinding the
rail is loud, and this can be multiplied if there is another team working nearby.
Therefore workers tend to wear ear protectors - and because of the dust that is kicked
up during the work, protective face masks are usually worn which cover the mouths
of the men. But communication is required, thus hand signalling between the men is
important.
I noticed one man checks the gauge face whilst the operator, some yards away, stands
with the machine and waits for "instructions". But because of the noise and the
80 "You must rotate the operators ... they're heavy machines" (Int: 09).
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equipment the men are wearing, the man checking the profile communicates with the
palm of the hand and with fingers pointing straight and by moving his hand to an
angle. This way he "shows" the operator the angle that he should next attack the rail.
With a nod, the operator shows he has understood (Fw: 13).
Even when close together, the men "discuss" non-verbally where the rail should be
ground. They often remove their gloves to touch, feel, and caress the rail. They feel
for ridges that can be imperceptible when looking from above and can be equally
difficult to notice when lying flat down by the rail, so the best indicator is "feel". But
the entire team needs to know where the ridge(s) / is (are) - because they grind in
turns.
They all take turns in feeling the rail at different points: then it's a nod of approval
here, and a flat palm of the hand skimmed over there, and a finger tip touched here,
and then some eye contact with each other, then more hand signalling around the
profile of the rail (Fw: 13).
I realise that the hand-movements imitate the direction of the grinding stone - the
operator copies the hand-movements when next operating the machine:
Whilst looking at the rail with the template they demonstrated with their hands the
motion and the direction that the grinder should take as it passes over the rail. The
grinding operator then duplicated with the machine the same "movement of the hands"
during the discussion. Again, after so many grinding passes the process was repeated
with the template and again a discussion took place between the three and the terms
the men spoke in were simple, "you need to hit this bit, move it up and down - like
thid'. To me, the words seem quite nebulous, and that more is "said" with hands
movements.
When the template was on the rail I was given the chance to look at the light passing
between the rail and profile. I saw "the desired profile" and the "shaping of the rail"
that had to be done. I could see how it was simpler to see, and feel, and then express
with your hands how the machine should be operated and manoeuvred over the rail





and the profile of
the rail.
Figure 8-17 Grinding operator assessing his own work (author's photograph).
Shaping the rail often requires the running band to be shifted (recall fig. 8-1, page
226). This is because the running band can often "move" to an incorrect position:
"You see... the track, the rails, shift andmove and the contactpoint of the wheel and
railmoves, so we grind the rail to move the running band, back to where it should
b^1." He shines his torch on the rail, and says "look, here is where the wheels are
running (offset to the left side of the rail, between the gauge corner and the centre of
the rail; indeed I can see strip ofworn metal about as wide as a small coin that runs
along the rail), we need to grind the rail so we shift the running band to here"(bang in
the middle of the rail, at the highest point of the curvature of the rail head) (Fw: 03).
"The profile isn't an exact gauge, it is only a guide... we try andget it flush, but if there
is still a high spot in the middle of the rail we might be as well to leave it, as soon as a
couple of trains pass over it with a weight ofa few tonnes it'll f/atten"(F\N: 05).
81
This connects with what the worker from chapter six, page 173, said about rails having an existing memory.
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Despite these words, I found that the grinders (during my research period) tended to
finish their shift with a snug fit between profile template and rail.
8.8.2 Don't let there be light
When the teams are progressing well there are long periods of grinding before they
stop and check the rail profile. I am given the opportunity to see the profile for myself
when they stop grinding. I see it gradually form into the desired shape. It is amazing
just how little metal they remove; fractions ofmillimetres over the entire night.
This time, when they assess the profile, they ask for my opinion. I take my hat off and
place my cheek on the rail and look very closely at the join of the template and rail... I
think that it is just too high at the number 8, and I run my finger over the area and can
feel a very slight ridge. The two men agree with me and mark a small area of the rail.
After several skims they ask me to have the first look. I think that it is perfect; the
template over the rail is snug. The GSM agrees, and is happy with their work thus the
team start packing their equipment and head back to the vans (Fw: 14).
The photgraph shows how
the team have marked on the
rail the area that is too high.
Notice how they have
written "8" referring to the
template division. They have
also scored a long length into
the white paint, indicating
where the ridge is. They have
also drawn an arrow
pointing at the ridge;
demonstrating to the
grinders where the highspot
remains.
Figure 8-18 Marking out the high point (author's photograph).
8.8.3 It's all in the blend: imperceptible processes
Though the teams get the template to fit perfectly, they must also simultaneously
blend the rail into the surrounding area so there is a slow transition to the deepest
point of grinding. To blend it in there are two buttons on the grinding machine; one
button raises the stone, the other lowers it.
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The operator must use his judgement for, depending on how long the button is
pressed, the further the stone will go down or up. Pressing the button like you would a
light switch does not move the stone to a pre-programmed setting. Instead, the
operator has to know how long to keep the button depressed, which depends on how
deep the operator wants to grind. This begs the question: how does the operator know
how long to keep it pressed? Tacit knowledge, once more, appears to be required, for
the answer to my question captures virtually everything about grinding a rail:
" You just know, you get to know, it's all about feet'. He then tells me that sometimes
"you can [physically] lift the grinder - that blends it id'.
I watch the men grinding the rail; I see how randomly they press the button to lower
or raise the stone: " They push the button as when they think", says, Ally, who then
raises the same point that one of the men just told me: sometimes they might "just lift
the grinding stone ever so slightly as they come to the end ofa run I watch out for
this, and when one of the men has finished his grinding turn and lets another have a
go, I ask him if he raised the grinder manually, without the button. He says "yes". It
was a process that was imperceptible to me (Fw: 14).
After watching closely (but failing to notice) whether the men lifted the machinery to
blend in, I am told:
"You just have to know when to lift it... to blend in the rail... you have to know when to
take the pressure to blend in"(Fw: 15).
8.9 TACIT KNOWLEDGE TACTICS
8.9.1 Different strokes, opinions, examples, and problems
Shifting the running band and profiling is a difficult, time-consuming, repetitive task
which relies on tacit skills. These tacit skills are directed, shaped and utilised by
judgement and interpretation which are at the discretion of the group and the
individuals. Because of this, we may ask whether there are different grinding tactics
among groups.
They have checked the template and have started to grind, positioning the stone as
and where they think. I noticed that this team, as opposed to the other team, do not
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have a marker pen to mark on the rail where it should be ground: a scratch with a
stone from the ballast on the rail is enough for them. I notice also that sometimes,
when it is just one person that has checked the profile that he too doesn't always mark
the rail, he just "automatically" places the stone where he "knows" it should be. ...After
a few passages they stop and check the profile again. It is very close to being finished.
They discuss the next step in these words: "Just two high spots... one pass here and
one pass herd'... though there is some verbal discussion, a lot of communication is by
hand signals and gesticulation and by means of touching the rail and pointing at
specific parts of the rail head.... But again, there is no mark put on the rail, the stone is
just guided to the area of the rail that needs to be attacked (Fw: 15).
Accordingly, I was told elsewhere:
Different teams, differentguys have there own way ofdoing it. This team tends to
grind the rail right through in one sweep, whereas other teamsmight do a metre at a
time, either way, they're bang on at the end of the day (Fw: 13).
And elsewhere, a GSM said:
They're good at doing this, they know how to do it: their method seems to work (Fw:
03).
The idea that teams grind in different ways was consolidated by another:
He told me that when manual rail-grinding first started in Britain, a specialist from
America visited. In America they have been doing this for years, but he saw how we
were working, and said, "see yourprofile, throw it over that wall. See, you're maybe
removing all the cracking, but you're not working to how the trains are running, you're
working to the gauge". The worker explained to me that the American visitor was
referring to the design of the cant, and how it is only ideal for one speed. Yet there are
different speeds for different traffic on the curve and we continually re-profile the rail
to one profile regardless of the cant. He told me that at times this process is not
working: "the running band will tell you where the trains are running so it's better to
work from that than from the profile. We found that that works well. Imean, ifwe
profile a rail one night, then we paint it and come back the next, we'll see where the
running band is [for there will be a clear running band worn into the painted rail by the
passage of the traffic during the day], then we grind it to the running band - and we've
found that sixmonths later it's still f/ne"(Fw: 18).
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During this conversation the same worker told me that there was some disagreement
over this grinding strategy. He told me how others were convinced that they should:
"Work to the gauge, work to the gauge, they say, but I don't think it's as simple as
that: maybe the gauge is telling you it's right - but the running band is telling you
differently the next night, so it's wrong, the gauge should only act as a guide. Imean
we're not a million miles away from what the gauge says the idealprofile is, but we've
shifted it fractionally, and it can make all the difference". So, I asked: how do you know
how to work away from the profile, and how to use the running band as a guide? -
"Now that's the difficult bit ifyou're to say how, it takes experience, after sometime,
when you know yourmachine you can get it bang on. Sometimes you come back the
next night and you see the running band running perfect, right down the rail like a
laser beam - perfect! I'm notputting a feather in my own cap, but it's good to see,
and. ...to get that it's difficult, and it only comes when you've been doing this for some
time'\Vvc. 18).
Getting to know your machine was discussed by another:
The guys have all told me that they prefer the MP 12 over the De-burrer82, even though the way
they have to operate it they'll get a sore back, but it's because they get feedback from the
machine, the operator needs feedback, and you don't get that with the de-burrer. When you're
raising and lowering the stone you're only using two buttons and you can't feel the tightness of
the stone on the rail, but with the MP 12, you can, and with that you can get any profile you want
(Int: 28).
8.9.2 Losing running bands and losing tempers
The social norms that underpin a grinding team's work are closely coordinated and
complicated. Each member is relied on for the quality of the work: such a tight set-up
based on delicate and subtle communication suggests that things have a real
possibility of going wrong.
You need skilled men for this job, and you need men who care. We lost a guy, he was useless,
he wasn't interested. When the COSS was speaking to us, he was away wandering not listening,
82 The MP12 and the De-burrer are two types of grinding machines.
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but when he was working, he was maybe removing a fault, but he was grinding in two others
(Fw: 18).
During all my time observing rail grinding, I never saw such characters: each team
member, to my eye, seemed committed to the cause. Despite the best efforts of a well
functioning team who have successfully ground hundreds of S&Cs, things can still go
wrong, and on one night of research I witnessed a problem. It was then that I saw that
patience plays a part and that the progress of work affects the men individually in
different ways.
The team are nearing the end of a possession. Things have not being going well. They
have been struggling. They have been grinding one area of the rail, then another, and
back and forth, repeatedly for the last hour or so. Gaining the desired profile of the rail
is proving difficult. During a moment there is a verbal discussion: "swipe it there"ar\d
"Just three swipes there" "there's notmuch in it".
But a member of the team seems to grind just a fraction too far after some passes
causing high spots elsewhere on the rail that then in turn must be ground. After three
hours on this rail the patience of one of the men is wearing thin and after grinding the
rail and then watching one of his colleagues measuring the profile with the template,
and then marking on the rail a sizeable area that still needs to be ground, he looks to
the heavens in despair and walks off cursing, leaving the grinding machine without an
operator. The man who marked the rail watches his team mate walk away, then he
himself, walks in silence to the machine to take over. The operator that walked away is
sitting on an embankment looking at the floodlit scene before him from a height - he
has lit a cigarette. I go over and join him. I ask him the obvious question: "Things not
going weiR" The answer is littered with spluttering expletives which is not so much
directed at me but at the rail which the grinder has kept a steely eye on. They are
indeed having problems, " We were closer to it at the start of the night, it's all this
fanny-ing about, you shouldjustplace the gauge over it, mark it, grind it, and that
should be it, but it's all this fucking about, grinding here, grinding there, grinding
here... Pisses me right off!"
One of the team ground just a fraction too far, and "lost it" (the running band, and his
temper), I note fiery glances between the men, and I feel a bit of an atmosphere has
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developed. At the moment I decide I will refrain from asking further questions about
grinding a rail (Fw: 13).
8.10 SUMMARY
In the last example where one of the grinders ground "too far", group solidarity was
broken because of the "temporary" failure of the task: the problem was solved a little
later. Those social mechanisms and social norms discussed through out this chapter,
which manual rail-grinding teams develop and utilise to successfully grind appear, on
the surface, to be routine and taken-for-granted. Instead, this episode, where the
grinders encountered real difficulties, shows how complex the task is. The taken-for-
granted routine that teams adopt to skilfully grind a rail, is on the contrary, far from
straightforward. In this chapter and the two preceding it, I have analysed the
constitution of such skills in terms of visual and UT inspection, and grinding, thus I
have noted how these skills are developed, and utilised. Quite evidently much of the
maintenance work detailed is a group process, meaning that the transmission and
mutual understanding of these skills is an important, socially interactive part of
effective rail maintenance. However, as many of the skills cannot be codified or
formulated explicitly, I have drawn attention to the key role of tacit knowledge and
mutual tacit understanding. Again I have shown how groups and individuals develop
this special form of knowledge. Consequently, I have shown the problems created by
paperwork such as following instructions and completing forms. In the next chapter,
all these matters are again analysed, but in the context of Swiss Federal Railways.
9 MAINTENANCE AND RENEWAL ON THE SWISS
RAILWAY NETWORK
On the factual level, evidence collected from other comparative groups - whether nations,
organizations, counties, or hospital wards - is used to check out whether the initial evidence
was correct. Is the fact a fact? ... Sociologists generally agree that replications are the best
means for validating facts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 23).
9.1 INTRODUCING SCHWEIZERISCHE BUNDESBAHNEN
(SBB)
9.1.1 Preamble
Until now, the entirety of this thesis has been about rail maintenance in parts of the
British network. In this chapter we look elsewhere to see how another national
industry completes rail maintenance. The Glaser and Strauss quote above refers to the
values of a comparative study. As discussed in chapter two, the methodology I
employed for my Swiss based research replicated the methodology I employed in
Britain.
9.1.2 Swiss rail statistics, facts and reputation
Switzerland has a handful of small privately operated railways that operate in
mountainous regions such as the Bernese Oberland. These systems generate the
majority of their income from transferring tourists from valleys to peaks. It is,
however, operating traffic over a network of nearly 3,000 kilometres that makes
Schweizerische Bundesbahnen (SBB) Switzerland's biggest travel and transport
company. SBB is the commonly used acronym when referring to the German name of
the company that owns and operates traffic on the network. In multilingual
Switzerland the same company may be referred to in French as CFF (Chemins de Fer
Federaux Suisses), or in Italian as FFS (Ferrovie Federali Svizzere).
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Swiss railways are commonly reputed to be a world leader in rail travel and
technology. In January 2004, Modern Railway magazine published a three page
spread analysing the Swiss system under the heading "Switzerland's Amazing
Railways", whilst an article in The Times83 was titled: "The man who makes the
Swiss Railway run like clockwork explains". Perhaps the highest accolade is found in
84The Rough Guide to Switzerland (2003). The introductory paragraph to "Getting
around" Switzerland assures any impending traveller or tourist:
The efficiency of the massively comprehensive Swiss public transport system remains one
of the wonders of the modern world. It's hard to overstate just how good it is: you can get
anywhere you want quickly, easily and relatively cheaply; everybody relies on it as a matter
of course; and it's clean, safe and pleasant (2003: 29).
The Federal Swiss State has a vital role within the operation of SBB. SBB is, under
special law, a limited (private) company, however, it is owned 100 percent by the
Confederation. SBB often employ the services of private contracted parties to
complete work; the role of the private contractor has become more significant in
recent times due to organisational change. "A new administrative board has been
created with greater decision-making powers, the railway is now a state-owned
limited company and has been split into three separate businesses: passenger, freight,
and infrastructure" (International Railway Journal, Dec. 1999). That was in 1999; in
2004 (during research) there were four businesses. The following is an illustration of
the current make-up of SBB, with an in-depth look at how maintenance and renewal
of the network is now organised.
83 The Times: 02/10/03.
84 The Rough Guide to Switzerland is one of a series of "Rough Guides" publications that cover many different
countries. A volume is a "must have" for any traveller whose budget requires of them to be financially astute, as I
was during the fieldwork for this thesis.
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9.2 INFRASTRUCTURE
9.2.1 Organisational Structures and ideology
The structure of SBB is relatively simple to follow, this is perhaps because "layers of
middle management [were] ruthlessly discarded in favour of a slimmer management
structure which provides more direct communication between the board and the
operational managers, and enables important decisions to be taken much more
quickly" (International Railway Journal, Dec. 1999). SBB is headed by the
"Verwaltungsrat" (board of directors) which consists of nine people. Under their
control are SBB's main businesses which are divided into four areas:
• Personenverkehr (Passenger Traffic);
• SBB cargo (Freight);
• Infrastruktur (Track and Track Access);
• Finanzen (Controlling / Real Estate).
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Figure 9-1 Business sectors of SBB (author's sketch).
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Our interest is Infrastruktur. The streamlined decision-making process that
underpinned the restructuring of SBB as a whole is evident within this business. The
words of the former Infrastructure Head, Pierre-Alain Urech, highlight this: "Our
motto is simple: clear tasks and clear processes in the organisation. In the competitive
85environment that we agreed to create, there is no place for duplication". Within
Infrastructure, four sectors contribute to the operation of the business (fig. 9-2):
• Sales and capacity management (Verkauf & Kapazitatsmanagement);
• Asset management;
• Technology and Innovation management;
• Project construction management (Projekte Bau Management).
Infrastruktur
Direction of process
Figure 9-2 Work process in Infrastruktur (author's sketch).
Our interest is focused on "Assetmanagement". This sector has two divisions: Safety
and Availability (VS), and Network Programme Management (NPM). The decision¬
making process involved with NPM is focused on financial control:
Passenger Traffic SBB Cargo
Sectors
Asset Management
Infrastrukiur Finance / Real Estate
Figure 9-3 The two divisions of Asset Management (author's sketch).
85 This is my translation from French. The original quote is as follows: « Notre devise est simple: des taches claires
dans une organisation et des processus claires. L'environnement competitif que nous entendons crder ne laisse




9.3.1 Models and the difference between maintenance and renewal
NPM leaders seek to answer two fundamental questions:
Our group [NPM] has two main questions. 1. How much money do we have to spend to
maintain [and renew] our assets; that's the first one, how much money do we have for the
track - very easy to ask, but very hard to answer. And then the second question. When we
know how much money we have for the track we need to know how to spend this money.
(Int: 31a & b).
For renewal work, money is spent largely on hiring private contractors. Despite this,
SBB is still involved extensively with the work:
All machinery is owned by the contractors, it's always been like this. The strategy we use
for the infrastructure is we engage people for track renewal work, and overhead work. The
material for the work is put in place by SBB; transported to the site by SBB. We have a
history of this. The decision of what needs to be done, and when it is done, is up to us.
There is a specific organisation for coordinating the parts - getting the material to the
location and planning who is doing it. So when we know what work needs to be done we
can tell them - there is this work and when it is the best opportunity for the inceptions
[possessions]. So we can tell these people with the machines - you come here then (Int: 30).
SBB only employ companies who are totally railway oriented. Civil engineering
companies with, for instance, a "railway division" are not involved:
Interviewee: .. .this department, they make the contracts, they execute the contracts for
railway engineering contractors. We don't have a general civil engineering company; our
contractors are typically railway engineering contractors.
Interviewer: So their interest is only in railway engineering, not just general engineering?
Interviewee: Yes (Int: 31a).
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9.3.2 Splitting costs and Integrated Maintenance Management
The question regarding how to spend money has no simple answer. To aid the
process, maintenance and renewal have been segregated. Maintenance is the concern
of Availability and Safety (VS) ('A' in fig. 9-4), and renewal is handled by Project
Construction Management ('B' in fig. 9-4), of the sector Project Construction.
It is split for finance - they (VS) do maintenance, and they (Project Construction
Management PCM) carry out the renewals. They are the two groups. Before they used to be
in the same group [in terms of financial management], but now it is different and it is this
way [i.e. separated financial accounts], (Int: 31b).
Infrastruktur
Figure 9-4 Splitting objectives and finances (author's sketch).
Separating the costs is not easy; drawing a clear line between what is renewal and
what is maintenance is difficult, and NPM has the task of deciphering the two ('C' in
fig. 9-4).
To say what the difference is between maintenance and renewal is difficult. It is given by
financial calculations. With maintenance you are not adding to the substance, you are not
increasing value, but with renewal you do. Renewal increases the worth of the network, its
like paying up the mortgage on a property; this is why it is important to separate
maintenance and renewal. And it is the task ofNPM to manage this, they are the financial
managers. ... Getting the balance between renewal rates and maintenance, however, is
difficult - but this is the model we work with [during this conversation the respondent









The graph depicts: The cost of maintenance
after intial renewal - see line 2. Line 1 depicts
the trend of continuous maintenance costs
without renewal.Where the two meet and cross
within the dashed section, the cost of
maintenance becomes as costly or costlier
than renewal - thus it is suggested, at this
point in time, that renewal is the best
cost-effective practice. Line 3 depicts the
trend if renewal is conducted during this
period.
YEARS >
Figure 9-5 The maintenance and renewal model (author's sketch from Int: 34).
The decision-making model given above has been simplified. Deciding how to
manage costs is best seen as the outcome of a tapestry of choices that spring from
several different sources:
Do we give it to the person who is crying the loudest? [This is] the question we have to ask,
so we are organised in the following way. ... We have one person who is making a
simulation model to find out how much money we need. Then we have the programme
managers, they are the guys who have to spend the money in the most intelligent ways. ...
This team works with the other group ofAsset Management VS ['A' in fig. 9-4] (Int: 31a).
Recent considerations for maintenance have resulted in the development of a new
position: the Integrated Maintenance Manager. I refer to the words of an SBB member
who talks about this recently fashioned position:
In our department a new position was created, we have a new colleague - just been here for
two months - and he does work for what we call Integrated Maintenance Management.
This came about because we found out that until now maintenance had always been the task
for the Inffastruktur division, but involves also the influence of the traffic division. The
influence of the traffic on the cost of the work is very big. You have limited durations of
possessions and they have a very big influence on the costs. Say the length of a normal
possession is 5 V2 hours: then for traffic reasons you have to reduce it by one hour. The cost
of the work that needs to be done, but cannot be completed then increases by 20-30 percent,
incredible. It's a very big influence. And so we say now, the people in the department that
runs the trains, they have to take some responsibility for the maintenance. And that's what
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we call Integrated Maintenance Management [IMM]. We are convinced there is a lot of
money to be saved here (Int: 31a).
During one specific stint of research I was given an insight into the practicalities that
the IMM must handle. Given the mountainous environment of Switzerland there are
many, many tunnels, and given the length of some86,1 wanted to know if work within
tunnels presented unique problems. This assumption was driven by an observation
during fieldwork where renewal work was planned for a length of single-line track in
an isolated location that was difficult to access:
Single line working
We arrive at the site - it is a single line. The single line is situated in a stunningly
beautiful landscape. The length of track to be worked on is curved and situated on the
side of a small hill. On one side of the track there is a slope that climbs steeply above
us. On the other side there is a steep slope that falls sharply down some 12-15 feet.
The track curls into sight from round the hill and then straightens up as it heads over a
level crossing and onwards for about half a mile to the small station of the nearby
village which itself is shadowed by the Alps. The back-drop to the track work tonight is
thoroughly imposing.
On the track there are several workers with orange fluorescent jackets and hard hats.
To get to where the men are we walk along a specially made path from the nearby
station. We walk along the top of the embankment - on the side that drops 12-15 feet.
The path was specially prepared - probably about a year ago. Franz tells me this work
would have been planned five years ago - thus they knew that adequate access for
walking would be needed - hence the reason the path looks very new and clean. The
narrow path is just wide enough to stand on safely at the top of the embankment as a
train goes by. The train that goes by is the last service to operate on the line - and it is
the service that the workers have been waiting on before work can start.
86 Such tunnels include the famous St. Gotthard Tunnel, which at 15kms long, will be dwarfed by The St. Gotthard
Base Tunnel which is due to open in 2012 and will be a staggering 58kms long.
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Once the train is in the nearby village station, the foreman uses a mobile phone to call
a signalman who ensures that the line is now clear. Then the overhead power supply is
killed. This is a must as some of the machines are quite high and could electrocute the
men.
Here I saw the influence of traffic on work, thus I asked if it is a problem: controlling
work for traffic or vice versa? Franz tells me: "It is not a majorproblem - the people
who control the traffic... they know the workmust happen and they know when it does
happen... they are involved in the planning. They perhaps change timetables very
slightly, maybe only by three minutes, just to take account of the small delay. So that
the passengers know that they will still arrive on timd'. He then mentions how there is
a limit to the amount of work that can be done on main routes: "For big constructions
jobs - between Bern andZurich - we have a maximum of two - three sites, never any
more, we do not have more than four construction sites on the principal lines. It would
have too big an effect on traffid'. With the last train gone and the line "blocked" work
has started (Fw: 33).
Given the effect of traffic and the location of the work in this one small example, i.e.
waiting for the last train to start work and given the problematic features of the site,
i.e., access problems, I was interested in how renewal work could be completed in
lengthy tunnels. Moreover, what occurs when the site to be renewed in a tunnel is
single line?
This can be a problem... The problems occurs when it is single line, when it is double line,
for spot maintenance, then there is not a problem, it is just the same as working outside a
tunnel - you step off a line to let traffic pass... But this way it is [a problem], when it is
single line and there is traffic every four to five minutes, we have a problem. We then have
to plan from here in Berne. If the line is not busy; then no problem. ... But there is also the
problem with ventilation - there are a lot ofmachines, with fumes, there can be a lot of dust
when moving ballast. So we use a machine that artificially injects clean air. But with
tunnels and work, it has often to go through the IMM and possessions are planned for
nights (Int: 34).
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9.4 FORMULATING A FORMULA: THE KNOWLEDGE BASES
9.4.1 The top-down plan
In this section we find out that a concoction of historical experience, local knowledge,
new technology and statistics are meshed together to form the knowledge and
understanding required for maintenance and renewal.
Figure 9-6 SBB Maintenance management process (source: Pfarrer, 2002:
Conference paper).
The meshing together of these accumulators of data is only possible after utilising two
methodological plans - the bottom up plan, and the top-down plan. The top-down
plan develops from factors that are "known". Infrastruktur, at the start of the year
"knows" how much money it has for maintenance and renewal - the department can
thus figure out a budget for both. The second matter is "understanding" what must be
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renewed. Such understanding comes from knowledge of an asset's life-span. This
knowledge is the buttress of a simple yet strict philosophy which was put to me in
these words:
Knowing the normal life span tells you when to renew. You have to change at the end of an
asset's life (Int: 30).
This peremptorily phrased statement shows the importance attached to knowing the
conditions of assets throughout their operational life. This knowledge informs a
theoretical model. In a paper produced by NPM we are told that:
The age structure of individual track elements provides the statistics for a theoretical model
that determines when to renew. These statistics also show when there are increasingly
strong preservation needs for an asset in its last period of life. They also tell when there are
low renewals rates.87
This theoretical / simulation model tells workers about the condition of the network as
a whole, for instance it is thought that:
About 2.3% of the network must be renewed every year (Int: 30).
Or regarding precise materials, say sleepers, another said:
We know when different sleeper types start to rot. We know that the renewal rate of a
wooden sleeper is 25 years, so we know that in some years we must renew some sleepers,
this comes from sleepers' age and trends. This system is working; it's a question of risk
(Int: 31b).
87 This quote is from the Schweizerische Bundesbahnen (2003) published paper: "Maintenance and
Renewal, Permanent Way: Processes, Responsibility, Models".
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9.4.2 The bottom-up plan
Urgency is now focused on short-term regional maintenance, as opposed to long-term
renewal needs. Yet similarly, this plan finds its root purpose in another
uncompromising value:
You must maintain when you have to - you have to improve the structure to accommodate
speed and loads (Int: 30).
By concentrating on the first half of this quote - you must maintain when you have to -
we find that local knowledge of local contingencies is indispensable. Information
pertaining to track/route idiosyncrasies must be obtained but, as one person points
out:
We get the information from visual inspection - the most expensive input (Int: 33b).
Despite the burden of costs for man-power, on-foot inspection remains an integral
part of the bottom-up maintenance plan:
The needs of the bottom-up plan are clearly defined and applied equally network-wide -
there is an examination of conditions in the field on each track, i.e., a maintenance decision
is not made at an office desk without exact knowledge of local conditions. [Furthermore]
the definition of the criteria and the condition examinations in the field take place via two
independent SBB internal experts. The condition examinations in the field are supported by
specialists of the Technical Support Team. Main criteria of decisions are the age, tonnage,
maintenance frequency, disturbance occurrence, visual evaluation as well as the results
from the test car (Schweizerische Bundesbahnen, 2003) 88
These words connect with those of an SBB worker when he was telling me about his
21 years with the company:
88 From Schweizerische Bundesbahnen document, 2003: "Maintenance and Renewal, Permanent Way:
Processes, Responsibility, Models".
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When he left school he started an apprenticeship-type programme with SBB. He
progressed and eventually became a member of a team called Technical Support
(defined later). He told me:
I am mainly office-based. I work Monday to Friday, earlymorning to /ate afternoon...
I was offered this job because [name] wantedmy experience ofwork on tracks at a
desk where decisions are made. You make decisions on track renewal indoors, but
you must know of the problems for the workers outdoors. ...I know the conditions
outside, that was why they wantedme inside when decisions are made (Fw: 33).
9.4.3 Top down / bottom up - the similarities
As in the top-down plan, knowledge of the conditions outdoors is a valuable
commodity, however, we should be wary of splitting the two plans as neatly as I have.
Though the two are operated and referred to in their own right, the top-down plan's
statistics and trends for understanding an asset's life-cycle come from the same
sources that the bottom-up plan relies on, i.e., experience, history, visual inspection.
We should also note that operating the two plans is not done in isolation. Both
maintenance and renewal utilise the same knowledge, and rely on the same sources of
understanding that produce the knowledge of track condition - namely the meshing
together of statistics, trends and local experience. Take the following:
We ask these questions - what are the needs? What are the faults? So what do we need to
do? This is the responsibility for maintenance and renewal. And in the districts, the
engineers, they have to say this district needs this, this district needs that. And you also
have statistics, so from observations and statistics you can propose what work will need to
be done. And [voie ferree personnel - permanent way workers] goes out to the different
districts once a year, and with all these findings we put them into a middle plan. Here we
can start saying - this needs to be done then. So you can get to a final point and say what
needs to be done in five years. This aids budget and discussions on proposed work. We can
delay work - we can ask what work is absolutely necessary? So we're adapting the
programming to fit the needs (Int: 30).
It has been shown how the NPM division of Asset Management makes maintenance
or renewal decisions. The methodologies utilised demand that final decisions be taken
with a thorough understanding of the actual conditions in the field. By taking a closer
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look at how maintenance is physically completed we also see how a thorough
understanding is developed and utilised within the Availability and Safety division of
Asset Management:
9.5 MAINTENANCE DECISION-MAKING
9.5.1 You must maintain when you have to
The priority for the Availability and Safety unit is maintenance. Accordingly, this
division and a group called Technical Support abide by the proclamation you must
maintain when you have to. This typically involves work that is planned and executed
in the short-term; it is this work which is supported by "Technical Support". At the
heart of this work there is a decision-making process forged around the necessities of
the network as and when they arise. At the moment we only look at how this decision¬
making process fits into an organisational structure. Recall part of the text in the NPM
publication (Schweizerische Bundesbahnen, 2003) which, this time with my
emphasis, stated:
The condition examinations in the field are supported by specialists of the Technical
Support Team. Main criteria of decisions are the age, tonnage, maintenance frequency,
disturbance occurrence, visual evaluation as well as the results from the test car.
This re-reading makes it plain that the relationship between those "in the field" and
the "Technical Support" team is critical. Within Technical Support there are six
functional positions headed by individuals - these six functions are given in fig. 9-7
as sub-departments.
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Figure 9-7 Availability and Safety: the sub-departments (author's sketch).
The Technical Support teams support and assist in the decision-making taken by the
different teams of the different sub-departments. Of these sub-departments, two are of
direct interest in this thesis:
• Inspection and Maintenance of Track Environment and Structures (Ouvrages
d'art). Here there are four different teams which have the following tasks: 1) one
inspects the condition of the track environment, this involves inspection of track
components (sleepers, bolts... etc), concrete structures such as tunnels and bridges,
this team also inspect embankments and is known in French as Teams d'inspection
des ouvrages. Another team (2), are construction engineers who repair faults. Two
other teams inspect other environmental matters they are: 3) teams for weed killing
(desherbage); 4) and teams to maintain forests close to the track (foret).
• Permanent Way Engineering (Voie Ferree; V.f.) (or, in German: Fahrbahn). The
maintenance of the permanent way includes the following three divisions: 1. P-
way spot-maintenance teams (Ingenieurs V.f.); 2. Ultrasonic groups (ultrason,
groupes d'auscultation); 3. Clearance within tunnels and bridges (profils d'espace
libre).
At this moment we need to know that these individual teams work within one of the
23 districts that the SBB network has been broken down into. The team charged with
the inspection of the track's environment (see fig.9-8), known in French as Teams
272
d'inspection des ouvrages89; and (2) the permanent way engineering teams involved
with spot maintenance and ultrasonic inspection are of interest to us.
Figure 9-8 Operating groups of the ouvrage d'art.
9.5.2 Teams d'inspection des ouvrages: the organisational structure on paper
For this type of work Switzerland has been divided into thirds and within each third
there are several of the 23 districts. Each third has a central Technical Support Office
(see fig. 9-9).
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Figure 9-9 Ouvrage d'art districts
89
Here, and from here on, 1 use the French inspection des ouvrages when referring to this department simply
because it is easier to read and not as clumsy as continually referring to "Inspection of track environment and all
concrete structures".
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This set-up requires each of the 23 inspection des ouvrages teams to co-ordinate and
plan their work as required from smaller offices. Such offices in the western section
are Bienne, Delemont, Fribourg, or Neuchatel.
Organising work to accommodate the needs unique to locations as and when required,
one presumes, requires a significant degree of foresight, instilled by experience. This
supposition stems entirely from the words of the NPM publication: a main criterion of
decision-making is conducted in the field by visual evaluation. But, as a corollary,
these words give rise to another assumption: learning the behaviour and trends of
permanent way assets within different locations cannot be done over night. Each
section of line, remember, has an existing memory that can have its own problems
that are generally learnt about over time. Thus, to adhere to the methodologies
required, such as the bottom-up plan, a key role must exist for workers with a
thorough understanding of their area.
Through extensive reference to fieldwork notes, let us now look at the role of
experience and tacit knowledge, the role of front-line decision-making, and the
autonomy of district workers during visual inspection.
9.6 ASSESSING ASSUMPTIONS AND FIELDWORK NOTES
9.6.1 Teams d'inspection des ouvrages: walking seven kilometres
On a blisteringly hot morning, in the shadow of the rolling green banks of the Jura
mountains, I stand on the platform of a mainline station where I have donned a bright
orange vest; my compulsory safety gear. I am with a similarly dressed SBB worker
called Markus.
Markus has been with SBB for "23 years, SBB is a good company, it's a big company"
and he "like[s his] work a lot". He is a member of this district's inspection team of the
ouvrages d'art. He walks an average "20 kilometres a weeks, but it can change, the
centre ofplanning can change tasks weekly, [he goes] to places where problems have
been reported, perhaps by trains drivers or that are due for a revisit".
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During the first few metres of our walk I ask Markus about his work. When he is
working he is "looking at everything, the conditions of the overheads, the surroundings,
ifstones have fallen from hi/is andmountain sides, the condition of the ballast, rails,
sleepers, and fencing. I see if things are tidy.
I ask him about the relevance of his 23 years of work on the railway: is experience
important? He tells me that though he has been with SBB for that long, he has only
been walking in this district for four years. But yes, experience is important: "By seeing
and knowing what to see, you see what components are functioning and what are not
functioning. ... I have a good idea where problems will be".
We have only covered a few metres before we come to the entrance of a tunnel that
burrows away deep below a huge mountain. When I look into it I see no daylight from
the opposite end. Asking Markus how long it is, he shows me a small map and points at
the tunnel on the paper. A figure tells me that it is over 1500metres long (about one
mile long).
In the tunnel Markus uses a torch which proved to be extremely handy from my point
of view as a researcher. Earlier when Markus had told me he looks at "everything" I
could only guess at what he really meant, moreover, he had also said that he knew
where problems were likely to occur, so clearly the problem was - how was I to know
when he would be looking at a potential problem area? In the tunnel this conundrum
was solved.
The beam of his torch indicated to me where he was looking - it gave me /valine of
vision - if only for 1500m of 7km. But from then on (outside the tunnel) I was able to
guess where he was looking. The torch's beam acted as a template I could use to
"follow" Markus' line of vision.
The torch light in the tunnel darted and skipped over the sleepers, the pads, the ballast
at quite a speed, not resting for a second - it certainly moved too fast for me to be
able to assess anything. The light danced sporadically from the rail nearest to us to the
rail furthest from us, to the walls of the tunnel on either side, to the apex of the ceiling
and back to the ground.
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As we were doing this Markus suddenly raised an arm and said "train". We stepped up
the pace till we reached a recess in the tunnel wall that gave us a point of safety.
When in the recess we waited for the train to come and it was during this period of
waiting that I became acutely aware of something quite disconcerting. Not only was I
surprised at the length of time it took the train to approach us and come into view, but
I was totally astounded that Markus knew it was coming in the first place, for I only
heard its approach when we were in the recess which was some moments since
Markus first signalled its approach. This was not only going to puzzle me whilst the
next few trains passed, but also made me question the quality of my own hearing. How
did Markus hear the trains coming?
In total seven trains passed us when we were in the tunnel, and until the fifth Markus
had consistently warned me in advance when a train was approaching and consistently
well before I could even hear a train. Yet eventually I found out: Markus knew trains
were approaching prior to seeing them (and hearing them) in the tunnel, because
when a train enters it, the air pressure is affected and your ears pop ever so lightly.
Given the length of the tunnel, ears pop very gently (and to me, at first, quite
unnoticeably) some time before you hear the train, thus there was time to get to a
recess which were never more than 45 paces apart.
Figure 9-10 Length of route walked with Markus (author's photograph).
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Further on (still in the tunnel) Markus stops and focuses the light on an area where
water is dripping. He shines the torch on numerous parts of the wall where a damp
patch is clearly observable. I become aware that Markus, apart from just looking is also
listening keenly. At times he looks away from the patch, head slightly bowed with an
ear directed to the scene of analysis. Conscious of this, I refrain from asking questions
and feel myself trying to control my breathing in an effort to keep the quietness as
pure as possible. Markus then moves on only a matter of paces before he does the
same. Then when he starts walking again, I ask if there is a problem. He hesitates for a
moment before saying it is ok. He simply explains he was listening to the dripping to
see how fast it was dripping, or how heavy it sounded. In any case he maintains that it
was ok.
Figure 9-11 Rail in good condition (author's photograph).
We exit the tunnel with still a few kilometres to go. I am particularly interested in the
role of "listening", considering the dripping episode in the tunnel. I ask him if he often
listens forpotential problems! He tells me "when a train goes by I watch and listen for
sounds; heavy sounds that dank, (at which point he slams a fist into the palm of his
hand repeatedly 5-6 times), I listen for heavy clanks at welds!'
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We move on in the blazing sunshine and I recall the dancing torchlight in the tunnel
and imagine Markus's eyes darting over the environment; swiftly surveying the land like
a bird of prey hovering above a field in search of its next meal. Soon he is not happy
with something. He is looking at clips and a seat that pin the rail to a sleeper - in the
end he records on paper that the sleeper and clips need attention. He points the
problem out to me: although there is cracking over the whole of the wooden sleeper -
the cracking where the rail is attached looks quite pronounced around the pad between
the rail and the sleeper. Markus doesn't like it, he takes the location from a nearby sign
and he tells me he will call colleagues.
At the end of the walk Markus records his work onto a notepad - " there were notmany
problems today", he tells me (Fw: 30).
During this walk I saw how experience underpinned a specific form of tacit
knowledge. For instance, Markus had developed an idea of where problems can
occur, and he had even developed an idea of how dripping should sound when things
are fine within tunnels.
Some days later I was given a glimpse of the autonomous working methods of district
workers, like Markus, when I spoke to a senior SBB member of staff. For instance, I
had asked Markus, when we were walking the track if it had been "walked" two
weeks ago, he had said no, it was a little longer than that. Regarding what others had
said: that every line is walked every two weeks (Int: 30; Int: 33), I wanted the senior
SBB worker to confirm or correct my information. He said:
They should be walking the line every two weeks... perhaps in their district they have
decided that walks on some lines can be reduced. I would think that decision will be
because of traffic. Freight has reduced... walking should refer to the rate of traffic,
tonnage... if tonnage increases, walking must increase. If the walking on some lines has
gone down, traffic has reduced (Int: 34).
The knowledge I had was correct, but the comment brought into focus a sense of
autonomy that these workers have. A significant degree of decentralisation permitted
frontline decision-making which is underpinned by local contingencies.
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9.7 THE UP KEEP OF THE PERMANENT WAY
9.7.1 Spot-maintenance
Maintenance of the permanent way is split into three areas (see fig. 9-12): spot-
maintenance teams, ultrasonic testing, and engineers concerned with tunnel and
bridge clearance. This thesis focuses attention on spot-maintenance and ultrasonic
testing.
Figure 9-12 Sub-departments of the Permanent Way (author's sketch).
For the spot-maintenance, Switzerland is split into six sections with each containing a
technical support office. The role of the Technical Support teams is outlined:
For all spot maintenance interventions [teams] have the responsibility, the competence and
the money to take the necessary measures. The Technical Support supplies them with
engineering expertise and disposes of the necessary funds to order major maintenance work
like re-railing entire sections (Pfarrer, 2002: Conference paper).
Figure 9-13 The structure of spot-maintenance in one district (author's sketch).
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This organisational structure (in fig. 9-13) of spot-maintenance is replicated through¬
out the SBB network, with only some slight changes that vary from district to district:
Yes, yes it is the same structure within each of the 23 districts, but there are changes in the
number of people in each department. In Zurich compared to Delemont where there are not
so much overheads, there are a different number of teams. The size of the teams... they
vary... they are of various sizes which correspond to the needs of the district they work in
(Int: 34).
In fig. 9-13, the box labelled "head of permanent way team" is the one that interests
us. Permanent way teams undertake immediate, small work that needs to be done to
the permanent way. One team maintains rails and sleepers and the related
components, another maintains switches and crossings and level crossings; the last
team maintains signalling. Tasks for the first team therefore include applying
preservative to wooden sleepers, replacing pads, chairs, renewing clips, bolts, screws,
and renewing short sections of rail. The task for the second team includes measuring
gauges at switches and crossings (S&Cs).
The idea of decision-making in the field as "decentralised" is also important if we
accept another matter: complex organisations such as a rail business distribute
workers over a wide geographical expanse, thus a significant degree of decentralised
decision-making, one presumes, must be required. In the following set of notes, I
assess this assumption.
9.7.2 Permanent way spot maintenance: checking a switch and crossing
installation
The work that is taking place this morning is the measurement of one set of S&C.
Hans introduces me to Joel, a trainee who is going to measure the S&C.
Joel shows me a document that lists and illustrates several types of S&C. By referring
to the diagram and referring to the rail type and profile, we find the maximum and
minimum tolerances of the gauge for each section of this S&C. After measuring the
gauge at seven different points, Joel records the results. He then refers to a master
sheet that states exactly what the measurement should be for each section - below
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this it then states what the maximum and minimum tolerances can be. It is typically -2
to +10mm.
The gauge however, (see fig. 9-14) is not the only measurement that Hans uses: he
tells me how he has been in the industry for 23 years (coincidentally the same length
of time as Markus from Fw: 30) - he knows by looking when something is wrong and
by way of example he shows me part of a manganese S&C where it does not come to a
pointed, straight end. Instead it is blunted and appears bashed - something he says he
doesn't like - and it is something he has already noted and has planned work for.
He gives me a further example of knowing when something is right or wrong. This
section of track is very busy and a lot of traffic is operating. When a train passes near
us, Hans demonstrates how he can tell if things are ok. He covers his eyes with his
hands and repeats the word - "listen, listen/'... he can hear when something is wrong.
Figure 9-14 The measurement gauge (author's photograph).
The measuring takes about 30mins - we stop and start mainly for traffic reasons. The
S&C measurement shows that all the sections are within the tolerances - the most the
measurement is out of the exact / ideal measure is two millimetres. Hans says that the
S&C is in good condition. But at another S&C things are different, one of the
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measurements shows the gauge to be five millimetres outside the tolerance zone and
moreover, the traffic over this S&C travels at high speed.
Figure 9-15 Close-up ofmeasurement gauge (author's photograph).
I ask what actions will be taken: "It will be fixed tomorrow, ifnot tomorrow only a little
time after that". However, if there were a lot of problems, "it takesmore planning - it
goes to control forplanning".
For fixing the smaller problems, the facilities are shown to me. By the station there are
numerous buildings, yards, and garages. Each hold and store specific material for all
aspects of maintaining the network in this district. This includes storage of tractors,
strimmers, weed killing drums, warning signs, and equipment such as clamps, spades,
large spanners and heavy machinery. For smaller permanent way components I am
shown inside an old carriage which has been converted into a storage room. Lining the
walls are small green baskets.
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Figure 9-16 Interior of converted carriage as a stock room (author's
photograph).
Within each there are either: bolts, nuts, plates, pads, or clips and many other smaller
items. Each basket is also colour coded - the codes refer to a sign on the door of the
carriage as you enter. There are four colours, and each colour designates the time
when each basket should be replenished. Each colour is a symbol of the degree of
urgency. It is, Hans tells me, "a very efficient method ofcontrolling stock!' and
managing "risk". When we go to other areas of the complex I see the same code for
much larger equipment, such as sleepers, rubber walkways for stations, and indeed rail
for normal line and S&Cs. In the yard there is a large area where there are some
sections of rail.
Hans shows me how these levels are maintained. He says how it is not one person's
responsibility to maintain the levels - it is everyone's. He explains this by taking me to
a room that is equipped with one desk, one computer, some files. Every worker has
access to the computer.
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Figure 9-18 Replacement sections of rail in yard (author's photograph).
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It is where they order supplies as and when required. In a different room I am given a
glimpse into the important role of history. There are several filing cabinets: Hans opens
one and takes out one folder and shows me the contents. It is lengthy roll of paper
once it is unfolded. At the top right there is a name of a route and beside it is the date
1985. The paper has a key for the symbols that are printed on it. Such symbols at
different points of the paper show when and where on the route ballast was renewed,
rails were renewed, sleepers were renewed and any maintenance work at S&Cs and
plain rail was done. Basically, the paper is a map of the route which details the history
of all work that has been done on it since 1985. He shows me other files which detail
work on other routes which go back even further, some 30 years. When showing me
the maps, Hans confirms my thoughts on the importance of recording all work on a
route, for he tells me: "to know what work was done and when is very important, it
helps when decisions have to be made for today or in the futurd'.
Beside the office block, there is another building - it has a kitchen, a communal area, a
shower and wash area. This building and this area looks new; Hans tells me it has been
in use for three years. I comment on how good the facilities look; he tells me how it
helps "motivation, people have to enjoy coming to work; that is very important"(Fw:
32).
The size of the complex that I visited was considerable: it had to be to store the many
components required for spot-maintenance. The size of this complex alone suggested
to me that spot-maintenance decision-making was an extensive, critical process done
within the districts with a degree of independence from central offices. Take the
following quote regarding the role of the man in the district:
We plan in the long term for renewal and plan in the short term for maintenance. Spot
maintenance is done on sharp curves [for example] - following up ultrasonics when we
have a defect. The man in the district has the responsibility and the means to change rail -
lengths are approximately 6 metres - there's no need for permission and he has the stock
for this. According to their experience they maintain their stock according to historical
need... We know that every year we have so many rail replacements, so we plan and take
the costs and calculate it from the budget (Int: 30).
Likewise, I asked another if he thought that this type of decision-making was a form
of decentralisation. This is how the conversation went:
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R: Yes, we train people; we give them the required competencies. We have delegated a lot
of competencies to the front. This is required for effective spot-maintenance. They have the
ability and the competencies required to realise what needs done and when. If it is a large
piece of work then it takes planning...
I: And that work is planned here (SBB HQ) with (name of SBB worker)?
R: Yes, to plan work, organise traffic, machinery. But for smaller work, it is essential for
the team to do it when it is required (Int: 34).
Relying on experience to execute frontline decision-making during spot-maintenance
is a necessity for effective operations and high levels of safety and availability. In the
next section regarding ultrasonic testing we see another critical necessity: the role of
the experienced team for decision-making.
9.7.3 Ultrasonic testing: The organisational structure on paper
Though essentially an inspection technique, ultrasonic testing is located here instead
of with ouvrages d'art inspection team because, unlike the ouvrages d'art, UT is
concerned with one component of the permanent-way - the rail - and not the entire
environment. The SBB network for UT organisation has been split into three sections,
with the boundaries between each, again, running from north to south. In the west of
the country the technical support office is in Lausanne, the others are in Zurich and
Luzern.
The principle that underpins ultrasonic testing (UT) frequency on the SBB network is
tonnage carried. SBB has a clear understanding of how much tonnage is carried on
every section of its entire network. A map of the network has been produced and
lengths of track are colour coded in line with the amount of tonnage that each section
of track supports daily. The network is thus broken down into four maximum tonnage
categories: 25,000; 50,000; 75,000; and 100,000 tonnes per day. Depending on the
level of tonnage a line carries, UT is completed at a particular frequency.
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By looking closely at how UT is structured in the west of the country (which we can
use as a template for how it is organised in the remaining sections - Int: 34), we see
the significant role that UT has on the SBB network.
In the western section, the network is broken down further into nine branch offices
(succursales) and named after the mainline station. The nine are: Lausanne, Geneve,
Neuchatel, Bienne, Fribourg, Delemont, Bern, St Maurice, and Brig. Within each
branch, data is known about all the lines, the tonnage carried per day, the rail type (i.e.
profile), the length of rail in kilometres between stations, and the amount of S&C on
that length. Furthermore, it is noted how each length of line and each switch is
ultrasonically tested- which is either by manual means, i.e., a test trolley (see fig. 9-
19) or by a rail based testing car. Additionally, each branch has been given a specific
time of the year when hand testing is done (see 9-19).
Branch Test period (month)
Lausanne January 6 February
Geneva February







Figure 9-19 Branch offices and train-based testing time, and picture ofmanual
test trolley (author's sketch and photograph).
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There is supplementary testing that occurs every year by means of a rail based
ultrasonic test car. In March the rail testing car from one private company is operated
over the entire western section. It is operated by the private contractor over a period of
15 nights. Then every fault that is found by the rail test car is checked manually by the
UT teams with testing trolleys during April. The same process then occurs later in the
year (September), but with a different rail based testing car from a different company.
Once more, any faults picked up by the car are then re-assessed by the team via the
test trolley in October. In November each route section is then subject to a "Controle
Partiel" - an end of term check-up. In December, no testing is done at all on the SBB
network, due to weather conditions.
9.7.4 Ultrasonic testing: the role of the team
Prior to seeing UT in practice it was pointed out to me that an experienced team is
seen as a valuable commodity, so when changing a group's structure without proper
regard, important dynamics may be lost:
They [the teams] are very good at their job, if you change things rapidly it could be a
catastrophe, it takes a lot of time to make a little change (Int: 33a).
It was suggested that experience has bred a high level of trust in the team's decision¬
making process. For instance, if a team finds a serious fault they contact their
supervisor, who contacts the controller of traffic and demands the cessation of traffic
operating on that line. If the controller of traffic questions this, she or he will then
contact the manager of all UT in Switzerland, who told me:
When he [the team member who found the fault] says no trains, I trust him, he means no
trains! He has the experience (Int: 33a).
When reading the following fieldwork notes we should keep in mind the emphasis
that is placed on the role of the experienced team.
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9.7.5 Ultrasonic operation: in practice (Testing an S&C and deja vu)
I have been driven to a small town's train station by an SBB worker where a switch and
crossing is due for a test. At the scene I meet up with Stephan. Stephan is the
supervisor of the team. Unlike other organisation for railway maintenance, there is not
an UT team per district. There are not 23 UT teams. Instead, there are three which
cover several districts in each third. Stephan introduces me to the men that are here;
there are five SBB workers altogether including Stephan. There are two men for look¬
out - one will stand some distance behind us, the other some distance ahead of us. The
route we are on is a principal line and the trains travel very fast. The other two men,
along with Stephan comprise the "UT" team - it is a three man team.
The equipment that the men are using is a hand-pushed test trolley which is similar to
the walking sticks used in Britain. The display pack from which the men read the
feedback are identical (see fig. 9-20).
Figure 9-20 Identical UT digital packs in Switzerland (left) and Britain (right
picture) (author's photographs).
The UT team firstly talk to me about the principles of UT. Stephan has a piece of chalk
and has scribbled on a sleeper the numbers 0° and 070° - beneath these digits he has
drawn a plain rectangle with a vertical line cutting down the breadth, and another
cutting down at an angle. He was clearly referring to the angle that the pulse is fired
into the rail. I know exactly what he is referring to, but he is keen that I understand
precisely. He uses a pen to show me the direction of the pulse from each probe as it
leaves the trolley. Stephan's method of explanation is virtually identical to the way UT
operators explained the same topic to me in Britain. Moreover, the men are all keen to
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shown me the importance of keeping the stick placed on the centre line (right at the
apex of the rail head). Again, in a process similar to the one I saw in Britain, the men
explain the concept of rail depth - by shifting the stick to the side they hit the
underside of the rail head and thus show me the feedback on the display, and then
once they have shifted it back to the centre they shown me how it should look.
They work closely together. Stephan said: "theymust be together, one to use [the
trolley] and watch the display, and one to watch the rail the where [the trolley] is
covering it. They are looking at differentparts; they listen for alarm forproblem". I ask
Stephan more about the task of the man who is looking at the rail. He is watching the
rail to notice such things as badly drilled bolt holes, one of which is pointed out to me
by Andreas. The bolt hole he is showing me has quite a bit of lipping and I can see the
threads of the drilled hole on the side of the rail web. This, Stephan says, is what
Andreas is looking for: he has to notice these things.
Continuing the same line of enquiry, I ask more about team work. The work between
members of an UT group, Stephan tells me: "is important, very important". One of the
men has worked with him for four years, the other three. And he continues, "it is
important to keep the group stable - you need stability and experiencd' - and when a
new person starts - " they have to take thejob seriously, because theymust always be
looking".
We continue examining the rail, and the team consistently point out to me the rail
depth signature when the 0-degree or 070-degree probes hits a bolt hole. But they also
show me something new.
In specific places, the rail base is raised from the ground where the switch blade meets
the stock rail - it is still flush at the top with the stock rail, but the depth of the rail is
shorter. It is raised as there is an area that the switch blade slides onto (see fig. 9 -
22). However, because the rail is raised and to keep it raised there are some bolts
hidden to the naked eye that prop it up, thus when the ultrasound wave hits this, it can
look like a problem on the digital packs.
The team, again are keen to point out to me that knowing that these bolts exist is an
important process of UT. Often they can be construed as problems, but knowing when
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the pulse will hit the bolts here, and knowing the difference of this from a real problem
is important (Fw: 31).
Figure 9-21 Risen switch blade and hidden bolts (author's photograph).
The afternoon I spent with Stephan and his team ofUT operators was as intriguing as
it was familiar. Despite the language differences; despite the change in environment,
the scene presented to me was uncannily familiar. The equipment was virtually
identical; the size of team, likewise.
9.8 A SENSE OF BELONGING AND 23 DISTRICTS
9.8.1 Example one: The track recording car
Dividing the country into 23 districts and allocating teams to these districts has aided
the development of a certain sense of belonging among the teams. This was
demonstrated to me during my time with the spot maintenance workers who
developed location-specific "knowledge" of the problem areas within the district they
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work in. And like Markus, they have developed an implicit understanding of their
district, which appears to generate feelings of ownership and pride:
It is important to keep the same team - this is very important, they take a special pride in
their rail region and this is a very important function for the safety of the rail (Int: 33a).
Elsewhere, but on the same point, a worker told me how he was proud to wear
clothing that displayed the SBB logo. He even told me about an occasion when he
was standing on a station platform waiting for a train that had been delayed and was
embarrassed at the excuse given over the public address system (Fw: 33). Given the
degree of pride that SBB workers appear to have in working for the company, I now
take a closer look at the organisational structure of maintenance to assess its impact
on workers and teams.
The station that I and two others are standing at is at the tip of a large stretch of
water, and the task today is to circumnavigate this large lake in a track recording car.
We are due to stop for lunch at the opposite tip, before making the return journey
along the opposite bank arriving back at this station in the late afternoon.
The track recording car arrives. It is two carriages long and the one we are on looks
like no other I have ever seen.
To start, deconstruct every preconceived idea of a normal carriage, and fill the empty
shell with one partition in the centre of the carriage so it is split in two. Then in one
half insert more partitions until one half of the carriage has cubicles of differing sizes -
one contains a toilet, another a small kitchen and the other, A small table and chairs.
The other half of the carriage, which is basically one large area, is where the work is
done. There is a large desk here and three seats are placed around it. The windows are
larger than normal so viewing the track is simple. On the wall that creates the partition
we have a multitude of data processing units and monitors.
When we boarded the train I met three other men. Throughout the entire journey two
of them were monitoring the screens relentlessly; glancing at digital displays, and
peering conscientiously at the track as it tailed off behind us. The other man sat
steadfastly in the same seat by the side of the carriage staring intently below at the
track that the train passed over. When we passed through a tunnel, he pressed one
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button, when we passed over a bridge he pressed another, when we passed over a
switch and crossing, another, and likewise for passing through a station, or over a level
crossing.
Figure 9-22 Some of the several databases (author's photograph).
Two men are at the desk: their interest is directed at graph paper which started to
scroll across the table from a feeding slit in the table as the train moved.
The paper is divided into sections (gauge measurement, cant deficiency for example)
and for each section a continuous reading is outputted on to the paper in a form which
I liken to the wavelengths on a medical cardiograph. Each of the sections have
tolerance levels that must not be breached, thus it is the task of the men analysing the
findings to act on any breached tolerances or tolerances that are nearly hit.
During the entire day I only saw one tolerance that was breached; the immediate
response was a quick and short discussion between all the men except the one by the
window, the area of the paper was underlined thickly with the pencil and then a phone
call was made.
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Figure 9-23 The lay-out of the track recording car results on paper (author's
photograph).
Figure 9-24 The desk, out ofwhich, the new graph is fed onto for analysis
(author's photograph).
When we were approximately half way through the morning we came to a halt at a
station and the two men I had met first thing gathered up the papers and left the train.
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Two others replaced them and took up the identical duties of those that had just been
relieved. The rest of the men on the train remained unchanged. Despite the change in
individuals the scenario was indistinguishable to earlier. These men spent the majority
of the day with us; it was not until sometime after lunch time that they too left the
train also, again packing up all the paper work that they dealt with. At this point the
original men who I had met first thing boarded the train again, the familiar activity
ensued: unpacking papers, underlining potential problems, and packing all the papers
at the end (Fw: 34).
In the following set of fieldwork notes, I again detail similar activities.
9.8.2 Example two: Track Renewal Inspection
I have met up with a party of eight. There are three men from Technical Support and,
of the others, two will act as look-outs. One of the men from Technical Support shows
me the plan for the day. We have about eight different locations to visit. He tells me
how there are several districts in his section and that we will be visiting two of them.
There will be an inspection of plain rail, rail on curves, and S&Cs, and rails at stations90.
At this location we are on and off the track as it's very busy. However, when on it,
Boris (of Technical Support) uses a long handled, blunted pick-axe type-tool to hammer
at the bolts that are attached to the rail seat. He hammers at bolts at every other
sleeper. The other three men and the other two from Technical Support scrutinise
different areas.
Some areas of the permanent way are walked past almost nonchalantly whilst others
are keenly inspected. At the end of the inspection the men come together and Andreas
and Boris have a long discussion during which they refer to flowcharts and tables.
Eventually they reach a final figure of "32". As it is below 50 it is given a "priority two".
Above 50, and the track needs quick attention.
90 I will just refer to the activity that ensued at one site as it was roughly duplicated throughout the day
at the other sites.
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This was roughly the process for the entire day. However, the point for now is that in
the late morning, three of the men left us and were replaced by another three men.
Despite this change the activity at each of the remaining sites remained the same.
Conscious of the change in personnel I ask questions about it. The three men who
were with us were the permanent way team for the district we are in - i.e., one of the
23. Andreas tells me that when they left us, we were leaving their district. We had a
crossed a boundary and entered a new district - hence the role of the other men -
they were the team for the district that we had moved into (Fw: 36).
I noted the term that Andreas had used when describing the reason for the change in
personnel: it was "their" district. It was similar terminology when I asked about the
reason for the changes in the track recording car, where I was told simply, that the car
had:
.. .crossed a [district] boundary and they [the men] join and leave us when we enter or leave
their district (Fw: 34).
Likewise, another said:
[The first man in the morning] had results for his district, and [he, the man in the afternoon]
had results for his district (Fw: 35).
Whether or not dividing the organisation of SBB's network into 23 districts was
designed to encourage a sense of belonging was intentional or otherwise, the workers
with whom I spent time with referred to specific districts as "his", or "theirs", and
indeed one member of Technical Support spoke of the districts in "my" section,
suggesting to me that they did indeed have a sense of belonging to the districts. This
argument gains favour when we remember how a UT worker spoke of the teams
"taking pride in their region". But it is a little tenuous to simply state that where a
worker works, he or she will have a sense of pride de facto. We need to know how
such feelings develop.
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9.9 CONSTRUCTING OWNERSHIP: FAMILIARITY BREEDS
COMMAND
9.9.1 The sources of sagacity
In the spot-maintenance example we saw how an S&C was measured but, more
importantly, we saw who measured it - a trainee. He was given the equipment, he was
given the relevant paper work, and he was supervised in everything that he did from
actual measurement of the S&C to the boxes he ticked on the paper. More importantly
this was done in a real-life situation. This was not the only example of learning in the
field that I witnessed. For track renewal inspection, there were three members of
Technical Support, two of the team, Andreas and Boris, were senior and were the lead
decision-makers. Whilst accommodating the input from the others, it was they who
decided on the final "priority" by working with flowcharts and figures. Of interest
however, is the role of the third Technical Support member. He was a trainee who:
Has been with SBB for nine months, he has to come out [on to site] with us and see... We
don't have people just from university; he has to go on site, to know and to see the way
work is done. ... We think it takes about two years this way, to learn how to work
effectively (Fw: 36).
These were the only two examples of training that I witnessed during my fieldwork,
yet the processes I saw tied into the words spoken by another when he referred to his
own training some years ago:
When I left school I was taken on at 16 and I started programme - in English I think it is
apprenticeship, I did this for three years, and then one year out for compulsory military
training. When I came back my training continued still... I went to a district, my work was
with the track and I trained with other people there, but they did not work with the track.
They worked with operating traffic, signal maintenance, inspection. This was so we could
all see what else happens when operating a railway network (Fw: 33).
Correspondingly, another worker gives a succinct outline of how training is structured
for those involved with the permanent way:
For the track environment, training is split into three faculties. One faculty for the track
people, one faculty for the overhead line, one faculty for safety equipment, S&Cs and their
electrical supply, they are really electricians. ... For training in these zones the schedule is
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three years, for one year the apprentice will join a team of other apprentices where their
progress will be recorded. They are then distributed to teams in the districts of the country.
The teams maybe take on one or two apprentices; here they are given a program of points
they have to learn. At the end they are examined, and become qualified track builders (Int:
34).
Whilst structured learning sensitises individuals to specific issues - completing paper
work; using measuring devices and other tools; understanding the role of others - it
was suggested that other skills can only be learnt in the field, e.g., dampness patterns
in tunnels, and knowing what to listen for when drips are falling, and what to listen
for when trains pass over S&Cs. In essence the learning period for railway
maintenance workers is continuous. It is, arguably, this process whereby individuals
come to "know" an area that enables them to generate feelings of ownership and
belonging. Take the next findings which describe the relationship between experience
and training for the ultrasonic operators:
For UT training, team members are taught the relevant principles as part of a week-
long course by a representative of a training company. With the appropriate
equipment, the representative visits the "third" of Switzerland where the team works.
Then each team member is tested on their ability to UT various pieces of rail. A
refresher course is conducted approximately every four years (Int: 33a). This length of
time is deemed suitable because UT remains relatively unchanged:
The technique is the same, but it is useful to refresh the principles (Int: 33a).
The length of time between refreshers courses is also thought suitable because:
Experience is more important than training (Int: 33).
Examining the construction of knowledge that shapes necessary decision-making has
referred us to the role of experience. The wealth of knowledge that these workers
have accumulated has seen them develop an ardent sense of familiarity with a district
which in turn suggests how feelings of ownership to a district and pride are cultivated.
298
9.10 FINAL COMPARISONS
9.10.1 Paperwork and confidence
This section stems entirely from a simple observation that I noted on several occasion
throughout my fieldwork.
In my British-based fieldwork, I referred to the amount of paperwork that was
required to be completed by workers. I mentioned how vans were simply full of
papers which seemed to confirm one worker's thought that "it is a paper industry
now".
In Switzerland I travelled to sites with the teams like I did in Britain, and within the
SBB minibuses or vans I always noted one consistent feature: the lack of paperwork.
Seats were always free; I never once had to move a folder, document, or loose
bundles of paper before I sat down. When the driver put the vehicle into first gear and
pulled away, not once did I have to instinctively catch a falling notepad, booklet or
diary. When paperwork was to be completed in a van after work on site, the SBB
worker completed two forms at most; the British worker completed much more before
going home to do even more. Given these clear cut differences I had to ask about
paperwork. One worker said:
...Those who have to make decisions do not have to go to the next in line, for that person to
go to the next in line and to come to a final point of authority where there is permission for
a decision. ... [this he thinks] counts for a low amount of paper (Fw: 33).
Interestingly, this respondent then said in incredulous tones:
In England you have very much papers... is it right that you have papers to write to say
other papers have been written, and there are papers to say more papers are needed?! (Fw:
33).
Elsewhere I asked one man of a track renewal inspection team about paperwork: Do
you have to complete a lot of forms when on site?
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No, we don't, we are only a small office, we've a small [technical support] team, so it is not
needed. For this we need confidence. I think in England you have a lot a paper work... you
have a lot, yes? (Fw: 36).
It seems Britain's attachment to paperwork has gained a reputation beyond its own
coast.
9.11 RCF THOUGHTS AND THE TIMING OF GRINDING
The research findings presented so far on SBB make no reference to manually
completed rail-grinding. This should not be mistaken for a sign that forms of RCF do
not exist on the SBB network.
On a rail there is some very light cracking which looks to me to be head checking. A UT
operator points out that head checking is a problem, but this particular stretch of
cracking is "no problem - it is so light; one pass of the grinding train and it will be
gond'.
As we are looking at the head checking I ask about the size of the problem - he
replies: "it is a problem for the whole ofEuropd' - realising that I am hearing a
remarkably similar statement to those I heard in Britain, I also hear a remarkably
similar opinion as to why it is a problem now: "who knows". He then refers to the
Pendolino (a specific type of train) services that are now operating and are quite new.
He also mentions wheel profiles and tread, before adding a new possible reason: He
thinks that it could possibly be because of the trend of powering trains by a locomotive
at the end of a train - so that essentially the train is being pushed along the track
instead of pulled. And regarding head checking's characteristics; he spoke of its
unpredictability. He mentioned how: "perhaps itgrows fast, perhaps itgrows sioW
(Fw: 31).
Consequently:
Gauge corner cracking can be considered as a recent phenomena: On the network of Swiss
Federal Railways [gauge corner cracking has been] regularly detected for about 12-15
years (Pfarrer: 2002).
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In the same paper, the author then points out the now familiar and important role of
experience, but in terms of RCF management:
The knowledge gathered on this subject [RCF], is based rather on experience than sustained
by scientific findings. We realise that the phenomenon occurs almost everywhere,
independently from the tonnage of the line. On lines with less traffic it just takes longer.
Analysing deterioration patterns leads to a better understanding of the development of
cracks and the adequate timing for rail renewal. With regular inspections by patrolmen - at
least once every two weeks on main line track and ultrasonic testing - a close monitoring of
crack development is assured (Pfarrer, 2002: Conference paper).
The close monitoring is characterised by close interaction between maintenance teams
and technical support:
A tight feedback is seen as an essential part of [RCF management]. Every [RCF] defect
leading to the replacement of a piece of rail is announced by form with all relevant data to
Asset Management. Regular contact between the track teams, the Technical Support, and
Asset Management are required to build up additional know-how which is given back to the
staff through institutionalised training (Pfarrer, 2002: Conference paper).
On one occasion, I witness this interaction first hand during Fw: 36:
We are at a curve that is situated within the confines of a railway station. I notice
immediately that there is a length of corrugation (a type of fault whereby the surface of
the rail has successive, but minor dips, thus giving a rippled effect). However, it was
interesting to see that attention by all parties was given to the wooden sleepers and
ballast before the rails despite obvious rail surface problems.
Boris said: the condition of the sleepers is the principal concern here. Not so much with
the metal sleepers elsewhere. This is because sleepers are not changed as much as
rails. More priority is given to sleepers. The rail is eventually measured by a tool that
records the effects of fatigue - and it is decided that the rail should be measured again
within two years.
Sleepers, it seems, are indeed given priority over rail because of the length of time they
are on the network compared to rails. Rails are changed quite frequently and this can
be because of head checking, which it was pointed out to me, is a new problem:
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"It is a big problem... a grandproblem. When to start treating the problem that... that
is difficult. You leave it for three months and the rail is finished'. And the cause? "It is
sometimes hard to find the right quality of rail, it is maybe that. And we have different
traffic, different wheels. If we only had one type of traffic then maybe it would be
easier... I think in France... the TGV... the TGV lines, I think they maybe do not have a
probierd'.
From here I asked Boris about the role of grinding: "It is too hard to do it by hand, and
very, very costly to do it by hand... But, also, it is also very hard to pick the right time.
When the cracking is very light, ideally we grind by the grinding train, thismust be
done just two weeks after the new rail is in place. If it is not done within 6months of
the new rail being in place, we have to change... Not finding the right time creates a
lot ofmaintenance work in a short timd'.
The hierarchy of inspection discussed in this quote was defined by another worker
more clearly:
Rails are subject to abrasions, fatigue, they are also easily changed. But sleepers, that is
much more complicated. When you renew sleepers you have to remove rails, seats, bolts,
pads, it is harder. It is a longer task than changing rail. With ballast we also have to remove
sleepers, bolts, pads... [etc.]. Therefore we analyse the condition of the ballast closely, for
when renewing that, we at the same time should renew everything. That is why we work
this way (Int: 34).
Additionally, the problem of when to grind was referred to by another during my time
on the track recording car. One of the men referred to the problem of shelling on fish-
plated rail.
It's a great problem, even when grinding... It is not too helpful to grind because you have
to go back... maybe two years later to do it again. So grinding, it is when it is done that
makes it right. At the right time it can be helpful, but only then. If not then, it is not good
(Fw: 34).
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So what occurs when cracks are found in S&Cs?
An S&C costs four to five times more than rail. It has more functioning components; it is
where traffic moves from one route to another. It has the potential to be the most hazardous
part of a railway. ... When a crack appears on an S&C, we apply UIC [European Union of
Railways] directions. There are three categories of cracks. The first category, we renew the
S&C immediately, the last, we test often and suggest renewal within three to four months
(Int: 34).
This passage connects with the words of others regarding the risk-management
applied to S&Cs:
In the yard, there is a large area that is fenced off, in this pen I see a machine I
recognise and which is used for removing lipping in Britain; I ask Joel what it is used
for and when. "It is used rarely", he tells me. "Sometimeswhen the [S&Cs] have to be
measured, [as they were earlier], lipping can cause a problems for [precision. Thus this
machine is used to] move it, and formeasurement to be dond'. I then ask about
grinding - do they hand grind the S&Cs at all? "Nd', is the short answer. He tells me
the "grinding train is used only when needed', but it is "impossible to use at [S&Cs] -
grinding at [S&Cs] is not dond'. I ask what maintenance occurs then if cracks or
fissures are found on the S&C? " They UT it, if there is an indication then it will be
renewed' - he tells me that" this is the practice in Germany and Francd', but he
doesn't think that it is in Britain (Fw: 32).
10 CONCLUSION
10.1 INTRODUCTION
10.1.1 The lay-out of this chapter
In this final chapter, findings are dissected and analysed within the sociological
framework illustrated in chapter one; the pattern of that chapter is replicated here. To
start, I contrast my findings on the organisational structures of the British and Swiss
industries. Then the two are evaluated against the organisational theories discussed in
the opening chapter. The impact that the structures have on the actual work completed
by maintainers is drawn out - how history and organisational change impact on skill
levels, for instance, is explained. How rail maintenance knowledge is "packaged" and
"distributed" by senior technicians to front-line workers is also of interest. Many of
the key skills in the rail maintenance activities I described require tacit knowledge.
Thus in the latter half of this chapter I point out the critical necessity of tacit
knowledge for individual maintenance activities and, in doing so, I point out the
problems that are created by the structural organisation of rail maintenance.
Knowledge, culture and context are indivisible and cannot be separated intellectually.
Technological knowledge, like scientific knowledge, is not some sort of pure,
objective matter that humans discover and absorb without manipulating.
Technological knowledge, in other words, is a social construct in an entirely literal,
non-pejorative sense: it is formed from a process which involves human decision¬
making, judgment, interpretation, and definitions. Moreover, these matters are
impacted on by still wider issues. The aims and objectives of a group of people can
affect how each member of the group, and the group itself, perceive data prior to
deciding what aspects of it should become formulated into knowledge ready for
distribution. In other words, the culture and context within which knowledge is
constructed becomes a part of the knowledge itself. Ultimately then, knowledge is
collectively constructed and is a social phenomenon. Knowledge is, indeed, social
through and through (MacKenzie, 1990: 10). This thesis can be viewed as an addition
to the body of work that justifies this opinion. The knowledge required for rail
maintenance is socially constructed. Strengthening the argument is the focus on tacit
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knowledge. Tacit knowledge underpins good rail maintenance: good rail maintenance
relies on it. Tacit knowledge, we were told in chapter one (section 1.10 page 62), can
only be transferred by inter-personal means. The argument is therefore this: if tacit
knowledge for good rail maintenance is essential, then rail maintenance relies
substantially on maintenance knowledge that is socially constructed.
10.1.2 The British industry past and present
In chapter three a brief account was given, depicting how BR's maintenance structure
was organised. This is because it became clear to me in the early days of my research
that I needed to complete some sort of socio-historic account of British railway
maintenance. I reasoned that, if I was to know why actual, physical frontline railway
maintenance procedures are the way they are today (when I observed them), I also
had to know how they were shaped and completed in previous years and what impact
any organisational change has indeed had. As Charles Perrow correctly points out:
Because interchange of structure and function goes on over time, a natural history of an
organisation is needed: We cannot understand current crises or competencies without seeing
how they were shaped (Perrow, 1972: 175).
It was during conversations with retired, semi-retired, and currently still working
railway maintenance workers that I was able to gain an understanding of how railway
maintenance was organised under the stewardship of BR. During these conversations
I was given an insight into how training was conducted; how relevant skills were
obtained; and how asset knowledge was developed, distributed, stored; how risk was
managed; and how physical maintenance work was actually carried out by the manual
worker. By gaining an understanding about these issues I was able to understand to a
greater degree why railway maintenance, and what I saw of it, was the way it was
when I saw it.
10.1.3 The regional baronies
For effective railway maintenance, and due to the very nature of the industry, railway
organisations will always have to rely on geographically dispersed workers. Thus, as
is common with other railway industries, BR's rail maintenance workers were
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regionalised. It was argued that this set-up encouraged the development of "regional
baronies" (Wolmar, 2001). Burns (1969), Burns and Stalker (1961) and March and
Simon (1958) would perhaps postulate the existence of the "sub-group". My findings
suggest that so-called regional baronies did indeed exist and that the concept of the
sub-group can be applied. Geographically dispersed groups of maintenance gangs
tended to generate an affinity with their region: they were likely to develop sectional
interests where their future security or betterment were matters of deep concern
(Burns, 1969: 246). As the authors then point out, there is a clear potential for
conflicting consequences of such sectional interests. However, in the railway industry,
where rail maintenance work groups were sectioned off and worked in a specific
region, it seems that, instead of generating only negative consequences, many
maintenance teams tended to develop taken-for-granted cultures (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966) of reliability and safety (Roberts, 1993; Sanne, 1999). This point
was driven home to me when the men I spoke to referred directly to BR days. The
idea of workers belonging to a region that housed its own working community
emerged through my findings. Remember how the men spoke and the terms they
used: workers spoke about a sense of "ownership" of an area of track; and when the
men talked about BR they tended to do so with a degree of pride and with a passion
that was perceptible and, remember, how being labelled a "railway man" had some
prestige, whilst today there are now "contractors" or "cowboys" working on the
network who are "not railway men" (Int: 08; Fw: 16; Int:18; Fw: 08; Int: 27; Int: 29;
Fw: 07; Int: 14; Int: 13; Fw: 09). These aspects combined to create a workplace
culture that enhanced a culture of safety, and what is more, the culture was
encouraged by the uncomplicated access that railway workers had to "their" track
(Fw: 08; Fw: 07; Int: 27a; Int: 03).
Sociologically speaking, new team members were socialised into work groups
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and they were inclined to internalise the same
commitments to work and to the area as the experienced railway men (Sagan, 1993;
Barnes, 2000). This, in turn, saw regional gangs developing and training their workers
to their way of life (Giddens, 1993), which Berger and Luckmann (1966) might argue,
was underpinned and maintained by tacit social mechanisms. Components of culture
such as language, custom, conventions, norms and beliefs underpinned and sustained
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a group's own work methods which were guided by a regional chief (Cohen & Taylor,
1992). Recall the railway man who knew the name of each of the 447 men under his
control in his area. Recall how workers had said they simply spoke to each other (Int:
14; Fw: 02) and that, if you never knew how to do something, you would ask
someone, for there was always some who would know (Int: 18). These rather
incidental, seemingly trivial and mundane, taken-for-granted (Berger & Luckmann,
1966) aspects of working life were instead hugely important as they let feelings of
ownership and pride generate within groups. Team members tended to develop a
common orientation to the task (Barnes, 2000; Goffman, 1959, Sanne, 1999). The
teams generated tacit understandings among members (Berger & Luckmann, 1966)
which would encourage mutual support and allow for the transmission of experience-
based tacit knowledge.
10.1.4 SBB and BR - the similarities
By taking a step back in history to look at how railway maintenance was organised
prior to privatisation in Britain, we see some similarities with the set-up of railway
maintenance at SBB of Switzerland, as I experienced it during the research period in
this country.
The first thing to note is how the Swiss nation-wide network is broken down into 23
small regional sections. Within each of the 23 regions there are several teams that
have clear-cut tasks - and as one would expect, there are teams with identical tasks to
some of these teams in Britain - there is for instance, a three-man ultrasonic testing
team. A strong sense of autonomy that characterised BR's regional baronies, it
appears, also characterise SBB teams. Recall for instance, the likely reason as to why
it had been decided to cut (just slightly) the amount of visual inspections to be
completed by an SBB worker on a length of line in a region:
Perhaps in their district they have decided that walks on some lines can be reduced. I would
think that decision will be because of traffic. Freight has reduced... walking should refer to the
rate of traffic, tonnage... if tonnage increases, walking must increase. If the walking on some
lines has gone down, traffic has reduced (Int: 34).
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Such decentralised decision-making by workers within each of the individual 23
districts is typical. The idea that the "man in the district has the responsibility" (Int:
30), is borne out through a considerable degree of confidence and trust, which one
might argue could be described as a culture of reliability - as one senior SBB
engineer told me: "We train people, we give them the required competencies. We
have delegated a lot of competencies to the front" (Int: 34). This philosophy was
explained to me quite plainly in a discussion with a senior member of SBB's
ultrasonic testing community. During a discussion about risk management and the
"location" of authority within the decision-making process if a serious fault is found
on a rail, I was told: "When he (the team member who found the fault) says no trains,
I trust him, he means no trains! He has the experience" (Int: 33a).
10.2 CREATING A CULTURE OF RELIABILITY
10.2.1 The permanent way and socialisation (the SBB example)
During another phase of research I was given an insight into how SBB's culture of
reliability might be nurtured. The facilities at the headquarters and base of one of the
23 regions that I visited, I was told, were similar in make-up to those of the other 22,
and one of the first things I noted was the quality of the facilities. There was a
communal area where workers could relax together, and there were facilities for them
to prepare food and to eat together if they so wished. The building was spacious,
bright, clean and comfortable. Creating a comfortable environment for workers to
prepare for work and to rest after work was seen as an important "part" of railway
maintenance - people have to enjoy coming to work, it helps motivation (Fw: 32).
There was a marked difference between the places that workers met up to prepare for
work in Britain compared to Switzerland. In Britain, workers tended to prepare for
work in grubby "portakabins" or small huts and rooms cluttered with items such as
dirty kettles and broken machinery, such as faulty walking sticks (Fw: 01).
The SBB organisational set-up had a positive impact on some workers. One told me
quite plainly that SBB was a good company (Fw: 30), whilst another told me of his
pride working for SBB and that he is embarrassed when things go wrong and he is
seen wearing an SBB logo in public (Fw: 33). The organisational make-up also helps
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to nurture a sense of belonging among workers - this was demonstrated to me whilst
watching work on the track recording car. Whilst aboard this train I noted how the
personnel aboard changed every so often. The explanation was quite simple - when
the car crossed a regional border workers changed. Those who left the car took with
them "their" paper work that documented "their" findings - that is, they took with
them information about "their" region, and the workers that replaced them, worked
with "their" documents about "their" region. Again it was the language that was used
that highlighted this - recall this defining quote: "Teams ... they take a special pride
in their rail region" (Int: 33a).
Training mechanisms also aided the development and "maintenance" - in Berger and
Luckmann's, (1966) use of the term - of a sense of ownership. Workers at SBB have
to complete three years of structured training, which involves the new employee being
fixed up with a team in one of the regions. Their progress is charted before they are
tested and qualified as a track worker (Int: 34). In this way the worker also picks up
valuable skills that can only be learnt on the track. This often involves watching and
then emulating the activities of experienced track workers. On one occasion - the
measurement of an S&C's gauge (section 9.7.2 page 279) - it was noticeable how the
trainee was guided on how to complete paperwork, yet he was also made aware of the
subtle noises to listen for which might indicate a problem. On another notable
occasion (section 9.8.2 page 294) where I witnessed one worker being trained, I noted
how he was again guided on site by experienced workers. Everything he did from
paperwork to the actual assessment process of permanent way assets was scrutinised
by his experienced colleagues.
Experience, and the process of gaining experience, at SBB, is a highly valued
commodity (fig. 9.6 page 266) that comes in many forms, some of which can be quite
unexpected. For instance there is the worker who had come to know how dripping
should "sound" in a tunnel, and what size damp patches on the walls were allowed to
be (Fw: 30). This is the type of tacit knowledge that the bottom-up and top-down
plans rely on, and exercise extensively. SBB and BR place[d] a considerable amount
of importance on the role of experience in permanent way maintenance. The words:
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"Experience is more important than training" (Int: 33), were uttered by an SBB
worker but could easily have been spoken by a BR worker. Despite this, however,
there is a marked difference between the outlook on training in SBB and how it was
formally structured in BR. In SBB a clear cut system is in place; during the time of
BR, training was underpinned by a subtle learning process which was markedly
different.
10.2.2 The permanent way and socialisation (the BR example)
Many of the railway workers in Britain told me that during the time of BR there was
little to no official training for tasks such as track inspection, instead it was commonly
accepted that new recruits to regions simply watched-and-learnt. What could be
"labelled" as training for track inspection was not done in a classroom (Fw: 09).
Instead, forms of training were characterised by norms that were habitually and tacitly
activated. There was a rather laissez-faire approach to precise learning strategies. On
the face of it, this form of training had assumed a rather deceptive taken-for-granted
pretence (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). I come to this conclusion because of the way
the men described learning strategies; they tended to recall it in a rather matter-of-fact
tone.
Basically there was no training, it was passed on; it was all stuff you picked up and you
progressed that way (Int: 13).
There was no specific training, no formal training for track inspection, it was on the job. The
track patroller would walk the track one, two, maybe three times a week, if you saw
something you would report it to your engineer. Knowledge was passed on like that (Int:
18).
Strands of Kunda's research (1992) may be recalled here. Remember how the
manager of the engineering firm he interviewed spoke about the workers and the
organisation: he said, "They are committed there is no doubt"; "That formal structure
tells you nothing"; "The idea is to educate people without them knowing it". Clearly
there was an important role for what Berger and Luckmann (1966) would refer to as
"tacit learning". The socialisation process that was in place at the engineering firm, in
Kunda's (1992) text was clearly important, as was the socialisation process that was
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operated within the regional baronies. If we draw a link with the "regional barony"
structure and the high reliability research work of Roberts (1993) we will see the
importance of this form of socialisation in action. The Berkeley theorists found that
the successful organisations created and maintained informal organisational structures
that varied and were adapted to the problems at hand. This is a key requirement for
the railway industry's regional teams because of the nature of the permanent way and
the varied environmental influences.
From the start of my research it became clear to me that the term "permanent way" is
a misnomer. The track moves this way and that ever so slightly when a train passes
over it - when it moves in the vertical direction, it is called "voiding" (Fw: 07). A
section of track can develop idiosyncratic characteristics, and because of this even the
smallest section of the permanent way has been described as having its own "existing
memory". The permanent way is likely to exhibit problems peculiar to areas: there
can be "local" problem spots due to the numerous variables interacting at the wheel /
rail interface (see chapter three, section 3.1.2 page 87). During interviews,
respondents often spoke about different areas being prone to different problems. Some
sections are known to suffer from flooding; others are prone to "wet-beds"; some
lines are more likely to exhibit a specific type of rail fault more than others.
Consequently experienced workers "knew" what areas should be monitored more
closely than others (Int: 01; Int: 27; Int: 27a; Fw: 01). It is precisely because of the
nature of the permanent way therefore that experienced regionally based teams are a
necessity. It is exactly this type of information that new recruits "pick-up" on the
track through socialisation and which lets them gain experience. As a result of
informal training mechanisms, workers get to know that some sections of the
permanent way required visual inspections that are more frequent than official
instructions stated (Int: 23). There was, as Roberts (1993) might argue, an approach to
formal regulations and codes that showed workers using their own discretion and
judgement.
This form of training (or socialisation) was vital as it often involved and encouraged
the transmission of tacit knowledge and know-how. Such knowledge can only be
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picked up by emulation - it cannot be transferred entirely by impersonal means
because the skills required have not, or cannot be codified (MacKenzie, 1996a: 215).
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that critical, regionally-based knowledge of
problem spots, common rail faults, and other localised permanent way weaknesses
and other asset knowledge were carried in the workers themselves, as the Rail
Regulator acknowledged: "too much essential knowledge [is] locked up in the heads
of people who had left the industry" (Winsor, 2001: Conference paper). The words of
Tom Burns (cited in Collins, 1982: 45), seem particularly apt: "Knowledge consists of
the ability to do something ... Knowledge is the property of people rather than
documents". As a consequence, this ultimately meant that work planning within
British Rail was based on a work bank with significant local discretion (Edmonds,
2000) and with this in mind, the metaphor of "regional barony" seems perfectly apt
also.
The training structures operated by SBB and by BR are different, yet, ironically, they
showe(d) the same aim - instilling practical experience and knowledge within the new
worker. Nevertheless, training methods and all other aspects of the industry were
radically re-structured during the privatisation process of the early 1990s.
10.2.3 Privatisation and Hatfield
Though not the reason for privatisation, the social causes of the Clapham Junction
disaster of 1988 (see chapter three: section 3.2.1 page 95) showed how some aspects
of the BR set-up were inefficient and in need of an overhaul. BR's operating
inconsistencies were handled during the Organising for Quality project when steps
were taken to remove managerial and track work "deadwood". The Safety and
Standards Directorate also desired more control from a central base; and as part of
this, thousands of working-procedures (instructions) were introduced. It was the
Hatfield disaster in October, 2000 that harshly exposed the weaknesses in the
organisational system that had been created unintentionally by the privatisation
process - recall the bulleted timeframe of events leading to the disaster in chapter
three (section 3.1.2 page 92) and how this suggests that the accident was down to
"systemic, structural reasons" (Hutter, 2001: 298).
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The restructuring of the industry transformed the BR maintenance system - this was
intended, but restructuring inadvertently threw away strengths - namely the know-
how that was locked up in the heads of those track workers who left the industry. A
large percentage of a valuable, knowledgeable, and experienced workforce of BR that
tended to develop pride in their workmanship had been discarded. One quote summed
up the point: "The problem with privatisation was, there was a big loss of expertise,
and with privatisation you had all these contractors coming in, and, they never had the
experience. So, there is a big lack of experience" (Int: 27a).
Prior to the Hatfield derailment there had already been much concern within and
outside the industry that railway maintenance skill levels had been dropping, and that
this was having a severe impact on safety levels. Therefore, when the accident
happened, this argument was again brought forth, but this time it gathered momentum
because of the actual reaction of the industry to the crash itself. The reaction
highlighted varying and inconsistent levels of specific maintenance skills and methods
across the national network - none more so than in the skills required for competent
visual inspection.
Industry leaders had to respond to Hatfield immediately. The nature of the response
was influenced by a fear that another crash caused by the same type of rail fault could
soon be repeated somewhere on the network's 20,000 miles of track: hundreds of
miles of track were walked in the following days and weeks as visual inspectors
desperately tried to find instances of a problem called "RCF" before it caused another
catastrophic derailment. During these days many false RCF sites were recorded by
visual inspectors because they did not possess adequate skills, knowledge (including
tacit knowledge) or experience to know what RCF was. It stands to reason that if a
large percentage of visual inspectors did not know what they were looking for after
the crash they would not have known what RCF was or how to look for it prior to the
crash. The argument that skill levels, and therefore safety levels, were questionable
thus gathers momentum. However, Reason (1997) reminds us that sharp-end human
failures (in this case, the failure to note genuine RCF) could be a consequence ofmore
deep-rooted reasons rather than the original cause of industrial accidents. In this case
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we could argue that the process of organisational change from a nationally-owned
single unit to a privatised and compartmentalised industry, which indeed was based
on plausible commercial arguments, was the deep-rooted cause91. For, as Reason
reminds us: "no group of managers can foresee all future ramifications of their current
decisions" (1997: 12). This argument is developed now.
10.2.4 Hatfield, decision-taking and language
Decision-making by senior managers can indeed cause unforeseen and detrimental
ramifications and a striking example of this can be seen in the industry when leaders
started to use the term "RCF". Industry chiefs regularly used the term in the aftermath
of the crash, but still some months prior to the release of an instruction - PWSI4
(Railtrack, 2001e) - that would eventually define it. At this point we should remember
the point Nelkin (1985: 25) made: "As action flows from the definition, the way a
problem is framed has an important bearing on what is or is not done about it" - this
sentiment certainly has parallels with the "RCF" management problem.
I noted there was no precise definition of RCF for permanent way workers some
twenty years ago, despite there being at least one preliminary study into the problem
in 1974 (see chapter five, section 5.5.1 page 142), yet today it is common parlance in
railway maintenance, due largely to the Hatfield disaster. This meant that in the days
just after the Hatfield derailment, when hundreds of workers were walking the track,
the competence level of the inexperienced visual inspectors was not the only problem.
Many experienced railway men who had been in the industry for years prior to
privatisation were also puzzled. One railway worker who had been in the industry for
many years gave a graphic account of how he perceived this period of time:
It was pure panic, we walked hundreds of miles of track being told to look for RCF, and we're
asking: What's RCF? What's gauge corner cracking? So people just didn't know what they were
looking for and noted everything. Then the first time I saw it, I was out walking with a guy from
lJ1 1 am not saying that the cause of the crash was because the industry changed to a privatised one - what I am
saying is that the cause of the crash was due to the actual process of organisational change.
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Railtrack and he pointed it out to me and told me: "That's RCF". I thought, "that's shelling"!
I've repaired that thousands of times! (Int: 28).
Structural change in Britain disrupted (and in some areas eradicated) important forms
of knowledge, but it also disrupted important, corresponding language codes which
had been used for effective rail maintenance. This situation was then compounded as
organisation-leaders implemented measures by labelling the problem RCF, which
only confused the experienced and inexperienced worker alike. As Downes and Rock
(1982) and Scheff (1966) would point out: there are abundant labels and terms
available to those who witness (technical) deviation and, despite such labels
apparently embodying general and seemingly objective ideas, there is often some
scope for negotiation.
10.3 UNRULY TECHNOLOGY AND INVENTING RAIL FAULTS
10.3.1 Technology and opinions
At this juncture I need to draw further attention to the "comprehension" of the
technical artefact that is the wheel / rail interface. It does not do to say that RCF has
always been at the current level and that privatisation removed skills that would have
identified it and would have thus prevented the Hatfield disaster. Indeed, as was
pointed out, the problematic rail at Hatfield was known about: it was organisation-
based delays that prevented the rail from being renewed (section 3.1.2 page 92).
Nevertheless, the underlying point of this section is actually demonstrated in the form
of two contrasting quotes that are referring to the same subject. Of RCF's "existence"
one railway worker said "It's been around for years" (Int: 21) whilst another said "it's
a new phenomenon" (Fw: 07). Both of these quotes are, paradoxically, correct.
Firstly, the idea that "It's been around for years" is defensible. We need look no
further than to the work of the locomotive pioneers (see chapter four, section 4.1.2
page 110) to see that forms of what could have been called RCF came into existence
the very moment an iron wheel was placed on an iron rail: frequent contacts between
the wheel and the rail, Richard Trevithick quickly discovered, diminished the fitness-
for-purpose of both. Some years later, in the 1830s, and in response to the problems of
315
the wheel / rail interface, Mr. Nicholas Wood conducted numerous experiments on
friction resistance. His findings suggested that a succinct account of the laws that
govern friction and wear was hard to come by. Even early on then, it seems Trevithick
had invented a mode of transport that was adopted widely, despite being built upon a
problem interface at its very heart (Arthur, 1999).
Now despite this, it can be said that the actual increase in the prevalence of RCF
defects can be considered as "a new phenomenon" because of a perpetual accretion of
technical details (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985) and financial changes. A senior
member of the Wheel / Rail Interface Systems Authority suggested that since
privatisation, traffic had become heavier and journeys have increased (Clementson,
2002b: Conference paper) and that these changes had an impact on the contact spot
where the wheel meets the rail and that RCF has increased as a consequence.
Technicians at a rail producing plant's testing laboratory concur - "There has been a
significant change in the weight of the vehicles, in the speed of the vehicles. That has
to have an effect" (Int: 23). What was also important was that the same speaker then
referred to the decreased level of financial investment in railway maintenance, and
that this too had had an effect on RCF's increased prevalence and higher risk status
(see chapter three, section 3.4.1 page 102). Nevertheless, others referred to the impact
of the aforementioned technical changes and their relationship with RCF occurrences.
For instance, one said: "But it is a dated system and the imbalance is using vehicles
with higher tractive and braking forces on it. There's been an optimisation of vehicles,
but not with rails" (Int: 25).
Similarly, another pointed out that the chemical composition of rails has not changed
much (Int: 22). This point was further agreed upon by another (Int: 27a). Now the
idea that the comments "it's been around for years" and "it's a new phenomenon" -
are both correct can be explained with reference to Wynne's work (1988), Barnes and
Edge's work (1982), and MacKenzie's work (1996b). The explanation also gives a
little more insight as to why experienced and inexperienced workers alike were
puzzled in the days following the Hatfield disaster. Firstly I will link a quote of
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Wynne's with the matter at hand, the text in [square] brackets having been added by
me:
During technological evolution [for our case - technological evolution has come about in
numerous ways. An increase in traffic volume and an increase in traffic weight are
technological changes just as much as technical changes in speed, braking and traction
forces. Add these changes to slight changes in the chemical make up of the rail and we
conceivably have a series of small technological evolutions at the wheel / rail interface over
a period of time] relevant practices [rail maintenance procedures] are re-capitulated into an
up-dated statement of formal rules - for example when new codes of practice [PWSI4] are
issued by a regulatory body [Railtrack] (Wynne, 1988: 153).
Ultimately this means that some types of rail failure previously perceived as less
hazardous have now come to be seen as a bona fide threat to safe rail travel. The
technological changes mentioned above, we can presume, created an unexpected
effect (Wynne, 19B8) - and that effect has been a rise in the occurrence of a defect
which would become commonly known as "RCF". This meant that railway industry
leaders (when this type of defect became more frequent) initially had to interpret this
type of rail failure, and they had to define it. This had two notable outcomes, the first
being the issuing of the PWSI4, and secondly, the use of a specific type of rail was
halted, namely, mill heat treated rail known as grade 260 (see chapter five, section
5.5.1 page 146).
Helping to explain these responsive actions is Barnes and Edge's (1982: 150) thought
that "Existing knowledge is always liable to prove insufficient: additional unexpected
features invariably appear in every new artefact or material process, throwing new
difficulties in the path of advance". Quite similarly, the "RCF example" shows how
definitions of rail failures and defects are fluid and subject to incremental change, and
the interpretation of associated new risks is, of course, entirely dependent upon the
community (railway industry leaders) that decides "what similarities matter and what
differences do not in technological testing" (MacKenzie, 1996b: 255). So, faced with
the "new" higher risk of an "old" problem, the community of railway industry leaders
decided to communicate their interpretations and definitions to the front-line working
community through PWSI4 (Railtrack, 2001e) and RT/PWG/001 (Railtrack, 2001a).
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10.3.2 Wheels and rails: the meeting point
However, there is another important matter of concern here. Evidently the
management of both sides of the interface is critical. Changes in the rail's make-up
and changes in the technical make-up of vehicles travelling upon it are of clear
importance. Thus, it is how representatives of the two sides interact that has also
proven interesting in this thesis.
Firstly, prior to privatisation it was pointed out to me how (in Britain) there was, for
instance an industry newspaper (Fw: 20), which was often used as a source to find out
what was going on in the industry regarding research and development. Now linked to
this is a conversation I had with another (Int: 05) who was referring to wheel profiles
whilst talking about RCF and its potential causes. He referred to BR's research and
development base at Derby, and he mentioned how the company had its own rolling
stock engineers who dealt with wheel profiles. But, during privatisation, this part of
the organisation was sold off, and a consequence, he suggested, was a lack of
knowledge about what is going on in the industry. And by way of example, we need
only look to his answer when I asked him about wheel profiles: From "an Italian
company", he said vaguely and hesitantly. There are further connections to be made
on this theme from chapter five. Recall how rail management computer programmes
would require "industry-wide collaboration" (Ms Wasserman's "Wheel-Chex"
presentation, chapter four, section 4.2.3 page 119) and remember how a speaker from
WRISA stated that there was a need for the industry to get "in balance with itself',
and that technical changes on one side of the interface, concerning vehicles, could be
harming the rail (Clementson, 2002b: Conference paper).
Overall, it would appear that the two key players on either side of the interface
(vehicle operating companies and railway maintainers) in Britain, arguably since
privatisation, do not communicate sufficiently with each other - one interviewee (Int:
06) suggested that there was actually "zero" communication between the two.
Nevertheless, it was also noted that it was Railtrack's job to be the intermediary
between the two, yet how the company went about this task was questionable (Int: 22;
Int: 02; Int: 06). The quality of communication and interaction between railway
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maintainers and train operating companies (TOCs) was probably demonstrated best
during the discussion on "possessions" (see chapter five, section 5.6.2 page 148).
Interviewees 3; 5; 7; and 27 each explained the difficulties due to the conflicts in aims
when juggling time for rail maintenance whilst ensuring minimal disruption for
traffic. This issue was perhaps explained best when one respondent said: "The
relationship with the TOCs is moving towards abetter relationship... but it is still
really us and them... it's all very political, they've got share holders... but it is getting
there, it's moving to a formal process" (Int: 29). Echoes of the work of Burns (1969),
Burns and Stalker' (1961), and Clegg's (1990) work can be noted. It would appear
that the industry has developed a mechanistic / Fordist mode of thinking - TOCs are
interested only in their affairs and maintainers likewise: the two are differentiated and
segmented. Yet the nature of the industry means it has to respond to technical
problems that may be unexpected, thus requiring it to work, ideally, to principles
associated with postmodern organisations (Clegg, 1990), i.e., organic / flexible
organisational systems (Tomaneny, 1994). Such principles seem to characterise
SBB's organisation regarding this matter.
SBB has a specific organisational structure that has recently been implemented with
the aim of mediating between traffic operators and railway workers - the
organisational form appears to bear post-Fordist / organic-system characteristics
(Grint, 1998). The process involves the role of the integrated maintenance manager -
IMM (Int: 31a). The IMM role is to bring together the two parties either side of the
interface (see chapter nine, section 9.3.2 page 262). Railway maintainers and traffic
operators, we were shown, have a sense of responsibility and understanding of what is
essentially the main task of the other. Train service operators are involved in planning
railway maintenance possessions, and railway maintainers are informed about the
needs of traffic operators. Railway maintainers, for instance, know what the key busy
routes are and how much work can be planned at any one time, and train operators
know that rails must be maintained and will change timetables (only very slightly) in
accordance (Fw: 33). In an other way, the problems that railway maintainers and train
operators experience are typically technically complex and can rarely be broken down
into precise steps, meaning the organisation would not function effectively if the
workforce was differentiated and segmented: as Grint (1998: 284) suggested:
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"Flexible technology with an inflexible workforce does not lead to flexible
production." The planning of railway maintenance on the SBB network is done in
collaboration by the railway maintainers and traffic operators. Both, through flexible /
organic organisational design, are keenly aware of each other's aims and both are
responsible for railway maintenance.
10.4 TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND RAILWAY MAINTENANCE
10.4.1 The efficacy of the written rule, or railway engineering as a bureaucratic
profession
After the Hatfield disaster it was made clear that, in Britain, some of the expertise to
deal with RCF, or what was known as "shelling" or "flaking", had been lost. During
fieldwork I gained an understanding of the skills that are required for competent RCF
management. RCF inspection is often done at night and a keen, trained eye that can
pick up tiny cracks in yards of rail is a critical necessity, yet learning "how to look"
and knowing "what to see", and "what to assess", and in many cases, "what to feel
for" on the rail surface is a very difficult thing to learn and to put into words. Some of
those I spoke to agreed (Int: 08; Int: 21; Int: 23; Int: 02; Fw: 01: Int: 28; see also
Wolmar 2001: 3).
As the British national network nearly ground to a halt as numerous unnecessary
speed restrictions were imposed after the false reports of RCF, a stark example of the
difficulty in diagnosing genuine RCF was demonstrated. Clearly the required skills
were not available nationwide and thus there was a need to standardise the work
practices and to virtually start anew. Consequently, industry leaders issued a specific
instruction for the management of RCF (PWSI4, Railtrack, 2001e) which delivered
definitions to the workforce. However, understanding the actual language of rules and
procedures requires the ability to "understand" from an experiential base
(Wittgenstein, cited in Kripke, 1982); and therein was another problem. Due to
structural change some areas of the British network were not equipped with the
resources to understand the procedures.
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We can understand why workers were confused if we utilise sociological concepts.
Organisational chiefs had tried to implement a new language for a problem
immediately. They issued more instructions - this time using (new) terms to codify,
construct and define a technical problem. During the "Organising for Quality" project,
and since, several thousand documents have been released92. The imposition of these
documents can be connected to the work of Daniel Bell (1974: 19). He noted that
modern industries were increasingly turning to theoretical knowledge as a way of
controlling and organising work. Bell said that, theoretical knowledge was typically
transmitted to workers through "codification ... into abstract systems of symbols".
However, critical requisites needed for competent understanding of these symbols,
terms and definitions (Nelkin, 1985) were missing. New terms need to be understood
by the relevant communities (Mannheim, 1982; Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and such
understanding and knowledge development, including the acquisition of tacit
knowledge, are typically transmitted to new members during a period of socialisation
by those already embedded into the relevant culture (Faulkner et al, 1997; Goffman,
1959; Barnes, 2000; Collins, 1982; MacKenzie, 1996a). New members learn about
their role and the relevant vocabulary during a process where they are exposed and
sensitised to a strong embedded culture. For the case in hand, the relevant culture had
been broken and the resources required to understand and interpret instructions were
diminished by differing degrees across the network, due to organisational
restructuring.
Implementing a new language, new instructions, and new definitions by the medium
of paperwork was arguably always going to be difficult for effective RCF inspection
and risk management. Thus we can concur with the fundamental thought of the high
reliability theorists that industrial catastrophes (such as the Hatfield derailment) are
92 Of specific interest to us has been the series of PWSI4s, the RCF best practice guide (RT/PWG/001, Railtrack,
2001a), known colloquially in the industry as "the blue book", the additional ultrasonic testing instructions -
(Railtrack, 1998b) namely the U14 and the instructions for "the Sperry", and finally the document for manual rail
grinding (RT/PWG/002, Railtrack, 2001b) - sometimes referred to as "the green book".
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consequences of a breakdown in social processes and comprehension (Roberts and
Wieck, cited in Sanne, 1999: 24).
Harry Braverman (1974) might suggest that the problems experienced within the
industry after the Hatfield disaster were exacerbated by a clear-cut separation between
"thinking" about rail maintenance and "doing" rail maintenance. By issuing the likes
of the Blue Book (RT/PWG/001, Railtrack, 2001a) and the PWSI4s, industry leaders
were promoting the primacy of formal rules and procedures, and they were intending
to standardise the activities of the rail maintenance workforce - and because of this it
is perfectly reasonable to suggest that rail maintenance workers (particularly
experienced workers) lost a certain degree of control over their work93.
My findings resemble those of Vaughan's (1996) analysis of organisational change at
NASA. To start, Vaughan noted that organisational change at the space agency led to
the use of many more private contractors. Communication between the many facets of
the space agency was often completed through paperwork and formal procedures
(Vaughan, 1996). At NASA this often meant that the demands of bureaucratic
standardisation did not accommodate (or could not allow) an engineer's judgement
call to inform the decision-making process. The form of routinisation at NASA
demanded clear-cut answers to decision-making choices - there was no leeway that
could accommodate an engineer's or a technician's "hunch" that something could still
go wrong despite all the safety checks aligning with bureaucratic protocol. By
keeping in mind this idea and by recalling several issues from my research, it will be
93
Interestingly, and perhaps suitable for further socio-linguistic research in itself, is that "RCF" is a commonly
used term in wider engineering disciplines. A search for the term in scientific and technological journals will show
that the term is often used in titles. Yet in the railway industry, it can be suggested, the actual use of the term
differs according to the worker's situation - my research suggests that there is a linguistic split between the
parlance of track workers and scientists. For instance, it was noted how RCF was a new term to much of the
permanent way based-workforce, yet the term RCF we know has been discussed in papers from 1974 (see chapter
five). Additionally, one industry scientist for instance hinted at this split when he said: "My perception of the
industry was that it was extremely difficult to get to understand the practical situation of the railway / wheel
interface because effectively the guys running the railways said you guys go and do what the hell you like in the
laboratories leave us to run the railways, don't come and interfere" (Int: 23).
322
argued that railway engineering in Britain has assumed similar hallmarks of a
bureaucratic profession.
10.4.2 "Engineers are now administrators" (Fw:09); "It's a paper industry now"
(Fw: 12)
When the "Organising for Quality" project was put into action, streamlining the
industry was a key aim, as was regaining more centralised control. This had an
additional affect on the type of work that railway engineers were now asked to
complete: "The whole concept of engineers has changed... engineers are now
administrators" (Fw: 09).
The amount of paperwork that employees are required to complete was illustrated
comprehensively in chapter five (section 5.3.3, page 134). At least 13 different
administrative steps are required to ensure one defect is "managed" in the proper
manner from initial discovery, to re-inspection, to responsive action, and to final re-
inspection. Quite clearly there was a "laid down process [which was] quite a complex
[and] quite a strict system" (Int: 02). Perhaps the most telling comment about the gulf
of paper work to be completed by British workers, however, came in the form of a
question to me which was posed by a Swiss railway worker. With sincerity, he asked
me: "In England you have very much papers... is it right that you have papers to write
to say other papers have been written, and there are papers to say more papers are
needed?!" (Fw: 33).
To be fair, the administrative process in Britain can be seen as the continuation of a
trend that has come to characterise modern industry in toto - the imposition of rules
and guidelines (Hales et al, 1988). Michel Foucault's work (1970) on the growth of
organised knowledge may be recalled here. His idea that administrative mechanisms
are becoming increasingly salient in modern society (for our case that includes
workplaces), and that they have a "controlling" influence on its members (i.e.,
workers) can be linked with this particular study: the amount of paperwork circulated
in the industry has created particular problems for some workers. There was a degree
of pressure on the worker to comply with the documents. As interviewee: 06 pointed
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out: "we are duty bound" to follow the procedures, and if you "break the rules your
arse is out the window" (Fw: 07). This meant that the paperwork affected track
workers considerably94. One of the abiding memories I have of my time with track
workers were those periods of time I spent travelling with them to sites. Apart from
being a moment for me to chat casually and informally with them about their work, it
also gave me a sharp insight into the amount of paperwork that is circulated in the
industry.
The insides of the vans I travelled in (in Britain), I imagined, resembled the aftermath
of an explosion at a small stationer's outlet: there was quite literally paper
everywhere; binders everywhere; pens everywhere; documents of varying size
everywhere - the scene within the vans of the SBB workers, I observed, was almost
the complete opposite95. Despite the pragmatic nature of the problems with a lot of
94 Problems with following paper work became evident when on site. Finding a defect according to the
last inspector's mileage could prove difficult for several reasons. There could be false reports from the
ultrasonic testing unit - and paint is often sprayed at the wrong area (Int: 27b; Int: 04; Fw: 02). If an
inspector marked out the location of the defect by striding out the yardage, his actual height affected
the distance he walked (Int: 02). If the defect was near a station, the mileage posts when compared to a
measuring stick were different because mileage posts are not positioned at stations (Fw: 07). And the
problems of sites within sites if the defect is at an S&C were noted (Fw: 02 & 11). These practical
problems add to pressure - time to get work completed during a possession is at a premium - not being
able to find a defect promptly cuts into the time. Thus, completing paperwork on a shift and during a
possession is typically not done. The ordering of work (i.e. listing what sites to visit in order whilst
accounting for location so as to not double back on yourself) is done before work (Fw: 02), and the
paper work required to detail the findings of the shift is often done at home and faxed into the office
(Fw: 12).
95 Some of the documents and papers included the latest PWSI4. Other booklets detailed rail faults and
gave photographic examples (The Rail Failure Handbook, for instance, or the "Blue Book", Railtrack,
2001a). Some papers listed mobile phone numbers of signalmen, colleagues, and PICOPS. Others
papers listed the work that was due for the week. These papers told the worker what type of inspection
should be completed at the sites - visual or ultrasonic; other papers noted the date of the last inspection,
the type of fault, the severity of the fault, the location and mileage, and often there was space for
"additional comments". This space often created problems however. In the first part of this chapter I
spoke about language and the problems of definition throughout the workforce. The section for
"additional comments" could be confusing in itself because "even people's terminology can be
different" as said interviewee: 05, and on the same topic another said: "The information we put in, it's
doesn't come back. I try to put in as much information I can under comments - RCF, longest crack
length, has come back at [location name] on switch blade, or stock rail if is that, at [S&C number]. We
give them that information, but when it comes back to us [stating the inspection frequency that the fault
requires], it will say mileage, location and rail, but, it won't tell you if it's the stock rail or the blade...
means we have to check both, or the length of the longest crack... I know the area and can remember
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papers, there are further problems connected with the actual technical content of
instructions which is now discussed.
10.4.3 Shall do in accordance (Int: 03)
This thesis has, in parts, been about the management and utilisation of tacit
knowledge required for rail maintenance. It was shown earlier how the workers of the
regional baronies acquired it, and it has been shown how the PWSI4 and other
documents struggle to account for it - tacit knowledge cannot be formulated
explicitly. This means problems may arise when a technological organisation
demands strict compliance with technical procedures for so called "best practice",
which could essentially be underpinned by tacit knowledge.
Robert Merton told us that the existence of numerous bureaucratic procedures can
exert a "constant pressure upon the official to be methodical, prudent and disciplined"
(1957: 198). Such pressure can often displace the organisation's goals: instead of
adhering to rules to reach a goal, the very idea of adhering to rules becomes the goal.
This, Merton argues, means that organisations can develop rigidities and can become
unable to adjust to contingencies - conformance with disciplined procedures,
whatever the situation, becomes an embedded way of life for the bureaucrat (1957).
Merton's ideas were applied in Hirschhorn's (1993) analysis of working procedures at
Ocean Reactor. Interpreting and then following the written word, Ocean's workers
found, was difficult. Tacit knowledge was often required for good practice, thus
ambiguities and contradictions were commonly found in the instructions which left
the worker in a precarious situation. They often felt accountable for mistakes and
feared being personally fined or punished, thus to protect themselves they would often
follow bad procedures and management processes "unthinkingly" or correct them
"carelessly" (Hirschhorn, 1993).
the majority, but I can't remember each and every fault I test, I test hundreds every week!... I don't
know if it's a problem with the software package... but we get little feedback" (FW: 02).
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I found that railway workers encountered similar problems to Ocean Reactor workers
- how to follow / interpret the PWSI4, how to conform to procedures (say measuring
a crack) and, finally, how to manage risk (crack categorisation). All are instances
where difficulties were encountered. One respondent, in his terms, suggests that
workers can treat the documents as "black and white" and end it there, or they can
involve "human interpretation" and an "analytical process" (Int: 23). My research is
littered with examples of workers using their own ad hoc interpretation; often it was
used to compensate for documentation discrepancies.
10.5 TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND VISUAL INSPECTION
10.5.1 Decision-making - an analytical process
In chapter six (section 6.1.1 page 152) some of the technical content of the PWSI4
that visual inspectors have to follow has been detailed. The sub-types of RCF are
detailed and it is illustrated where they occur on the rail head. The document also
shows how the individual cracks are to be measured: workers have to take into
account the entire shape of the crack, noting all its branches, and each crack in a
section has to be labelled on the web of the rail. This is difficult: "it can all get
confusing" (Int: 01).
It was also pointed out that actually finding a crack could depend on luck (Fw: 02)
and furthermore, to be sure it was genuine RCF you really had to be on your hands
and knees touching the rail whilst operating tactile skills (feeling for serrated edge in
the shadows) - something that was not practical during normal working conditions
(Int: 03). I also noted that some workers used a measuring device and others did not.
The reason for this difference comes down to group-based or individual interpretation
and judgment. Many of the workers I spoke to and observed in their work (Fw: 02;
Ints: 04; 07; 03; 08; 06; 27a; 21; 02; 01 - see chapter. 6 section: How long is a crack?
Page 158) agreed that visual inspection of RCF required a guess-timation of the effect
of numerous variables that were presumed to be of importance during the moment of
the actual inspection. Thus weather conditions, lighting, dampness, dirt, grease, and
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other matter all affected how one "sees" an instance of RCF. In other words, the
railway workers I observed during inspections often "satisficed" (Simon, cited in
Vaughan, 1996); despite numerous constraints which made optimisation unfeasible,
they had to make a decision on a rail's fitness-for-purpose. This meant decision¬
making was often based on experience rather than clear-cut evidence. This argument
suggests why some of the workers I observed used a measuring rule when others did
not. Judgment, interpretation, and one's own tactile know-how underpin
methodology.
During another session of fieldwork (chapter six, section 6.5.2 page 169), I was given
a clear cut example of how workers can utilise their own judgment in an effort to
reduce risk whilst taking leave of their working schedules. The visual inspector during
that night of fieldwork was scheduled to look at a weld - when we got to the site there
was nothing to cause alarm, the weld was clear of cracking. However, instead of
heading back to the van to travel to the next site, the visual inspector shone his torch
further along the rail and decided to go on and look at further welds. He was not
scheduled to look at any more welds or sites on this stretch of line, and he did not
have to do what he was doing, but he "felt" that he should, saying to me that "it is
curious", thermite welds on this line are liable to cracking. Sure enough when we
inspected the next weld there was a crack 20mm long. His judgement paid off and he
completed an unscheduled risk assessment.
Once the visual inspector found the crack I was given a further example of the limits
of the document. I say, in chapter six (section 6.3 page 161) that I perused industry
documents looking at photographic examples of RCF. I did this to prepare myself for
my observational field work, yet soon found out that such pictures were not able to
give me the competencies required for effective and proper inspection. On one
occasion, when I walked in front of the visual inspector on the permanent way to see
if I could spot RCF first, I noted how I missed numerous RCF sites; he often pointed
out sites to me after I had passed them by. Then, if it was left to me to measure the
instances of cracking that was found, it was highly likely that I would have given a
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false measurement. This is because of the aforementioned difficulties in measuring
(i.e., shadows, dampness, dirt... etc).
During an inspection of an S&C (chapter six, section 6.5.6 page 175), I noted how the
visual inspector's task was to give his opinion on a 40mm crack that a team of
grinders had found the night before. A crack of this length should be categorised as
"severe" and ultrasonically tested within 36 hours. Nevertheless, the inspector I
accompanied was there to assess the possible reasons for the crack in the first place.
His examination process took into account several features, some of which are noted
in railway maintenance procedures - such as: look for missing bolts. He also noted
how the switch blade was a little too high and that a stretcher bar was slack. Others,
however, were not listed in the handbook, for instance he noted how there was too
much ballast. The difficulty in reading information of the rail web (such as "place of
manufacture"), he had learnt, meant there was too much ballast. Finally, he came to
the conclusion that the crack itself could have been caused by all these things, but
still, he concluded, it was only a surface crack and that it did not descend into the
main body of the rail head.
10.5.2 Inverting "redundancy" theory
Due to the problems of inconsistencies with crack analysis and measurement,
maintenance companies (when maintenance was completed by workers of individual
companies and not by Network Rail personnel) had to deal with it in some way.
Consequently, the maintenance company I worked with designed a system that was
intended to account for the difficulties in crack measurement and analysis.
Going by the high reliability thesis, we are told that, if industrial organisations are to
deal with technical problems effectively there should be in place "redundant modes of
problem solving at operational level, and resistance to pressure to resolve or
rationalise the process by adopting a single best way approach" (Roberts, 1993: 23).
The maintenance company I worked with turned this idea on its head with respect to
RCF inspection. Instead of operating multiple ways to overcome problems, it was
decided to decrease and limit the amount of "modes of problem solving at operational
328
level": the amount of individuals charged with RCF inspection was cut to one small
group. In the north and east region an "RCF team" of three was separated from a
wider spectrum of visual and ultrasonic operators of approximately a dozen.
Furthermore the company "rationalised the process by adopting a single best way
approach"
The process of reducing organisational systems to assess and measure RCF cracking
fits better with the theory of Charles Perrow (1984). In his Normal Accident thesis,
Perrow points out that by increasing organisational systems to fix problems, the
system will only be aggravated further (1984). The maintenance company clearly
thought that limiting the number of individuals charged with RCF inspection would
decrease variables that could otherwise worsen the situation and create problems.
Despite the difficulties in rail fault measurement, however, the visual inspector is
under pressure to note all instances of RCF correctly. This was one of the key reasons
the first PWSI was issued after the Hatfield derailment. However, that document was
issued in haste due to the inspection problems after the accident itself (Int: 03), and its
content only added to the problems. One engineer explained:
.. .Because it [the first PWSI4] contained technical errors and confusion in some parts, issue
2 came up very quickly. Certainly issue one did allow for engineer's judgement but because
it was abused... more extreme than expected, issue 2 came out very quickly... which was all
about "shall do in accordance..." and issue 3 as far as I am aware is not any different. (Int:
03).
However, having to work to a strict rule book can conceivably create a problem, as
one engineer explained to me: "If we followed them to the letter we would have to
shut the network down, as simple as that" (Fw: 07). This consequently meant that in
an effort to follow the PWSI4 document accurately many track walkers often "cover
themselves now by reporting possible RCF" (Fw: 02).
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10.6 TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND ULTRASONIC INSPECTION
10.6.1 Operator judgement
My research shows that there are marked similarities between the SBB approach to
ultrasonic testing and Railtrack / Network Rail's approach. On both networks, a
comprehensive ultrasonic testing (UT) timetable is in place, and both programmes are
underpinned by similar analytical processes such as traffic weight and speed. Both
networks also utilise a rail-based ultrasonic testing unit. SBB operates two types
(from different manufacturers) of ultrasonic test trains, whilst in Britain the UTU, and
now the UTU2, operates. One difference between the two systems is that SBB
complete an end of term assessment (the "Controle Partiel"), the company does not
UT during the winter period - weather conditions make UT unfeasible during this
time. In Britain there is year-round testing. There is also comprehensive manual
testing of rails (especially at S&Cs in both countries), where again there are
similarities. On both systems UT is typically completed by three-man teams - of
which one man is the supervisor. However, testing is undertaken during the day in
Switzerland, unlike the majority of UT work in most areas in Britain - where UT is
typically completed during the night.
The principles of ultrasonic testing are well-known in the field of non-destructive
testing and are applied often and routinely within the oil, gas, and nuclear industries.
Yet despite working with seemingly clear-cut procedures96, correct operation of UT
equipment, which includes interpretation of its output, relies on the judgment of the
operator which is often tacit in nature. The ability to decipher between a spurious and
a genuine fault signal requires substantial interpretative skills on the part of the
operator who must be dedicated to their work. A point which was agreed upon in both
96 In the case of UT in the railway industry, the probe is placed on the rail and the ultrasound is transmitted into the
rail via a coupling fluid, usually water. In an intact rail, the ultrasound beam travels through the rail to its
maximum depth and is then reflected back from "rail bottom" to its origin at the probe. Here the mechanical
vibrations are re-converted into electrical signals by the probe and are displayed on a cathode ray oscilloscope or
computer monitor screen. The waveforms shown on the display are then analysed and assessed by the ultrasonic
technician or operative. Where the maximum depth of the material is known, the technician will be looking for an
uninterrupted signal from the boundary at the rail depth. Any discontinuity in the wave from the specimen's depth
will suggest that there is an internal flaw.
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Britain as in Switzerland: "The lads have to be interested in their work. If they come
to their work with the aim of just getting finished, that's no use... they have to be
interested because it depends on their interpretation of that screen" (Int: 05) - "they
have to take the job seriously, because they must always be looking" - (Fw: 31).
10.6.2 The relationship between rail disasters and the status of ultrasonic testing
The technological evolution of ultrasonic testing within the British railway industry
was noted in chapter seven (section 7.1.1 page 185). Two rail disasters, one at Hither
Green and the other at Hatfield (over thirty years later), had effects on ultrasonic
testing in some distinct ways. Hither Green led to the widespread introduction of the
pulse-echo technique, and Hatfield led to the development of the U14 testing
procedure and the introduction of "the Sperry". The crashes (specifically the Hatfield
disaster) also had an impact on the "status" of the ultrasonic operator. Historically,
ultrasonic testers had been seen as unwanted and unneeded as it was thought they only
completed additional, superfluous work (Ints: 01; 02; 03; 05). It was then suggested
that the actual role of the ultrasonic operator (i.e. looking for problems for others to
solve) within the industry unintentionally gave them a negative and low status.
Though this is exactly their safety-critical role, other workers may not perceive it in
this way.
There has however been a change: since the Hatfield disaster ultrasonic testing is
increasingly seen as a important requirement in rail maintenance by industry workers
(Int: 05; Int: 25), and the historical impact on the level of esteem with which UT
technicians are held has been, and continues to be significant. The identity and
importance of the UT operator within the British railway industry and how it seems to
relate to specific rail crashes appear to be closely connected. This point ties in closely
with a thought of Gabrielle Hecht (1996). She suggested that areas of social research
should analyse how risk interpretation and social activity with "stable" (indeed UT
was described as a technical activity that remains "the same" by Int: 33a)
technologies, say ultrasonic testing, are connected to and impacted on by on-going
social, political and cultural matters.
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The unfavourable status that was historically attached to ultrasonic testing seems to be
abating. Its perceived importance has increased in recent years, especially since the
Hatfield crash. The high skills of the operator that are required for effective testing are
being increasingly acknowledged. The author of this thesis has again been concerned
with analysing the constitution of these skills; how these skills are channelled; and
how relevant skills are passed on to others new to the technology on both the British
network and SBB network.
10.6.3 Getting to know things - some differences in formal training
Time after time it was explained to me, and often demonstrated quite explicitly, that
in Britain formal training mechanisms (i.e., attending a two-week class for basic
training at the Derby test centre) for ultrasonic testing only went so far: the course did
not equip the new operator with all required competencies. Though the candidate
learnt the basics and passed a test to gain a certificate, his97 learning continued on site
and in real situations. This is because knowing everything after the two week course
and having the ability to complete all the checks and tests for defects is highly
unlikely (Fw: 10). A similar outlook in Switzerland exists among SBB workers.
The SBB UT teams complete a one-week course as opposed to a two-week course
and, what is more, the teams do not leave "their" section of the network for training -
a representative of the training company visits them. This is different from the British
where all prospective UT operators have to travel to Derby. Quite similarly though,
SBB and British workers are examined on rail pieces with known flaws in them.
Nevertheless, a clear difference is found in ideas concerning operator re-certification.
Every two years the British worker must be re-tested on his learnt skills and
competence prior to the expiry date of his current certificate. This is different to
SBB's re-test plans. UT workers, a senior member of SBB's UT community told me,
971 only met male ultrasonic operators.
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were retested "about every four years" (Int; 33a), and as another pointed out, this is
because "experience is more important than training" (Int: 33).
Gaining experience, or "getting to know things" (Fw :16) is a valuable part of the
process in becoming a competent operator in Britain and Switzerland. My findings
point out that experience underpins proficient UT: the operator often makes decisions
on a rail's internal quality based on sound judgement and tacit interpretations that are
typically informed by tacit social learning (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) in the UT
group which is thus, in turn, referred to as "experience" (Fw: 11; Fw: 12; Fw: 16; Int:
33; Int: 05; Int: 25; Fw: 31). Having the competence (and confidence) to make risk
assessments based on immeasurable or implicit knowledge about variable outputs
(though internal rail flaws can be similar and can be broken down into types such as
"taches ovales" or "piping" - the signatures on the displays for each type of fault are
not presented in consistent patterns that are immediately identifiable as a distinct
"type") requires training and collaborative group-learning over a considerable period
of time. Such training encompasses several aspects, one for example, is how the
operator will develop an ability to see where flaws are on the digital units, and he will
also develop an ability to imagine where the flaws are inside the rail.
Finally, and most importantly, the training strategy involves the new operator
becoming part of a group of experienced operators to learn role-specific knowledge
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966). In this way the new recruit becomes exposed to the
taken-for-granted (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), embedded way of doings things: we
were shown how he is shown what traditions, cultures (MacKenzie, 1990), beliefs,
and expectations guide work (Pool, 1997). Segments of Fw: 11 and 16 were
particularly illustrative98. Some interconnected issues arise here. It appears that "it is
98 For instance: "So these things you learn through experience and by asking the others guys with
experience and the knowledge. The first time I saw something like that I thought crikey, got a fault
here, but you find out it's otherwise, you rely on people with knowledge. Sometimes, the way they've
battered the bolt - it can cause a slight chip and you can get a reading of that - but you get to know
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through participating in the community that individuals learn the logic of the system
and their own role" (Hutchins, cited in Sanne, 1999). Others (Douglas, 1982; Douglas
&Wildavsky, 1982; Nelkin, 1985; Cutter, 1993) would suggest that such
organisational mechanisms and interaction would generate community-dependent
views and perceptions on risk. Whilst others (Goffman, 1959; Berger & Luckmann,
1966; Heath & Luff, 1992; Barnes, 2000; and Sanne, 1999) would add that this
organisational system is likely to see members develop a shared orientation about the
task at hand - this point does indeed seem to be true: "They look out for each other,
that's good. It's important to have that. They discuss the problem, and they agree on
the final action" (Int: 05).
An SBB worker also spoke about this subject in similar tones. It was suggested that
the structure of the group was intrinsically important for the work at hand - indeed, it
is thought that changes in the group's personnel could have unintended and unwanted
consequences: "They [the teams] are very good at their job, if you change things
rapidly it could be a catastrophe, it takes a lot of time to make a little change" (Int:
33a). This comment suggests that at SBB there is a firm understanding that accidents
can be caused by deficiencies in the organisational structure, and that industrial
accidents are not always because of sharp-end human failures (Reason, 1997).
By being trained in this organisational set-up, he (the newcomer), will also note that
these matters of worker collaboration act as a guide and become the basis for future
work (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985). In Kuhnian and Mertonian terms, the
ultrasonic operator becomes an agent who will help to ensure a technological
paradigm is fulfilled and continue as a future frame of reference for problem solving.
these things. Even though you do the course at Derby and they assess you and you pass your test you
still learn on the track" (Fw: 11). And: "When you're at the training centre they do point out things like
this to you, but still you have to see on site and be with others who 'know'; by watching these guys
who already know these things, that's how you learn. These little things are important" (Fw: 16).
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10.6.4 The ultrasonic testing socio-technical system
Because of the way new UT operators are taught their trade and the way that
experienced UT operators execute their work, the relationship between the social and
technical is deeply interconnected making the boundary between the social and the
technical unclear. For that reason, it is folly to say that ultrasonic inspection requires
only step-by-step operation by compliant human users. On the contrary, my findings
suggest that it is a unique form of interaction between the human operator and the
machine that makes competent ultrasonic inspection possible. On this matter,
Oudshoorn and Pinch (2003: 3) explain: "users and technology are too often viewed
as separate objects". Callon (1999: 183) had already pointed to the use of the actor-
network theory, which was "developed to analyse situations in which it is difficult to
separate humans and non-humans, and in which actors have variable forms and
competencies". With reference to my findings on ultrasonic testing methods we can
see how the human and the machine interact: recall the comments about the role of
tactile skills with "touch" and "feel" when testing: "For manual work contact coupling
is preferred, because it gives the operator a better "feel" of what they are doing"
(Sziland, 1982: 43-44).
My findings have shown how this important skill is again learnt through the medium
of group work, but it was another technician that gave us a lucid description of the
importance of "feel" when he said:
"Sound deflects at different velocities off'different surfaces, it's like throwing a ball of a
wall, depending on how you throw it, it will bounce of at different angles and speeds, so the
medium matters, pressing the probe on the rail with different force can change things" (Fw:
10)
10.6.5 The role of feeling and imagination
Quite clearly the role of the operator's body is important, and here some will note the
comparisons between the task of the visual inspector and the UT operator.
Understanding what to feelfor at one's finger tips is all important when running
fingers along a rail searching for surface irregularities (i.e., the fish scales effect), and
the same level of importance can be ascribed to ultrasonic testing when the operator is
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sliding the probe over the rail and is interacting with the machinery (cathode ray tube
or computer digital display). In other words, competent UT requires a key link
between operator and machine. The link, it seems, requires of the operator to conjure
up an image of the ultrasonic sound wave travelling through the rail whilst running
the probe over the surface: recall this section from Fw: 10.
It is at this moment that I guess UT operators need to use their imagination if they are to
understand what is going on inside the rail with the pulsing ultrasonic beam. I asked about
the role of imagination, and transferring what it is the operator imagines on to the visual
display screen...
B: That's it!... It's simple trigonometry really... Training is done at Derby for a fortnight, for
the basics, it wasn't until the second week that I suddenly got it... I understood what was
happening with the probe and where the beam was inside the rail. Until then it was all over
the top of my head.
In other words, it was when he "got it" that a unique, tacit link was made between the
human and the machine; he had acquired the necessary tacit knowledge for UT
operation. An example of what can occur if that key link fails to bond was illustrated
on the night I was given the chance to ultrasonically test a rail: I remember how my
untutored and clumsy "touch" with the probe made the reading of the signals on the
unit unintelligible. Furthermore, imagining where the ultrasound wave is in the rail
and its direction of travel is imperative: visual aids are hence required to help workers
understand. At the Derby test centre I was shown how a see-through rail head had
been manufactured and a red beam was fired into it. This model replicated how an
ultrasound wave travels. Furthermore, when I was on site in Britain and Switzerland,
workers at first introduced me to ultrasonic testing by using visual aids to "describe"
how ultrasonic testing works. For instance, they scored on the rail with chalk or
placed a pen against the web to show me the angle of the sound wave. Securing this
image in the mind's eye (Ferguson, 1993) and by thinking "visually" (Vincenti, 1990)
and transferring the image to real life situations, I gathered, is what an UT operator
must do whilst caressing the rail's surface with the probe.
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Linking the movement of the probe and its position upon the rail, whilst accounting
for the sound wave's likely proximity to internal features like boltholes, directs the
image of the sound wave's journey that is being played back in the mind of the
operator. Knowing how hidden, internal material can disrupt the wave's journey to the
rail bottom and back to the probe has to be visualised in the operator's mind.
Connected to this area of work of the UT operator is the thought of Vincenti (1990)
who argued that visual aids [such as computer generated images like the signature on
UT digital display] are only effective tools if the operator knows how to interpret
them. Accordingly, as Canfield (1981), and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), would
suggest, UT is more about knowing how rather than knowing what. This thought was
drawn out most obviously when testing at rail ends where bolt-holes are found (see
chapter seven, section 7.3.1 page 205) and at S&Cs where bolts can be hidden - most
notably on the Swiss system (see chapter nine, section 9.7.5 page 289).
The sociology of knowledge theory suggests that society (in this case an ultrasonic
testing community) and knowledge are not detached. Recall the words of Collins
(1982), with my [inclusions]: "The process of learning [how to ultrasonically test a
rail, which we now know involves extensive group work and colleague collaboration],
or building up tacit understandings [i.e., "feeling" the rail with the probe and how this
constructs images in the mind's eye], is not like learning items of information, but is
more like learning a language or a skill" - which, Faulkner et al (1997) and
MacKenzie (1996b) reminds us, is only transferred by social and personal interaction.
Thus, as Law (1991: 20) explains: "knowledge and technical systems cannot be
understood unless the simultaneous reconstruction of the social context of which they
form is also studied". Accordingly, this thesis has been about "the socio-technical
system". Schmid et al (1994) tell us that for the workplace to operate effectively
during periods of alteration, relevant changes must be made throughout the system:
optimisation of the social and technical systems must be done in conjunction.
My research uncovered some difficulties when changes are implemented and
alterations are made to one side of the socio-technical system - namely the
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introduction of the PCN (Personal Certificate of Non-destructive testing). With the
PCN, general UT theory for new UT candidates has become more intense: UT
operators who have been in the industry for years have become very competent and
highly skilled operators, despite their lack of theoretical knowledge. Their basic
training, combined with their years of experience and knowledge development, has
produced in them a sound understanding of the UT process as associated with rail
testing. However, for them to remain in the industry, they have to be re-tested to PCN
standards every two years, which involves learning new material which some, it is
feared, may struggle with (Int: 05; Int: 25). The thought is that, with the introduction
of new technology, new training structures on technological matters should take
account of the working culture that exists already. The PCN type qualification should
not be "added on" and imposed on people. When alterations are made to training
strategies there must be reference to the current experience base and current modes of
decision-making that are encapsulated within the socio-technical system.
10.7 TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND MANUAL RAIL-GRINDING
10.7.1 SBB and Network Rail: technical similarities and cultural differences
SBB and Network Rail (as Railtrack did) both utilise a train-based grinding system,
but unlike Network Rail, SBB does not employ teams ofmanual rail-grinders.
Train-based rail grinding is the only regularly used method of grinding on the SBB
network, and the timing of this is of the utmost important. Initial grinding must be
done within the first two weeks of a new rail being laid, thereafter the timing for
further grinding has to be closely examined: any grinding that is done is only done if
required (Int; 34; Fw: 32; Fw: 36). The use of manually operated rail-grinding
machinery on the SBB system is limited to the use of the so-called de-lipper when any
irregularities on the rail's gauge face (i.e., lipping) are preventing precise
measurement of the gauge (Fw: 32). Regular manually operated grinding of the rail is
simply not done anywhere - it is too expensive when set against any short-term or
long-term benefits (Fw: 31; Fw: 32; Fw: 34; Fw: 36; Int: 34). The approach to rail-
grinding on the Network Rail system is almost completely different apart from the
practice of grinding new rail. Thereafter, train-based grinding should be planned on a
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cyclic basis (PWSI4, Network Rail, 2003). A further difference, and the most marked
difference, is the role of manual rail-grinders.
After the Hatfield disaster it was decided that a full manual rail-grinding programme
of S&Cs should be implemented and, the idea was fully supported by groups such as
the Wheel / Rail Interface Systems Authority. Regular manual rail-grinding at S&Cs
is therefore a new activity: the only form of grinding that was regularly done prior to
this on the network was completed by a train-based system (The Speno), however, the
use of this decreased throughout the 1980s as its perceived worth dwindled and it was
felt to reduce the useful life of rail. Manual rail-grinding was also done, but was
typically by welders during the normal course of their work - after welding, the
welder typically has to grind off the excess (Int: 28; Int: 09). In the main, however,
regular manual rail-grinding of S&Cs by specific teams trained for that task alone is a
new addition to rail maintenance in Britain. How industry leaders in Britain framed
the problem of RCF has had an important bearing on what is now being done about it
(Nelkin, 1985). The principal method to control RCF, they determined after
consulting "world experts" (PWSI4, Network Rail, 2003)) is through regular grinding.
In Switzerland, despite experiencing the same problems with the wheel / rail interface,
the way SBB leaders framed the problem suggested that they should rely extensively
on their own experience rather than scientific findings (Pfarrer, 2002: Conference
paper).
Pool (1997: 5-6) suggested, after his research found differences in how different
countries managed nuclear power, that the explanations for such "different outcomes
cannot be found in engineering, since the countries are essentially using the same
technology"; this comment fits with the thrust of my thesis. The differences in rail-
grinding between Switzerland and Britain, Pool (1997) and Douglas and Wildavsky
(1982) would state, are due to culturally based world views. Outcomes from risk
assessment are always going to "rest upon the relevant community" (MacKenzie,
1996b). What is more, these issues also help us reject the traditional model of the
science and technology relationship (Barnes & Edge, 1982). The model suggests that
accepted, systematically constructed, scientific knowledge underpins engineering
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knowledge. If this is the case, rail-grinding would be administered (or perhaps not if
scientific findings proved that it was futile) after "working out and realizing the
implications of scientific theories" (Barnes & Edge, 1982: 148). Instead, we can
surmise that the differences between the two railway industries' approach to rail-
grinding is because railway engineers "possess their own distinct cultural resources
which provide the principal basis for the innovative activity" (Barnes & Edge, 1982:
150). But what is the distinctive difference? A tentative argument may be that the
socio-historical cultural influences at SBB suggest that work should be based more on
experience rather than science. In Britain, there has been a move towards a
science/procedure based approach. Perhaps, after privatisation inadvertently discarded
valuable knowledge that was locked up in the heads of workers, it was thought that
the ensuing knowledge gap could be bridged by scientific formulae and application.
In chapter four (section 4.2.3 page 119) for instance, I noted how the use of computer
packages to assess and monitor rail conditions is increasingly sought for in Britain,
whilst SBB rely on an experience-based model illustrated in chapter nine (section
9.4.1 page 266).
10.7.2 The activity and aims ofmanual rail-grinding in Britain
There is however an irony. If, in Britain, the decision to implement manual grinding
of rail at S&Cs was informed more by explicit scientific principles, it is ironic that the
actual process of manual rail-grinding relies extensively (arguably entirely) on subtle
key work processes that are implicit and tacit in structure. In this section sociological
concepts discussed in earlier sections are employed once more to shed light on
implicit mechanisms that enable a group of workers to successfully grind a rail.
Chapter eight showed how hand grinders have six aims to fulfil whilst grinding a rail.
They have to: remove any lipping that may be covering cracks; then they have to
"MPI" it (magnetic particle inspection) to see if there is any cracking that may be
missed by the naked eye. If so they then have to remove the cracking; and they have
to regain the profile of the rail to accepted standards; and they have to blend in the
ground rail to the surrounding rail that was untouched by the grinder (so as not to
cause a sudden dip for passing vehicles) and, finally they must re-MPI it. Removing
340
cracking, re-gaining the profile, and blending in the rail are grinding processes that
have to be done simultaneously. Completing the whole process for just a few metres
of one rail typically takes a whole shift (approx. six hours). The achievement of these
six aims must be completed within precise parameters: the teams cannot remove more
than five millimetres of rail with the coarse grinding stones, and the rail must be in a
suitable operating condition at the end of the shift so as to prevent line closures and
delays. These conditions can be impacted on by further matters. There can be
problems with the technicalities of a possession (opening a switch blade can cause
problems, and letting traffic pass such as the grinding train and track patrollers in the
Land Rover can cause delays).
In total, these are the environmental conditions of a possession in the railway industry
when grinders have to complete delicate work that is controlled by tacit skills and
mechanisms.
10.7.3 Needing someone who "knows"
Given the novelty of grinding S&Cs as an ongoing maintenance procedure, training
workers specifically for the task is an obvious pre-requisite but, firstly, the actual
training structures had to be put in place. This posed some difficulties as there was
virtually no experience to fall back on, one instructor for instance put it this way: "But
because there was no real experience in grinding S&Cs like this, I was learning about
it at the same time" (Int: 28). To assist the situation, the IMC I worked with turned to
a specific group of people who were likely to grasp the technicalities of grinding a rail
quicker than others: namely welders. These men: "have a history in grinding - they
need to know how to make shapes ... they need to have had a history of using hand
grinding machines". (Int: 28).
There is a clear connection between my findings and Harry Collins' findings (1982)
regarding the construction of a TEA laser. Collins found that successful construction
depended on someone in the laboratory who knew where to look for problems. This
person was both a carrier and a source of knowledge and, by having him or her in the
laboratory they were thus able to transmit "know-how" to others less practised. The
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link with manual rail-grinding is clear: relying on, and trying to teach, someone
without a background in metals is likely to prove unsuccessful (Int: 09), as "you can't
take Joe Bloggs off the street whose got experience in electrics and ask him to grind a
rail, he maybe doesn't understand metal... or the process, so he'll never get a good
result" (Int: 29). If we paraphrase Faulkner's (1997) take on Collins's work and
manipulate it for this thesis we get closer to the point: A team of manual rail-grinders
need to know someone who had used a grinding machine before, they needed this
person's tacit knowledge. They needed at least one member of the team to know
where to look for problems and who was likely to say, without formulating explicitly,
have you looked at component x? By asking such questions and by simply working in
their normal way, the source is likely to pass on tacit skills which often involve the
transference of judgemental skills (MacKenzie & Spinardi, 1996).
During rail-grinding, team members often pause for thought to judge what is required:
they have to assess what grinding strategy will work and which will not. Indeed, the
whole point of the rail-grinding team's work is to solve a problem: grinding out
cracking or re-profiling a deformed rail. Whatever it is, the team of grinders at the
start of a shift know that they have to tackle a problem and what is more: "There're
different problems and they all have different methods for grinding the problem" (Fw:
15).
10.7.4 Rail-grinding paradigms
The teams continually assess varying problems. However, it tends to be the case that
the teams fall back on known, tried and tested grinding strategies. Learnt grinding
processes are typically exploited and often extended by the individuals and the teams.
For instance, the teams have learnt that you cannot just attack high spots on the rail:
"you can't just go at it, have to take it easy, it's a gradual process, if you went at the
rail you would just flatten it, it's got to be done gently" (Int: 28). And what is more:
"There're different methods for grinding each rail problem ... it all depends on the
type of problem... the initial problem tells you how to grind" (Fw: 15). Elsewhere it
was pointed out to me how the actual location of the rail itself can shape how grinders
approach the problem - if the S&C is located on a curve, the cant deficiency comes
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into play and grinders may opt to digress ever so slightly from the standard template
profile. In this circumstance the grinders learnt to work from the running band that is
created by passing vehicles instead of the running band of the template - the
difference between the two is minute, yet makes a significant difference in terms of
future work loads. In these instances there are clear examples of workers learning the
limitations and advances that can be made with the technology at hand.
The connections with Kuhn's thoughts on paradigm as a "concrete problem solution"
(Kuhn, 1970) are obvious. Workers, for instance, have achieved numerous technical
objectives that required strategies not learnt during formal training. For example,
depending on problems they may not grind high spots immediately, but might work in
from one of the faces (Fw: 15), or they may grind the rail in one sweep, or metre by
metre (Fw: 13), or they may grind from the running band instead of the template (Fw:
18), and they may lift the machine manually to blend in the rail instead of using the
machine's functions (Fw: 14). Each of these ideas has been conceived over time and
the skills to accomplish them have been honed during the same period. Of
importance, however, is that each practice should be viewed as an achievement upon
which future work is modelled (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985). In Kuhnian terms, the
workers having learnt the basics of grinding - which involved getting to know the
machine (Fw: 18) and finding out how to make shapes (Int: 28) - and once
understood they have attempted to extend and exploit grinding methods in a variety of
ways (Kuhn cited in Crombie, 1961).
10,7.5 The culture of manual rail-grinding
The actual mechanisms that underpin these work practices can be illustrated with
reference to the work of Merton (1957) and MacKenzie (1996a). Firstly, Merton told
us that "definitions of a situation become an integral part of the situation and thus
affect subsequent development" - for this thesis it is how grinding operators define
individual rail problems that dictates how each should be ground. This is clearly what
occurs when a team approach their work and define (or "scope", Int: 28) how grinding
should be executed prior to any actual grinding. What is also the case is that this
decision-making process informs future work for other nights. Improvements in
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manual rail-grinding techniques come about by the extrapolation of identified
limitations and possibilities into the future and, importantly, its continuance becomes
embedded (MacKenzie, 1996a) in the team. It becomes an integral part of what may
be called a taken-for-granted workplace culture (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). At this
point arguments can be put forward for the idea of co-constructionism (Murdoch,
2001). Indeed, it seems that grinding strategies were not simply slotted into a pre¬
existing cultural context - instead it seems that grinding knowledge and culture were
being developed simultaneously. When talking about manual rail-grinding, we should
refer to, in Law's (1991: 8) words, "the social and the technical all in one breath".
Culture, we know, is formed by the meshing together of customs, norms, conventions,
language, etc. Each of these components must be learnt by group members if the
group is to continue performing its function (Giddens, 1993, Abercrombie, 1984,
Cohen, 1994, Cohen & Taylor, 1992). In terms of manual rail-grinding, we also find
that, collaborative (often tacit) social processes of learning (Berger & Luckmann,
1966) about the technology shape the group's work mechanisms and enable the
simultaneous construction of a corresponding culture.
The argument for this stems from the fact that manual rail-grinding is a new activity,
and that problems in teaching the profession were caused because there was no "real
experience" (Int: 28) to refer to. There was (in part) a semblance of a pre-existing
grinding community which was made up of welders, but there was no dedicated S&C
manual rail-grinding community - it had to be constructed. Consequently as the
grinders learnt the trade they also developed a community and individual teams within
developed their own culture ("Different teams, different guys have their own way of
doing [manual rail-grinding]" Fw: 13) but, as learning is ongoing, the cultural make¬
up of the teams is constantly extending to fit the requirements of the trade. This is
most notable in terms of communication. Communication typically involves precise
linguistic terms (Mannheim, 1982). Yet, the environment of the railway during a
manual rail-grinding possession makes verbal communication impossible at most
times - generators are noisy, so too are grinders, and workers also wear ear-protectors
and masks over their mouths. Talking to each other lucidly is simply not possible.
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Communication, instead, had to adapt to the surroundings, and gesticulation
transpired as the most convenient mode to "converse". Specific hand signals between
team members let each other know about the progress of work at that point in time.
It should be pointed out, however, that even if manual rail-grinders worked in quiet
conditions and were able to talk to each other about their task - gesticulation would
still be required. Grinding a rail requires what Vincenti (1990) and Ferguson (1993)
would refer to respectively as "visual thinking" in the "mind's eye". Though there are
precise aids such as the template with numerical divisions, all grinding relies on
judgment, experience, interpretation, feel or, in short, tacit knowledge. Knowing how
many passes of the grinding stone are required to remove a high spot; knowing when
and "how" to lift the machine for blending in rail; knowing how grinding at one point
on the rail will affect the rail in the future and in terms of the whole process; and
knowing how a rail will "look" once the grinding machine has passed, are all essential
parts of the activity, but explaining and describing each instance in a coherent
instructive, succinct manner with precision cannot be done. Oral communication is
used often when group members are together, say when checking the template's fit on
the rail, but the terminology is imprecise and vague. Because of the spoken word's
failings, hand signals are used. Again, by resorting to tactile skills, the men caress the
rail this way and that, and in doing so they mimic the direction that the machine
should take when next operated. Such gesticulation which requires a shared
understanding of tactile knowledge, make up for the inadequacies of speaking.
To understand the meaning of communicative features such as these, however, group
members must have a shared understanding which involves a common orientation to
the task (Sanne, 1999; Goffman, 1959). As one grinder told us: "You need skilled
men for this job, and you need men who care" (Fw: 18). To get to such a level of
shared understanding, Berger and Luckmann (1966) suggest, involves secondary
socialisation - that process whereby individuals learn role-specific knowledge.
Similarly, Sanne's (1999) take on Heath and Luff's (1992) concept of distributed
cognition, can be used to back up some ofmy findings. For instance, we know that
grinding a rail is a lengthy and tiresome process that requires team members to take
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turns. However, each worker, when taking up his post at the wheel of the grinding
machine, must know "where" the last operator got to in terms of the whole project.
Each operator must "know" what one must do now and, given that it is not
immediately perceptible by simply looking at the rail, operators must have a shared
understanding of the situation.
Having a shared idea of where the rail must be ground and in what order parts of the
rail profile should be attacked with the machine is paramount - each individual has to
visualise and coordinate the process for themselves but it must be in tandem with his
team mates. Each operator's visualisation adds to an appreciation of the overall
situation, and assists with the complete work situation (Sanne, 1999). Ultimately, a
working division of labour in the team of manual rail-grinders emerges where each
worker knows what to do and how in a complex socio-technical system (Callon,
1999). We can see how important shared tacit understanding is for members of the
teams if we imagine the work units consisting of individuals each working in his own
way. If the team members looked at the rail on their own, and assessed where it
should be ground on their own, and adopted their own procedures and utilised them in
a different order, the outcome would very likely be very different. If there was simply
no communication between the team members and no sharing of aims, then grinding a
rail successfully would, in all likelihood, be impossible.
10.8 CONCLUSION
This sociologically-based thesis has been about the technological knowledge required
for three key activities that form part of track maintenance in Britain. In sections of
the thesis, RCF has been referred to and utilised as a heuristic device to guide analysis
of visual inspection, ultrasonic inspection, and manual rail-grinding. From this
departure point, several issues emerged that became of empirical interest.
History and organisational change, it soon became clear, were going to be important
issues. Whilst researching this area of the thesis I realised that real, physical, on-site,
activities that characterised railway maintenance during BR's reign were underpinned
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by experience. How workers knew what was to be done was often driven by
experience. Discussions on gaining experience logically referred to how work was
organised - the make-up of the regional baronies, it transpired, showed how
knowledge was transmitted from experienced worker to new recruit. By fast-
forwarding to the current day, we gained a strong idea as to what exactly that
knowledge consisted in by analysing the many skills involved in visual and ultrasonic
inspection. Two interconnected issues were of importance here. Effective
management of the permanent way requires local knowledge for local problem spots
and such local knowledge, underpinned as it is by experience, is often tacit in nature.
As has been documented by several sociological studies however, organisations that
have to control workers involved in technological activities can struggle because of
the very nature of the work. The contradiction is simple: how can organisation-leaders
tell decentralised workers how to work (i.e. by transmitting instructions from a
central-base) when often the work in question cannot be verbally communicated even
at face-to-face level? If efforts to overcome this contradiction involve the issuing of
even more documents, confusion among a workforce is likely to be exacerbated. We
saw this clearly happening in the British railway industry, most notably after
privatisation.
In terms of RCF alone, we saw how the workforce was confused by instructions in the
days and months following the Hatfield disaster. During this period, the British
industry in a sense performed like Charles Perrow's pushmepullyou analogy. Perrow
classifies railway industries as tightly coupled and exhibiting linear interaction (1984:
332). When the tightly coupled parts of the system fail, they will fail in
comprehensible and expected ways. We need to dwell on a seemingly taken-for-
granted, yet hugely important point: such failures will be comprehensible to whoml
Prior to privatisation and prior to those experienced workers leaving the industry
(with the knowledge locked up in their heads), failures in some parts of the permanent
way were likely to have been comprehensible: a decentralised workforce able to
address the problems was in place. But when large parts of this workforce left the
industry there was a knowledge gap and a subsequent lack of experience. This
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logically meant that what were previously well-known problems and failures were
now not comprehensible to many of those who came to the industry anew. In a sense,
the system, in Perrow's terms, shifted from one that was linear to complex - problems
and failures became incomprehensible. The nature of the technology in itself had not
changed: the technology was not more complex as a result of organisational change.
On the contrary, it was the complicated organisational change that involved the intake
of inexperienced workers who did not know the technology that made it
incomprehensible during times of technical failure. Then, after shifting to this state of
affairs, the industry exacerbated the problem by issuing thousands of maintenance
documents as it sought more control from a central base than had been the case when
BR was in control.
Ultimately, the post-privatised set-up in Britain saw the implementation of a
pushmepullyou model. The nature of the permanent way requires decentralised
decision-making, but more control from a central base was striven for - inherent
conflicts, Perrow tells us, would naturally occur, and what is more, discarding a
knowledgeable workforce, we can add, only aggravated the problem. The SBB model
of 23 small regions, on the other hand, points out how centralised and decentralised
authorities can be slotted together without undue conflict if the role of experience is
fully acknowledged and accommodated.
In my thesis I have shown how tacit, experiential, tactile knowledge was required for
rail maintenance before and after privatisation - my ethnographic findings have
pointed out that the critical importance of tacit knowledge remains today, in the
privatised set-up. Effective rail maintenance can only be completed by experienced
workers who often rely on tacit knowledge. Despite the disruption to the workforce in
the wake of privatisation, I found that the groups of workers I spent time with (such as
ultrasonic operators, but especially manual rail-grinders) are, in their own way,
building up once more a personal asset register that they are knowledgeable about.
Individual visual inspection teams are building up a catalogue of rail problems and the
likelihood of their location and severity. The teams, I found, are continuing to learn
about the permanent way and its associated, localised peculiarities. Manual rail-
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grinders are in a constant learning curve also and, what they have learnt is often tacit
in nature and only comprehensible to and applicable by the group that constructed the
knowledge. Quite similarly, ultrasonic operators, despite formal training learn from
the group. New recruits typically learn and pick-up things from experienced workers.
Essentially, during my research, I note how the development of know-how is a project
for the individual and the group - group members often learn together and use what
they learn as a guiding mechanism for future work - and what they know is often tacit
in nature. Effective rail maintenance relies on socially constructed, tacit knowledge.
10.9 RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of my findings, some recommendations for improving aspects of railway track
maintenance in Britain can be put forward.
The regional baronies, that characterised the organisational set-up of BR's
maintenance systems, appear to have used an approach to railway track maintenance
that was similar to today's organisation of the activity at SBB with its small
maintenance teams within each of the 23 districts of their network. I believe that
lessons can be learnt from the current maintenance systems that are in place at SBB
and, I would suggest that the maintenance systems that underpinned BR's stewardship
of its assets can be improved upon.
Despite alleged differences in the quality and art of work that existed between the
baronies, devolution of maintenance responsibility to small teams under local and
regional chiefs who have the authority and, probably most importantly the trust of
centrally-based senior managers to make decisions offers the possibility of creating an
effective working culture of safety. Such decisions would include cutting or
increasing inspection levels as and when required. An increase in trust could also cut
levels of bureaucracy and this would result in a significant decrease in the amount of
paperwork required to be completed by track workers. A decrease in the amount of
often unnecessary paperwork would not only increase the time for track workers to
"work" on the track, but, in all likelihood, workers would simply enjoy their work
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more: as I found in Switzerland, workers enjoying their work was seen as highly
important and effective. Indeed, in Britain, paperwork appears to be the bane of many
supervisors' working life. Following instructions to the letter at times was confusing;
completing forms was difficult, instructions were often unclear or impractical during
maintenance activities (most notably for visual inspection and crack categorisation)
and, on occasions, workers noted duplication.
Cutting paperwork, which includes both the issuing of instructions and forms to be
completed, requires a substantial level of trust and belief in the competencies of
geographically dispersed workers. SBB therefore created a central training scheme
where workers were immersed in an environment that characterised the railway
industry as a whole. Apprentice welders, for instance, trained with and consequently
developed some knowledge of the work of those who operate the traffic, of electrical
engineers, and of those who operate the signalling. Though appearing to be
unnecessary and time-consuming this was, on the contrary, hugely important. This
set-up gives each worker a deep sense of what is required to allow a railway system to
operate efficiently and safely. Ensuring that "their" part of the systems is working in
line with the standards becomes imperative and a sense of pride is generated which,
in-turn, helps to sustain the working culture of safety.
Network Rail, I would suggest, should look at developing a training scheme for
newcomers to the industry that will immerse apprentices into a training environment
that simulates and accounts for all aspects of the railway industry - hand grinders, for
instance should not be trained solely on grinding as it was the case during my research
period. Crudely speaking, grinding personnel should be introduced to traffic
operation, signalling, etc and the problems that can arise due to knock-on effects from
track maintenance problems. In this way new recruits can develop an understanding
of the "whole" that is the railway system: they will see their work as an integral part
of a deeply interconnected system. The current system in Britain does not account for
this, and this arguably goes some way to explaining the negative feelings that exist
between train operators and track maintainers. The two parties understand on a
somewhat superficial level what each other has to do, but the two do not discuss (at
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all) intrinsic needs and requirements, as and when contingencies arise. At SBB the
position of the Integrated Maintenance Manager was fashioned to account for this
need. A clear cut communication channel exists between train operators and track
maintainers - the two are able to discuss their needs: and an "us and them" situation
(which characterises the relationship between the two in Britain) has not emerged, but
rather a considerable level of respect and understanding. Trainers at Network Rail's
new apprentice training centre in Portsmouth should heed this advice.
It should be underscored, however, that implementing such changes would involve a
long term project. Working cultures cannot be changed over night. Current workplace
cultures must be taken into account: i.e., recall how the PCN certificate created
problems for older UT operators. However, implementing a training scheme of the
type suggested above could put in motion a socialisation process which, over time,
could become self-fulfilling and self-sustaining. Again, crudely speaking, as workers
gain a sense of how "their" work matters and how it affects the "whole" of the
industry - a sense of pride, commitment, and ownership could come to underpin and
guide working activities. The positive traits of the former BR maintenance structure
may thus be recreated without the risk of re-introducing some of the negative aspects
of the BR culture. Furthermore, as knowledge develops, in the sense that we have
seen how hand grinders have developed knowledge and how UT operators develop
knowledge, there will be less of a need for an instruction-based method of
communication between geographically dispersed workers and centrally based senior
managers.
By implementing structural change to encourage such developments, Britain's railway
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